Complaint Case—Offence exclusively triable by Court of Session—Section 244 Cr.P.C.—Inapplicability. Where a complaint discloses offences exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the Magistrate is not required to record prosecution evidence under Section 244 Cr.P.C. before committing the case under Section 209 Cr.P.C. The Magistrate's function at the stage of commitment is confined to statutory compliance and commitment of the case. (Paras 6–13) Section 209 Cr.P.C.—Commitment proceedings—Nature of Magistrate's jurisdiction. The role of the Magistrate at the stage of commitment under Section 209 Cr.P.C. is administrative and ministerial in character. The Magistrate is not expected to undertake an evaluation of the merits of the prosecution case or hold a pre-trial inquiry before committing the case to the Court of Session. (Paras 10–13)

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Case: Neeraj Gupta v. Pardeep Kumar Bansal & Ors.
Citation: 2026 INSC 660 | Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 776 of 2026 | Decided on 01.07.2026.

Headnotes

1. Complaint Case—Offence exclusively triable by Court of Session—Section 244 Cr.P.C.—Inapplicability.
   Where a complaint discloses offences exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the Magistrate is not required to record prosecution evidence under Section 244 Cr.P.C. before committing the case under Section 209 Cr.P.C. The Magistrate's function at the stage of commitment is confined to statutory compliance and commitment of the case. (Paras 6–13)
2. Section 209 Cr.P.C.—Commitment proceedings—Nature of Magistrate's jurisdiction.
   The role of the Magistrate at the stage of commitment under Section 209 Cr.P.C. is administrative and ministerial in character. The Magistrate is not expected to undertake an evaluation of the merits of the prosecution case or hold a pre-trial inquiry before committing the case to the Court of Session. (Paras 10–13)
3. Section 244 Cr.P.C.—Scope.
   Section 244 Cr.P.C. applies only to warrant cases instituted otherwise than on a police report which are triable by a Magistrate. It has no application where the offences are exclusively triable by the Court of Session. (Paras 7–9, 13)
4. Commitment Proceedings—No duplication of evidence.
   Acceptance of the view that prosecution evidence under Section 244 Cr.P.C. must be recorded even in Sessions triable complaint cases would unnecessarily compel witnesses to depose twice regarding the same facts, contrary to the legislative intent of expeditious criminal trials. (Para 9)
5. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973—Legislative scheme—Abolition of elaborate committal inquiry.
   The 1973 Code consciously abolished the elaborate committal inquiry contemplated under the Code of 1898. The Legislature intended to eliminate delay by restricting the Magistrate's role and leaving consideration of evidence and framing of charge to the Sessions Court. (Paras 12–13)
6. Magistrate—No adjudication on merits at commitment stage.
   At the stage of Sections 207 to 209 Cr.P.C., the Magistrate cannot examine the sufficiency of evidence, assess guilt, or determine whether additional accused should be added or excluded. Such questions fall within the jurisdiction of the Sessions Court. (Paras 10–12)
7. High Court—Remand to Magistrate for recording evidence under Section 244 Cr.P.C.—Unsustainable.
   The High Court erred in remanding the matter to the Magistrate for compliance with Section 244 Cr.P.C. The impugned order was set aside as being contrary to the statutory scheme governing commitment of Sessions triable offences. (Paras 13–14)
8. Revision—Challenge to discharge and framing of charge—Remand.
   Upon setting aside the erroneous remand order, the Supreme Court directed the High Court to decide afresh both the complainant's revision challenging discharge of two accused and the revision filed by the accused challenging the framing of charge, independently and expeditiously. (Paras 14–15)

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Cases Referred

• Ajoy Kumar Ghose v. State of Jharkhand — distinguished; Section 244 applicable to Magistrate-triable warrant cases. (Para 8.1)
• Sunil Mehta v. State of Gujarat — distinguished. (Para 8.3)
• Harinarayan G. Bajaj v. State of Maharashtra — distinguished. (Para 8.2)
• Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab — followed on the limited role of the Magistrate at the commitment stage. (Para 10)
• Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Ashutosh Ghosh — followed; no evidence required before commitment. (Para 11)
• State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi — followed on the legislative object behind Section 209 Cr.P.C. and abolition of committal inquiry. (Para 12.1)
• Rattiram v. State of Madhya Pradesh — followed regarding the restricted role of the Magistrate in commitment proceedings. (Para 12.2)

BNSS—Sections 193(3), 193(8) and 230—Construction. Section 193(3) prescribes the essential contents of the police report; Section 193(8) requires filing of additional copies for supply to the accused; and Section 230 fixes the timeline for furnishing copies. Non-compliance with Section 193(8) or delay in supplying copies under Section 230 does not equate to non-filing of the police report for the purpose of default bail. (Paras 17–23) Default Bail—Right under Article 21—Nature. The right to default bail is an indefeasible statutory right flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution. However, the right is conditional and survives only until a valid police report is filed within the prescribed statutory period. (Paras 20–23) Charge-sheet—Incomplete filing of documents—Effect. Even where all documents relied upon by the prosecution do not accompany the charge-sheet, the police report is not rendered invalid. Such omission neither vitiates the charge-sheet nor revives the right to default bail. (Paras 22–25)

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ase: Shaurya Sunil Kumar Singh v. Central Bureau of Investigation
Citation: 2026 INSC 666 | Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4333 of 2026 | Decided on 01.07.2026.

