Friday, March 20, 2026

One World, But No Cry 🎵 By Muralimohan M.

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One World, But No Cry 🎵
By Muralimohan M.

Verse 1
In this world, like a small village,
Every voice can find its way,
Only whispers, no more cries,
Only dreams will never die.

From desert fumes to my next door,
We indulge ourselves in mighty wars,
Not just theirs and not just ours,
Pain runs deeply through our veins.

🎵 Chorus 🎵
One world dream is rising strong,
“One for all” will carry on,
From the ashes we restore—
A world worth living for.

Verse 2
Voices rise, and hearts can hear,
Truth is stronger than our fear,
Far away, no mother cries,
Hope is shining in her eyes.

Stories guide us from the past,
Teaching peace that’s meant to last,
Different paths but one same aim,
We can rise above the pain.

🎵 Bridge (Call for Peace) 🎵
Don’t be mad—be leaders wise,
Rule with peace, our civil prize,
Bury egos, end the wars,
Open hearts and healing doors.

Groom the world with love and grace,
Let peace shine in every place,
Guide us forward, strong and true,
A better world begins with you.

🎵 Final Chorus 🎵
One world dream is rising strong,
“One for all” will carry on,
From the ashes we restore—
A world worth living for.

🎵 Outro 🎵
If we listen, we will hear,
Peace is stronger than our fear…

Thursday, March 12, 2026

Petroleum Retail Dealership – Draw of lots selection – Provisional selection – Requirement to submit security deposit and supporting documents – Rectifiable deficiencies pointed out – Candidate failing to rectify within stipulated time – Consequence of rejection or movement to Group-3 applicants justified. (Paras 7–10, 13)

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Administrative Law – Retail Outlet Dealership – Selection Guidelines – Rectifiable deficiencies in documents – Failure to rectify within stipulated period – Effect – Held, as per Guidelines governing selection of dealers for Retail Outlets, failure to submit rectified documents within 21 days results in rejection of candidature or movement to Group-3 category – Action of respondent corporation valid.

(Paras 11–13)

Writ Jurisdiction – Article 226 – Interference with administrative action – Selection process governed by specific guidelines – Where action of authorities is strictly in accordance with the governing guidelines and no statutory or legal right is violated, writ petition not maintainable.

(Paras 13, 17)

Petroleum Retail Dealership – Draw of lots selection – Provisional selection – Requirement to submit security deposit and supporting documents – Rectifiable deficiencies pointed out – Candidate failing to rectify within stipulated time – Consequence of rejection or movement to Group-3 applicants justified.

(Paras 7–10, 13)

Selection Guidelines – Binding nature – Guidelines governing selection of dealers for Regular and Rural Retail Outlets through Draw of Lots/Bidding Process – Binding on all Oil Marketing Companies – Authorities have no discretion to relax or extend prescribed time for rectification of deficiencies.

(Paras 11–13)

Procedural fairness – Communication through registered e-mail – Candidate having previously responded to communications sent to registered e-mail – Intimation regarding deficiencies sent to same e-mail cannot be faulted.

(Para 14)

Ground of illness – Failure to rectify deficiencies – Plea of illness unsupported by satisfactory medical evidence – Not sufficient to invalidate administrative action taken in accordance with prescribed guidelines.

(Para 14)

Retail Outlet Dealership – SC-PH category candidate – Failure to rectify land-related and category-specific documents – Corporation justified in placing candidature under Group-3 category as per guidelines.

(Paras 15–16)

Result:

Writ Petition dismissed; action of respondent authorities upheld.
(Paras 17–18)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 – Dismissal of complaint for want of prosecution – Resultant discharge of accused – Remedy available to complainant/victim – Appeal maintainable before Sessions Court under proviso to Section 372 CrPC.

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Criminal Procedure – Appeal against acquittal in cheque dishonour case – Complaint under Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act dismissed for want of prosecution – Complainant filing appeal before High Court under Section 378(4) CrPC – Maintainability – Held, where complainant is also a “victim”, appeal lies before Sessions Court under proviso to Section 372 CrPC – Appeal before High Court not maintainable.

(Paras 3–5)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 – Dismissal of complaint for want of prosecution – Resultant discharge of accused – Remedy available to complainant/victim – Appeal maintainable before Sessions Court under proviso to Section 372 CrPC.

(Paras 2–5)

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 372 Proviso – Right of victim to file appeal – Applicability to cheque dishonour cases – Complainant treated as “victim” – Appeal lies before Sessions Court.

(Paras 4–5)

Precedent – Supreme Court decision – M/s Celestium Financial v. A. Gnanasekaran (2025 LiveLaw (SC) 666) – Principle reiterated – Complainant who is also a victim in cheque dishonour case may prefer appeal under proviso to Section 372 CrPC.

(Para 4)

Procedure – Appeal filed in wrong forum – High Court directing return of original bundle – Liberty granted to represent appeal before competent Sessions Court within specified time – Sessions Court directed to consider appeal and delay condonation petition in accordance with law.

(Para 6)

Result:

Appeal returned to appellant for presentation before the concerned Sessions Court within four weeks.
(Para 7)

Criminal Law – Meaning of “honourable acquittal” – Concept explained – Expression not found in CrPC or IPC – Judicially evolved term – Distinguished from acquittal based on benefit of doubt – Honourable acquittal occurs where court conclusively finds accused did not commit offence – Acquittal due to lack of evidence or benefit of doubt cannot be treated as honourable acquittal. (Paras 5.2–5.2.3)

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Service Law – Recruitment to police force – Character verification – Candidate involved in criminal case for serious offences including kidnapping and rape – Acquittal on benefit of doubt – Screening Committee rejecting candidature – Validity – Held, screening committee competent to assess antecedents and suitability – Candidate acquitted only on benefit of doubt cannot claim appointment as of right – High Court Division Bench erred in directing reconsideration treating acquittal as honourable acquittal – Order set aside.

(Paras 3, 5–5.3, 7–9, 9.1–9.2)

Criminal Law – Meaning of “honourable acquittal” – Concept explained – Expression not found in CrPC or IPC – Judicially evolved term – Distinguished from acquittal based on benefit of doubt – Honourable acquittal occurs where court conclusively finds accused did not commit offence – Acquittal due to lack of evidence or benefit of doubt cannot be treated as honourable acquittal.

(Paras 5.2–5.2.3)

Police service – Nature of disciplined force – Requirement of impeccable character and integrity – Persons with criminal antecedents or involvement in offences involving moral turpitude may be excluded from recruitment even if acquitted.

