2026 INSC 672
Bejla Oraon v. Kali Das Oraon & Ors.
Civil Appeal No. 8780 of 2026
Supreme Court of India — 09.07.2026
Coram: Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.
HEAD NOTES
1. Customary Law — Proof of custom — Burden lies on the person asserting the custom — Paras 5–6, 10–13
A person who asserts the existence of a customary right must establish:
that the custom exists;
that the party is governed by that custom;
its long, continuous and established usage;
its prevalence among the concerned tribe, family or community; and
that the custom is certain, reasonable and not opposed to public policy.
A mere absence of evidence establishing the contrary proposition does not amount to proof of the asserted custom. The burden cannot be discharged by saying that no prohibition against the alleged custom has been proved. Paras 6, 12–13.
2. Customary Law — Ghardamad — Uncle-in-law adopting niece's husband — Custom not proved — Paras 11–13
The evidence established, as a customary practice, that a ghardamad/son-in-law could acquire rights in the property of his father-in-law.
However, that did not establish the distinct proposition that an uncle-in-law could adopt his niece's husband as his ghardamad and thereby confer upon him rights in the uncle-in-law's property.
The Supreme Court held that this specific custom was nowhere established by evidence. Para 11.
3. Substantial question of law under Section 100 CPC — Once framed, must be answered — Para 11
The High Court had framed the question concerning the ability of an uncle-in-law to adopt the niece's husband as a ghardamad but did not answer it merely because the courts below had recorded concurrent findings.
The Supreme Court held that ordinarily, once a substantial question of law is framed, the parties must be heard on that question and the question must be decided. If the High Court intended not to examine the question because of concurrent findings, there was no reason to formulate it in the first place. Para 11.
4. Concurrent findings of fact — Supreme Court's jurisdiction under Article 136 — Paras 8–9
Ordinarily, concurrent findings of fact are not interfered with in an appeal under Article 136. Interference is justified in exceptional circumstances, including where the findings:
are unsupported by evidence;
are perverse;
disregard material evidence;
rest upon inadmissible or irrelevant evidence;
are contrary to law;
do not arise from the pleadings;
are arbitrary or such that no reasonable judicial mind could have reached them; or
cause grave injustice or undue hardship.
Paras 8.1–8.4.
5. Customary inheritance among Oraons/Udaons — Daughters' right in landed property — Evidence accepted — Para 10.2
The plaintiff's witnesses consistently stated that daughters did not acquire a share in landed property under the applicable Udaon/Oraon custom.
The defence evidence was materially inconsistent. The Supreme Court therefore accepted the plaintiff's evidence and held that, as proved in the case, daughters did not acquire a right or share in the property. Para 10.2.
6. Ghardamad — Right in father-in-law's property established, but limited to the proved custom — Para 10.3
The testimony of the parties was sufficient to establish the custom that a son-in-law/ghardamad could acquire a right in the property of his father-in-law.
However, proof of that custom could not be extended to establish the separate and wider proposition that an uncle-in-law could adopt his niece's husband as his ghardamad. Para 10.3 read with Para 11.
7. Succession of issueless Udaon — Nearest male agnate — Para 10.4 and 10.5
The evidence concerning succession to an issueless Udaon was inconsistent on the question whether the property devolved upon a nephew, niece, or both.
The Court therefore did not accept the alleged custom merely on the basis of isolated testimony. Instead, it relied upon the acknowledged customary-law sources governing the community, particularly the principle that, in the absence of a ghardamad or another directly related male heir, the nearest male agnate succeeds to the property. Paras 10.4–10.5 and 13.
8. Lease/partition deed — Document cannot create title where executant had no transferable share — Para 10.6
The Court found uncertainty as to whether the disputed document was a lease deed or partition deed. That distinction did not affect the result.
A lease deed does not itself confer title, while partition can operate only between persons having shares in the property. Since Budhen did not establish the necessary share against Ledura, the document could not confer title upon her merely by being characterised as a partition. Para 10.6.
I. FACTS OF THE CASE
1. Origin of the dispute — Para 3
Sukhu Oraon had three sons:
Dhungru;
Ledura; and
Bhoula.
The plaintiff, Sukhu, was the second son of Dhungru and claimed ownership over the lands originally belonging to his grandfather, Sukhu.
