SUIT FOR PERPETUAL INJUNCTION – NATURE OF RELIEF AND BURDEN OF PROOF – Plaintiff claiming protection of possession over Ac.0.10 cents, consisting of Ac.0.06 cents allegedly ancestral and Ac.0.04 cents D–Patta land – Revenue record (Ex.A1 Adangal) reflected only Ac.0.04 cents D–Patta in name of third party pattadar (Akkavarapu Appayya) with plaintiff’s father shown as enjoyer/possessor – No independent material produced to establish possession over entire Ac.0.10 cents as on the date of suit – Held, in a suit for bare injunction the plaintiff must affirmatively prove actual possession of the suit property as on the date of filing; he cannot succeed by pointing to alleged weaknesses in defendants’ title – Concurrent finding that plaintiff failed to prove possession over Ac.0.10 cents, therefore not entitled to injunction.

1. CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908 – SECTION 100 – SECOND APPEAL – SCOPE OF INTERFERENCE – Dismissal of suit for perpetual injunction by trial Court, confirmed by first appellate Court – Both Courts concurrently found that plaintiff failed to prove possession over full extent claimed (Ac.0.10 cents), and could at best show enjoyment of only Ac.0.04 cents – Findings based on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence (Adangal, Ex.A1; Grama Krayachiti, Ex.B2; witness testimony) – High Court in second appeal declined to reappreciate evidence in absence of perversity or misapplication of law – No substantial question of law arising – Second appeal dismissed.

2. SUIT FOR PERPETUAL INJUNCTION – NATURE OF RELIEF AND BURDEN OF PROOF – Plaintiff claiming protection of possession over Ac.0.10 cents, consisting of Ac.0.06 cents allegedly ancestral and Ac.0.04 cents D–Patta land – Revenue record (Ex.A1 Adangal) reflected only Ac.0.04 cents D–Patta in name of third party pattadar (Akkavarapu Appayya) with plaintiff’s father shown as enjoyer/possessor – No independent material produced to establish possession over entire Ac.0.10 cents as on the date of suit – Held, in a suit for bare injunction the plaintiff must affirmatively prove actual possession of the suit property as on the date of filing; he cannot succeed by pointing to alleged weaknesses in defendants’ title – Concurrent finding that plaintiff failed to prove possession over Ac.0.10 cents, therefore not entitled to injunction.

3. EVIDENCE – REVENUE RECORDS – ADANGAL – PROBATIVE VALUE – Ex.A1 Adangal showing Ac.0.04 cents in S.No.8/8 standing in name of pattadar (Akkavarapu Appayya) with plaintiff’s father as enjoyer – Court treated this as consistent with plaintiff’s case of enjoyment of D–Patta land to the extent of Ac.0.04 cents, but not proof of possession over larger extent of Ac.0.10 cents alleged – Mismatch between pleaded extent and evidenced extent fatal to suit for injunction over the whole – Revenue records relevant to possession, but cannot be stretched beyond what they record on their face.

4. UNREGISTERED GRAMA KRAYACHITI – STAMP ACT – EFFECT OF DEFICIT STAMP COLLECTION – ASSIGNED LAND / PROHIBITED PROPERTY – Defendants relied on Ex.B2 Grama Krayachiti (unregistered) dated 29-06-1997, allegedly executed by plaintiff’s father in favour of first defendant’s wife, for Ac.0.03 cents, with plaintiff as second executant – Document sent to District Registrar for collection of deficit stamp duty; duty collected, and certificate issued under Section 40 of the Indian Stamp Act – Appellate Court observed that if the property were part of assigned land not transferable, the registering/stamp authorities would have objected at that stage; further, property not shown as included in the list of prohibited properties under Section 22-A of the Registration Act – Ex.B2, though unregistered, was accepted as one piece of evidence consistent with defendants’ plea of possession, and to repel plaintiff’s case that the land was non-alienable assigned land.