(Paras 2, 5.3.3, 5.5.3, 7, 7.1)

Service Law – Recruitment – Effect of acquittal in criminal case – Acquittal not conclusive proof of suitability for appointment – Employer entitled to consider nature of allegations, antecedents and circumstances of acquittal while deciding suitability of candidate.

(Paras 5.5.2(a)–(c), 5.6, 7)

Service Law – Role of Screening Committee – Power to assess antecedents and suitability of candidates – Wide discretion vested in employer – Courts should not substitute their own assessment unless decision is arbitrary, mala fide or perverse.

(Paras 7.1–7.3, 8, 9)

Judicial Review – Limited scope in matters of recruitment suitability – Courts cannot override employer’s assessment regarding antecedents and character unless decision suffers from arbitrariness, mala fides or irrationality.

(Paras 9–9.1)

High Court – Writ Appeal – Interference with employer’s decision regarding suitability of candidate for police service – Impermissible when Screening Committee exercised discretion based on relevant considerations.

(Paras 9.2–10)

Result:

Judgment of Division Bench of High Court dated 20.07.2023 set aside – order of Screening Committee rejecting candidature restored – appeal allowed.
(Paras 10–11)

Persons with Disabilities – Recruitment to Government service – Combined Graduate Level Examination, 2018 – Post of Auditor – Candidate suffering from “mental illness” (55% disability) recommended by SSC – Dossier returned by CAG on ground that post not suitable for such disability – Legality – Subsequent Government Notification dated 04.01.2021 identifying posts suitable for benchmark disabilities – Effect – Held, in view of said notification and affidavit of CAG expressing willingness to accommodate candidates in suitable Group ‘C’ posts, there remained no impediment to consider them for appointment – SSC directed to forward dossiers – Appointment to be made accordingly.

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Persons with Disabilities – Recruitment to Government service – Combined Graduate Level Examination, 2018 – Post of Auditor – Candidate suffering from “mental illness” (55% disability) recommended by SSC – Dossier returned by CAG on ground that post not suitable for such disability – Legality – Subsequent Government Notification dated 04.01.2021 identifying posts suitable for benchmark disabilities – Effect – Held, in view of said notification and affidavit of CAG expressing willingness to accommodate candidates in suitable Group ‘C’ posts, there remained no impediment to consider them for appointment – SSC directed to forward dossiers – Appointment to be made accordingly.

(Paras 5–9, 11, 17–21)

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Identification of posts suitable for benchmark disabilities – Government notification dated 04.01.2021 – Inclusion of new disability categories such as autism, specific learning disability and mental illness – Supersession of earlier list of 2013 – Effect on recruitment process.

(Paras 11, 17)

Service Law – Recruitment process – Candidate recommended by Staff Selection Commission – Rejection of candidature by cadre controlling authority – Challenge before Central Administrative Tribunal – Tribunal directing constitution of Medical Board and possible appointment – High Court setting aside Tribunal order – Matter before Supreme Court – Resolution through administrative accommodation following policy change.

(Paras 10–13, 15–21)

Persons with Disabilities – Reservation in public employment – Candidate with benchmark disability and another similarly situated candidate – Court ensuring accommodation in suitable posts – Direction to authorities to forward dossiers and consider appointment – If notified posts already filled, supernumerary posts to be created to accommodate candidates.

(Paras 19–21)

Administrative law – Subsequent policy development during pendency of litigation – Government authority expressing readiness to implement revised policy – Court disposing appeal by issuing directions for implementation rather than adjudicating earlier dispute.

(Paras 18–21)

Directions issued – SSC to forward dossiers of appellant and respondent candidate within two weeks – CAG to consider appointment to identified Group ‘C’ posts suitable for their disabilities – If original vacancies filled, supernumerary posts to be created – Appointment to take effect from date of joining.

(Para 21)

Result: Civil Appeal disposed of with directions. (Para 22)

Wednesday, March 11, 2026

Electronic Evidence — Call Detail Records — Mandatory Certificate — Section 65-B Evidence Act / Section 63 BSA Electronic evidence in the form of call detail records is inadmissible unless accompanied by the mandatory certificate under Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act. (Paras 49-52)

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Criminal Law — Circumstantial Evidence — Requirement of Complete Chain of Circumstances — Failure of Prosecution Case — Acquittal

Penal Code / Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita — Sections 302/34 IPC [103(1)/3(5) BNS] — Section 201 IPC [Section 238 BNS] — Murder — Conviction based on circumstantial evidence — Sustainability.

Held, where prosecution case rests solely on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances relied upon must be fully established, conclusive in nature, and must form a complete chain excluding every hypothesis except the guilt of the accused — Failure to prove any link in the chain is fatal to prosecution. The governing principles laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra reiterated. (Paras 27, 53)

Where the alleged circumstances relied upon by prosecution, namely recovery of currency notes, recovery of blood-stained shirt, and call detail records, were found unreliable and inadmissible, conviction cannot be sustained. (Paras 26, 53-55)

Conviction and sentence set aside — Accused acquitted. (Paras 55-56)

Recovery Evidence — Section 27 Evidence Act — Currency Notes — Doubtful Recovery — No Nexus with Crime

Recovery of currency notes allegedly received by accused for committing murder held not reliable where discrepancy existed regarding the exact amount recovered (₹46,000 in seizure memo but ₹46,145 counted in court). (Paras 29-32)

Further held, mere recovery of currency notes without proof of nexus with the crime cannot constitute an incriminating circumstance in a case based purely on circumstantial evidence. (Para 33)

Such recovery wrongly treated as incriminating by trial court. (Para 33)

Recovery of Blood-Stained Article — FSL Report — Chain of Custody — Failure of Link Evidence

Recovery of a blood-stained shirt allegedly worn by accused at the time of the incident held highly doubtful where the circumstances of concealment appeared improbable and unnatural. (Paras 34-35)

Forensic evidence becomes admissible only when prosecution establishes complete chain of custody of seized articles from the time of seizure till examination at FSL. (Para 36)

Where material discrepancies existed in malkhana records and testimony of witnesses regarding date of dispatch and handling of samples, chain of custody stood broken, rendering FSL report unreliable. (Paras 37-42)

Held, breach in chain of custody renders FSL report a worthless piece of evidence. (Para 44)

Even otherwise, mere matching of blood group on recovered article with that of deceased is insufficient to establish guilt in absence of other corroborative circumstances. (Paras 45-46)

Electronic Evidence — Call Detail Records — Mandatory Certificate — Section 65-B Evidence Act / Section 63 BSA

Electronic evidence in the form of call detail records is inadmissible unless accompanied by the mandatory certificate under Section 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act. (Paras 49-52)

