LANDLORD–TENANT – DENIAL OF TITLE – SUBSEQUENT SUIT FOR DECLARATION AND POSSESSION – TENANT’S WIFE SETTING UP AGREEMENT OF SALE – BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF. 1st plaintiff’s son had let out the plaint schedule shop to 1st defendant on monthly rent of Rs.600/- for running “Prasad Textiles”. On default in rent, eviction proceedings (R.C.C. No.3/1999) were initiated; in those proceedings, the tenant denied the landlord’s title and pleaded that his wife (2nd defendant) had already purchased the shop under agreement of sale dated 06-08-1997 and was in possession as owner. In view of this denial of title and assertion of ownership, plaintiffs instituted the present suit for declaration and recovery of possession. Courts below held, and High Court accepted, that once the tenant repudiates the jural relationship by setting up a purchase through his wife, the onus is squarely on the defendants to prove the alleged sale arrangement strictly. Defendants failed to discharge this burden: Ex.B1 was unregistered, pronounced forged by a handwriting expert, and inconsistent with the admitted ancestral nature of the property. Their plea of ownership consequently failed, and plaintiffs’ title stood.

1. CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908 – SECTION 100 – SECOND APPEAL – CONCURRENT FINDINGS ON TITLE AND POSSESSION – NO SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW – SCOPE OF INTERFERENCE.
   Plaintiffs (landlords) sued for declaration of title and recovery of possession of non-residential premises (cloth shop) with mesne profits. Defendants 2 to 5 (family of original tenant) relied on an unregistered agreement of sale (Ex.B1, dated 06-08-1997) allegedly executed by plaintiff No.1 and her brother (Vedam Venkata Ramanaiah) in favour of 2nd defendant and set up absolute ownership in her. Trial Court, on detailed appreciation of oral and documentary evidence including expert opinion (Ex.X1) branding Ex.B1 as a forged document and admissions of D.Ws that the property was ancestral, held that plaintiffs 2–6 were absolute owners and decreed declaration, possession and mesne profits. First appellate Court confirmed. In second appeal, High Court held that the challenge was essentially to concurrent factual findings; no perversity, non-consideration of material evidence, or misapplication of legal principle was demonstrated. Reiterating that under Section 100 CPC, interference is confined to substantial questions of law and not to re-appreciation of evidence, the Court declined to interfere. Second appeal dismissed at admission; six months’ time granted to vacate.

2. LANDLORD–TENANT – DENIAL OF TITLE – SUBSEQUENT SUIT FOR DECLARATION AND POSSESSION – TENANT’S WIFE SETTING UP AGREEMENT OF SALE – BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF.
   1st plaintiff’s son had let out the plaint schedule shop to 1st defendant on monthly rent of Rs.600/- for running “Prasad Textiles”. On default in rent, eviction proceedings (R.C.C. No.3/1999) were initiated; in those proceedings, the tenant denied the landlord’s title and pleaded that his wife (2nd defendant) had already purchased the shop under agreement of sale dated 06-08-1997 and was in possession as owner. In view of this denial of title and assertion of ownership, plaintiffs instituted the present suit for declaration and recovery of possession. Courts below held, and High Court accepted, that once the tenant repudiates the jural relationship by setting up a purchase through his wife, the onus is squarely on the defendants to prove the alleged sale arrangement strictly. Defendants failed to discharge this burden: Ex.B1 was unregistered, pronounced forged by a handwriting expert, and inconsistent with the admitted ancestral nature of the property. Their plea of ownership consequently failed, and plaintiffs’ title stood.

3. EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 – EXPERT EVIDENCE – HANDWRITING EXPERT – UNREGISTERED AGREEMENT OF SALE FOUND FORGED – EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT.
   Ex.B1, the alleged agreement of sale dated 06-08-1997, was sent to a handwriting expert (P.W.2) at plaintiffs’ instance. P.W.2’s opinion (Ex.X1) was that the document was forged. Defendants 1 and 2, along with attestors and scribe (D.Ws.3 to 5), supported Ex.B1 in their oral evidence, but cross-examination yielded significant admissions: (i) D.W.2 admitted that the plaint schedule shop and other properties were ancestral properties of Vedam Saraswathamma and Vedam Venkata Ramanaiah; (ii) D.W.5 also admitted the ancestral character; (iii) D.W.1 admitted that 2nd plaintiff managed the properties after the death of Venkata Ramanaiah. Courts below preferred the expert’s scientific opinion, corroborated by the inherent improbability of unilateral alienation of ancestral property by one co-heir without necessity or consent, over the self-serving testimony of interested witnesses. Ex.B1 was held to be a forged and fabricated document “pressed into service only to squat over the plaint schedule property for a meagre rent of Rs.600/-”. High Court treated this factual conclusion as a proper appreciation of evidence not open to interference in second appeal.

4. TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882 – SECTIONS 5 & 54 – REGISTRATION ACT, 1908 – SECTIONS 17 & 49 – UNREGISTERED AGREEMENT OF SALE – NO TRANSFER OF TITLE – MORE SO WHEN PROPERTY IS ADMITTEDLY ANCESTRAL.
   Ex.B1 was an unregistered agreement of sale for Rs.1,00,000/-, allegedly coupled with delivery of possession. High Court endorsed the view of the Courts below that:
   (i) being an unregistered agreement, Ex.B1 could not effect transfer of ownership in immovable property; no title passed even if entire consideration was alleged to have been paid;
   (ii) in any event, the shop was admitted to be part of the ancestral properties of Vedam Viswanadham and his brother Venkata Ramanaiah; hence plaintiff No.1 and her brother, as co-sharers, could not convey exclusive title in favour of 2nd defendant so as to divest the other heirs (plaintiffs 2–6);
   (iii) once Ex.B1 was found forged, defendants had no legal foundation for their claim.
   Accordingly, the Courts rightly refused to recognise any right, title, or even protective equity in favour of 2nd defendant on the basis of Ex.B1.

5. JOINT FAMILY / ANCESTRAL PROPERTY – CO-HEIR’S POWER TO ALIENATE – EFFECT VIS-À-VIS OTHER HEIRS.
   On defendants’ own admissions, the plaint schedule shop formed part of the ancestral estate inherited by Vedam Saraswathamma and her sons Viswanadham and Venkata Ramanaiah. D.W.1 admitted that after Viswanadham’s death, his younger brother Venkata Ramanaiah managed the entire property, that he died unmarried in 1998, and that after him 2nd plaintiff managed the properties. In such a matrix, even if Ex.B1 were genuine (which it was not), neither 1st plaintiff nor Venkata Ramanaiah could, without legal necessity or the consent of all heirs, convey an absolute title in the joint/ancestral shop to 2nd defendant. High Court agreed with the Courts below that ancestral character plus lack of legal necessity meant that 2nd defendant could not claim better title than her vendors; plaintiffs 2–6, as heirs, retained their ownership and were rightly declared absolute owners.

6. SUCCESSION – ALLEGED WILL BY PLAINTIFF No.1 – COMPETING CLAIM OF DEFENDANT No.6 – SECTION 100 CPC – FINDING ON VALIDITY OF WILL LEFT UNDISTURBED.
   Defendant No.6 (grandson through plaintiff No.5) propounded a Will dated 27-07-2005 allegedly executed by plaintiff No.1 bequeathing, inter alia, the suit shop to him. Additional issues were framed on the validity and binding nature of the Will. The trial Court, on evidence, rejected the Will as not affecting plaintiffs 2–6’s rights and decreed the suit in their favour. The appellate Court affirmed. In second appeal, although the appellant attempted to invoke the Will dispute as a substantial question, High Court treated the findings on the Will as pure questions of fact and declined to reopen them, noting that no perversity or legal misdirection was shown.

7. CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908 – ORDER XLI RULE 31 – APPELLATE JUDGMENT – COMPLIANCE – SECOND APPEAL PLEA REJECTED.
   One substantial question framed by the appellants was whether the first appellate Court’s judgment complied with Order XLI Rule 31 CPC. High Court, on examination, found that the appellate Court had: (i) formulated appropriate points for determination; (ii) discussed the evidence of each material witness; and (iii) given reasons for affirming the trial Court. It therefore held that the appellate judgment satisfied the statutory requirements and that the complaint under Order XLI Rule 31 did not give rise to any substantial question of law.

8. MESNE PROFITS – CONFIRMATION IN SECOND APPEAL.
   Trial Court awarded Rs.43,200/- towards past mesne profits for wrongful use and occupation by defendants 2–5 from 01-12-1999 to 30-11-2002, in addition to declaration and possession. The appellate Court confirmed this relief. High Court, having upheld the concurrent findings on title and on the forged nature of Ex.B1 and seeing no perversity on the quantum, allowed the mesne profits decree to stand and only granted time (six months) to vacate and deliver vacant possession.

ANALYSIS AND LEGAL CONTEXT

(i) Factual architecture and litigation trajectory

• The shop in question is part of an ancestral commercial block standing in the name of the Vedam family. It was let out by a member of that family (Vedam Seetharamaiah, son of plaintiff No.1) to the 1st defendant, who ran “Prasad Textiles”.

• Upon rent default, the landlord initiated eviction proceedings (R.C.C. No.3/1999). Faced with eviction, the tenant denied the landlord’s title and claimed that his wife (2nd defendant) had already “purchased” the shop from plaintiff No.1 and her brother, under an agreement of sale dated 06-08-1997. On that basis he disputed the jural relationship itself.

• Once denial of landlord’s title was taken on oath in the rent case, the plaintiffs bifurcated the remedies: they filed a civil suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession, including mesne profits; the rent control route was no longer an adequate or appropriate forum to resolve title.

(ii) Pleadings and issues – how the case was structured

The plaint asserted:

• ancestral origin of the property in the Vedam line;

• succession to that estate by plaintiff No.1 and her children (plaintiffs 2-6);

• tenancy of 1st defendant and his default;

• denial of title in RCC and setting up of Ex.B1, compelling a declaration suit.

Defence lines:

• Defendants 1, 2, 3 and 5 (essentially the tenant and his close family) adopted a common stand: that 2nd defendant purchased the shop on 06-08-1997 from 1st plaintiff and Vedam Venkata Ramanaiah for Rs.1,00,000/- under an agreement of sale (Ex.B1), that entire consideration was paid and possession handed over, and that she had since been in possession as absolute owner. They thus denied any landlord–tenant relationship.

• Defendant No.6, a grandson, sought to carve out a competing title through a Will dated 27-07-2005 said to have been executed by plaintiff No.1.

The trial Court framed core issues around: (a) plaintiffs’ title and entitlement to possession; (b) mesne profits; (c) genuineness and effect of the Will; and (d) genuineness and binding nature of Ex.B1. This is important because the High Court later notes that all material pleas were correctly translated into issues, which strengthens the concurrent findings.

(iii) Treatment of Ex.B1 – both on fact and law

On the factual plane:

• Ex.B1 was subjected to expert examination; P.W.2, a handwriting expert, opined (Ex.X1) that the signatures attributed to plaintiff No.1 and to Vedam Venkata Ramanaiah were not genuine.

• Defendants examined D.Ws.1 and 2 (defendants 1 & 2) and D.Ws.3 to 5 (scribe and attestors) to prop up Ex.B1, but admissions in cross-examination undercut their position:

  • D.W.2 admitted that the plaint schedule shop and other properties were ancestral to Venkata Ramanaiah and Viswanadham.