Headnotes

1. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023—Section 187(3)—Default Bail—Scope.
   The indefeasible right to default bail arises only upon failure of the investigating agency to file the police report/charge-sheet within the prescribed period of sixty or ninety days. Once a charge-sheet complying with Section 193(3) BNSS is filed within the statutory period, the right to default bail stands extinguished. (Paras 19–23, 26)
2. BNSS—Section 193(8)—Non-filing of additional copies of charge-sheet—Effect.
   Failure to file additional indexed copies of the police report and accompanying documents as contemplated under Section 193(8) BNSS does not invalidate the charge-sheet and does not confer any right to default bail under Section 187(3) BNSS. (Paras 21–25, 27)
3. BNSS—Sections 193(3), 193(8) and 230—Construction.
   Section 193(3) prescribes the essential contents of the police report; Section 193(8) requires filing of additional copies for supply to the accused; and Section 230 fixes the timeline for furnishing copies. Non-compliance with Section 193(8) or delay in supplying copies under Section 230 does not equate to non-filing of the police report for the purpose of default bail. (Paras 17–23)
4. Default Bail—Right under Article 21—Nature.
   The right to default bail is an indefeasible statutory right flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution. However, the right is conditional and survives only until a valid police report is filed within the prescribed statutory period. (Paras 20–23)
5. Charge-sheet—Incomplete filing of documents—Effect.
   Even where all documents relied upon by the prosecution do not accompany the charge-sheet, the police report is not rendered invalid. Such omission neither vitiates the charge-sheet nor revives the right to default bail. (Paras 22–25)
6. Interpretation of procedural provisions—Section 193(8) BNSS.
   The requirement to furnish additional copies of the police report under Section 193(8) BNSS is procedural and cannot be construed so as to enlarge the scope of Section 187(3) BNSS relating to default bail. (Paras 23–25)
7. Default Bail—Cognizance taken—Effect.
   Where a charge-sheet complying with Section 193(3) BNSS has been filed within limitation and cognizance has been taken by the competent court, the accused cannot seek default bail on the ground that copies of the charge-sheet were supplied subsequently. (Paras 26–27)
8. Default Bail and Regular Bail—Distinct considerations.
   Consideration of default bail is independent of the merits of the prosecution case. Rejection of default bail does not preclude the accused from seeking regular bail, which must be considered independently on its own merits. (Para 28)

---

Cases Referred

• Saravanan v. State — right to default bail under Article 21. (Para 20)
• Fakhrey Alam v. State of Uttar Pradesh — default bail as an indefeasible right. (Para 20)
• State v. T. Gangi Reddy — object of default bail. (Para 20)
• Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain v. State of Maharashtra — right ceases on filing of charge-sheet. (Para 20)
• SFIO v. Rahul Modi — filing of charge-sheet extinguishes default bail. (Para 20)
• Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam — application for default bail may be oral. (Para 20)
• Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab — liberal approach in matters of personal liberty. (Para 20)
• Judgebir Singh v. National Investigation Agency — filing of police report extinguishes right to default bail. (Para 21)
• Central Bureau of Investigation v. Kapil Wadhawan — non-filing of all documents does not invalidate charge-sheet. (Para 22)
• Central Bureau of Investigation v. R.S. Pai — requirement to file supporting documents is directory. (Para 24)
• Narendra Kumar Amin v. Central Bureau of Investigation — filing of police report complying with statutory requirements defeats claim for default bail. (Para 25)

Will—Registration—Effect. Registration of a Will does not by itself remove suspicious circumstances or dispense with the obligation of the propounder to establish its genuineness. Even a registered Will must satisfy the judicial conscience of the Court where suspicious features exist. (Paras 17–18, 32)

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Case: Sardari Lal v. Bishan Dass & Ors.
Citation: 2026 INSC 669 | Civil Appeal No. 10990 of 2016