Requirement of such certificate is mandatory and a condition precedent for admissibility, as reiterated in:

Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer
Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal. (Paras 50-51)

In absence of the mandatory certificate, call detail records cannot be relied upon even if service provider employees were examined. (Para 52)

Circumstantial Evidence — Failure to Establish Unbroken Chain — Benefit of Doubt

Where all three alleged circumstances (recovery of money, recovery of shirt, and CDRs) were either unreliable or inadmissible, prosecution failed to establish a complete and coherent chain of circumstances pointing towards guilt. (Paras 53-54)

Consequently, conviction recorded by trial court and affirmed by High Court cannot stand. (Paras 54-55)

Result

Appeal allowed — Conviction and sentence set aside — Appellant acquitted and directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case. (Paras 55-56)

Family arrangement / Panchayat partition – Plea of – Burden of proof A party pleading prior partition or family arrangement must prove the same by reliable evidence. Mere assertion that a Panchayat was held and a muchalika was executed is insufficient unless the document itself or other convincing evidence of such arrangement is produced. (Paras 6–7) Family arrangement – Non-production of document – Adverse inference Where the defendant relies on a written family arrangement (muchalika) but fails to produce the document before the Court, and no documentary proof of payment or settlement is produced, the Court is justified in rejecting the plea of earlier partition. (Paras 6–7) Evidence – Oral testimony without documentary support Oral testimony of witnesses regarding payment of money or execution of family arrangement cannot be accepted in the absence of supporting documentary evidence when such documents are expected to exist. (Para 7)

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Partition – Daughter claiming share in father’s property – Absence of will

Where properties were purchased by the father and no testamentary disposition was executed by him, on his death the children succeed equally and each heir becomes entitled to an equal share in the property. (Para 6)

Family arrangement / Panchayat partition – Plea of – Burden of proof

A party pleading prior partition or family arrangement must prove the same by reliable evidence. Mere assertion that a Panchayat was held and a muchalika was executed is insufficient unless the document itself or other convincing evidence of such arrangement is produced. (Paras 6–7)

Family arrangement – Non-production of document – Adverse inference

Where the defendant relies on a written family arrangement (muchalika) but fails to produce the document before the Court, and no documentary proof of payment or settlement is produced, the Court is justified in rejecting the plea of earlier partition. (Paras 6–7)

Evidence – Oral testimony without documentary support

Oral testimony of witnesses regarding payment of money or execution of family arrangement cannot be accepted in the absence of supporting documentary evidence when such documents are expected to exist. (Para 7)

Second Appeal – Section 100 CPC – Interference with findings of fact

Under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Section 100, the High Court will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless a substantial question of law arises. When the First Appellate Court properly appreciated evidence and concluded that the alleged family arrangement was not proved, no substantial question of law arises. (Para 7)

Result

Second Appeal dismissed; judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court granting 1/3rd share to the plaintiff confirmed. (Para 8)

Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1938 – Widow’s interest in joint family property When a Hindu male dies leaving interest in joint family property, his widow acquires the same interest as that of her husband under Section 3(2) of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1938, subject to the limitation that it is initially a Hindu woman’s estate but with the right to demand partition equivalent to that of a male coparcener. (Para 5) Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Section 14 – Enlargement of widow’s estate Where property had devolved on a Hindu widow under the provisions of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1938, such limited estate becomes her absolute property under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Consequently, other heirs cannot claim partition in the property that became the widow’s absolute property. (Paras 5, 7)

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Partition – Re-opening of partition – Inequitable distribution of shares

Where a partition deed is found to be unequal and unconscionable, the Court is justified in setting aside the partition deed and directing reopening of the partition so that shares of the parties are determined according to law. (Paras 2, 6)

Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1938 – Widow’s interest in joint family property

When a Hindu male dies leaving interest in joint family property, his widow acquires the same interest as that of her husband under Section 3(2) of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1938, subject to the limitation that it is initially a Hindu woman’s estate but with the right to demand partition equivalent to that of a male coparcener. (Para 5)

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Section 14 – Enlargement of widow’s estate

Where property had devolved on a Hindu widow under the provisions of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1938, such limited estate becomes her absolute property under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Consequently, other heirs cannot claim partition in the property that became the widow’s absolute property. (Paras 5, 7)

Coparcenary property – Right of grandchildren

Grandchildren cannot claim any share in property that has become the absolute property of the grandmother under Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Their right to partition can extend only to the share of their father in the joint family property. (Paras 5, 7)

Determination of shares on reopening of partition

Upon reopening of partition, the property must be divided in accordance with the legally determined shares of the parties, and the partition must be effected equitably with reference to the quality and nature of the property. (Para 7)

Result

Appeal partly allowed; decree of the trial Court modified; plaintiffs held entitled to 2/3rd share in the property allotted to their father, while the remaining 1/3rd share remains the absolute property of the father, and the share allotted to the widow remains her absolute property. (Paras 7–8)

Will – Proof – Requirement of sound disposing state of mind A will must be proved by showing that the testator executed it in a sound and disposing state of mind as required under the principles embodied in Sections 59 and 63 of the Indian Succession Act. When the evidence shows that the testator was seriously ill, paralytic and admitted to hospital immediately after execution of the document, the Court may infer lack of mental alertness and treat the execution with suspicion. (Paras 24–26, 28)

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Will – Proof of – Suspicious circumstances – Burden on propounder

Where the testator was suffering from serious illness including paralysis and shaky condition and the propounder of the will played a prominent role in its execution, the Court must carefully scrutinize the evidence and the propounder must remove all suspicious circumstances. Failure to examine the scribe and inability to establish the mental fitness of the testator at the time of execution renders the will unproved. (Paras 26, 31)

Will – Proof – Requirement of sound disposing state of mind

A will must be proved by showing that the testator executed it in a sound and disposing state of mind as required under the principles embodied in Sections 59 and 63 of the Indian Succession Act. When the evidence shows that the testator was seriously ill, paralytic and admitted to hospital immediately after execution of the document, the Court may infer lack of mental alertness and treat the execution with suspicion. (Paras 24–26, 28)

Suspicious circumstances in execution of will – Illustrative factors

Suspicious circumstances include:
(1) prominent participation of the beneficiary in execution of the will;
(2) shaky signature or thumb impression of the testator;
(3) feeble or debilitated mental condition of the testator; and
(4) unnatural or unfair disposition of property.
Unless such suspicious circumstances are satisfactorily explained, the will cannot be accepted as genuine. (Paras 30–31)

