Summary of Circular No. 04/2025 Source: High Court of Andhra Pradesh (ROC.No.208/SO/2025) Date: April 28, 2025 Core Mandate The High Court of Andhra Pradesh has directed all Judicial Officers in the state to decide and dispose of pending Execution Petitions (EPs) within a strict timeframe of six months from their date of filing. Extensions are permitted only under exceptional circumstances and must be justified by recording reasons in writing.

advocatemmmohan

Summary of Circular No. 04/2025

Source: High Court of Andhra Pradesh (ROC.No.208/SO/2025)

Date: April 28, 2025

Core Mandate

The High Court of Andhra Pradesh has directed all Judicial Officers in the state to decide and dispose of pending Execution Petitions (EPs) within a strict timeframe of six months from their date of filing. Extensions are permitted only under exceptional circumstances and must be justified by recording reasons in writing.

Background and Legal Precedent

The directive comes in response to significant backlog issues and directly complies with the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India's judgment dated March 6, 2025 (Civil Appeal Nos. 3640-3642 of 2025). The Supreme Court highlighted nationwide delays in execution proceedings and reiterated the mandatory guidelines established in Rahul S. Shah v. Jinendra Kumar Gandhi and Bhoj Raj Garg v. Goyal Education and Welfare Society & Ors.

Key Operational Guidelines

The circular highlights specific procedural directives from the Supreme Court to streamline executions:

Property & Possession Suits: Courts must actively examine parties regarding third-party interests (under Order 10) and compel document disclosures (under Order 11, Rule 14). Ambiguity in decrees must be eliminated before issuance.

Money Suits: Courts should immediately resort to oral applications for executing money decrees (Order 21, Rule 11) and can demand a disclosure of assets/security from the defendant before settling issues.

Evidentiary Limits: Execution courts must not mechanically issue notices to third-party claimants. Gathering new evidence should be limited to rare and exceptional cases; instead, courts should utilize Commissioners or electronic materials (video/photos).

Frivolous Objections: Frivolous or mala fide resistance must be penalized using compensatory costs (Section 35-A) and appropriate CPC provisions.

Enforcement Assistance: Courts may direct local police stations to provide necessary assistance to officials executing a decree.

Administrative Accountability

Prioritization: Unit Heads must ensure their judicial officers streamline processes and prioritize older, long-pending execution matters.

Consequences of Non-Compliance: The circular explicitly warns that any Presiding Officer who fails to comply with these directions will be held personally accountable to the High Court on the administrative side.

HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

ROC.No.208/SO/2025 Date: 28.04.2025

CIRCULAR NO. o4/2025

Sub: High Court of Andhra Pradesh - Judgment dated

06.03.2025 of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal

Nos. 3640-3642 of 2025 -Disposal of execution

petitions by the Executing Courts within six months -

Certain instructions - Issued -R eg.

Ref: Judgment dated 06.03.2025 of Hon'ble Supreme Court

in Civil Appeal Nos. 3640-3642 of 2025.

***

The attention of all the Unit Heads of District Judiciary in Andhra

Pradesh is invited to the Judgment dated 06.03.2025 in Civil Appeal Nos.

3640-3642 of 2025 of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, wherein the Hon'ble

Supreme Court observed long and inordinate delay across the country in

deciding the Execution Petitions by the Executing Courts and directed for

disposal of the same within six months.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said Judgment observed inter

alia as under:

11

73. It is worthwhile to revisit the observations in Rahul S.

Shah (supra) wherein this Court has provided guidelines

and directions for conduct of execution proceedings. The

relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced

below:

"42.

42.1.

42.2.

All courts dealing with suits and execution

proceedings shall mandatorily follow the below

mentioned directions:

In suits relating to delivery of possession, the court

must examine the parties to the suit under Order

10 in relation to third-party interest and further

exercise the power under Order 11 Rule 14 asking

parties to disclose and produce documents, upon

oath, which are in possession of the parties

including declaration pertaining to third-party

interest in such properties.

In appropriate cases, where the possession is not

in dispute and not a question of fact for

adjudication before the court, the court may

appoint Commissioner to assess the accurate

description and status of the property.

42.3. After examination of parties under Order 10 or

production of documents under Order 11 or receipt

of Commission report, the court must add all

necessary or proper parties to the suit, so as to

avoid multiplicity of proceedings and also make

such joinder of cause of action in the same suit.

42.4. Under Order 40 Rule 1 CPC, a Court Receiver can

be appointed to monitor the status of the property

in question as custodia legis for proper

adjudication of the matter.

42.5. The court must, before passing the decree,

pertaining to delivery of possession of a property

ensure that the decree is unambiguous so as to

not only contain clear description of the property

but also having regard to the status of the

property.

42.6. In a money suit, the court must invariably resort to

Order 21 Rule 11, ensuring immediate execution of

decree for payment of money on oral application.

42.7. In a suit for payment of money, before settlement

of issues, the defendant may be required to

disclose his assets on oath, to the extent that he is

being made liable in a suit. The court may further,

at any stage, in appropriate cases during the

pendency of suit, using powers under Section 151

CPC, demand security to ensure satisfaction of any

decree.

42.8.

42.9.

