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CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908 – SECTION 100 – SECOND APPEAL – CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF FACT – NO SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW – SCOPE OF INTERFERENCE.
Plaintiff–assignee filed suit for bare injunction claiming possession over Ac.0.01 cent in Sy.No.130, on the strength of house-site patta (Ex.A1) and an alleged oral gift of half of the site to the Gram Panchayat. Defendant set up title and possession under a registered sale deed dated 08-08-2012 (Ex.B1) for Ac.0.03 cents in Sy.No.132, with identical boundaries, purchased from erstwhile occupants of “Patha Relli Veedhi”. Trial Court, after appreciating oral and documentary evidence, held that the plaintiff failed to prove present possession and dismissed the suit; first appellate Court confirmed. In second appeal, it was contended that Courts below mis-appreciated Exs.A1, A2 and evidence of P.Ws.1–3. High Court held that both Courts had in fact considered the entire evidence, that the conclusions were pure findings of fact, and that no perversity, misapplication of law, or ignoring of material evidence was shown. Reiterating the principles in Chandrabhan v. Saraswati and Jaichand v. Sahnulal on the narrow scope of Section 100 CPC, the Court held that no substantial question of law arose. Second appeal dismissed at admission; no costs. -
SUIT FOR PERPETUAL INJUNCTION – PLAINTIFF’S BURDEN TO PROVE POSSESSION ON DATE OF SUIT – ASSIGNED HOUSE-SITE PATTA – MERE PATTA NOT SUFFICIENT WHEN POSSESSION AND TITLE ARE SERIOUSLY DISPUTED AND ADMISSIONS FAVOUR DEFENDANT.
Plaintiff’s case rested on a D-Form type house-site patta (Ex.A1) said to have been issued in 1999 for Ac.0.01 cent in Sy.No.130, and on a plea that she gifted half of the site to the Panchayat for construction of a building and remained in possession of the remaining half. She produced Ex.A1 and one more document (Ex.A2) and examined herself and two witnesses. Defendant specifically denied the survey number, set up Sy.No.132, and proved purchase of Ac.0.03 cents under a registered sale deed dated 08-08-2012 (Ex.B1) from former “Old Relli Street” residents, asserting actual possession (hay-rick, cattle). Boundaries in Ex.A1 and Ex.B1 were the same; only survey number and extent differed. Plaintiff led no documentary or independent evidence of any gift of half the land to the Panchayat, while P.Ws.1–3 admitted that (i) Relli families of Patha Relli Street had been shifted by Government to a new colony with houses/house-sites, (ii) those families sold their old house-sites, and (iii) vendors of defendant belonged to Old Relli Street. P.W.1 also admitted knowledge that defendant purchased the schedule property under a registered sale deed; P.W.3 supported that fact. On this material, both Courts concurrently held that plaintiff failed to establish actual possession over the suit site and that her bare patta, unsupported by proof of possession and undermined by admissions, could not prevail against the registered sale and possession set up by defendant. Injunction was therefore refused. -
ASSIGNED HOUSE-SITE – ALLEGED PARTIAL GIFT TO LOCAL BODY – FAILURE TO PROVE – EFFECT ON CLAIM OF CONTINUING POSSESSION.
Plaintiff pleaded that she had “given half of the site” covered by Ex.A1 for construction of the Panchayat building on the western side, retaining and possessing only the remaining half. No gift deed, Panchayat resolution, revenue proceedings, or any official record was produced to prove such dedication or the extent left with her. Trial Court expressly recorded that plaintiff failed to prove gifting half of the assigned land for the Panchayat building; the appellate Court agreed. Having failed to prove how much of the original Ac.0.01 cent remained with her, and with the defendants’ vendors traced to the very locality (Old Relli Street) from which the Panchayat building and other sales emanated, plaintiff’s story about continued exclusive possession over the “remaining half” was disbelieved. Her injunction claim failed at the foundational level of proof of possession. -
EVIDENCE – ADMISSIONS BY PLAINTIFF’S WITNESSES – EFFECT – WHEN PLAINTIFF’S OWN EVIDENCE SUPPORTS DEFENDANT’S VERSION.
P.W.1 (plaintiff) in cross-examination categorically admitted knowledge that defendant had purchased the suit property under a registered sale deed. P.W.3 also deposed about such purchase. P.Ws.1 to 3 further admitted that the Relli residents of Patha Relli Street were given Government houses/sites elsewhere, shifted to the new colony, and sold away their old sites – aligning with defendant’s case that he purchased the land from those very owners. Courts below treated these admissions as undermining plaintiff’s claim of exclusive possession based on patta and as supporting defendant’s version of title and possession. High Court refused to disturb those appreciation-of-evidence findings in second appeal. -
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908 – SECTION 100 – HIGH COURT’S LIMITED JURISDICTION – CHANDRABHAN v. SARASWATI AND JAICHAND v. SAHNULAL APPLIED.
High Court reiterated that under Section 100 CPC it cannot re-appreciate evidence or recast factual conclusions merely because another view is possible. Referring to Chandrabhan v. Saraswati [(2022) 20 SCC 199] and Jaichand v. Sahnulal [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3864], it summarised: (i) an inference of fact from contents of documents is a question of fact; only misconstruction or wrong legal application raises a question of law; (ii) substantial question of law must have a material bearing on the decision and either involve a debatable legal issue or show that lower Courts decided in disregard of clear legal principle; (iii) interference with findings of fact is permissible only where Courts below ignored material evidence, acted on no evidence, drew wrong legal inferences, or wrongly cast burden of proof. As the appellant did not demonstrate that any of these exceptions applied, and the concurrent findings on possession and appreciation of Exs.A1, A2 and Ex.B1 were evidence-based, no substantial question of law arose. Second appeal dismissed at admission, without costs.
ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW
The litigation is a classic illustration of a bare injunction suit where the plaintiff relies on an old house-site patta, while the defendant meets it with a later registered sale deed, actual user, and admissions emerging from the plaintiff’s side.
The plaintiff’s case was built around Ex.A1, a house-site patta for Ac.0.01 cent in Sy.No.130 of Talada village, allegedly granted by the M.R.O. on 06-03-1999. On this foundation she asserted continuous possession: first, erecting a thatched shed that later collapsed; then retaining the land as a vacant site. She further tried to explain away the Panchayat building abutting her land by saying that she “gave half” of the assigned site for that public purpose, retaining and possessing the balance half. As an additional prop, she relied on a grievance application dated 18-02-2013 to the Collector seeking sanction of a house on that site – implicitly suggesting that the revenue authorities themselves were conscious of her claim.
The defence systematically attacked each limb. First, the defendant challenged the very identity of the land: according to him, the correct survey number was 132, not 130. Second, he denied that the patta in Ex.A1 ever translated into real, exclusive possession in favour of the plaintiff. Third, he set out a coherent local history: that the “Relli people” of Patha Relli Street had long ago been given Government houses/house-sites in a separate colony, whereupon they shifted and sold their earlier house-sites in Old Relli Street to various purchasers. The suit schedule property, measuring Ac.0.03 cents in that very area, originally belonged to Ragolu Terejamma and seven others, who sold it to him under a registered sale deed dated 08-08-2012 (Ex.B1). He claimed that he has been in possession since then, keeping haystacks and tethering cattle on the land.
Two factual features heavily influenced both Courts and, ultimately, the High Court.
The first is the mapping of documents to ground reality. Ex.A1 and Ex.B1 have the same boundaries; only the survey number (130 versus 132) and extent (0.01 versus 0.03) differ. The plaintiff’s case that her patta land included part of the present site, that she gifted “half” for the Panchayat building, and that she retained the rest, demanded corroboration. Yet, there was no gift deed, no Panchayat resolution, no revenue entry reciting such gift, and no other contemporaneous record linking Ex.A1 with the present suit site in a concrete way. By contrast, Ex.B1 is a regular registered sale deed executed by identified Relli vendors who, on the plaintiff’s own witnesses’ showing, were among those who had vacated and sold their Patha Relli holdings after receiving new Government houses.
The second is the plaintiff’s own evidence. P.Ws.1–3 explicitly admitted that:
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the Relli families of Patha Relli Veedhi were provided houses / house-sites by the Government and shifted to a new colony;
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they sold away their old houses in Old Relli Street;
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the vendors of the defendant were from Old Relli Street; and
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plaintiff was aware that the defendant had purchased the schedule property under a registered sale deed.
Once these admissions are on record, the plaintiff’s claim of unbroken, exclusive possession based solely on the patta becomes fragile. The trial Court took note of these aspects, especially P.W.1’s admission of knowledge of Ex.B1, and P.W.3’s corroboration of the sale. It concluded that, as between a bare patta unsupported by concrete proof of continuing possession and a registered sale deed from recognised prior occupants, backed by admissions about the sale, the plaintiff’s version was less credible.
On the injunction law side, the judgment quietly re-affirms the settled proposition that in a suit for bare injunction the plaintiff must succeed on proof of possession as on the date of suit and cannot rely on the weakness of the defendant’s title. Here, the trial Court’s reasoning was: (i) the plaintiff failed to prove the alleged gift of half the site to the Panchayat, which was central to her explanation of the Panchayat building and of the reduced extent still in her hands; (ii) she failed to prove that the vacant portion presently in dispute was the balance of Ex.A1; and (iii) the oral evidence, including her own, pointed more strongly to the defendant’s side of the story.
The appellate Court, acting as the final fact-finding forum, re-examined Exs.A1, A2, Ex.B1, and the testimonies. It concurred with the trial Court: the “assigned land plus gift” narrative was not satisfactorily proved, while the defence of a regular sale from dispossessed Relli owners was consistent with local history and with the admissions. It therefore confirmed dismissal of the suit.
At that stage, the only way the appellant could obtain relief in second appeal was by demonstrating that the concurrent findings were vitiated in one of the recognised ways: ignoring crucial evidence, acting on no evidence, misconstruing the documents in a way that raised a legal question, or misapplying legal principles (for example, wrongly casting the burden of proof). That is why the High Court anchored its reasoning in Chandrabhan and Jaichand: it recited the precise contours of Section 100 CPC and the limited circumstances in which revisiting facts is permissible.
However, the appellant’s submissions remained at the level of “Courts below failed to properly appreciate Ex.A1, A2 and P.Ws.1–3”. The High Court pointed out that this is, in substance, an invitation to re-appreciate evidence and reach a different conclusion – exactly what Section 100 forbids. There was no showing that the Courts below ignored any material document; on the contrary, the High Court notes they expressly considered Ex.A1 and Ex.B1, the identical boundaries, the mismatch in survey numbers and extents, and the admissions. Nor was there any argument that a legal principle had been misapplied; the Courts applied the correct principle that possession must be proved by the injunction plaintiff.
The High Court therefore framed two “substantial questions” simply to structure its discussion – whether Exs.A1, A2 and P.Ws.1–3 had been properly appreciated, and whether plaintiff had established possession – and then answered both by saying the findings were factual, evidence-based, and not perverse. It then expressly invoked the Supreme Court’s caution that High Courts cannot, in second appeal, re-weigh evidence just to prefer a different factual conclusion.
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