Multiple wills – Each will must be independently proved

Where two rival wills are relied upon by different parties, each will must independently satisfy the legal requirements of proof. If both suffer from suspicious circumstances and the propounders fail to dispel those suspicions, neither will can be accepted as genuine. (Paras 27–28, 31)

Hindu Law – Marriage – Proof of second marriage – Burden

A woman claiming rights in the property of the deceased as his second wife must prove the valid marriage in accordance with law. Where evidence indicates that the alleged marriage occurred during subsistence of the first marriage and no valid proof of marriage is produced, the claimant cannot be treated as a legally wedded wife. (Paras 33–34)

Succession – Devolution of property – When wills set up by other claimants fail

Where the alleged wills relied upon by rival claimants are not proved and the second marriage is not established, the estate of the deceased devolves upon the legally wedded first wife as the sole heir. (Para 34)

Subsequent will executed by heir – Validity

Once the property devolves upon the lawful heir, such heir is competent to bequeath the property by a subsequent will. If that will is duly proved and not seriously disputed, it becomes operative and the beneficiaries under it succeed to the estate. (Paras 34–35)

Appeal – Interference with findings on appreciation of evidence

Where the Single Judge has carefully examined the evidence relating to execution of wills and reached a conclusion that the documents are surrounded by suspicious circumstances and not proved, the Division Bench will not interfere with such findings. (Paras 26–28, 31, 35)

Result

Letters Patent Appeals dismissed; judgment of the learned Single Judge affirmed; defendants 3 to 6 in O.S. No.165 of 1980 held entitled to the properties of the deceased in terms of the will executed by the first wife. (Para 35)

Monday, March 9, 2026

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13(1)(ib) – Divorce – Desertion – Essential ingredients – Desertion requires proof of factum of separation and intention to permanently abandon the matrimonial relationship (animus deserendi) – Mere living separately or temporary separation does not constitute desertion. (Paras 16–17)

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Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13(1)(ib) – Divorce – Desertion – Essential ingredients – Desertion requires proof of factum of separation and intention to permanently abandon the matrimonial relationship (animus deserendi) – Mere living separately or temporary separation does not constitute desertion.

(Paras 16–17)

Matrimonial Law – Desertion – Burden of proof – Husband seeking divorce must establish that the wife voluntarily deserted him without reasonable cause and with intention to end matrimonial life – When wife expresses willingness to join the husband, desertion cannot be inferred.

(Paras 12, 16–17)

Hindu Marriage Act – Divorce proceedings – Evidence – Issuance of legal notice seeking restitution of matrimonial life indicates willingness to continue marriage – Such conduct weakens the plea of desertion when later divorce is sought on the same ground.

(Paras 11, 14)

Matrimonial Disputes – Separation – Ordinary wear and tear of married life – Minor disputes or temporary separation between spouses cannot be treated as desertion or cruelty warranting dissolution of marriage.

(Para 17)

Civil Procedure Code – Order XLI Rule 17(2) – Appeal – Absence of respondent – Appeal cannot be allowed merely because the respondent does not appear – Court must examine the case on merits and the appellant must establish grounds for interference.

(Para 10)

Family Courts Act, 1984 – Section 19 – Appeal – High Court while exercising appellate jurisdiction must independently examine whether findings of Family Court are sustainable on facts and law.

(Para 10)

RESULT

Family Court Appeal Dismissed –

Order dated 20-07-2007 in O.P.No.49 of 2004 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court-cum-IV Additional District & Sessions Judge, Vijayawada dismissing the husband’s petition for divorce confirmed – Husband failed to prove desertion by the wife – No order as to costs.
(Para 18)

Hindu Law – Partition – Claim of coparcenary share – Plaintiff claiming to be son of deceased – Burden of proof – When paternity is seriously disputed, burden lies heavily on plaintiff to establish lawful relationship and birth through cogent evidence – Mere self-serving statements or uncorroborated testimony insufficient to prove paternity. (Paras 13–16, 31–32)

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Hindu Law – Partition – Claim of coparcenary share – Plaintiff claiming to be son of deceased – Burden of proof – When paternity is seriously disputed, burden lies heavily on plaintiff to establish lawful relationship and birth through cogent evidence – Mere self-serving statements or uncorroborated testimony insufficient to prove paternity.

(Paras 13–16, 31–32)

Evidence Act, 1872 – Documentary evidence – Voters list, affidavits and similar documents – Entries based on information supplied by individuals – Such documents are only corroborative in nature and cannot by themselves establish relationship or paternity.

(Para 16)

Evidence – Self-serving affidavits – Evidentiary value – Affidavits executed by interested persons without examination of witnesses or supporting evidence carry little evidentiary weight and cannot prove marital relationship or legitimacy.

(Para 17)

Civil Procedure Code – Partition suit – Non-joinder of necessary parties – When portions of suit property had been alienated to third parties prior to suit, purchasers are necessary parties – Failure to implead such alienees renders suit defective.

(Paras 26–28)

Civil Procedure Code – Order XLI Rule 27 – Additional evidence in appeal – Additional evidence cannot be permitted merely to fill lacunae – Party must show due diligence and exceptional circumstances – Delay of more than two decades in producing documents without explanation is fatal.

(Paras 36–42)

Evidence – DNA test – Scope – Courts should not direct DNA test as a matter of course – Such direction can be issued only when strong prima facie case exists – Courts must consider consequences such as branding a child illegitimate and cannot compel a person to give sample for testing.

(Paras 47–49)

Partition – Proof of heirship – When plaintiff fails to establish that he is the son of the deceased and legal heir, he is not entitled to claim coparcenary share in family properties.

(Paras 31–32)

RESULT

Appeal Suit Dismissed –

Judgment and decree dated 06-08-2003 in O.S.No.55 of 1996 of the Senior Civil Judge, Adoni confirmed.
Plaintiff failed to prove that he is the son of late Hanuma Reddy and therefore not entitled to any share in the suit properties.
I.A. Nos.1 & 2 of 2024 seeking additional evidence and DNA test dismissed.
Each party to bear their own costs.

(Paras 51–52)

Contract/Ad-hoc employment – Replacement of contractual employee – A contractual or ad-hoc employee cannot be replaced by another contractual or ad-hoc employee – Such employee can only be replaced by a regularly selected candidate through lawful recruitment process – Practice of replacing one temporary employee by another temporary employee is arbitrary and violates principles of fairness in public employment. (Paras 14–18, 28–30)

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Constitution of India – Articles 14, 16 & 226 – Contract/Ad-hoc employment – Replacement of contractual employee – A contractual or ad-hoc employee cannot be replaced by another contractual or ad-hoc employee – Such employee can only be replaced by a regularly selected candidate through lawful recruitment process – Practice of replacing one temporary employee by another temporary employee is arbitrary and violates principles of fairness in public employment.

