Defamation — Libel — Newspaper publication — Qualified privilege — Scope Held, mere publication on a subject of public interest does not by itself confer qualified privilege on a newspaper. For qualified privilege to attach, the publisher must establish a reciprocal duty and interest between communicator and recipient. Public interest alone is insufficient. (Paras 19–23)

advocatemmmohan

Defamation — Libel — Newspaper publication — Qualified privilege — Scope

Held, mere publication on a subject of public interest does not by itself confer qualified privilege on a newspaper. For qualified privilege to attach, the publisher must establish a reciprocal duty and interest between communicator and recipient. Public interest alone is insufficient.
(Paras 19–23)

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Defamation — Qualified privilege — Duty to communicate — Journalist

A journalist has no higher privilege than an ordinary citizen. There is no general duty cast upon newspapers to publish defamatory matter merely because the subject concerns public affairs. The defence of qualified privilege requires proof of a legal, social or moral duty to communicate, recognised by ordinary standards of society.
(Paras 20–25)

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Defamation — Public interest — Fair comment distinguished

Right to fair comment on matters of public interest is distinct from qualified privilege. Confusing the two is impermissible. Even during matters of wide public concern, defamatory statements of fact must be justified or defended under fair comment, not privilege.
(Paras 22–24)

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Defamation — Malice — Express malice — Burden of proof

Once privilege is claimed, the burden lies on the plaintiff to prove express malice. Express malice includes reckless disregard for truth, improper motive, or publication driven by hostility or prejudice. Prior animosity and predetermined intent to defame are relevant indicators.
(Paras 26–37)

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Defamation — Evidence — Prior conduct of defendant

Earlier defamatory publications, forced apologies, and admissions evidencing hostility are relevant to infer express malice in a subsequent libel.
(Paras 27–28)

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Damages — Defamation — Exemplary damages — Permissibility

Exemplary or punitive damages are not ordinarily awardable in libel actions. Damages are compensatory in nature, except in two categories:
(i) oppressive or unconstitutional acts by the State, and
(ii) cases where the defendant calculated profit exceeding compensation.
(Paras 38–41)

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Damages — Aggravated damages — Scope

Aggravated damages may be awarded within the compensatory framework where the defendant’s conduct is high-handed, oppressive, or insulting, increasing mental suffering and injury to reputation.
(Paras 41–44)

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Damages — Quantum — Appellate interference

Where exemplary damages are wrongly awarded, appellate courts are bound to interfere. Reduction justified where claim is excessive and disproportionate to proven injury.
(Paras 45–48)

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Joint tort-feasors — Single decree — Modification on appeal

In libel by joint tort-feasors, there must be a single decree for total damages. Appellate court may vary decree against non-appealing defendants under Order XLI Rules 4 & 33 CPC.
(Paras 49–50)

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II. ANALYSIS OF FACTS

1. The plaintiff, a prominent industrialist and holder of several public and quasi-public positions, sued for libel arising from an article published in the weekly newspaper Blitz.
   (Paras 1–4)

2. The article alleged large-scale tax evasion, financial jugglery, abuse of official position, import-export rackets, and corruption, portraying the plaintiff as the head of an illicit financial empire.
   (Paras 10–14)

3. Defendants admitted publication and responsibility. Defences raised were:

   • justification,

   • fair comment,

   • qualified privilege.
     (Para 5)

4. At appellate stage, justification and fair comment were abandoned; arguments confined to qualified privilege and quantum of damages.
   (Para 7)

5. Evidence disclosed longstanding hostility of defendant No.1 towards the plaintiff, including a prior libel episode in 1947 ending in an apology, which the defendant admitted was against his conviction.
   (Paras 27–28)

6. The editor admitted having a “bad impression” of the plaintiff and having decided to “expose” him even before verifying material supplied by defendant No.4.
   (Para 27)

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III. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Qualified Privilege

1. The Court reaffirmed classical common-law principles from Toogood v. Spyring and Adam v. Ward, holding that qualified privilege depends on duty and reciprocity, not merely public curiosity.
   (Paras 8–23)

2. Newspapers enjoy no special immunity. Journalistic freedom is co-extensive with, not superior to, that of ordinary citizens.
   (Paras 22–24)

3. Indian constitutional policy against concentration of wealth does not create a journalistic duty to defame without proof.
   (Para 16)

4. The Court rejected the argument that exposing governmental inaction creates a new duty justifying privilege.
   (Para 25)

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B. Express Malice

1. Express malice was inferred from:

   • preconceived hostility,

   • reckless publication without verification,

   • persistence in defamatory allegations,

   • litigation conduct aggravating injury.
     (Paras 26–37, 44)

2. Consequently, even assuming privilege, it stood defeated by express malice.
   (Para 37)

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C. Damages

1. Trial court erred in awarding exemplary damages.
   (Paras 38–41)

2. However, aggravated damages were justified due to:

   • gravity of allegations,

   • plaintiff’s standing,

   • conduct of defendants during trial.
     (Paras 44–45)

3. Claim of Rs. 3,00,000 was held excessive; reduced to Rs. 1,50,000 as fair compensation.
   (Para 48)

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IV. FINAL HOLDING

• Defence of qualified privilege rejected.

• Finding of express malice affirmed.

• Exemplary damages set aside; compensatory aggravated damages sustained.

• Decree modified by reducing damages to Rs. 1,50,000.

• Single modified decree applies to all joint tort-feasors.
  (Paras 48–51)