The court exercising jurisdiction under Section 47

or under Order 21 CPC, must not issue notice on

an application of third party claiming rights in a

mechanical manner. Further, the court should

refrain from entertaining any such application(s)

that has already been considered by the court

while adjudicating the suit or which raises any such

issue which otherwise could have been raised and

determined during adjudication of suit if due

diligence was exercised by the applicant.

The court should allow taking of evidence during

the execution proceedings only in exceptional and

rare cases where the question of fact could not be

decided by resorting to any other expeditious

method like appointment of Commissioner or

calling for electronic materials including

photographs or video with affidavits.

42.10 The court must in appropriate cases where it finds

the objection or resistance or claim to be frivolous

or mala fide, resort to sub-rule (2) of Rule 98 of

Order 21 as well as grant compensatory costs in

accordance with Section 35-А.

42.11 Under Section 60 CPC the term "... in name of the

judgment-debtor or by another person in trust for

him or on his behalf" should be read liberally to

incorporate any other person from whom he may

have the ability to derive share, profit or property.

74.

42.12 The executing court must dispose of the execution

proceedings within six months from the date of

filing, which may be extended only by recording

reasons in writing for such delay.

42.13 The executing court may on satisfaction of the fact

that it is not possible to execute the decree without

police assistance, direct the police station

concerned to provide police assistance to such

officials who are working towards execution of the

decree. Further, in case an offence against the

public servant while discharging his duties is

brought to the knowledge of the court, the same

must be dealt with stringently in accordance with

law.

42.14 The Judicial Academies must prepare manuals and

ensure continuous training through appropriate

mediums to the court personnel/staff executing the

warrants, carrying out attachment and sale and

any other official duties for executing orders issued

by the executing courts."

(Emphasis supplied)

The mandatory direction contained in Para 42.12 of

Rahul S. Shah (supra) requiring the execution

proceedings to be completed within six months from the

date of filing, has been reiterated by this Court in its

order in Bhoj Raj Garg v. Goyal Education and Welfare

Society & Ors., Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 19654 of

2022."

In view of significant pendency of Execution Petitions in Executing

Courts in Andhra Pradesh and in compliance with the directions issued by

the Hon'ble Supreme Court, all the Unit Heads of District Judiciary in

Andhra Pradesh are hereby directed to instruct all the Judicial Officers

dealing with the Execution Petitions in their respective units to ensure that

the execution petitions pending shall be decided and disposed of within a

period of six months without fail.

It is imperative that concerted efforts be made to streamline

processes, prioritize old and long pending matters, and adhere strictly to

the timelines prescribed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

It is made clear in terms of directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court

that in the event of failure to comply above directions, the concerned

Presiding Officer is responsible to the High court on administrative side.

yusBa Sathi

REGISTRAR GENERAL

To

1. All the Registrars in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.

2. All the Unit Heads in the State of Andhra Pradesh (with a request to circulate

the same to all the Judicial Officers in their respective units).

3. All the Presiding Officers of Labour Courts/Tribunals in Andhra Pradesh.

4. The Registrar (IT cum CPC), High Court of Andhra Pradesh (with a request to

place the circular in the official website of the High Court).

[Final Decree Proceedings – Delay] Court emphasized need to avoid delay in drawing final decrees under Order XX Rule 18 CPC; preliminary decree does not dispose of suit; courts should proceed suo motu to final decree without requiring separate proceedings. (Paras 29–33)

advocatemmmohan

[Partition – Claim of Legitimacy] Plaintiffs claimed half share in family property as descendants of Damodaran through Chiruthakutty; defendants denied marriage and legitimacy. (Paras 3–4)

[Trial Court Findings] Long cohabitation between Damodaran and Chiruthakutty established; presumption of marriage drawn; plaintiff held legitimate son; preliminary decree for partition passed. (Paras 5–6)

[High Court Reversal] Held no valid marriage proved; plaintiff treated as illegitimate child; denied share in coparcenary property. (Paras 7–9)

[Presumption of Marriage – Section 114 Evidence Act] Law presumes marriage from long cohabitation; legitimacy favoured over bastardy; heavy burden on party denying marriage. (Paras 15–19)

[Case Law Principles]

• Andrahennedige Dinohamy v. Balahamy (PC): Cohabitation presumed to be marriage. (Para 16)

• Mohabbat Ali Khan v. Mohd. Ibrahim Khan (PC): Presumption against concubinage. (Para 17)

• Badri Prasad v. Dy. Director of Consolidation: Strong presumption of wedlock from long cohabitation. (Para 18)

• S.P.S. Balasubramanyam v. Suruttayan: Presumption of legality of marriage from long years of living together. (Para 19)

• Tulsa v. Durghatiya, Challamma v. Tilaga, Madan Mohan Singh v. Rajni Kant, Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma: Similar principles reiterated. (Para 20)

[Evidence Supporting Marriage] Birth certificate, voters list, death certificate, insurance policy, military discharge certificate, electoral cards, and letters (Exs. A2–A23) corroborated marriage and legitimacy. (Paras 22–25)

[Supreme Court Holding] Defendants failed to rebut presumption; marriage between Damodaran and Chiruthakutty established; plaintiff legitimate; High Court erred in denying partition. Trial Court decree restored. (Paras 26–28)