(Paras 14–18, 28–30)

Service Law – Ad-hoc / Contractual appointment – Nature of engagement – Temporary appointment intended only as stop-gap arrangement until regular recruitment is made – Continuation of temporary appointments for work of perennial nature by successive contractual engagements amounts to misuse of the contractual system.

(Paras 28–30)

Public Employment – Temporary employee – Right to continuation – Though a contractual employee has no right to regularization, he cannot be arbitrarily displaced by another temporary employee – He may be allowed to continue until the post is filled through a regular selection process.

(Paras 18–21, 28–30)

Service Jurisprudence – Ad-hoc employment – Principle reaffirmed – Doctrine laid down in State of Haryana v. Piara Singh that ad-hoc employees should not be replaced by another ad-hoc employee continues to hold the field and was not overruled by the Constitution Bench in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi.

(Paras 17–20)

Education Institutions – Universities – Teaching staff – Repeated contractual engagements – Frequent replacement of teachers on temporary basis disrupts academic stability and adversely affects quality of education – Universities must maintain continuity and stability in teaching staff.

(Paras 31–32)

Constitutional Principles – Right to Education – Articles 21 & 21-A – Education being a constitutional obligation of the State, arbitrary engagement and disengagement of teaching staff undermines educational standards and institutional continuity.

(Paras 31–34)

RESULT

Writ Petition Allowed –

Petitioner (contract Assistant Professor) shall continue in service until the post is filled by a regularly selected candidate in accordance with law.
Respondent University is at liberty to issue fresh notification for regular recruitment to the post.
Order will not preclude disciplinary proceedings, if warranted in accordance with law.
No order as to costs.

(Para 35)

Registration Act, 1908 – Section 22-A(1)(c) (A.P. Amendment) – Prohibition of registration – Properties belonging to Religious and Charitable Endowments – Documents relating to transfer of such properties executed by persons not authorized under Endowments Act cannot be registered – Once property is entered in the statutory register maintained under Section 43 of the A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987, the registering authority is justified in refusing registration. (Paras 8, 10, 11)

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Registration Act, 1908 – Section 22-A(1)(c) (A.P. Amendment) – Prohibition of registration – Properties belonging to Religious and Charitable Endowments – Documents relating to transfer of such properties executed by persons not authorized under Endowments Act cannot be registered – Once property is entered in the statutory register maintained under Section 43 of the A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987, the registering authority is justified in refusing registration.

(Paras 8, 10, 11)

A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 – Section 43 – Register of endowment properties – Entry of property in statutory register – Once property is incorporated in the register after following procedure under Section 43(4) & (5), it is treated as property belonging to the endowment institution for purposes of Section 22-A of the Registration Act.

(Paras 6–8, 11)

Registration Act – Section 22-A – Clauses (b), (c) and (e) – Distinction – Properties owned by Government or religious endowments fall under clauses (b) and (c) – Notification under clause (e) required only when claim relates to “avowed or accrued interest” and not ownership – Reliance placed on Full Bench judgment in Vinjamuri Rajagopala Chary v. State of Andhra Pradesh.

(Para 10)

Writ Jurisdiction – Subsequent events – Consideration by appellate court – Even though on the date of the Single Judge’s order the property was not entered in the register, subsequent entry in the statutory register during pendency of appeal can be taken into account – Once property stands entered in the Endowments register, registration of transfer document cannot be directed.

(Para 11)

Registration – Refusal of registration – Validity – Registering authorities justified in refusing registration of documents relating to properties falling under Section 22-A(1)(a) to (d) when competent authorities communicate the list of prohibited properties.

(Para 10)

RESULT

Writ Appeal Allowed –
Judgment and order dated 31-07-2012 in W.P. No.29963 of 2011 set aside – In view of subsequent entry of the property in the register maintained under Section 43 of the Endowments Act, 1987, registration of the document relating to the property cannot be directed – No costs – Pending miscellaneous applications closed.
(Para 11)

Property Law – Title to immovable property – Fraudulent sale deed executed by impersonation – Sale deed executed by impersonator is void ab initio – Such document conveys no title to transferee – Subsequent purchaser from such transferee also acquires no valid title. (Paras 22–24) Transfer of Property – Chain of title – When vendor himself has no valid title – Principle of nemo dat quod non habet – Purchaser from a person having no title cannot acquire better title – Subsequent registered sale deed does not confer valid ownership. (Paras 23–24)

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Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Section 100 – Second Appeal – Scope of interference – High Court cannot interfere with concurrent findings of fact recorded by trial Court and first appellate Court unless findings are perverse, contrary to law, based on no evidence or inadmissible evidence – First appellate Court being final Court of facts – When no substantial question of law arises, second appeal liable to be dismissed.

(Paras 15, 17, 29)

Property Law – Title to immovable property – Fraudulent sale deed executed by impersonation – Sale deed executed by impersonator is void ab initio – Such document conveys no title to transferee – Subsequent purchaser from such transferee also acquires no valid title.

(Paras 22–24)

Transfer of Property – Chain of title – When vendor himself has no valid title – Principle of nemo dat quod non habet – Purchaser from a person having no title cannot acquire better title – Subsequent registered sale deed does not confer valid ownership.

(Paras 23–24)

Limitation Act, 1963 – Article 65 – Suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession – Plaintiff dispossessed in December 2008 – Suit filed in 2009 – Limitation period of 12 years from date of dispossession – Suit within limitation – Article 59 relating to cancellation of instrument not applicable.

(Para 26)

Property Law – Void document – Necessity of cancellation – When earlier document is void ab initio due to impersonation – Such document need not be cancelled by separate relief – It can simply be ignored in a suit for declaration of title and possession.

(Para 27)

Adverse Possession – Claim of title under registered sale deed – Party claiming ownership under sale deed cannot simultaneously plead adverse possession – Assertion of lawful title negates hostile possession required for adverse possession.

(Para 25)

Civil Procedure Code – Order XLI Rule 31 – First appellate Court judgment – Requirement of framing points for determination and discussing evidence – When appellate Court frames relevant points and re-appreciates evidence, judgment cannot be said to violate Order XLI Rule 31 CPC.