Headnotes

1. Will—Proof—Burden of proof—Propounder.
   The burden of proving a Will lies upon its propounder. Proof of execution under Section 63 of the Succession Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act is only the first step. The propounder must further satisfy the judicial conscience of the Court that the Will represents the free and conscious testamentary act of the testator. (Paras 27–32)
2. Will—Suspicious circumstances—Duty of propounder.
   Where suspicious circumstances surround the execution of a Will, the propounder must satisfactorily explain such circumstances and dispel all legitimate doubts before the Will can be accepted as genuine. Mere formal proof of execution is insufficient. (Paras 28–32, 38–40)
3. Will—Meaning of "suspicious circumstances".
   Suspicious circumstances include any legitimate circumstance creating doubt regarding the genuineness of the Will, such as unjust exclusion of natural heirs, unnatural disposition, doubtful execution, participation of beneficiaries, unexplained alterations or any circumstance inconsistent with the normal course of human conduct. Such suspicion must be real and not the product of conjecture or fanciful imagination. (Paras 30–32, 38–40)
4. Will—Disinheritance of wife—Suspicious circumstance.
   Where a testator disinherits his wife, who had cordial relations with him and cared for him throughout his lifetime, in favour of distant relatives or strangers without convincing justification, such exclusion constitutes a significant suspicious circumstance requiring satisfactory explanation. (Paras 41–45)
5. Will—Reasons assigned in testament—Court's scrutiny.
   Although a testator is not legally bound to record reasons for making a bequest, where reasons are stated in the Will, the Court is entitled to examine whether they are genuine or merely a facade to justify an otherwise suspicious disposition. (Paras 43–45)
6. Will—Registration—Effect.
   Registration of a Will does not by itself remove suspicious circumstances or dispense with the obligation of the propounder to establish its genuineness. Even a registered Will must satisfy the judicial conscience of the Court where suspicious features exist. (Paras 17–18, 32)
7. Will—Unexplained alterations in registration endorsement.
   Material and unexplained cuttings or alterations in the registration endorsement, particularly regarding the identity of the executant, constitute serious suspicious circumstances. Failure to explain such alterations may justify rejection of the Will. (Paras 14, 40)
8. Civil Procedure—Admissions—Alternative pleadings.
   A plaintiff may raise inconsistent or alternative pleas. An alternative plea that a Will is vitiated by fraud, undue influence or coercion does not amount to an admission of its execution where the principal plea is that no Will was ever executed. (Paras 35–37)
9. Evidence—Admissions—Doctrine of non-traverse.
   Facts specifically pleaded in the plaint and not specifically denied in the written statement stand admitted under Order VIII Rule 5 CPC and ordinarily require no further proof. (Paras 37)
10. Evidence—Failure of plaintiff to enter witness box.
    Where the plaintiff's title is founded upon admitted facts and the defendant seeks to defeat that title by propounding a Will, mere non-examination of the plaintiff or other witnesses does not relieve the propounder of the burden of proving the Will in accordance with law. (Paras 37–38)
11. Second Appeal—Section 100 CPC—Concurrent findings regarding suspicious circumstances.
    Findings regarding existence of suspicious circumstances surrounding a Will and the sufficiency of their explanation are primarily findings of fact. Interference in second appeal is impermissible unless a substantial question of law genuinely arises. (Issue 4; Paras 25, 32 and subsequent discussion)
12. Will—Judicial conscience—Governing principle.
    In cases involving disputed Wills, the ultimate test is whether the evidence inspires confidence and satisfies the judicial conscience of the Court that the testament truly represents the free and informed intention of the testator. (Paras 28–32, 38–40)

Cases Referred

• H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma
• Rani Purnima Debi v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb
• Jaswant Kaur v. Amrit Kaur
• Kalyan Singh v. Chhoti
• Shivakumar v. Sharanabasappa
• Lilian Coelho v. Myra Philomena Coelho
• Madhukar D. Shende v. Tarabai Aba Shedage

Artificial Intelligence — Judicial use — Human control. Artificial Intelligence may legitimately assist judicial administration and legal research; however, adjudication, legal reasoning and decision-making must remain under complete human supervision. AI is only an aid and cannot substitute judicial application of mind. (Paras 1–6).

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(A) Artificial Intelligence (AI) — Judicial adjudication — Use of AI-generated material — Zero tolerance.
Courts must adopt a policy of zero tolerance towards the production, citation or reliance upon AI-generated fake, non-existent or hallucinated precedents. Any decision founded, even partly, upon such material undermines the integrity of the adjudicatory process and cannot be sustained. (Paras 6–9, 15–17).

(B) Judicial Decision-making — AI-generated fake precedents — Effect.
A judgment or order based upon fake, hallucinated or non-existent judicial precedents is no decision in the eye of law. Such use contaminates the decision-making process, subverts the rule of law and renders the judgment liable to be set aside irrespective of the extent of its influence on the final decision. (Paras 7, 15–18).

(C) Advocates — Professional misconduct — Citation of AI-generated fake precedents.
It constitutes professional misconduct for an advocate to cite AI-generated fake or hallucinated precedents without proper verification. The Bar Council of India was directed to formulate appropriate guidelines and disciplinary norms to prevent such misconduct. (Paras 7–9).

(D) Judges and Tribunals — Reliance on AI-generated material — Duty of verification.
Reliance by a Judge or Tribunal upon fake or hallucinated AI-generated material amounts to a serious judicial lapse. While AI may be used as an aid to research, every precedent and legal proposition must be independently verified before being relied upon in judicial determination. (Paras 1–7, 15–17).

