Inordinate delay — Negligence and want of due diligence — Effect. Where the applicant remained inactive for a prolonged period and failed to prosecute the matter diligently, the Court is justified in refusing condonation. Negligence, lack of bona fides, want of diligence and unexplained inaction disentitle a litigant from discretionary relief under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. (Paras 7, 8, 9) Pandemic as ground for delay — Rejection. The plea of the COVID-19 pandemic cannot justify an unexplained delay originating many years earlier. Where the decree was passed in 2007 and the pandemic occurred only in 2020, reliance upon the pandemic as an explanation for the entire delay is untenable. (Para 7)

advocatemmmohan

I.A. No.1 of 2025 in A.S. No.677 of 2025
Decided on 19.12.2025

Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 — Condonation of delay — Inordinate delay of 6624 days (about 18 years) — Ex parte decree — Sufficient cause — Absence of diligence.

An application for condonation of delay must disclose sufficient cause preventing the party from approaching the Court within the prescribed period. Mere assertions, afterthought explanations and vague averments unsupported by satisfactory material do not constitute sufficient cause. Where the defendants suffered an ex parte decree in 2007 and sought to file an appeal after nearly eighteen years without explaining either their absence in the suit or the prolonged inaction thereafter, the delay cannot be condoned. (Paras 6, 7, 8, 9)

Condonation of delay — Length of delay not decisive — Sufficiency of cause is material.

The decisive factor is not the length of delay but the adequacy and acceptability of the explanation offered. Even a short delay may not be condoned if sufficient cause is absent, while a long delay may be condoned if satisfactorily explained. (Para 8)

Law of limitation — Public policy — Courts cannot extend limitation on equitable grounds.

The law of limitation, though sometimes harsh in its operation, must be applied with full rigor. Courts possess no equitable jurisdiction to extend limitation periods in the absence of sufficient cause. The maxim dura lex sed lex (the law is hard, but it is the law) applies. (Para 8)

Inordinate delay — Negligence and want of due diligence — Effect.

Where the applicant remained inactive for a prolonged period and failed to prosecute the matter diligently, the Court is justified in refusing condonation. Negligence, lack of bona fides, want of diligence and unexplained inaction disentitle a litigant from discretionary relief under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. (Paras 7, 8, 9)

Pandemic as ground for delay — Rejection.

The plea of the COVID-19 pandemic cannot justify an unexplained delay originating many years earlier. Where the decree was passed in 2007 and the pandemic occurred only in 2020, reliance upon the pandemic as an explanation for the entire delay is untenable. (Para 7)

Merits of appeal — Irrelevant at stage of condonation.

While considering an application for condonation of delay, the Court is concerned only with the existence of sufficient cause. The merits of the proposed appeal are not relevant for deciding whether the delay should be condoned. (Para 8)

Held: The appellants failed to establish any sufficient cause for condoning the delay of 6624 days. The application for condonation of delay was rejected and consequently the appeal was dismissed as barred by limitation. (Paras 9 to 11)

Cases referred:

1. Indus Hospitals v. Rajeev Lochan Singh.
2. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan.
3. Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer.
4. Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs v. Special Deputy Collector (LA).