[Final Decree Proceedings – Delay] Court emphasized need to avoid delay in drawing final decrees under Order XX Rule 18 CPC; preliminary decree does not dispose of suit; courts should proceed suo motu to final decree without requiring separate proceedings. (Paras 29–33)

In partition suits, preliminary decree does not dispose of the suit; proceedings continue until final decree is passed dividing property by metes and bounds. (Paras 5, 11, 15)

advocatemmmohan

[Partition Suit – Preliminary Decree] In partition suits, preliminary decree does not dispose of the suit; proceedings continue until final decree is passed dividing property by metes and bounds. (Paras 5, 11, 15)

[Final Decree Proceedings – Nature] Application for final decree is not a plaint but merely a reminder to the court to complete its duty; suit remains pending until final decree is drawn. (Paras 11–15)

[Order II Rule 2 CPC – Inapplicability] Order II Rule 2 applies only to suits; it does not bar filing of multiple final decree petitions in partition suits. (Paras 10, 14, 19)

[Multiple Final Decrees Permissible] Courts may pass more than one final decree in partition suits; decree may be partly preliminary and partly final. (Paras 20–21)

[Withdrawal of Suit – Liberty Reserved] Plaintiffs permitted to withdraw suit for declaration and injunction with liberty to revive final decree proceedings (FDP No. 27 of 1995) and contest validity of Will. (Paras 1, 4, 7–10)

[Binding Directions to FDP Court] FDP Court directed to dispose of proceedings uninfluenced by observations of lower courts, ensuring fresh adjudication in accordance with law. (Para 11)

Suit was for declaration by non‑executant with consequential relief of joint possession; proper court fee computable under Section 7(iv)(c) read with Section 7(v), not ad valorem on sale consideration. (Paras 7–8)

advocatemmmohan

APEX COURT 

[Reliefs Claimed – Co‑parcenary Property] Plaintiff sought declaration that houses and agricultural lands purchased by father were co‑parcenary properties, and that alienations (Will, gift, sale deeds) were void qua co‑parcenary rights. (Paras 1–2)

[Court Fee – Punjab Court Fees Act, 1870] Court fee governed by Section 7(iv)(c) and Section 7(v); declaratory suits with consequential relief must be valued at plaintiff’s valuation, subject to minimum equal to property value. (Paras 5–6)

[Cancellation vs. Declaration – Distinction]

• Executant of deed must sue for cancellation, paying ad valorem fee on sale consideration.

• Non‑executant may sue for declaration that deed is void or not binding; court fee differs depending on possession. (Paras 6–7)

[Illustration – Executant vs. Non‑executant] If ‘A’ executes sale deed and later sues, he must seek cancellation with ad valorem fee. If ‘B’ (non‑executant co‑parcener) sues, he seeks declaration that deed is not binding; fixed fee if in possession, ad valorem if also seeking possession. (Para 6)

[Trial Court & High Court Error] Both courts wrongly held that plaintiff’s prayer amounted to cancellation, requiring ad valorem fee on sale consideration. (Paras 2–3, 7)

[Supreme Court Holding] Suit was for declaration by non‑executant with consequential relief of joint possession; proper court fee computable under Section 7(iv)(c) read with Section 7(v), not ad valorem on sale consideration. (Paras 7–8)

[Co‑ownership – Nature of Rights] Each co‑owner is entitled to possession and enjoyment of every part of the joint property; exclusive possession by one does not amount to ownership unless accompanied by ouster. (Paras 13–18) [Exclusive Possession – Limits] A co‑owner may occupy or even construct on part of joint property, provided he does not deny equal rights of others; remedy of excluded co‑owner is partition, not ejectment. (Paras 19–21) [Ouster – Stringent Test] Ouster requires clear denial of title and hostile assertion to knowledge of other co‑owners; mere exclusive possession or construction is insufficient. (Paras 22–24) [Construction on Joint Property] Raising a permanent structure without consent of co‑owners changes character of property; courts may order demolition if construction is in defiance of protest or injunction. (Paras 25–27)

advocatemmmohan

[Co‑ownership – Nature of Rights] Each co‑owner is entitled to possession and enjoyment of every part of the joint property; exclusive possession by one does not amount to ownership unless accompanied by ouster. (Paras 13–18)

[Exclusive Possession – Limits] A co‑owner may occupy or even construct on part of joint property, provided he does not deny equal rights of others; remedy of excluded co‑owner is partition, not ejectment. (Paras 19–21)

[Ouster – Stringent Test] Ouster requires clear denial of title and hostile assertion to knowledge of other co‑owners; mere exclusive possession or construction is insufficient. (Paras 22–24)

[Construction on Joint Property] Raising a permanent structure without consent of co‑owners changes character of property; courts may order demolition if construction is in defiance of protest or injunction. (Paras 25–27)

[Mandatory Injunction – Discretionary Relief] Injunction is not granted as of right; courts weigh equities, considering whether injury is substantial or trivial, and whether defendant acted in defiance of law or court orders. (Paras 26–27)

[Equitable Considerations] Relief of demolition is justified where defendant persisted despite plaintiff’s protest and in violation of temporary injunction; courts will not protect wrongful acts under guise of co‑ownership. (Paras 8–9, 27)