5. ASSIGNED LAND – PLEA OF NON-ALIENABILITY – ONUS – Plaintiff’s theory that land was D–Patta / assigned, and hence inalienable, was not supported by any specific statutory bar or notification; revenue record itself showed pattadar as a third party with plaintiff’s father only as enjoyer; no evidence that the land stood notified under Section 22-A, or that assignment conditions prohibited transfer and were still in force – In absence of cogent proof of non-alienability, civil court proceeded on ordinary presumptions of transferability, especially when stamp authorities had already dealt with Ex.B2 for deficit duty without objection on that ground.

6. SECOND APPEAL – CONCURRENT FINDINGS ON POSSESSION – NO SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW – Trial Court found, on evidence, that plaintiff had not proved possession over the entire Ac.0.10 cents, and that his own evidence and Ex.A1 adangal supported at best Ac.0.04 cents; appellate Court as final Court of fact confirmed this on reappraisal – High Court reiterated that under Section 100 CPC, it cannot re-weigh evidence or substitute its view where Courts below have exercised discretion judicially and findings are neither perverse nor contrary to law – No material illegality, misreading of evidence, or application of wrong legal test demonstrated – Second appeal dismissed without costs.

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DEEP ANALYSIS OF FACTS, EVIDENCE AND LAW

The structure of the case is quite tight: this is a classic “bare injunction + possession” second appeal where the High Court was asked to re-enter the facts through the back door of an evidentiary objection (to Ex.B2) and an “assigned land” narrative.

I. Factual foundation

The plaintiff’s case rested on a composite source of possession:

1. Ac.0.06 cents said to have been acquired by grandfather through “ancestral nucleus” (no specific title document produced).

2. Ac.0.04 cents of D–Patta land in S.No.8/8, allegedly granted to his father as landless poor.

He therefore claimed to be in possession of Ac.0.10 cents and sought mere injunction, not declaration.

The defendants’ case was narrower and more focused:

1. They did not seriously accept that plaintiff was in exclusive possession of the entire Ac.0.10 cents.

2. They set up a specific transaction: wife of first defendant (Alivelu Mangamma) purchased Ac.0.03 cents under a Grama Krayachiti in 1997 from plaintiff’s father; plaintiff himself signed as second executant; possession allegedly delivered then.

3. They supported this with Ex.B2 Grama Krayachiti and the fact that it was sent to the District Registrar for deficit stamp duty, which was collected and certified under Section 40 Stamp Act.

Thus the core dispute, at its lowest common denominator, was: who was actually in possession of the suit schedule land (in its full extent) as on the date of suit?

II. Why the plaintiff failed on possession

The High Court explicitly anchored itself in the settled rule for suits for injunction simpliciter: the plaintiff must prove de facto possession on the date of suit; title questions are secondary except insofar as they help infer de jure possession.

Two thorns in the plaintiff’s case:

1. Extent mismatch:
   – Suit claim: Ac.0.10 cents
   – Ex.A1 Adangal: only Ac.0.04 cents reflected, in D–Patta category.

   The court treated this mismatch as significant. At best, plaintiff could support a claim over 0.04, not 0.10, from his own document.

2. Revenue record structure:
   – In Ex.A1, pattadar is not plaintiff’s father but one Akkavarapu Appayya.
   – Plaintiff’s father is only shown in the column of “enjoyer/possessor”.

   That tends to support an enjoyment-based claim over the D–Patta extent, but weakens any assertion that the larger extent including the 0.06 cents “ancestral” is demonstrably with the plaintiff as on the date of suit. There is no independent revenue record, nor any title deed, to back the claimed Ac.0.06 cents.

The trial Court treated these gaps as fatal for a bare injunction suit, and the appellate Court adopted that view as a concurrent finding of fact.