(E) Artificial Intelligence — Judicial use — Human control.
Artificial Intelligence may legitimately assist judicial administration and legal research; however, adjudication, legal reasoning and decision-making must remain under complete human supervision. AI is only an aid and cannot substitute judicial application of mind. (Paras 1–6).

(F) Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — S. 7 — Orders of NCLT and NCLAT based on fake precedents — Validity.
Where the National Company Law Tribunal relied upon fake, non-existent and AI-generated precedents and the error escaped scrutiny before the Appellate Tribunal, both orders were vitiated and liable to be set aside. The Section 7 application was restored to the file of the Adjudicating Authority for fresh consideration on merits uninfluenced by the earlier orders. (Paras 15–20).

(G) Judicial Process — Integrity of adjudication — Paramount consideration.
Maintenance of the purity and integrity of judicial decision-making is paramount. Any contamination of the adjudicatory process by fabricated or hallucinated legal authorities strikes at the root of the rule of law and warrants immediate corrective action by the appellate court. (Paras 6–9, 17–20).

O. VII R. 11(d) — Rejection of plaint — Object and scope. The object of Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC is to terminate, at the threshold, civil proceedings which, on a meaningful reading of the plaint itself, are barred by law. The provision is intended to prevent abuse of the judicial process and avoid unnecessary trial in suits which are ex facie not maintainable. (Paras 18–21). (B) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. VII R. 11(d) — Limitation — Suit for specific performance — Article 54, Limitation Act, 1963. Where the foundation of the suit is an agreement to sell executed decades earlier and the plaint does not disclose any satisfactory explanation for failure to institute proceedings within the statutory period of three years prescribed under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by limitation and the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. (Paras 22, 25–28).

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(A) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. VII R. 11(d) — Rejection of plaint — Object and scope.
The object of Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC is to terminate, at the threshold, civil proceedings which, on a meaningful reading of the plaint itself, are barred by law. The provision is intended to prevent abuse of the judicial process and avoid unnecessary trial in suits which are ex facie not maintainable. (Paras 18–21).

(B) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. VII R. 11(d) — Limitation — Suit for specific performance — Article 54, Limitation Act, 1963.
Where the foundation of the suit is an agreement to sell executed decades earlier and the plaint does not disclose any satisfactory explanation for failure to institute proceedings within the statutory period of three years prescribed under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, the suit is barred by limitation and the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. (Paras 22, 25–28).

(C) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. VII R. 11 — Rejection of plaint — Test to be applied.
While deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the Court must confine itself to the averments contained in the plaint read as a whole. The defence in the written statement or disputed questions of fact are wholly irrelevant. Where clever drafting creates an illusion of a cause of action or conceals a statutory bar, the Court must lift the veil and reject the plaint at the threshold. (Paras 19–21).

(D) Limitation — Specific performance — Right to sue — Accrual.
The period of limitation for a suit for specific performance commences when the right to sue first accrues. A subsequent judicial observation that no civil proceedings have yet been instituted does not create a fresh cause of action or revive a claim already barred by limitation. (Paras 24–25).

(E) Limitation — Delay of several decades — Effect.
A litigant who has remained silent for several decades without instituting proceedings cannot, as an afterthought, seek enforcement of an old agreement by ignoring the law of limitation. Such a suit is barred by law and constitutes an abuse of the process of Court. (Paras 22, 26–28).

(F) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. VII R. 11(d) — Rejection of plaint — Suit barred by limitation — Consequence.
Where the plaint itself discloses that the claim is hopelessly barred by limitation, the orders refusing rejection of the plaint are unsustainable and liable to be set aside, with rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. (Paras 26–28)

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 166 and 168 — Compensation — Assessment of annual income — Income-tax Returns — Governing principles. There is no rigid or universal formula for determining the annual income of a deceased or injured claimant on the basis of Income-tax Returns (ITRs). The paramount consideration under the Motor Vehicles Act is the award of just, fair and reasonable compensation. ITRs constitute an important statutory indicator of income but must be assessed in the light of the facts and circumstances of each case. (Paras 15–20).

advocatemmmohan

(A) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 166 and 168 — Compensation — Assessment of annual income — Income-tax Returns — Governing principles.

There is no rigid or universal formula for determining the annual income of a deceased or injured claimant on the basis of Income-tax Returns (ITRs). The paramount consideration under the Motor Vehicles Act is the award of just, fair and reasonable compensation. ITRs constitute an important statutory indicator of income but must be assessed in the light of the facts and circumstances of each case. (Paras 15–20).

(B) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Compensation — Salaried employees — Assessment of income.

For salaried persons, ordinarily the Income-tax Return of the immediately preceding assessment year constitutes the appropriate basis for determining annual income. Where the deceased or claimant had recently received a promotion and the enhanced income is not reflected in the return, the Court may rely upon the promotion order and other corroborative financial material. (Para 18).

