Friday, December 12, 2025

Whether the power of seizure under Section 102 CrPC can be lawfully exercised by investigative authorities in proceedings initiated solely under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Whether Section 18A of the PC Act and the procedural regime under the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 are mutually exclusive of the investigative powers under Section 102 CrPC. Whether the decision in Ratan Babulal Lath v. State of Karnataka (2022) constitutes a binding precedent to the effect that the PC Act is an exhaustive code precluding recourse to Section 102 CrPC.

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — Section 18A; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 102 — Seizure v. Attachment — Distinction — Applicability. Where investigation under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ("PC Act") disclosed alleged disproportionate assets held by a public servant and his relatives, police exercised powers under Section 102 CrPC to freeze bank accounts and seize certain monetary instruments. The High Court set aside the seizure, relying on earlier pronouncements treating the PC Act as a self-contained code governing attachment/confiscation under Section 18A and the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944. Held: The power to seize under Section 102 CrPC and the power to attach/confiscate under Section 18A read with the Ordinance are distinct in purpose, scope and procedure; they are not mutually exclusive. Section 102 CrPC is an investigative power available to police to secure property that may be evidence or alleged to be proceeds/linked with an offence; Section 18A/Ordinance prescribes a separate, judicially supervised procedure for attachment/confiscation with substantive consequences. A prior decision (Ratan Babulal Lath) which summarily characterized the PC Act as a complete code without detailed factual analysis does not constitute binding ratio on the narrow question of seizure under Section 102. Where seizure under Section 102 was exercised in aid of investigation and reported as required, the action is sustainable, subject to assessment of whether retention remains necessary following completion of investigation. De-freezing orders granted without addressing statutory safeguards and post-investigation consequences are liable to be set aside with directions calibrated to the status of investigation and present position of funds. Appeal allowed in part.


CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS

  1. A preliminary enquiry by the Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB), West Bengal, targeted the accused Prabir Kumar Dey Sarkar. Material alleged substantial unexplained assets vis-à-vis declared income for the check period (2007–2017).

  2. FIR No. 09/19 registered; investigation revealed numerous fixed deposits and bank deposits in the names of the main accused and relatives including the respondent (father).

  3. Police froze several fixed deposits and bank accounts under Section 102 CrPC. Application to de-freeze was rejected by the City Sessions Court (28.03.2023); subsequently, the Calcutta High Court set aside the freezing order (04.10.2024) holding that Section 102 could not be invoked where the PC Act and Section 18A governed attachment.

  4. Sanction for prosecution against the main accused was granted (22.04.2024) and chargesheet filed (13.05.2024). The State challenged the High Court order by way of this appeal.


ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

  1. Whether the power of seizure under Section 102 CrPC can be lawfully exercised by investigative authorities in proceedings initiated solely under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

  2. Whether Section 18A of the PC Act and the procedural regime under the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 are mutually exclusive of the investigative powers under Section 102 CrPC.

  3. Whether the decision in Ratan Babulal Lath v. State of Karnataka (2022) constitutes a binding precedent to the effect that the PC Act is an exhaustive code precluding recourse to Section 102 CrPC.


ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

A. Nature and Purpose — Seizure (Section 102 CrPC) v. Attachment/Confiscation (Section 18A/Ordinance)

  1. Textual and functional distinctions: Section 102 uses the language of seizure and empowers any police officer to take possession of property alleged or suspected to have been stolen or found under suspicious circumstances. The Ordinance/Section 18A contemplates attachment and confiscation by an expressly judicial process (application to a District Judge/Special Judge, affidavits, ad-interim attachment, show-cause, hearing and opportunity to furnish security).

  2. Comparative statutory practice: Parallel statutes (PMLA, Income-tax Act) evidence that attachment/confiscation is a consequence requiring structured, deliberative and judicially supervised steps. Seizure under Section 102 is immediate and investigative in character, often aimed at securing evidence and preventing tampering or dissipation in the course of a criminal probe.