[Partition as Proper Remedy] Where co‑owners disagree on user, remedy lies in suit for partition and settlement of accounts; exclusive possession per se does not justify ejectment. (Paras 19–21)

[Partition Suit – Joint Family Property] Plaintiffs claimed suit lands were acquired by common ancestor Chandoji and remained joint family property; defendants contended lands were self‑acquired by Ramchanderji. (Paras 7–8, 16) [Exclusive Ownership Claim] Defendants asserted Ramchanderji purchased lands under registered sale deeds of 1968, paid entire consideration, and later acquired Balram’s share through sale‑cum‑family settlement deed dated 22.03.1975. (Paras 8, 12, 14) [Adverse Possession Defense] Defendants pleaded continuous exclusive possession since 1975, asserting title perfected by adverse possession; plaintiffs denied ouster and maintained joint possession. (Paras 8.2, 10, 16) [Limitation and Non‑Joinder] Defendants argued suit barred by limitation and bad for non‑joinder of necessary parties (wives and daughters of Balram, Mohanlal, and Chandoji). (Paras 8.3, 10, 14)

advocatemmmohan

TELANGANA HIGH COURT 

[Partition Suit – Joint Family Property] Plaintiffs claimed suit lands were acquired by common ancestor Chandoji and remained joint family property; defendants contended lands were self‑acquired by Ramchanderji. (Paras 7–8, 16)

[Exclusive Ownership Claim] Defendants asserted Ramchanderji purchased lands under registered sale deeds of 1968, paid entire consideration, and later acquired Balram’s share through sale‑cum‑family settlement deed dated 22.03.1975. (Paras 8, 12, 14)

[Adverse Possession Defense] Defendants pleaded continuous exclusive possession since 1975, asserting title perfected by adverse possession; plaintiffs denied ouster and maintained joint possession. (Paras 8.2, 10, 16)

[Limitation and Non‑Joinder] Defendants argued suit barred by limitation and bad for non‑joinder of necessary parties (wives and daughters of Balram, Mohanlal, and Chandoji). (Paras 8.3, 10, 14)

[Revenue Records and Mutation] Dispute centered on entries in revenue records: defendants relied on mutation in Ramchanderji’s name and succession pattas; plaintiffs challenged cancellation of pattas and alleged fraudulent mutation. (Paras 8.2, 12–13)

[Trial Court Findings]

• In O.S. No. 108 of 2016: plaintiffs failed to prove exclusive title or validity of 1975 sale‑cum‑family settlement; declaration and rectification denied.

• In O.S. No. 44 of 2018: preliminary decree passed holding suit lands were joint family property, plaintiffs entitled to partition into four equal shares. (Para 16)

[Appeals – Appellants’ Contentions] Appellants argued trial court erred by not framing issue on whether Chandoji acquired suit property; contended plaintiffs failed to prove acquisition by ancestor; relied on admissions of PWs and documentary evidence showing exclusive possession of Ramchanderji. (Para 19)

[Burden of Proof] Court emphasized plaintiffs must prove acquisition by ancestor under Sections 101–102 Evidence Act; mere entries in tenant column insufficient to establish title. (Para 19)

[Adverse Possession – Co‑owners] Possession of one co‑owner presumed to be on behalf of all; adverse possession requires open denial of title, hostile animus, and ouster to knowledge of other co‑owners. (Paras 20–23)

advocatemmmohan

APEX COURT 

[Res Judicata – Cause of Action Test] A subsequent suit is barred only if founded on the same cause of action as the earlier suit. A possession suit based on settlement deed (1962) is distinct from a partition suit based on birthright (1988). (Paras 14–19)

[Cause of Action – Definition] Cause of action means every fact necessary to prove the plaintiff’s right to relief; differs from mere evidence. (Paras 16–17)

[Partition Suit – Maintainability] Dismissal of earlier possession suit does not bar later partition claim; plaintiff entitled to seek share in family property. (Paras 18–19)

[Adverse Possession – Co‑owners] Possession of one co‑owner presumed to be on behalf of all; adverse possession requires open denial of title, hostile animus, and ouster to knowledge of other co‑owners. (Paras 20–23)

[Ouster Doctrine – Requirements] To establish ouster, defendant must prove: (i) declaration of hostile animus, (ii) long and uninterrupted exclusive possession, (iii) exercise of ownership rights openly and to knowledge of co‑owner. (Paras 21–23)

[Weakness of Ouster Defense] Ouster is a weak defense in partition suits; mere exclusive possession or enjoyment of profits by one co‑owner does not amount to adverse possession. (Paras 20–22)

[Settlement of Long‑Standing Dispute] Supreme Court, to end five decades of litigation between siblings, ordered equitable partition: appellants entitled to 35% share, respondent 65%. If partition by metes and bounds not possible, property to be sold and proceeds divided accordingly. (Para 25)

[Suspicion Removal – Judicial Conscience] Courts must be fully satisfied that Will was validly executed; mere assertions or registration cannot remove suspicion. (Paras 13–14, 17)

advocatemmmohan

APEX COURT 

[Execution of Will – Section 63(c) Succession Act] A Will must be attested by two or more witnesses, each witnessing the testator’s signature or acknowledgment; simultaneous presence is not mandatory. (Paras 12, 15)