  • D.W.5 confirmed that the suit shop formed part of the ancestral estate of Saraswathamma and her sons.

  • D.W.1 admitted that after the death of Viswanadham, his younger brother Venkata Ramanaiah managed the entire property, that he died unmarried in 1998, and that after him 2nd plaintiff managed the entire property.

Those admissions, read with the expert’s opinion, made the trial Court comfortable in branding Ex.B1 “forged and fabricated”, not merely “suspicious”.

On the legal plane:

• Even assuming Ex.B1 to be genuine, it was merely an unregistered agreement of sale. By itself, it does not convey title (Section 54 TPA; Sections 17 & 49 Registration Act). At best, it could support a plea under Section 53A TPA (part performance), which presupposes clean pleadings, readiness and willingness, and a valid underlying contract – all of which were absent here.

• More critically, the property was admitted to be ancestral/co-owned estate. Even a genuine agreement by one co-heir without necessity cannot operate to divest the shares of all other heirs or to convert the property into exclusive self-acquisition of the purchaser, unless shown to be for legal necessity and subsequently ratified. No such case was made.

Thus, the agreement was legally incapable of conferring full title and factually disbelieved and branded forged. The High Court emphasises both aspects: first the expert evidence and admissions collapsing Ex.B1, then the registration/ancestral property angle to show that even absent forgery, the defendants’ title theory was untenable.

(iv) How the Courts handled the Will propounded by defendant No.6

Defendant No.6’s case was that, by virtue of a Will dated 27-07-2005 (executed by plaintiff No.1), he became the absolute owner of properties including the suit shop. Plaintiffs countered that this Will was not genuine and that they were the legal heirs.

The trial Court:

• framed a specific additional issue on the Will’s validity and binding nature;

• examined evidence and rejected the Will as either not proved in accordance with Section 68 of the Evidence Act or not displacing the plaintiffs’ rights.

The first appellate Court affirmed that view. In second appeal, the High Court notes this entire exercise and treats it as factual adjudication properly done. Since the appellants (defendants 2–5) could not show that the Will finding was contrary to any mandatory legal requirement (e.g., wrong burden, failure to apply Section 63 Succession Act / Section 68 Evidence Act), the High Court declined to re-open that track.

Subtext for you as counsel: if you wish to attack or defend a Will finding in second appeal, you must pin it to legal error (wrong test for due execution/attestation, misplacement of burden, non-compliance with statutory mandates), not merely “the witnesses should have been believed/disbelieved”.

(v) The Section 100 CPC analysis – why the appeal fails at the threshold

The judgment contains a neat, self-contained paragraph explaining “substantial question of law”:

• It must directly and substantially affect the rights of parties.

• It must be more than technical/academic.

• It arises where findings are:

  • recorded without any evidence,

  • given in disregard of material evidence,

  • based on inadmissible evidence, or

  • perverse.

The appellants tried to dress up factual complaints as questions of law:

• that the appellate Court did not comply with Order XLI Rule 31;

• that Courts “misinterpreted” Ex.B1;

• that no succession certificate had been obtained;

• that no proper issues were framed.

The High Court answers these, implicitly, as follows:

1. The appellate judgment did comply with Order XLI Rule 31 – points for determination, discussion, and reasons are all present.

2. Interpretation of Ex.B1 was not a “legal construction” question but a factual exercise of weighing genuineness, supported by expert evidence.

3. A suit for declaration and possession on heirship basis does not require a succession certificate; succession certificates are required primarily for debts and securities, not for immovable property suits. Hence, that question itself didn’t raise any legal difficulty.

4. Proper issues were framed (including on agreement and Will) and additional issues added when new defences emerged. There was no prejudice for want of issues.

Because the appellants failed to tie any of these points to a genuine legal misdirection, the High Court concluded that the second appeal was an attempt to secure a third round of fact-finding, which Section 100 CPC does not permit.