(C) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Compensation — Self-employed persons and business income — Assessment of income.

In the case of self-employed persons or persons carrying on business, annual income should ordinarily be assessed with reference to the average income disclosed in the Income-tax Returns of the preceding three years. The Court must also consider surrounding circumstances including the nature of business, growth pattern, future potential, initial losses, geographical factors and other relevant circumstances affecting earning capacity. (Paras 19–20).

(D) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Income-tax Returns filed after death or injury — Evidentiary value.

Where Income-tax Returns are filed after the death or injury of the claimant, the Court must scrutinise them with greater care. If supported by balance sheets and other financial records, such returns may be relied upon; otherwise, surrounding business circumstances become decisive in assessing true income. (Para 20).

(E) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Compensation — Determination of business income — Judicial discretion.

Assessment of business income cannot rest upon a mechanical average of Income-tax Returns alone. The Court is empowered to determine a realistic annual income after considering the nature and potential of the business so as to ensure award of just compensation. (Paras 21–23).

(F) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Compensation — Insurance Agent — Assessment of income.

In the case of an Insurance Agent whose income is performance-oriented, averaging Income-tax Returns beyond the previous three years is unjustified. Income should be assessed keeping in view the fluctuating nature of commission-based earnings and the average of the immediately preceding three years. (Paras 9–12 of Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 3088 of 2025).

(G) Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Compensation — Self-employed trader — Income-tax Returns filed after death.

Where recent Income-tax Returns were filed after the death of the deceased and supporting financial records were unavailable, remand was considered inappropriate. Having regard to the available Income-tax Returns and the nature of the wholesale grocery business, the Court determined a reasonable annual income to ensure just compensation. (Paras 10–14 of Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No. 7735 of 2025). 

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Ss. 200, 209 and 244 — Complaint case exclusively triable by Court of Session — Recording of evidence by Magistrate before commitment — Not required. In a complaint case involving offences exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the Magistrate is not required to record prosecution evidence under Section 244 CrPC before committing the case under Section 209 CrPC. The duty of the Magistrate is confined to complying with the statutory requirements of commitment. (Paras 6–13).

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(A) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Ss. 200, 209 and 244 — Complaint case exclusively triable by Court of Session — Recording of evidence by Magistrate before commitment — Not required.
In a complaint case involving offences exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the Magistrate is not required to record prosecution evidence under Section 244 CrPC before committing the case under Section 209 CrPC. The duty of the Magistrate is confined to complying with the statutory requirements of commitment. (Paras 6–13).

(B) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — S. 209 — Commitment proceedings — Scope of Magistrate's jurisdiction.
At the stage of commitment under Section 209 CrPC, the Magistrate performs a limited statutory function. The Magistrate is not required to examine the merits of the prosecution case or evaluate the sufficiency of evidence, but only to ascertain whether the offence is exclusively triable by the Court of Session and thereafter commit the case in accordance with law. (Paras 7.2, 10–12).

(C) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — S. 244 — Applicability.
Section 244 CrPC applies to warrant cases instituted otherwise than on a police report which are triable by a Magistrate. The provision has no application where the complaint relates to offences exclusively triable by the Court of Session. (Paras 7.3, 8.1–8.3, 13).

(D) Criminal Procedure — Commitment proceedings — Legislative object.
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 deliberately abolished the elaborate pre-committal inquiry under the old Code of 1898 with the object of expeditious disposal of criminal cases. Requiring recording of prosecution evidence before commitment would defeat the legislative intent and revive a procedure consciously omitted by Parliament. (Paras 11–12.2).

(E) Criminal Procedure — Commitment — Duplication of evidence — Impermissibility.
Acceptance of the view that prosecution evidence under Section 244 CrPC must be recorded before commitment in Sessions triable complaint cases would compel witnesses to depose twice on the same facts without statutory sanction and would unnecessarily delay criminal trials. (Para 9).

(F) Criminal Procedure — Sessions triable complaint case — High Court — Remand to Magistrate for recording evidence under S. 244 CrPC — Legality.
The High Court erred in remanding the complaint to the Magistrate for compliance with Section 244 CrPC. Such remand being contrary to the scheme of the Code was liable to be set aside. The High Court was directed to decide the pending criminal revisions afresh on merits. (Paras 13–14). 

