2026 INSC 900
Jamnabai & Ors. v. Vasudev & Ors.
Supreme Court of India — Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 39 of 2026
Judgment dated: 20 August 2026
Bench: Augustine George Masih, J.
I. HEAD NOTES
1. Second appeal under Section 100 CPC — Concurrent findings of fact — Limits of High Court jurisdiction — Paras 15–17
The High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, reversed concurrent findings of the trial court and the first appellate court.
The Supreme Court reiterated that a second appeal lies only on a substantial question of law and that concurrent findings of fact cannot ordinarily be disturbed unless they are shown to be perverse or vitiated by an error of law. A different view of the evidence is not sufficient to justify interference. Paras 16–17.
2. Relinquishment of proprietary interest — Burden of proof — Revenue mutation — Paras 18–22
The respondents asserted that Ramprasad had voluntarily relinquished his proprietary interest through statements, an affidavit and Ex.D5, followed by mutation of the revenue records under Ex.D22.
The Supreme Court held that the burden of establishing relinquishment lay upon the respondents. A proprietary interest in immovable property cannot be treated as voluntarily abandoned merely because a subsequent revenue entry records another person's name. The underlying transaction by which the proprietary interest is alleged to have been surrendered must independently be established. Paras 18–20.
3. Revenue entries do not create or extinguish title — Para 22
The mutation effected pursuant to Ex.D22 could not, by itself, extinguish Ramprasad's title.
A revenue entry is essentially fiscal in character and neither creates nor extinguishes title. The presumption attaching to a revenue entry under Section 117 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 is a rebuttable evidentiary presumption and not a presumption of title.
4. Proof of Ex.D5 — Para 20
The Supreme Court found that Ex.D5 had not been satisfactorily proved.
The document did not clearly identify the property, did not specify consideration and was not a registered instrument. The first appellate court had additionally found absence of independent witnesses to its execution, discrepancy concerning the stamp papers and inconsistency in the evidence.
The High Court's treatment of Ex.D5 as an undisputed document was found unsustainable.
5. Limitation — Articles 58 and 100 of the Limitation Act, 1963 — Paras 23–26
The High Court treated the 1990 mutation as the event from which limitation commenced.
The Supreme Court held that limitation could not be determined merely from the date of the revenue entry. The relevant question was when the right to sue actually accrued.
The appellants' case was one of declaration of co-ownership by succession with consequential relief, and not a suit founded upon a direct challenge to the revenue order. Paras 23–26.
6. Co-ownership and ouster — Para 25
Ramprasad and Vasudev were co-owners. Possession of one co-owner is ordinarily treated as possession on behalf of all.
For limitation to commence against a co-heir on the basis of ouster, there must be an open assertion of hostile title coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment to the knowledge of the other co-heir.
Mere exclusive possession is insufficient.
7. Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Para 27
The suit was not barred by the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act.
The appellants had not sought a bare declaration. They had sought:
declaration of co-ownership;
partition;
possession; and
permanent injunction.
Therefore, the absence of a specific prayer for cancellation of Ex.D22 did not render the suit non-maintainable.
8. Adverse inference from non-examination of witness — Para 28
The non-examination of appellant No.1 did not automatically warrant an adverse inference.
The Court held that such an inference must be assessed against the evidence actually available, including the documentary evidence concerning the public notice dated 26.01.2008 and certified copies obtained on 30.01.2008.
The presumption under Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act, 1872 extends to regularity of official procedure, but does not conclusively establish the bona fides of the underlying private transaction.
9. High Court exceeded jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC — Paras 29–30
The Supreme Court held that the High Court had exceeded the permissible limits of its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC by reappreciating the same evidence and substituting a different conclusion for the concurrent findings of the courts below without the requisite perversity or error of law.
10. Final relief — Paras 31–34
The High Court judgment dated 09.05.2025 was set aside.
The first appellate court judgment dated 02.05.2019, affirming the trial court decree dated 04.05.2016, was restored.
The appellants and other legal heirs of late Ramprasad were held entitled to the declared shares, subject to lawful partition under the applicable provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code.
The respondents were restrained from alienating the disputed property or creating third-party rights contrary to the trial court decree until lawful partition.