III. Treatment of Ex.B2 Grama Krayachiti and stamp proceedings

The plaintiff tried to attack Ex.B2 in two broad ways:

1. As an inadmissible unregistered instrument affecting immovable property.

2. As relating to “assigned” land, hence void and not capable of conferring even a colourable claim.

The first point – registration – goes to its value as a conveyance of title, not its relevance as a piece of evidence. Civil courts often use such documents to infer possession or the nature of dealings inter se, even if they are not operative as transfers for want of registration.

The appellate Court’s reasoning is quite telling:

• Ex.B2 was sent to the District Registrar for deficit stamp duty (i.e., for stamping purposes).

• Duty was collected and a Section 40 Stamp Act certificate issued.

• In that process, if the property were non-transferable assigned land or covered under Section 22-A Registration Act as prohibited, an objection would normally arise at that stage.

• There is no evidence that any such objection was raised.

• Property was not shown to be on the 22-A prohibited list.

So, the Court is not saying Ex.B2 is a perfect conveyance of title; rather, it is using the administrative history of Ex.B2 to reject the plaintiff’s narrative that this is alienation of forbidden assigned land. That in turn makes the defence version of a sale of 0.03 cents more plausible and consistent.

In effect:

• Ex.B2 is used as a fact-scenario document:
  “This is how and why the defendants claim possession over a part of the land.”

• It also functions as a rebuttal of the “assigned/non-transferable” theory, not as a foundation of perfect title.

IV. Assigned land / D–Patta argument: why it didn’t carry weight

The plaintiff’s story had an implicit doctrinal angle: D–Patta land, landless poor, non-alienable.

However, at the evidentiary level, nothing beyond Ex.A1 Adangal and a bare pleading was produced:

• No assignment order or patta granting the land.

• No specific condition of non-alienation.

• No proof or notification placing the land under Section 22-A prohibited list.

Against this, the court had:

• Adangal showing a third-party pattadar and plaintiff’s father only as enjoyer.

• Ex.B2’s passage through the stamp authority without being treated as void on assignment grounds.

Given this, the Court logically refused to elevate the “D–Patta/assigned land” argument into a legal bar to the defendants’ possession.

V. Section 100 CPC – Why the second appeal went nowhere

The High Court explicitly re-affirmed the standard:

• It cannot reappreciate evidence in second appeal.

• It can interfere only if:
  – findings are perverse, or
  – based on no evidence, or
  – based on inadmissible evidence, or
  – there is failure to consider relevant material, or
  – an incorrect legal test was applied.

Here:

1. Trial Court carefully weighed plaintiff’s evidence (PWs 1–3, Exs.A1–A3) and defendants’ (DWs 1–3, Exs.B1–B2).

2. It found that plaintiff failed to establish possession over Ac.0.10 cents.

3. First appellate Court, as final fact court, revisited:
   – the evidentiary value of Ex.A1,
   – the content and processing of Ex.B2,
   – the question whether this was assigned/prohibited land,
   and then fully concurred.

The High Court found no misdirection of law in:

• the approach to burden of proof in injunction suits, or

• the use of Ex.B2 as a piece of evidentiary material.

Therefore, no “substantial question of law” could be framed realistically. On that basis, the second appeal was dismissed without costs.

VI. Doctrinal takeaways for your future use

1. In bare injunction suits, the plaintiff’s success hinges on proof of possession at the date of suit, not on how weak the defendant’s title may be. The moment there is mismatch between pleaded extent and proved possession (as here), the suit is vulnerable.

2. Revenue records like adangals are useful, but only to the exact extent they record. Here, Ex.A1 supported possession of 0.04 cents, not 0.10.

3. Unregistered sale documents (like Grama Krayachiti) can still be used:

   • to show the nature of possession,

   • to corroborate a consistent defence narrative,

   • to rebut an “assigned/non-transferable” argument, especially when stamped and vetted by authorities.

4. In second appeal, any attempt to re-characterize such a document as “inadmissible” must demonstrate that the Court below relied on it as a title-conveying instrument, not merely as one evidentiary piece in assessing possession and conduct of parties. That element is missing here, so the “inadmissible evidence” hook for S.100 CPC was not made out.