(A) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. XXIII R. 3 — Compromise decree — Essential requirements. After the 1976 amendment to the Code, a lawful compromise can be recorded only if it is in writing and signed by the parties or by a duly authorised representative. Compliance with the mandatory requirements of Order XXIII Rule 3 is a condition precedent for passing a valid compromise decree. (Paras 5.1–5.2). (B) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. XXIII R. 3 — Compromise by Advocate — Authority to compromise. An advocate has no implied authority to surrender or conclude the substantive rights of the client by entering into a compromise unless expressly authorised or justified by exigent circumstances. In the absence of express authorisation or proof of necessity, a compromise signed or accepted on behalf of the client is invalid. (Paras 5.2(f), 5.3–5.6). (C) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. XXIII R. 3 — Compromise decree — Duty of Court. While recording a compromise, the Court is not a mere recording authority. It must apply its judicial mind to satisfy itself that the compromise is lawful, voluntary and in conformity with the requirements of Order XXIII Rule 3 before affixing its seal of approval. (Paras 5.2(e), (g), 5.6). (D) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. XXIII R. 3 — Voluntary consent — Absence of signature of party. Where the compromise petition does not bear the signature of the concerned party and there is no material establishing express authorisation to counsel, the voluntary consent contemplated by Order XXIII Rule 3 is absent and the compromise decree is contrary to law. (Paras 5.3–5.6). (E) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — S. 151 — Compromise decree obtained by fraud — Recall — Delay. The inherent power under Section 151 CPC may be exercised to recall a compromise decree alleged to have been obtained by fraud. Mere delay, however long, cannot be permitted to perpetuate an illegal or fraudulent decree where substantive rights are affected. (Paras 6.1–6.7). (F) Limitation — Fraud — Delay of 25 years — Effect. Though limitation is an important principle of law, it cannot be employed to defeat substantive rights or perpetuate an illegality. Where fraud is alleged, the compromise is prima facie contrary to law, and foundational facts remain seriously disputed, extraordinary delay may, in the facts of the case, be condoned. Such indulgence is not to be treated as a general rule but depends upon the facts of each case. (Paras 6.3–6.7). (G) Partition Suit — Compromise decree set aside — Consequence. Where the compromise decree is found to be invalid for non-compliance with Order XXIII Rule 3 and material factual disputes remain unresolved, the proper course is to set aside the compromise decree and direct adjudication of the partition suit by a full-fledged trial on evidence. (Para 6.7).

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(A) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. XXIII R. 3 — Compromise decree — Essential requirements.
After the 1976 amendment to the Code, a lawful compromise can be recorded only if it is in writing and signed by the parties or by a duly authorised representative. Compliance with the mandatory requirements of Order XXIII Rule 3 is a condition precedent for passing a valid compromise decree. (Paras 5.1–5.2).

(B) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. XXIII R. 3 — Compromise by Advocate — Authority to compromise.
An advocate has no implied authority to surrender or conclude the substantive rights of the client by entering into a compromise unless expressly authorised or justified by exigent circumstances. In the absence of express authorisation or proof of necessity, a compromise signed or accepted on behalf of the client is invalid. (Paras 5.2(f), 5.3–5.6).

(C) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. XXIII R. 3 — Compromise decree — Duty of Court.
While recording a compromise, the Court is not a mere recording authority. It must apply its judicial mind to satisfy itself that the compromise is lawful, voluntary and in conformity with the requirements of Order XXIII Rule 3 before affixing its seal of approval. (Paras 5.2(e), (g), 5.6).

(D) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — O. XXIII R. 3 — Voluntary consent — Absence of signature of party.
Where the compromise petition does not bear the signature of the concerned party and there is no material establishing express authorisation to counsel, the voluntary consent contemplated by Order XXIII Rule 3 is absent and the compromise decree is contrary to law. (Paras 5.3–5.6).

(E) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — S. 151 — Compromise decree obtained by fraud — Recall — Delay.
The inherent power under Section 151 CPC may be exercised to recall a compromise decree alleged to have been obtained by fraud. Mere delay, however long, cannot be permitted to perpetuate an illegal or fraudulent decree where substantive rights are affected. (Paras 6.1–6.7).

(F) Limitation — Fraud — Delay of 25 years — Effect.
Though limitation is an important principle of law, it cannot be employed to defeat substantive rights or perpetuate an illegality. Where fraud is alleged, the compromise is prima facie contrary to law, and foundational facts remain seriously disputed, extraordinary delay may, in the facts of the case, be condoned. Such indulgence is not to be treated as a general rule but depends upon the facts of each case. (Paras 6.3–6.7).

(G) Partition Suit — Compromise decree set aside — Consequence.
Where the compromise decree is found to be invalid for non-compliance with Order XXIII Rule 3 and material factual disputes remain unresolved, the proper course is to set aside the compromise decree and direct adjudication of the partition suit by a full-fledged trial on evidence. (Para 6.7).

(E) Precedent — Larger Bench decision — Binding effect. A Bench of lesser or co-equal strength cannot disregard the ratio of an earlier larger Bench. Where an earlier three-Judge Bench has authoritatively declared the source of power under a remission policy, a later inconsistent decision of a smaller Bench is liable to be treated as per incuriam. (Paras 14–15).

