Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 Condonation of delay — Second appeal — Knowledge of decree Where appellant pleads lack of knowledge of the appellate decree and explains delay on that basis, rejection of condonation application without proper enquiry into such explanation is unsustainable — Delay of 650 days condoned in the interest of justice. [Paras 5, 14–15]

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Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5

Condonation of delay — Second appeal — Knowledge of decree

Where appellant pleads lack of knowledge of the appellate decree and explains delay on that basis, rejection of condonation application without proper enquiry into such explanation is unsustainable — Delay of 650 days condoned in the interest of justice.
[Paras 5, 14–15]

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Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Section 100

Second appeal — Dismissal at threshold on limitation

Second appeal cannot be dismissed mechanically on the ground of limitation when explanation for delay raises triable issues — High Court required to examine whether sufficient cause exists before foreclosing statutory remedy.
[Paras 13–16]

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Ex parte decree — Appellate stage

Lack of opportunity of hearing

Where decree for specific performance is passed ex parte at appellate stage, denial of opportunity to contest on merits is a relevant factor while considering condonation of delay.
[Paras 7, 12, 15]

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Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Section 16

Specific performance — Discretionary relief

Decree for specific performance being discretionary in nature, courts should be slow to deny opportunity of hearing on technical grounds of limitation, particularly when serious factual and legal issues arise.
[Paras 7, 12, 15]

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Limitation — Appeals pending at appellate stage

Liberal approach

In matters pending at appellate stage, particularly where appeals are not listed periodically, courts should adopt a liberal approach in condoning delay, following principles laid down in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom.
[Paras 8, 15]

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Natural justice — Substantial justice over technicality

Procedural law should not be applied in a manner that defeats substantial justice — Technical dismissal on limitation, without examining bona fides of explanation, is liable to be interfered with.
[Paras 14–16]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Scope of “Sufficient Cause” under Section 5

The Court reiterates that while limitation law must be applied, condonation of delay depends on acceptability of explanation, not merely length of delay. Explanation based on lack of knowledge of decree warrants judicial scrutiny and cannot be rejected summarily (Paras 5, 14).

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B. Liberal Approach at Appellate Stage

Relying on Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom, the Court emphasises that when matters are pending at appellate stage:

• litigants often rely on counsel for intimation;

• appeals may not be listed for long periods;

• strict standards applied at institution stage are diluted.

Hence, a lenient and justice-oriented approach is required (Paras 8, 15).

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C. Ex parte Decree for Specific Performance

The Court places weight on the fact that:

• specific performance is discretionary;

• decree was passed ex parte in first appellate court;

• appellant was denied effective opportunity of hearing.

Such circumstances justify condonation to enable adjudication on merits (Paras 7, 12, 15).

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D. Error in High Court’s Approach

The Supreme Court finds fault with the High Court for:

• disbelieving explanation of change of address without enquiry;

• giving overriding importance to accrued rights of respondent;

• dismissing appeal solely on limitation.

This approach was held contrary to settled principles governing condonation of delay (Paras 13–15).

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E. Balance between Limitation and Justice

While acknowledging long pendency and accrued rights, the Court holds that substantial justice must prevail, especially where refusal to condone delay results in irreversible consequences (Paras 14–16).

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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS FOUND)

• Suit for specific performance filed in 2001 based on agreement dated 18-02-1998 (Paras 3, 12).

• Trial Court partly decreed suit only for refund (Para 3).

• First appellate court decreed specific performance ex parte (Para 4).

• Appellant filed second appeal with 650 days delay, explaining lack of knowledge due to non-service and change of address (Paras 5, 14).

• High Court rejected condonation solely on limitation (Paras 6, 13).

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IV. FINAL HOLDING / RESULT

• Impugned judgment of High Court set aside.

• Delay in filing second appeal condoned.

• High Court directed to consider second appeal for admission expeditiously and dispose of it on merits.

• Observations not to affect merits of appeal.
  [Paras 15–18]

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Ratio (Concise)

In second appeals, particularly where an ex parte decree for specific performance is involved, delay attributable to lack of knowledge of decree should be examined liberally; dismissal on limitation without proper enquiry defeats substantial justice.