  3. Precedent: This Court's jurisprudence recognises that police may seize bank accounts/passports under Section 102 where the property is related to the commission of an offence (see Tapas D. Neogy, Suresh Nanda, Teesta Setalvad). Freezing under Section 102 must be to aid investigation; it is not in itself an attachment yielding final proprietary consequences.

B. Procedural Safeguards and Post-seizure Obligations

  1. Reporting requirement: Section 102(3) mandates that the seizure be reported to the Magistrate "forthwith" — meaning as soon as reasonably possible given context and investigatory exigencies (Shento Varghese). Delay, if satisfactorily explained, does not automatically vitiate seizure; unreasonable delay may invite departmental consequences but does not necessarily undo valid investigative acts.

  2. Investigative adequacy: The sustaining of a Section 102 action requires demonstration that retention served investigatory needs — e.g., risk of evidence loss, likelihood of dissipation, or direct nexus to offence. Where investigation is complete, continued retention must be justified; affected parties may seek release or be directed to offer security/bank guarantees.

C. On the Question of a "Code in Itself" and Precedential Value

  1. What constitutes ratio decidendi: Precedent binds where the court lays down legal principles tied explicitly to material facts and reasoning; obiter or perfunctory formulations lack binding force. A "code in itself" conclusion requires careful enquiry into whether the statute comprehensively regulates the field and excludes operation of other laws.

  2. Ratan Babulal Lath: The Court finds that in that decision the statement that the PC Act is a complete code was not accompanied by a full exposition of facts and a reasoned comparison of the procedural provisions; hence it lacks the necessary elements of a binding ratio on the narrow question at hand. The present bench therefore treats Ratan Babulal Lath as not determinative for the question whether Section 102 CrPC may be used for seizure in aid of investigation under the PC Act.

D. Application of Law to the Present Facts

  1. Investigation and sanction were obtained; charges were framed and the chargesheet presented. Initial seizure/freeze of fixed deposits took place during the investigation. The Trial Court rejected the de-freezing application; the High Court inverted that view on the premise that Section 102 could not be used where Section 18A applies.

  2. Having found the two regimes distinct, and the investigative power under Section 102 available, the present appeal determines that the High Court erred in setting aside the seizure on the sole ground that attachment procedure was not followed. The seizure was an investigatory step — not an attachment under the Ordinance — and thus permissible if reported/justified.

  3. However, completion of the investigation and presentation of the chargesheet changes the calculus. Continued freezing must be re-examined: if funds have already been released or investigation yields no continuing need for retention, equitable remedies (re-deposit, security/bank guarantee, or release) become appropriate.


CONCLUSION & FINAL ORDER

  1. The appeal is allowed in part.

  2. Holding: The powers under Section 102 CrPC and the powers under Section 18A of the Prevention of Corruption Act (via the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944) are distinct and not mutually exclusive. Section 102 CrPC may be lawfully invoked by police in the course of investigation under the PC Act to seize or freeze bank accounts and other movable properties where there exists a nexus to the alleged offence or a risk to the investigation, subject to the safeguards and reporting obligations provided under law.

  3. On the facts of this case: Given that investigation has concluded and a chargesheet has been filed, the court directs as follows:

    • If the frozen amounts have already been released pursuant to the High Court order, the respondent shall either re-deposit the said amount or furnish tangible security/bank guarantee for the like amount within three weeks from the date of this order.

    • If the amounts have not been released, the status quo as preserved by the stay of the High Court order shall be governed by the directions above and parties retain the right to pursue appropriate proceedings before the competent court to determine proprietary rights and the necessity of continued retention/attachment.

  4. The rights and remedies of the parties under the PC Act, Ordinance and CrPC (including appeals and applications for release on furnishing security) are kept open.

  5. Pending applications, if any, are disposed of in the terms above.

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