(Para 28)

RESULT

Second Appeal Dismissed –
Decree and judgment dated 10-07-2025 in A.S. No.240 of 2012 on the file of the III Additional District Judge, Guntur confirming decree in O.S. No.86 of 2009 upheld – Appellant/defendant No.1 directed to deliver vacant possession of plaint schedule property to the plaintiff within two months – Each party to bear their own costs.
(Para 30)

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 – Temporary injunction – Appeal proceedings – Property already alienated prior to filing of suit – Petition seeking injunction restraining alienation – Lower Appellate Court dismissed application on ground that property had already been sold to third parties in the year 2003 – Held, when property was already alienated long prior to institution of suit, injunction restraining respondents from alienating such property does not arise – Further, purchasers were not impleaded as parties – Order refusing injunction justified. (Paras 6–8)

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Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 – Temporary injunction – Appeal proceedings – Property already alienated prior to filing of suit – Petition seeking injunction restraining alienation – Lower Appellate Court dismissed application on ground that property had already been sold to third parties in the year 2003 – Held, when property was already alienated long prior to institution of suit, injunction restraining respondents from alienating such property does not arise – Further, purchasers were not impleaded as parties – Order refusing injunction justified.

(Paras 6–8)

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 – Temporary injunction – Necessary parties – Property sold to third parties prior to suit – Purchasers not impleaded – Injunction order would not bind such purchasers – Petition seeking injunction without impleading purchasers not maintainable.

(Paras 6–7)

Civil Procedure – Temporary injunction – Alienation during pendency of suit or appeal – Transactions by co-sharer in joint family property – Rights of purchaser limited to share of vendor – Any transaction during pendency of suit or appeal subject to result of litigation – Doctrine akin to lis pendens.

(Para 6)

Civil Procedure – Appellate jurisdiction – Order of lower appellate Court refusing temporary injunction – Interference by High Court – When order does not suffer from perversity or legal infirmity, High Court will not interfere.

(Para 7)

Civil Procedure – Appeal against interlocutory order – Expedite disposal of main appeal – High Court directing lower appellate Court to dispose of appeal within stipulated time.

(Para 8)

RESULT

Civil Miscellaneous Appeal Dismissed –
Order dated 16-04-2024 in I.A. No.19 of 2024 in A.S. No.3 of 2024 on the file of the II Additional District Judge, Kurnool at Adoni refusing temporary injunction confirmed – Lower appellate Court directed to dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible, preferably within one year – No costs.
(Para 8)

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Order VII Rule 11(d) – Rejection of plaint – Suit barred by limitation – Cancellation of registered sale deed dated 08.12.2010 – Suit filed in 2020 – Plaintiff admitting execution and registration of sale deed – Limitation under Articles 58 and 59 of Limitation Act – Three-year limitation begins from date of knowledge/registration – Suit filed nearly ten years later – Held, plaint ex facie barred by limitation – Trial Court erred in dismissing application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC – High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 – Order of trial Court set aside and matter remanded for fresh consideration of the application. (Paras 8–13, 19, 20)

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Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Order VII Rule 11(d) – Rejection of plaint – Suit barred by limitation – Cancellation of registered sale deed dated 08.12.2010 – Suit filed in 2020 – Plaintiff admitting execution and registration of sale deed – Limitation under Articles 58 and 59 of Limitation Act – Three-year limitation begins from date of knowledge/registration – Suit filed nearly ten years later – Held, plaint ex facie barred by limitation – Trial Court erred in dismissing application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC – High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 – Order of trial Court set aside and matter remanded for fresh consideration of the application.

(Paras 8–13, 19, 20)

Limitation Act, 1963 – Articles 58 & 59 – Suit for cancellation of instrument – Limitation period of three years – Knowledge of alleged non-payment of consideration arising at the time of execution of sale deed – Plaintiff filing suit after lapse of about ten years – Held, limitation expired in 2013 and suit instituted in 2020 is clearly barred by limitation.

(Paras 8–11, 13)

Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 91 & 92 – Registered sale deed – Presumption regarding valid execution and payment of consideration – When document itself records transaction, oral allegations contrary to document ordinarily impermissible – Plaintiff admitting execution of sale deed and delivery of possession – Contention of non-payment of consideration cannot easily be entertained contrary to recitals of registered document.

(Paras 14–15)

Civil Procedure – Order VII Rule 11(d) – Limitation as ground for rejection of plaint – Though limitation generally a mixed question of fact and law – Where plaint averments themselves show suit to be hopelessly barred – Court empowered to reject plaint at threshold – Reliance placed on Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle – Courts should nip such litigation in the bud to prevent abuse of process.

(Paras 12–13)

Constitution of India – Article 227 – Supervisory jurisdiction of High Court – Scope – High Court may interfere where subordinate Court assumes jurisdiction not vested in it or fails to exercise jurisdiction properly – Power wider than ordinary revisional jurisdiction – Can be exercised to correct grave jurisdictional errors.

(Paras 16–18)

RESULT

Civil Revision Petition Allowed –
Order dated 24.10.2024 in I.A. No.59 of 2022 in O.S. No.426 of 2020 on the file of the III Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division), Kadapa set aside – Matter remanded to the Trial Court for fresh disposal of I.A. No.59 of 2022 in light of the observations made by the High Court – No costs.
(Para 20)

Sunday, March 8, 2026

HINDU LAW — Partition — Suit for partition — Non-joinder of necessary parties — Daughters/coparceners not impleaded — Effect — Suit not maintainable. In a suit for partition, all persons having a share in the joint family property must be impleaded as parties. After the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, daughters are coparceners and entitled to equal share along with sons. Failure to implead daughters who are coparceners renders the suit bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and such defect is fatal to the suit. (Paras 17, 21, 23) HINDU LAW — Partition — Suit for partial partition — Omission to include all joint family properties — Maintainability. Where the plaintiff omits certain joint family properties from the plaint schedule and seeks partition of only some properties, the suit amounts to one for partial partition and is not maintainable unless valid justification is shown. (Paras 30, 31)

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CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908 — Section 100 — Second Appeal — Scope of interference — Concurrent findings of fact by Courts below — When High Court can interfere.
High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, cannot re-appreciate evidence or disturb concurrent findings of fact unless the findings are shown to be perverse, based on misreading of evidence or contrary to record. Existence of a substantial question of law is sine qua non for entertaining a second appeal. In the absence of such question of law, the High Court cannot substitute its own opinion for the conclusions reached by the Courts below. (Paras 34, 35)

HINDU LAW — Partition — Suit for partition — Non-joinder of necessary parties — Daughters/coparceners not impleaded — Effect — Suit not maintainable.
In a suit for partition, all persons having a share in the joint family property must be impleaded as parties. After the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, daughters are coparceners and entitled to equal share along with sons. Failure to implead daughters who are coparceners renders the suit bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and such defect is fatal to the suit. (Paras 17, 21, 23)