II. FACTS AND EVIDENCE OF THE CASE
1. Original ownership and devolution — Para 4
The suit property is agricultural land bearing Survey No.307, measuring approximately 12.41 acres, situated at Village Kanadia, Tehsil and District Indore, together with a house.
The property was held by Bhagwansingh, who had two sons, Ramprasad and Vasudev.
Upon Bhagwansingh's death, the property devolved upon the two brothers and the revenue records were mutated in their joint names.
2. Appellants' case — Paras 5–6
The appellants maintained that Ramprasad continued to hold an equal proprietary interest.
They alleged that Ramprasad suffered from alcoholism and was subjected to humiliation and physical assault by Vasudev. Jamnabai, Ramprasad's wife, thereafter took him to her parental village.
The appellants stated that the family continued to receive agricultural produce from the land and that repeated requests for partition were deferred.
The immediate cause for the suit arose from a public notice dated 26.01.2008 concerning an agreement to sell part of the property.
On obtaining certified revenue records on 30.01.2008, the appellants discovered that:
Survey No.307/01 stood mutated in the name of Jaswant, son of Vasudev;
Survey No.307/02 stood mutated in the name of Vasudev; and
Ramprasad's name had disappeared from the revenue records.
The suit was instituted on 13.02.2008 seeking declaration of co-ownership, partition, separate possession and permanent injunction.
3. Respondents' defence — Para 7
The respondents contended that Ramprasad had been adopted in childhood by his maternal grandmother and had received agricultural land at Achlukhedi.
According to the defence, after sale of that land in 1980, Ramprasad and Vasudev jointly acquired land at Upadinatha.
The respondents further pleaded that the brothers had partitioned the Kanadia property in 1981, pursuant to which 1.927 hectares was mutated in favour of Jaswant with Ramprasad's consent.
The respondents relied upon:
Ex.D19 — affidavit dated 11.04.1990;
Ex.D20 — statement before the Naib Tehsildar;
Ex.D22 — order dated 24.04.1990 in Revenue Case No. 3A/6A/1989/90;
Ex.D5 — written consent dated 17.06.1990; and
revenue records Ex.D17 to Ex.D24.
Their case was that Ramprasad had voluntarily relinquished his interest before his death in 1992.
4. Oral evidence — Para 8
The appellants examined:
Mangilal — PW-1;
Takhat Singh — PW-2;
Vikram Singh — PW-3.
The respondents examined:
Vasudev — DW-1;
Shankarlal — DW-2;
Rajaram Patidar — DW-3;
Ramchandra — DW-4.
Documents Ex.D1 to Ex.D16 were exhibited before the trial court.
5. Trial court findings — Para 9
The trial court decreed the suit.
It found:
the plea of adoption unsupported by documentary or other satisfactory evidence;
the defence concerning acquisition and sale of the Upadinatha land uncertain and inconsistent;
removal of Ramprasad's name in 1990 not shown to have been effected in accordance with law;
Ex.D5 vague because it did not clearly identify the property;
no sufficient basis to infer that the appellants knew of the 1990 mutation before 2008.
The trial court recognised the appellants' co-ownership and held that they were entitled to one-tenth share each, with separate possession following lawful partition. Actual partition by metes and bounds was left to the competent Revenue Court.
6. First appellate court — Para 10
The first appellate court permitted additional revenue records Ex.D17 to Ex.D24 to be brought on record under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC and examined two additional witnesses.
Upon reappreciation of the material, it found:
no independent witness had been produced to prove Ex.D5;
the stamp papers had been purchased in January 1990 although Ex.D5 bore a June 1990 date;
the evidence concerning Ex.D5 was inconsistent;
signatures attributed to Ramprasad on Ex.D17 to Ex.D21 had been denied;
no independent witnesses had been produced to prove execution of those documents.
The first appellate court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial court decree.
III. LAW APPLIED AND DISCUSSED
1. Section 100 CPC — Scope of second appellate jurisdiction — Paras 16–17
The Supreme Court examined the settled principles governing interference with concurrent findings.
It relied upon, inter alia:
Bholaram v. Ameerchand;
Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann; and
P. Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K. Patkar.
The Court held that Section 100 CPC confers restricted jurisdiction.
A second appeal can be entertained only where a substantial question of law arises.