[Proof of Will – Section 68 Evidence Act] At least one attesting witness must be examined to prove execution; proviso excluding this requirement for registered documents does not apply to Wills. (Paras 16–17)

[Section 71 Evidence Act – Strict Interpretation] Section 71 applies only when attesting witness denies or fails to recollect execution; it cannot be invoked when witness is not summoned or fails to prove execution. (Paras 17, 20–21)

[Suspicious Circumstances – Burden on Propounder] Where Will excludes natural heirs or contains unusual dispositions, propounder must dispel all legitimate suspicions to satisfy judicial conscience. (Paras 13–14)

[Registration of Will – Limited Presumption] Registration of Will may reduce suspicion but does not prove due execution; statutory proof requirements under Sections 63 and 68 remain mandatory. (Paras 9–10, 14, 18–19)

[Judicial Conscience Test] Courts must act as a court of conscience in Will cases, ensuring instrument is truly last testament of testator, executed with free will and sound mind. (Paras 13, 18, 28)

[Case Law Principles]

• H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma: Propounder must prove signature, sound mind, understanding, and free will. (Para 13)

• Jaswant Kaur v. Amrit Kaur: Suspicious circumstances require heavier burden on propounder. (Para 14)

• Surendra Pal v. Saraswati Arora: Proof must remove doubts of coercion or fraud. (Para 14)

• Rabindra Nath Mukherjee v. Panchanan Banerjee: Registration reduces suspicion but does not replace proof. (Para 14)

• Janki Narayan Bhoir v. Narayan Namdeo Kadam: If one attesting witness fails, other must be examined. (Paras 18, 21)

• M.B. Ramesh v. Veeraje Urs: Court may call for further evidence to satisfy conscience despite technical lapses. (Paras 18–19)

[Effect of Non‑Examination of Attesting Witness] If attesting witness is alive and capable, failure to examine renders Will unproved; Section 71 cannot be invoked to bypass this requirement. (Paras 20–21)

[Suspicion Removal – Judicial Conscience] Courts must be fully satisfied that Will was validly executed; mere assertions or registration cannot remove suspicion. (Paras 13–14, 17)

[Partition – Effect] Unless partition is pleaded and proved, property purchased from joint family funds retains its joint character; mere assertion of partition without evidence is insufficient. (Paras 12–14)

advocatemmmohan

M.P. HIGH COURT

[Section 100 CPC – Scope of Second Appeal] Second appeal lies only on substantial questions of law; findings of fact by lower courts cannot be interfered with unless perverse or contrary to law. (Paras 7–9)

[Res Judicata – Applicability] Dismissal of earlier suit in default does not operate as res judicata; interlocutory orders like temporary injunctions do not conclude rights. (Paras 9–10)

[Joint Hindu Family Property – Presumption] No presumption that property is joint family property merely because family is joint; burden lies on party asserting joint character to prove existence of nucleus. (Paras 12–15)

[Purchase in Minor’s Name] Property purchased in name of minor (aged five years) with no independent source of income indicates acquisition from family funds, supporting inference of joint family property. (Para 11)

[Partition – Effect] Unless partition is pleaded and proved, property purchased from joint family funds retains its joint character; mere assertion of partition without evidence is insufficient. (Paras 12–14)

[Half Share of Plaintiff] Appellate Court rightly held plaintiff entitled to half share in disputed property, as defendants failed to prove exclusive ownership or partition. (Para 13–14)

[Supreme Court Precedent – Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar] Reiterated principle: existence of sufficient nucleus must be proved to treat property as joint; burden shifts to party claiming self‑acquisition only after such proof. (Para 15)

[Doctrine of Nucleus and Blending] Mere existence of small nucleus is insufficient; property becomes joint only if nucleus is income‑yielding and acquisition is linked. Voluntary blending of self‑acquired property requires clear intention to abandon separate rights. (Para 15, citing R. Deivanai Ammal v. G. Meenakshi Ammal)

[Ancestral Property – Definition] Property inherited from paternal ancestors up to three generations is ancestral; share obtained on partition retains ancestral character vis‑à‑vis male issue. (Para 14, citing Govindbhai Chhotabhai Patel v. Patel Ramanbhai Mathurbhai)

[Coparcenary Property – Principles] Coparcenary property consists of ancestral property; sole surviving coparcener may treat property as separate until birth of a son, whereupon coparcenary revives. Alienation by karta valid only for legal necessity. (Para 15, citing Rohit Chauhan v. Surinder Singh)

[Coparcenary – Incidents] Coparcenary under Mitakshara comprises propositus and three lineal male descendants; rights include acquisition by birth, demand for partition, collective ownership, joint enjoyment, restrictions on alienation, and survivorship. (Paras 27–28) [

advocatemmmohan

Delihi High Court

[Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Scope] Rejection of plaint is a substantive action, exercised strictly within the confines of Order VII Rule 11 CPC; plaint must be read as a whole and not rejected on selective averments. (Paras 20–23)

[Cause of Action Requirement] A plaint discloses cause of action if averments, taken as correct in entirety, would entitle plaintiff to relief; clever drafting to create illusion of cause of action is impermissible. (Paras 21–23)