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APEX COURT 

(A) Constitution of India — Art. 161 — Remission — Haryana Remission Policy, 2002 — Nature of power — Constitutional power of Governor.
The Haryana Remission Policy dated 12-04-2002 is an exercise of the Governor's constitutional power under Article 161. A subsequent statutory remission policy issued under Sections 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot override, supersede or curtail the constitutional power exercisable under Article 161. (Paras 9–13, 16).

(B) Constitution of India — Art. 161 — CrPC, 1973 — Ss. 432, 433 — Remission — Constitutional and statutory powers — Distinction.
The power of remission under Article 161 is distinct, independent and superior to the statutory powers under Sections 432 and 433 CrPC. A statutory policy framed under the Code cannot abrogate or supersede a remission policy operating under Article 161 of the Constitution. (Paras 9–10, 12–13, 16).

(C) Remission — Applicable Policy — Beneficial policy — Life convict.
Where the earlier remission policy is constitutional in character under Article 161, its operation is not displaced by a later statutory policy. The convict is entitled to consideration under the more beneficial constitutional policy. (Paras 10, 12–13, 16).

(D) Precedent — Per incuriam — Principles governing.
A judgment is per incuriam where its ratio is irreconcilable with an earlier decision rendered by a Bench of equal or larger strength, or where a binding statutory provision or binding precedent has not been noticed. The doctrine is an exception to stare decisis and must be invoked sparingly. Judicial discipline requires adherence to decisions of larger Benches. (Paras 14–15).

(E) Precedent — Larger Bench decision — Binding effect.
A Bench of lesser or co-equal strength cannot disregard the ratio of an earlier larger Bench. Where an earlier three-Judge Bench has authoritatively declared the source of power under a remission policy, a later inconsistent decision of a smaller Bench is liable to be treated as per incuriam. (Paras 14–15).

(F) Remission — Haryana Remission Policies, 2002 and 2008 — Applicability.
The observation in the 2008 statutory policy that it supersedes the 2002 Policy is ineffective insofar as the 2002 Policy derives its authority from Article 161 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the appellant's remission application is required to be considered under the 2002 Policy. (Paras 16–18).

(G) Prospective operation — Remission.
The declaration of law shall operate prospectively and shall not reopen remission applications already decided. The State may thereafter maintain separate constitutional and statutory remission policies. (Para 17). 

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — S. 187(3) — Default Bail — Scope — Filing of charge-sheet within statutory period — Effect of non-filing of additional copies of charge-sheet under S. 193(8). The indefeasible right to default bail arises only when the charge-sheet itself is not filed within the prescribed period of 60/90 days. Once a charge-sheet complying with the requirements of S. 193(3) BNSS is filed within limitation, the right to default bail stands extinguished. Mere non-filing of additional copies of the police report and documents required under S. 193(8) BNSS does not confer a right to default bail. (Paras 19, 21–27).

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APEX COURT 

A) Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — S. 187(3) — Default Bail — Scope — Filing of charge-sheet within statutory period — Effect of non-filing of additional copies of charge-sheet under S. 193(8).
The indefeasible right to default bail arises only when the charge-sheet itself is not filed within the prescribed period of 60/90 days. Once a charge-sheet complying with the requirements of S. 193(3) BNSS is filed within limitation, the right to default bail stands extinguished. Mere non-filing of additional copies of the police report and documents required under S. 193(8) BNSS does not confer a right to default bail. (Paras 19, 21–27).

(B) Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — Ss. 193(3), 193(8), 230 and 187(3) — Charge-sheet — Additional copies for supply to accused — Nature of requirement.
Section 193(8) requiring submission of additional copies of the police report for supply to the accused is procedural. Non-compliance therewith does not invalidate or vitiate the charge-sheet already filed in accordance with S. 193(3), nor can it be equated with non-filing of the charge-sheet for the purpose of claiming default bail under S. 187(3). (Paras 17–19, 23–25).

(C) Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — S. 230 — Supply of police report and documents — Fourteen-day period — Effect of breach.
The requirement of supplying copies of the police report and allied documents to the accused within fourteen days under S. 230 is distinct from the statutory right to default bail. Delay in supplying such copies may invite appropriate procedural remedies, but does not create an entitlement to default bail once the charge-sheet has been filed within the prescribed period. (Paras 18–19, 23, 26–27).

(D) Criminal Procedure — Default Bail — Nature of right.
Default bail is an indefeasible right flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution. However, it is a right available only till the filing of a valid charge-sheet within the statutory period. It is not a bail on merits and ceases upon timely filing of the police report. (Paras 20–23).

(E) Criminal Procedure — Charge-sheet — Non-filing of supporting documents — Effect.
Even where all supporting documents are not filed along with the charge-sheet, the charge-sheet is not rendered incomplete or invalid. The investigating agency may produce additional documents subsequently with the permission of the Court. Such omission does not revive or create a right to default bail. (Paras 22–25).

(F) Criminal Procedure — Regular Bail — Consideration independent of default bail.
Rejection of a claim for default bail does not preclude consideration of an application for regular bail. Such application must be decided independently on its own merits and uninfluenced by observations made while deciding the issue of default bail. (Para 28).