HINDU LAW — Partition — Suit for partial partition — Omission to include all joint family properties — Maintainability.
Where the plaintiff omits certain joint family properties from the plaint schedule and seeks partition of only some properties, the suit amounts to one for partial partition and is not maintainable unless valid justification is shown. (Paras 30, 31)

HINDU LAW — Joint family property — Property standing in the name of female member — Presumption — Burden of proof.
Where properties stand in the name of a female member of the family, there is a presumption that they are her self-acquired properties. The burden lies on the person asserting that such properties are joint family properties to establish that they were purchased from the joint family nucleus. Mere pleading without cogent evidence is insufficient to rebut the presumption. (Paras 24–27)

EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 — Unregistered partition deed — Admissibility.
An unregistered partition deed cannot be received in evidence to prove the terms of partition. However, it may be looked into for collateral purposes such as proving severance of status or nature of possession, but not for enforcing rights arising out of the partition itself. (Para 32)

HINDU LAW — Benami plea in family property — Requirement of proof.
Where property stands in the name of the mother, the plaintiff alleging that the father purchased the property in her name from joint family funds must establish the existence of sufficient joint family nucleus and the source of funds. In absence of such evidence, the property must be treated as self-acquired property of the person in whose name it stands. (Paras 25–28)

SECOND APPEAL — Dismissal at admission stage.
Where the Courts below, upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, recorded concurrent findings that (i) certain properties are self-acquired properties of the mother, (ii) suit is bad for non-joinder of daughters who are coparceners, and (iii) the suit is for partial partition, and the appellant failed to raise any substantial question of law, the second appeal is liable to be dismissed at the admission stage. (Paras 33–36)

Result:
Second Appeal dismissed. No costs. Pending miscellaneous applications closed. (Para 36)

Friday, March 6, 2026

In a partition suit, the proceedings continue until the final decree is passed; therefore, if circumstances arising after the preliminary decree require alteration of shares, the court has jurisdiction to pass a second preliminary decree, and such determination of altered shares constitutes a decree appealable under law. Paras: 158–159

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1. Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Partition Suit – Multiple Preliminary Decrees – Permissibility

In a partition suit, if an event occurs after passing of the preliminary decree but before passing of the final decree, which necessitates alteration of shares of parties, the court is competent to pass another preliminary decree correcting the shares.

There is nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure prohibiting passing of more than one preliminary decree in a partition suit.

Paras: 158–159

2. Partition Suit – Nature of Proceedings – Jurisdiction of Court until Final Decree

A partition suit does not terminate with the passing of a preliminary decree.
The suit continues until a final decree is passed, and the court retains jurisdiction to resolve disputes that arise after the preliminary decree.

Paras: 158–159

3. Variation of Shares after Preliminary Decree – Whether Decree

Where the trial court varies the specification of shares after passing of the preliminary decree due to subsequent events, such an order amounts to a decree and is therefore appealable.

Paras: 158–159

4. Appeal – Filing without Copy of Decree – Exceptional Circumstances

Although Order XLI Rule 1 CPC requires a copy of the decree to accompany the memorandum of appeal, the absence of such copy will not render the appeal incompetent when the appellant was unable to obtain the decree due to the failure of the trial court to prepare it.

Para: 157

5. Hindu Law – Jain Widow – Nature of Estate in Ancestral Property

In the absence of a contrary custom, a Jain widow takes only a limited estate (widow's estate) in ancestral property inherited from her husband.

She does not possess absolute powers of alienation over ancestral property, though such absolute rights may exist in respect of self-acquired property where custom is proved.

Para: 160

6. Will – Testamentary Power after Severance of Status

Where a partition suit has been filed and shares have been specified by a preliminary decree, there is severance of status in the joint family.

Consequently, a coparcener may validly bequeath his share in the joint family property by will.

Paras: 161–162

Ratio Decidendi

In a partition suit, the proceedings continue until the final decree is passed; therefore, if circumstances arising after the preliminary decree require alteration of shares, the court has jurisdiction to pass a second preliminary decree, and such determination of altered shares constitutes a decree appealable under law.

Paras: 158–159

A transferee who has taken possession of property in part performance of an agreement of sale can defend and protect his possession under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act even if the limitation period for filing a suit for specific performance has expired, since the law of limitation bars only the remedy and not the defence. Paras: 20–22

1. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 53-A – Part performance – Protection of possession

A transferee who has taken possession of immovable property in part performance of an agreement of sale is entitled to protect his possession under Section 53-A T.P. Act, provided the statutory conditions are fulfilled.

Such protection is available even if the transferee has not filed a suit for specific performance.

Paras: 17–18, 19

2. Limitation Act – Effect on defence under Section 53-A T.P. Act

The expiry of limitation for filing a suit for specific performance does not extinguish the right of a transferee to defend his possession under Section 53-A T.P. Act.

The law of limitation bars the remedy but does not extinguish a defence.

Paras: 20–22

3. Section 53-A – Nature of right – Shield and not sword

Section 53-A confers a defensive right on the transferee in possession.

It enables the transferee to protect possession against the transferor or persons claiming under him, though it does not confer title.

Paras: 15–18

4. Legislative object of Section 53-A T.P. Act

Section 53-A was introduced by the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 1929 to incorporate the equitable doctrine of part performance.

The purpose of the provision is to protect a transferee who has acted upon a contract and taken possession in good faith so that the transferor cannot commit fraud by evicting him.

Paras: 12–16

5. Conditions for invoking Section 53-A T.P. Act

For a transferee to invoke protection under Section 53-A, the following conditions must be satisfied:

There must be a contract to transfer immovable property for consideration.
The contract must be in writing and signed by the transferor.
The terms of the contract must be capable of being ascertained.
The transferee must have taken possession in part performance.
The transferee must have performed or be willing to perform his part of the contract.

Para: 17

Ratio Decidendi

A transferee who has taken possession of property in part performance of an agreement of sale can defend and protect his possession under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act even if the limitation period for filing a suit for specific performance has expired, since the law of limitation bars only the remedy and not the defence.

Paras: 20–22

Apex court held that There is no distinction between an agreement of repurchase (re-conveyance) and an ordinary agreement of sale. Such an agreement still remains a contract for sale of immovable property and must be governed by the same law applicable to ordinary agreements of sale. The Court further held: The mere fact that the agreement is described as a re-conveyance or buy-back agreement does not alter its legal character. It remains enforceable through a decree for specific performance if the plaintiff proves readiness and willingness.

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Apex court held that

There is no distinction between an agreement of repurchase (re-conveyance) and an ordinary agreement of sale. Such an agreement still remains a contract for sale of immovable property and must be governed by the same law applicable to ordinary agreements of sale.