[Joint Hindu Family – Presumption] Joint Hindu family under Mitakshara law is presumed to continue until severance of status is clearly established; mere divergence in residence or rituals does not disrupt jointness. (Para 25)

[Coparcenary – Incidents] Coparcenary under Mitakshara comprises propositus and three lineal male descendants; rights include acquisition by birth, demand for partition, collective ownership, joint enjoyment, restrictions on alienation, and survivorship. (Paras 27–28)

[Daughter’s Rights Pre‑2005] Under Hindu Succession Act, 1956, daughters were Class‑I heirs but not coparceners; they inherited only on father’s intestate death. (Para 29)

[2005 Amendment – Gender Equality] Section 6 amended to confer coparcenary rights on daughters by birth, equal to sons; they can demand partition and dispose of their share independently. (Para 31)

[Supreme Court Precedent – Vineeta Sharma] Daughters’ coparcenary rights are by birth, not contingent on father’s survival at amendment; amendment applies retroactively to recognize rights. (Paras 32–33)

[Testamentary Instruments – Challenge] Plaintiff’s challenge to validity of wills and testamentary documents raises triable issues; allegations of forgery and non‑compliance with statutory requirements cannot be decided at threshold. (Para 16)

[Partition Suits – Liberal Reading] In suits for partition and declaration, pleadings must be construed liberally; complete particulars may lie within exclusive knowledge of defendants. (Paras 17–18)

[Principle of Equality] Post‑2005 amendment, daughters are entitled to equal share in coparcenary property, in parity with male coparceners. (Paras 31–33

[Partition and Nature of Property] Property allotted to a coparcener on partition of ancestral estate retains its ancestral character vis‑à‑vis his male descendants, who acquire rights by birth. (Paras 7.2, 9–10)

advocatemmmohan

APEX COURT 

[Section 100 CPC – Scope of Second Appeal] High Court cannot re‑appreciate evidence under Section 100 CPC unless findings of lower courts are contrary to law, based on inadmissible evidence, or recorded without evidence. (Paras 12, 12.1, 12.2, 32–36)

[Substantial Question of Law] A substantial question of law must materially affect rights of parties; mere re‑appreciation of facts does not qualify. Misconstruction of documents or violation of settled law may give rise to such a question. (Paras 12, 12.1, 33)

[Partition and Nature of Property] Property allotted to a coparcener on partition of ancestral estate retains its ancestral character vis‑à‑vis his male descendants, who acquire rights by birth. (Paras 7.2, 9–10)

[Self‑Acquired vs. Ancestral Property] No presumption that property is joint family property merely because a joint family exists; burden lies on the party asserting joint family character to prove existence of nucleus. (Paras 13, R. Deivanai Ammal case extract)

[Doctrine of Nucleus] To establish property as joint family property, proof of sufficient nucleus capable of acquisition is essential; mere existence of small or insignificant nucleus is insufficient. (Para 13)

[Doctrine of Blending] Self‑acquired property becomes joint family property only if voluntarily thrown into common stock with clear intention to abandon separate claim. (Paras 6.3, citing Mallesappa Bandeppa Desai and Lakkireddi Chinna Venkata Reddi)

[Burden of Proof] Once existence of nucleus is proved, presumption arises that property acquired is joint; burden shifts to party claiming self‑acquisition to prove independent funds. (Para 13)

[Sale of Joint Family Property] Alienation of joint family property without consent of coparceners and without legal necessity is void. (Paras 7.4, 10)

[Relief of Cancellation of Sale Deed] In a suit for partition, specific prayer for cancellation of sale deed executed in favour of third parties is mandatory. (Para 6.2, citing Murugan v. Kesava Gounder)

[Findings of First Appellate Court] First Appellate Court is final court of facts; its findings cannot be interfered with unless vitiated by ignoring material evidence or misapplication of law. (Paras 12, 12.1, 34–36)

[Cause of Action Requirement] A plaint must disclose a cause of action; bald averments without essential pleadings regarding existence of Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) are insufficient. (Paras 11, 19–20)

advocatemmmohan

Delhi High Court

[Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Scope] Application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC cannot be used to adjudicate disputed facts; rejection of plaint must be based only on plaint averments. (Paras 8–11)

[Cause of Action Requirement] A plaint must disclose a cause of action; bald averments without essential pleadings regarding existence of Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) are insufficient. (Paras 11, 19–20)

[Self‑Acquired Property vs. HUF Property] Property acquired by a male Hindu after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 does not automatically become HUF property; it remains individual property unless thrown into common hotchpot. (Paras 15, 18–20)

[Supreme Court Precedents]

• CWT v. Chander Sen (1986) 3 SCC 567: Property devolving under Section 8 of Hindu Succession Act is inherited in individual capacity, not as HUF. (Paras 16–18)

• Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar (1987) 1 SCC 204: Post‑1956, inherited property is not HUF property vis‑à‑vis sons. (Paras 17–18)

[Mutation and Ownership] Mutation in favour of Defendant No. 1 establishes her as absolute owner of the suit property, being sole surviving legal heir of late Sh. Pradeep Kumar Mittal. (Paras 5–6)