Information Technology Act, 2000 — S. 79 — Intermediaries — Non-joinder of uploaders/publisher — Maintainability of suit. Non-impleadment of the publisher, author of the book, or the persons who uploaded the impugned videos is not fatal at the prima facie stage. Where the identities of uploaders are not readily ascertainable from the Basic Subscriber Information (BSI), the suit cannot be dismissed for non-joinder. The intermediary platforms, through which the impugned content is disseminated, are necessary and proper parties. (Paras 23–25).

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Information Technology Act, 2000 — S. 79 — Intermediaries — Non-joinder of uploaders/publisher — Maintainability of suit. Non-impleadment of the publisher, author of the book, or the persons who uploaded the impugned videos is not fatal at the prima facie stage. Where the identities of uploaders are not readily ascertainable from the Basic Subscriber Information (BSI), the suit cannot be dismissed for non-joinder. The intermediary platforms, through which the impugned content is disseminated, are necessary and proper parties. (Paras 23–25).

Defamation — Internet publication — Video summarising previously restrained book — Defamatory content. Where the impugned videos are substantially a summary/paraphrase of a book whose offending portions had already been restrained by a previous judicial order, the videos also prima facie constitute defamatory content. A public figure does not forfeit the right to reputation merely because of public status. (Paras 26–33).

Information Technology Act, 2000 — S. 79 — Geo-blocking — Meaning. Geo-blocking is merely territorial or geographical blocking. Content remains available on global platforms outside the blocked territory and therefore amounts only to partial disablement of access. (Paras 50–54).

Information Technology Act, 2000 — S. 79 — Intermediaries — Global blocking — Court orders. Where intermediary platforms themselves remove content globally under their internal policies, there is no reason why a judicial order directing removal of unlawful content should be confined only to territorial geo-blocking. (Paras 51–54, 94).

Jurisdiction — Internet — Upload from India — Global dissemination. When defamatory material is uploaded from an IP address located in India and is thereafter replicated and disseminated globally through the intermediary's computer network, Indian courts possess jurisdiction to direct removal or disabling of such content from the entire computer resource and not merely from a geographically limited segment thereof. (Paras 80–82, 94).

Information Technology Act, 2000 — S. 79 — Global injunction — Uploads from India and abroad — Distinction. Content uploaded from IP addresses within India is liable to be removed or disabled globally. In respect of content uploaded from outside India, intermediaries may geo-block access within India, since the unlawful act is the dissemination of such content within India. (Paras 90–96).

Injunction — Global effect — Jurisdiction in personam. Indian courts are competent, in appropriate cases, to grant injunctions having global effect where the defendants are subject to the court's in personam jurisdiction. Such power is to be exercised sparingly and for good and sufficient reasons. (Paras 88–90).

Information Technology Act, 2000 — S. 79 — Effectiveness of judicial orders. Orders directing removal or disabling of unlawful online content must be effective and complete. Restricting relief only to geo-blocking where the circumstances warrant wider relief would render the court's order ineffective, as the offending material would continue to remain accessible through global platforms. (Paras 92–94).

Relief — Moulding of relief — Where, after a full-fledged trial, the Court records findings establishing the entitlement of a person connected with the litigation though the plaintiff, in the capacity in which the suit was instituted, is found not entitled to the relief claimed, the Court may, in exceptional circumstances, mould the relief in favour of the person legally entitled, instead of driving such person to a fresh suit, provided the controversy has been fully adjudicated, no prejudice is caused to the opposite party, and such course alone would shorten litigation and render complete justice. (Paras 20–24) Alternative formulation Civil Procedure — Moulding of relief — Mere failure of the plaintiff's pleaded capacity to establish title does not necessarily entail dismissal of the suit. Where the evidence and findings conclusively establish the entitlement of another person already before the Court, and the defendants have fully contested the issue without prejudice, the Court may exercise its equitable jurisdiction to mould the relief in favour of such person to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. (Paras 22–24)

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Relief — Moulding of relief — Where, after a full-fledged trial, the Court records findings establishing the entitlement of a person connected with the litigation though the plaintiff, in the capacity in which the suit was instituted, is found not entitled to the relief claimed, the Court may, in exceptional circumstances, mould the relief in favour of the person legally entitled, instead of driving such person to a fresh suit, provided the controversy has been fully adjudicated, no prejudice is caused to the opposite party, and such course alone would shorten litigation and render complete justice. (Paras 20–24)

Alternative formulation

Civil Procedure — Moulding of relief — Mere failure of the plaintiff's pleaded capacity to establish title does not necessarily entail dismissal of the suit. Where the evidence and findings conclusively establish the entitlement of another person already before the Court, and the defendants have fully contested the issue without prejudice, the Court may exercise its equitable jurisdiction to mould the relief in favour of such person to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. (Paras 22–24)