The claim was resisted by Budhain, daughter of Bhoula, and her husband Punai.
2. Basis of defendants' claim
The defendants relied upon the alleged fact that Ledura, who had no children, had taken Punai as his ghardamad.
They asserted that Ledura's property had consequently devolved upon Punai.
The plaintiff disputed this and maintained that the defendants had no title and that the subsequent deed relied upon by them was legally ineffective. Para 3.
3. Applicable community custom
It was undisputed that the parties belonged to the Oraon/Udaon community and were governed by its relevant customary law.
One important feature of the alleged custom was that daughters did not ordinarily inherit landed property.
The precise questions concerning ghardamadship, succession and the disputed property, however, were matters requiring proof.
II. QUESTIONS ARISING FROM THE EVIDENCE
The Supreme Court organised the evidence around six principal factual questions:
Whether partition took place between Sukhu's branch and Ledura/Bhola;
Whether daughters acquired rights in Udaon caste property;
Whether a son-in-law/ghardamad acquired rights in property;
Who succeeded to the property of an issueless Udaon — nephew or daughter;
Who became entitled to the property after the deaths of Bhola, Ledura and Buranga; and
Whether the disputed lease/partition deed was validly executed or secretly obtained.
Para 9.
III. EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS
A. Partition — Para 10.1
The evidence substantially established that no partition had taken place among the relevant branches of the family.
The only material suggesting otherwise came from DW-4, who stated that Ledura had "written land" to Budhen.
But the evidence did not establish:
the legal/customary authority for Ledura to do so;
the extent of property allegedly transferred;
the property retained by Ledura; or
whether the prevailing custom permitted such transfer.
The Court therefore held that the alleged partition was not proved. Para 10.1.
B. Daughters' inheritance — Para 10.2
The plaintiff's witnesses were consistent that women and daughters did not acquire title to landed property under the relevant custom.
The defence witnesses, however, contradicted one another.
Some suggested that a daughter could receive property through a written instrument; another denied the right; another was unable to state the position.
Because the plaintiff's evidence survived cross-examination and the defence evidence was internally inconsistent, the Court accepted the plaintiff's version.
Finding: As proved in the case, daughters did not possess a customary right or share in the landed property. Para 10.2.
C. Ghardamad's right — Para 10.3
The evidence from the parties established that the custom of a son-in-law/ghardamad acquiring rights in his father-in-law's property existed.
This finding, however, was not equivalent to establishing that every person claiming ghardamad status acquired property rights.
The precise identity of the person adopting the ghardamad and the relationship between the parties remained critical. Para 10.3.
D. Succession of an issueless Udaon — Para 10.4
The evidence became substantially inconsistent.
Different defence witnesses gave different versions:
one said nephew and niece would inherit;
others said nephew alone;
another contradicted that proposition.
The Court specifically cautioned that a customary rule cannot be established merely through the isolated testimony of one witness where the alleged custom requires proof of long and continuous usage. Para 10.4.
E. Entitlement after deaths of family members — Para 10.5
The plaintiff's witnesses consistently asserted that the plaintiff became entitled after the deaths of Bhola, Ledura and Buranga.
The defence witnesses again produced inconsistent versions.
The Court also noted that:
Punai had died;
there were no surviving male descendants through the relevant line; and
the acknowledged customary source relied upon by the courts stated that, in such circumstances, the nearest male agnate would succeed.
The plaintiff therefore succeeded on this issue. Para 10.5.
IV. THE GHARDAMAD ISSUE — CENTRAL FINDING
This is the core of the judgment.
The trial court relied upon the work of Sarat Chandra Roy, The Oraons of Chotanagpur concerning the custom of ghardamadship.
The material relied upon by the trial court recognised circumstances where a male owner without a son could take a prospective son-in-law into his household as ghardamad.
But the Supreme Court identified a critical distinction.
The record showed that:
Ledura, the uncle-in-law, was said to have adopted Punai.
Yet the material relied upon did not establish that an uncle-in-law was competent under the prevailing custom to adopt his niece's husband as his ghardamad.
Para 11.
The Supreme Court therefore refused to extend the proved custom beyond what the evidence actually established.
V. WHY THE HIGH COURT'S APPROACH WAS REJECTED
The High Court had framed the question concerning the uncle-in-law's ability to adopt the niece's husband as ghardamad.