[Plaintiffs’ Locus Standi] Plaintiffs, being heirs of late Sh. Praveen Kumar Mittal, cannot claim partition in property of late Sh. Pradeep Kumar Mittal; they already inherited assets of their own predecessor. (Paras 6–7)

[Existence of HUF – Pleading Requirement] Mere assertion of HUF existence without pleading source of funds, throwing into hotchpot, or ancestral inheritance prior to 1956, does not establish HUF. (Paras 18–20)

[Principle of Tenants‑in‑Common] Section 19 of Hindu Succession Act mandates heirs succeeding together take property as tenants‑in‑common, not joint tenants, further negating automatic HUF character. (Para 19)

[Rejection of Plaint] Since plaint failed to disclose cause of action and lacked material particulars establishing HUF, rejection under Order VII Rule 11 CPC was justified. (Paras 20–21)

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Section 80(1) and Section 80(2) — Impleadment of State/Instrumentality of State in a pending suit via amendment — Mandatory requirement of statutory notice — Ouster of Civil Court's jurisdiction — Held: Section 80 CPC is mandatory and explicitly bars the institution of a suit against the Government or a public officer without serving a two-month prior written notice. When a State Government or its instrumentality is subsequently impleaded as a defendant in a pending suit by way of an amendment, a new and distinct cause of action is introduced against such public entity. The plaintiff is duty-bound to either serve a fresh statutory notice under Section 80(1) CPC or seek explicit leave of the Court under Section 80(2) CPC before carrying out the impleadment. Failure to comply with this mandatory condition precedent strips the Civil Court of its inherent jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate the claim against the State entity. Non-compliance cannot be waived or cured retrospectively. The plaint, to the extent of such impleaded State party, is liable to be rejected at the threshold, and any decree passed against it is a complete nullity.

advocatemmmohan

(A) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Section 80(1) and Section 80(2) — Impleadment of State/Instrumentality of State in a pending suit via amendment — Mandatory requirement of statutory notice — Ouster of Civil Court's jurisdiction — Held: Section 80 CPC is mandatory and explicitly bars the institution of a suit against the Government or a public officer without serving a two-month prior written notice. When a State Government or its instrumentality is subsequently impleaded as a defendant in a pending suit by way of an amendment, a new and distinct cause of action is introduced against such public entity. The plaintiff is duty-bound to either serve a fresh statutory notice under Section 80(1) CPC or seek explicit leave of the Court under Section 80(2) CPC before carrying out the impleadment. Failure to comply with this mandatory condition precedent strips the Civil Court of its inherent jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate the claim against the State entity. Non-compliance cannot be waived or cured retrospectively. The plaint, to the extent of such impleaded State party, is liable to be rejected at the threshold, and any decree passed against it is a complete nullity.

[Paras 26 & 44]

(B) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Section 47 — Execution of Decree — Objection to Executability — Decree as a Nullity — Underlying jurisdictional defect — Scope of Executing Court's powers — Held: While an Executing Court generally cannot go behind a decree, a well-recognized exception exists where the decree is passed by a Court lacking inherent jurisdiction. A decree that is an absolute nullity due to a fundamental statutory bar on jurisdiction can be challenged and resisted even at the stage of execution under Section 47 CPC. Since the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the suit against the appellant-Corporation for want of mandatory statutory notice under Section 80 CPC, the resulting money decree was an absolute nullity and void ab initio. It remains legally unenforceable in execution proceedings, irrespective of the fact that the decree had previously been unsuccessfully contested on other grounds up to the appellate stage.

[Para 44]

(C) Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 — Prospective operation — Prior transactions governed by Section 34 of CPC, 1908 — Legality of compounding interest — Held: The statutory protection and the high compounding interest rates provided under the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993, operate strictly prospectively. Where the underlying supply order or transaction for raw materials was concluded in the year 1985—long predating the enactment of the 1993 Act—the computation and award of interest are governed strictly by Section 34 CPC, and not by the special provisions of the 1993 Act. The trial court's award of 2% monthly compound interest under the 1993 Act for a 1985 commercial supply was erroneous and legally unsustainable.

[Paras 4.5 & 5.1]

(D) State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 — Section 29 — Statutory Takeover of Defaulting Unit — Liability of State Financial Corporation for third-party debts of the unit — Privity of Contract — Held: A State Financial Corporation exercising its statutory powers under Section 29 of the SFC Act takes over the assets of a defaulting borrower unit for the limited purpose of realizing public dues. Such a statutory takeover does not automatically fasten personal liability onto the Corporation for independent commercial debts incurred by the private unit prior to the takeover, especially in the absolute absence of any privity of contract or commercial dealings between the third-party supplier and the Corporation. Burdening public sector financial institutions with such unchecked, inflated liabilities violates public interest.

[Paras 4.4, 6.2, & 12]

CASE LAW CITED

• Shaki Tubes Ltd v. State of Bihar, (2009) 7 SCC 673 (Relied on).

• Gangappa Gurupadappa Gugwad Gulbarga v. Rachawwa and Ors., AIR 1971 SC 442 (Relied on).

• Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd and others v. M/s. Coromandel Sacks Pvt. Ltd, (2024) 5 SCR 321 (Referred to).