The Court further held:

The mere fact that the agreement is described as a re-conveyance or buy-back agreement does not alter its legal character. It remains enforceable through a decree for specific performance if the plaintiff proves readiness and willingness.

. Facts of the Case

The appellant was the original owner of an immovable property.
He sold the property to the respondent through a registered sale deed.
Immediately thereafter, a separate agreement was executed, under which the respondent agreed to re-sell (re-convey) the property to the appellant after five years for a fixed consideration.
After expiry of the stipulated period, the appellant demanded reconveyance and expressed readiness and willingness to pay the agreed consideration.
The respondent refused to execute the sale deed.
The appellant therefore filed a suit for specific performance.

Findings of Courts

Trial Court – decreed specific performance.
First Appellate Court – confirmed the decree.
High Court (Second Appeal) – reversed the decree, holding that the reconveyance clause was merely a privilege or concession and not an ordinary agreement.

The matter reached the Supreme Court.

2. Issues Before the Supreme Court

The Court considered mainly three legal questions:

Whether a reconveyance agreement is merely a privilege or a concession.
Whether such an agreement can be enforced through specific performance.
Whether the High Court was justified in disturbing concurrent findings of fact in second appeal under Section 100 CPC.

3. Supreme Court’s Legal Reasoning

(A) No Distinction Between Reconveyance Agreement and Ordinary Sale Agreement

The Supreme Court rejected the High Court’s view that the agreement was merely a privilege.

The Court held:

An agreement for re-purchase or reconveyance is still an agreement for sale of immovable property and must be governed by the same law applicable to ordinary agreements of sale.

Important Explanation by the Court

The Court explained that:

A privilege or concession exists only where one party has a unilateral option.
But where both parties have reciprocal obligations, it is an ordinary contract.

Therefore:

If the agreement creates mutual obligations, it is enforceable through specific performance.

(B) Interpretation of Reconveyance Agreements

The Court clarified an important doctrinal point:

Just because an agreement is described as “reconveyance” does not change its legal nature.

The Court stated:

The mere description of an agreement as reconveyance does not alter its substance. It still remains a contract for sale of immovable property.

Thus, courts must examine the true intention of the parties, not merely the label of the document.

(C) Readiness and Willingness (Section 16(c) Specific Relief Act)

The Supreme Court observed that the plaintiff had:

issued legal notice,
offered to pay the consideration,
filed the suit within the stipulated period.

Hence the Court held that the plaintiff had proved readiness and willingness.

The Court also clarified:

It is not necessary for the plaintiff to deposit the sale consideration unless the court directs him to do so.

This principle flows from Explanation (i) to Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act.

(D) Limits of Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC

Another significant holding relates to second appeals.

The Court held that:

The Trial Court and First Appellate Court had recorded concurrent findings of fact.
The High Court cannot re-appreciate evidence in second appeal unless there is a substantial question of law.

Therefore, the High Court acted beyond its jurisdiction.

(E) Rise in Property Prices Not a Ground to Refuse Specific Performance

The respondent argued that property prices had increased, and therefore specific performance should not be granted.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument and held:

Rise in price may be relevant when the court is deciding the issue for the first time.
But when two courts have already granted specific performance, price rise cannot be used to reverse the decree.

4. Final Decision of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court:

Allowed the appeal
Set aside the High Court judgment
Restored the decree for specific performance

Thus, the plaintiff succeeded.

5. Legal Principles Emerging from the Judgment

The case establishes the following important principles:

1. Reconveyance Agreements Are Enforceable

A reconveyance agreement is not merely a privilege but a contract for sale capable of specific performance.

2. Substance Over Form

Courts must examine the real nature of the agreement, not merely its title.

3. Readiness and Willingness

Issuing notice and filing suit while expressing willingness to pay consideration satisfies Section 16(c).

4. Limits on High Court in Second Appeal

High Courts cannot disturb concurrent findings of fact unless a substantial question of law arises.

5. Increase in Property Value

Increase in property value does not defeat an otherwise valid decree for specific performance.

Wednesday, March 4, 2026

Unauthorized passenger – Meaning. An unauthorized passenger refers to a person travelling in a motor vehicle contrary to the purpose, permit, or seating capacity prescribed under the Motor Vehicles Act and without any connection with the vehicle’s permitted use. (Para 37)

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1. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 173 – Appeal against award of MACT – Scope of interference.

In an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the High Court will not interfere with the award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal when the findings on negligence, liability and compensation are based on proper appreciation of oral and documentary evidence. (Paras 31, 42)

2. Motor accident – Goods vehicle – Coolies travelling in vehicle – Whether unauthorized passengers.

Where labourers travelled in a goods vehicle for the purpose of loading and unloading goods as “Jattu Coolies”, they cannot be treated as unauthorized or gratuitous passengers. Their presence in the vehicle is directly connected with the work relating to the goods being transported. (Paras 31, 34, 41)

3. Insurance policy – Coverage of coolies – Liability of insurer.

When the insurance policy shows that the insurer collected premium for carriage of coolies and passenger cover under relevant IMT clauses, the insurer cannot deny liability for compensation to coolies travelling in the goods vehicle at the time of accident. (Paras 32–34)

4. Burden of proof – Insurance defence – Liability exclusion must be proved by insurer.

When the insurer pleads breach of policy conditions or non-liability, the burden of proof lies on the insurer to establish the same by adducing cogent evidence. In the absence of such proof, the insurer remains liable to satisfy the award. (Para 39)

5. Unauthorized passenger – Meaning.

An unauthorized passenger refers to a person travelling in a motor vehicle contrary to the purpose, permit, or seating capacity prescribed under the Motor Vehicles Act and without any connection with the vehicle’s permitted use. (Para 37)

6. Evidence – Injured witness – Credibility.

Testimony of the injured witness regarding the manner of accident and his presence in the vehicle carries significant evidentiary value and cannot be discarded in the absence of material contradictions. (Paras 24–27)

7. Motor accident claims – Liability of insurer, owner and driver – Joint and several liability.

When the vehicle involved in the accident is insured and the accident occurs due to rash and negligent driving, the insurer along with the owner and driver becomes jointly and severally liable to satisfy the award passed by the Tribunal. (Paras 14, 15, 43, 44)

Ratio Decidendi

Where labourers travel in a goods vehicle as “Jattu Coolies” for the purpose of loading and unloading goods and the insurance policy covers carriage of such coolies by collecting the requisite premium, they cannot be treated as unauthorized passengers. Consequently, the insurer cannot escape liability and remains jointly and severally liable with the owner and driver to pay compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. (Paras 31–34, 41–42)