But it did not decide that question.
Instead, it proceeded on the basis that because there was no established bar against such adoption, an adverse inference could not be drawn.
The Supreme Court expressly rejected this approach.
The correct principle is:
The person asserting the custom must prove the custom.
It is not sufficient to say:
“There is no evidence proving that the custom is prohibited.”
That reverses the burden of proof.
The absence of proof of a prohibition cannot substitute for affirmative proof of the alleged custom. Para 12.
VI. PROOF OF CUSTOM — LEGAL PRINCIPLES
The Supreme Court distilled the law at Para 6.
A person asserting custom must prove:
1. Applicability
He must establish that he is governed by the alleged custom.
2. Long usage
The practice must have existed for a sufficiently long period.
3. Prevalence
Its practice within the relevant tribe or family must be established.
4. Certainty and reasonableness
The custom must be certain and reasonable and cannot be immoral, optional or contrary to public policy.
5. General evidence
Evidence from members of the relevant community may establish the practice.
6. Public records
Where supported by public records, the custom may safely be acted upon.
7. Judicial notice
Once a court has taken judicial notice of a particular custom, it need not necessarily be proved afresh in every proceeding.
8. Statutory recognition
A custom may acquire legal force through judicial confirmation or statutory recognition.
9. Custom once disallowed
A custom once judicially disallowed cannot simply be revived.
10. Persons acquainted with custom
Under Section 48 of the Evidence Act, the opinions of persons likely to know about the existence of the custom are relevant. Para 6.
VII. CONCURRENT FINDINGS — WHY SUPREME COURT INTERFERED
Ordinarily, the Supreme Court does not interfere with concurrent findings of fact.
The judgment carefully recognises that principle through Srinivas Ram Kumar, Bharwada Bhoginbhai, Mithilesh Kumari and Ramachandran. Paras 8.1–8.4.
But that restraint is not absolute.
Interference can occur where, inter alia:
material evidence has been ignored;
findings are contrary to law;
findings are unsupported by the pleadings;
irrelevant or extraneous evidence has been relied upon;
findings are perverse;
the conclusion is one which a reasonable judicial mind could not reach; or
grave injustice or undue hardship results.
Para 8.4.
Here, the Supreme Court found that the lower courts had proceeded upon an incorrect approach to the proof of custom and had accepted a customary relationship which had not been established in the form asserted.
That justified interference notwithstanding the concurrent findings.
VIII. DISPUTED DOCUMENT — WHY IT DID NOT SAVE THE DEFENDANTS
The Court found it unnecessary to finally characterise the document as either a lease deed or partition deed.
The result was the same.
If it was a lease:
A lease does not confer title.
If it was a partition:
Partition presupposes the existence of shares in the persons between whom the partition is effected.
The evidence did not establish Budhen's share in the property in the first place.
Therefore, the document could not create title where the underlying customary entitlement had not been established.
Para 10.6.
IX. FINAL CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court took a cumulative view of the evidence and customary law.
It held that:
the custom permitting a ghardamad to obtain rights in the property of his father-in-law was proved;
the distinct custom permitting an uncle-in-law to adopt his niece's husband as ghardamad was not proved;
the defendants could not discharge their burden merely by showing absence of an express prohibition;
the alleged partition/transfer in favour of Budhen was not established as conferring title;
the disputed document could not create title in the absence of a legally or customarily established share;
in the absence of a ghardamad or another directly related male heir, the recognised customary rule entitled the nearest male agnate to the property.
Accordingly, the judgments of the courts below were set aside and the plaintiff's suit was decreed.
Appeal allowed. Costs to be borne by the parties themselves. Paras 13–14.
MOST IMPORTANT LEGAL PROPOSITION
The judgment can be reduced to one particularly important proposition:
A customary right must be affirmatively proved by the person who asserts it. The absence of proof of a prohibition against the claimed custom is not proof of the custom itself.
And, more specifically:
Proof that a son-in-law may become a ghardamad of his father-in-law does not, without further evidence, prove a custom under which an uncle-in-law may adopt his niece's husband as his ghardamad and thereby confer upon him inheritance rights in the uncle-in-law's property.
That distinction between the custom actually proved and the wider custom asserted is the decisive feature of Bejla Oraon.
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