JUDGMENT EXTRACTS ON CORE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

On Mandatory Compliance of Section 80 CPC during Impleadment: *"In cases such as the one under consideration, the State, which was not originally a party, could be impleaded and the plaint could be amended by inclusion of pleadings, cause of action and relief against the State. In such cases also, the plaintiff, immediately upon becoming aware of the necessity to implead the State, is duty bound to either issue a notice as contemplated under Section 80(1) CPC or obtain leave under Section

Duty of Clean Hands and Suppression of Material Facts: A litigant who approaches the court is bound to disclose all facts relevant to the litigation. If a plaintiff withholds vital documents or suppresses the fact of a previously filed and withdrawn suit concerning the same property to gain a tactical advantage, they are guilty of trickery and playing a fraud on the court. A person whose case is based on falsehood or concealment has no right to approach the court and can be summarily thrown out at any stage. (Paras 23, 25 & 29)

advocatemmmohan

Order VII, Rule 1(j) (as applicable in Punjab); Order II, Rule 2 — Suppression of Material Facts, Disclosure of Prior Litigation, Approbate and Reprobate, and Discretionary Relief in Specific Performance

• Duty of Clean Hands and Suppression of Material Facts: A litigant who approaches the court is bound to disclose all facts relevant to the litigation. If a plaintiff withholds vital documents or suppresses the fact of a previously filed and withdrawn suit concerning the same property to gain a tactical advantage, they are guilty of trickery and playing a fraud on the court. A person whose case is based on falsehood or concealment has no right to approach the court and can be summarily thrown out at any stage. (Paras 23, 25 & 29)

• Definition of Material Fact: What constitutes a "material fact," the suppression of which disentitles a party to discretionary relief, depends on the unique facts and circumstances of each case. A fact is material if it is essential for the logical determination of the dispute (lis) or directly impacts the grant or denial of the ultimate relief. (Para 28 & 29)

• Mandatory Statutory Disclosure under Order VII, Rule 1(j): Under Order VII, Rule 1(j) of the CPC (as amended in Punjab), a plaintiff is under a strict statutory obligation to include a specific statement in the plaint clarifying whether any previous suit between the same parties, or those under whom they claim, litigating on the same grounds, was previously instituted or decided, along with its outcome. (Para 18)

• Doctrine of Estoppel (Approbate and Reprobate): A litigant cannot be permitted to assume entirely inconsistent positions in a court of law to play fast and loose, or to blow hot and cold. A party cannot approbate and reprobate by systematically shifting grounds across sequential litigations to suit their financial or legal convenience. (Para 18)

• Belated Clarifications in Replication: A replication filed by a plaintiff after the defendant exposes the prior suppressed litigation in their written statement is treated as a defensive afterthought. Such a filing cannot automatically cure a fraudulent or dishonest omission of a material fact made in the original plaint. (Para 18 & 20)

• Specific Performance as a Discretionary Relief: Specific performance is an equitable, discretionary relief. A plaintiff who attempts to evade state revenue (e.g., executing alternative lawsuits to evade stamp duty and registration fees) or intentionally conceals past adverse proceedings does not approach the court with clean hands and is legally disentitled from receiving equitable relief. (Para 6, 18 & 29)

Pleadings and Proof: No amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was never put forward in the pleadings. A question which did not arise from the pleadings and was not the subject matter of an issue cannot be decided by the court. The court must confine its decision to the questions raised in the pleadings. (Para 8 & 10)

advocatemmmohan

apex court 

Order VI, Rule 2; Order XIV, Rule 1; Section 100 — Scope of Pleadings, Framing of Issues, and Powers in Second Appeal

• Pleadings and Proof: No amount of evidence can be looked into upon a plea which was never put forward in the pleadings. A question which did not arise from the pleadings and was not the subject matter of an issue cannot be decided by the court. The court must confine its decision to the questions raised in the pleadings. (Para 8 & 10)

• Relief outside Prayer: A civil court cannot grant a relief which is not claimed and which does not flow from the facts and the cause of action alleged in the plaint. The observation that a prayer is merely a "suggestion" is incorrect; the jurisdiction to grant relief necessarily depends on the pleadings, prayer, court fee paid, and evidence led. (Para 8 & 16)

• Exceptions to the Rule: A case not specifically pleaded can only be considered in exceptional circumstances where the pleadings in substance contain the necessary averments, the issues generally cover the question, and the parties went to trial fully conscious of the issue. The court cannot make out such a case suo motu if neither party raised the contention during arguments. (Para 12)

• Distinction between Title and Easement: The facts required to establish title are fundamentally different from those required to establish an easementary right. A suit for declaration of title relates to natural rights inherent in ownership, whereas an easement relates to a right possessed by a dominant owner over a property not his own, restricting the natural rights of that property's owner. (Para 13)

• Pleadings for Easement: A dominant owner seeking easementary relief must explicitly plead and prove the nature of the easement and its manner of acquisition (e.g., prescription vs. necessity). For prescription, they must plead open and uninterrupted enjoyment for twenty years independent of any agreement; user with express permission constitutes a license, not an easement. (Para 14)

• Necessary Parties for Easement: A right of easement can be declared only when the servient owner of the property is explicitly impleaded as a party to the suit. (Para 15