Concurrent findings of fact ordinarily cannot be disturbed unless they are:
perverse; or
vitiated by an error of law.
A mere possibility of another inference from the evidence does not justify interference.
2. Burden of proving relinquishment — Paras 18–20
The respondents asserted that Ramprasad had voluntarily relinquished his proprietary interest.
The Supreme Court placed the burden squarely upon the respondents.
The appellants were not required to establish the falsity of the alleged relinquishment by sending documents for expert examination merely because the respondents relied upon them.
The alleged surrender of proprietary rights had to be independently established.
3. Evidentiary value of revenue mutation — Para 22
The Supreme Court applied the settled principle in Sawarni v. Inder Kaur that revenue entries do not create or extinguish title.
The revenue entry serves fiscal purposes.
Even the statutory presumption of correctness under Section 117 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code is rebuttable and does not constitute a presumption of title.
4. Limitation and co-ownership — Paras 23–26
The Court considered Articles 58 and 100 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
The date of mutation cannot, by itself, determine commencement of limitation.
The relevant consideration is the date on which the right to sue actually accrued.
The Court applied the principle in P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy that ouster of a co-heir requires:
open assertion of hostile title;
exclusive possession and enjoyment; and
knowledge of such hostile assertion by the other co-heir.
Mere exclusive possession does not amount to ouster.
5. Article 58 and Article 100 — Para 26
Article 58 applies to a suit for declaration and begins when the right to sue first accrues.
Article 100 concerns a suit to set aside a specified act or order of a civil court or government officer.
The present suit, however, was substantially a suit for declaration of co-ownership by succession with consequential relief.
The mutation was relied upon by the respondents as a defence to the appellants' title; the suit was not founded upon a direct challenge to the revenue order.
6. Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act — Para 27
The Court explained that Section 34 requires further relief where a plaintiff seeks a declaration but can obtain consequential relief.
Here, however, the appellants sought:
declaration;
partition;
possession; and
permanent injunction.
Therefore, the suit was not one for a bare declaration.
The Court further distinguished cancellation of a revenue entry from declaration of title.
7. Section 114(e), Evidence Act — Para 28
The respondents relied upon the presumption of regularity of official acts.
The Supreme Court held that Section 114(e) supports a presumption regarding the regularity of official procedure, but does not conclusively establish the bona fides or validity of the private transaction underlying the official proceeding.
The presumption therefore did not cure the deficiencies in proof concerning Ex.D5 and the alleged relinquishment.
IV. FINAL FINDINGS
1. Ex.D5 was not proved as a valid relinquishment of Ramprasad's proprietary interest — Paras 19–21.
2. The revenue mutation under Ex.D22 did not extinguish Ramprasad's title — Para 22.
3. The 2008 suit was not barred merely because mutation had occurred in 1990 — Paras 23–26.
4. There was no sufficient finding of ouster of Ramprasad during his lifetime so as to commence limitation against him — Para 25.
5. The suit was not barred by the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act — Para 27.
6. Non-examination of appellant No.1 did not automatically justify an adverse inference — Para 28.
7. The High Court's reversal of concurrent findings amounted to reappreciation of evidence without the perversity or error of law required for interference under Section 100 CPC — Paras 29–30.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court held that the High Court had exceeded the permissible limits of its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC in reversing the concurrent findings of the trial court and first appellate court.
The High Court's judgment dated 09.05.2025 was therefore set aside.
The judgment and decree of the first appellate court dated 02.05.2019, affirming the trial court judgment and decree dated 04.05.2016, were restored.
The appellants and other legal heirs of late Ramprasad were held entitled to the shares declared in their favour, subject to lawful partition under the applicable provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code.
The respondents were restrained from alienating the disputed property or creating third-party rights contrary to the trial court decree until such lawful partition.
There was no order as to costs, and pending interlocutory applications, if any, stood disposed of.
Core legal proposition
In a second appeal under Section 100 CPC, concurrent findings of fact cannot be displaced merely because the High Court prefers a different appreciation of the evidence. Interference requires a substantial question of law and a demonstrable perversity or error of law. Where relinquishment of an interest in immovable property is pleaded, the party asserting such relinquishment bears the burden of proving the underlying transaction; a revenue mutation by itself neither creates nor extinguishes title.
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