PROPERTY LAW — Sale by impersonation — Void document — Effect — Need (or not) for cancellation — Limitation. Where an impersonator executed a registered sale deed in favour of defendant No.2 by signing as real owner and affixing his own photograph in place of the true owner, and the impersonator was later convicted under Sections 419, 420, 468 and 471 IPC for that very transaction, held: sale deed in favour of defendant No.2 is void ab initio and conveys no title; subsequent sale by defendant No.2 to defendant No.1 conveys no better title. Such void document need not be set aside; it can be ignored. Suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession filed by real purchaser from original owner is governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963; Article 59 has no application. Suit held within time.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908 — Section 100 — Second Appeal — Scope of interference with findings of fact — Concurrent findings of trial Court and first appellate Court — When can be interfered with.
High Court in second appeal cannot disturb concurrent findings of fact of trial Court and first appellate Court except where such findings are contrary to mandatory provisions of law, settled legal position, based on inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence. On facts, both Courts below having rightly held that plaintiff derived valid title from original owner and defendants claimed under a void, impersonated sale deed, no substantial question of law arose for consideration. Second appeal dismissed.
(Rel. on Bhagwan Sharma v. Bani Ghosh, AIR 1993 SC 398; Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, AIR 1999 SC 471.)

PROPERTY LAW — Sale by impersonation — Void document — Effect — Need (or not) for cancellation — Limitation.
Where an impersonator executed a registered sale deed in favour of defendant No.2 by signing as real owner and affixing his own photograph in place of the true owner, and the impersonator was later convicted under Sections 419, 420, 468 and 471 IPC for that very transaction, held: sale deed in favour of defendant No.2 is void ab initio and conveys no title; subsequent sale by defendant No.2 to defendant No.1 conveys no better title. Such void document need not be set aside; it can be ignored. Suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession filed by real purchaser from original owner is governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963; Article 59 has no application. Suit held within time.

LIMITATION ACT, 1963 — Articles 59 and 65 — Suit for declaration of title and possession based on title — When Article 65 applies — When Article 59 does not.
Plaintiff having purchased suit property under registered sale deed from original owner in 2008, alleging illegal dispossession in December 2008 and filing suit in January 2009 for declaration of title and recovery of possession, suit is governed by Article 65 (12 years from dispossession) and is not barred by limitation. The fact that there exists an earlier void sale deed obtained by impersonation does not attract Article 59 where the plaintiff’s suit is essentially one for declaration of his title and possession, and the earlier instrument is void ab initio.

ADVERSE POSSESSION — Inconsistency with plea of derivative title under sale deed.
Defendant No.1, claiming title under registered sale deed of 2006 from defendant No.2, cannot simultaneously claim adverse possession. Plea of lawful title under a sale deed is inherently inconsistent with plea of hostile, open, continuous and exclusive possession required for adverse possession. Adverse possession claim rejected.

CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908 — Order XLI Rule 31 — First appellate judgment — Requirements — Compliance.
First appellate Court framed appropriate points for consideration, reappreciated oral and documentary evidence, and recorded its conclusions on each point. Contention that judgment is not in accordance with Order XLI Rule 31 CPC rejected.

II. ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

1. Parties and Procedural History

• Plaintiff (R1 in second appeal) filed O.S.No.86/2009 before I Addl. Senior Civil Judge, Guntur, seeking:

  • Declaration of title over plaint schedule property (110 sq. yds., RCC house, D.No.1-36-28/1),

  • Consequential possession, and

  • Costs.

• Defendant No.1 (appellant in second appeal) and Defendant No.2 (R2) resisted the suit.

• Trial Court decreed the suit on 06-08-2012, declaring plaintiff as absolute owner and directing D1 to deliver possession within one month.

• A.S.No.240/2012 filed by D1 before III Addl. District Judge, Guntur, was dismissed on 10-07-2025, confirming the trial Court.

• D1 then filed Second Appeal No.720/2025 under Section 100 CPC.

• Second appeal was admitted on 17-10-2025 on six substantial questions of law (adverse possession, Article 59, validity of subsequent sale, necessity of cancellation, O.41 R.31 compliance, etc.).

2. Plaintiff’s Case and Chain of Title

• Original owner: Alla Venkateswara Rao (P.W.2), who purchased 1200 sq. yds including plaint property from Tarumani Subba Rao under Ex.A2 (sale deed dated 30-06-1979).

• Plaintiff purchased the plaint schedule property from P.W.2 under Ex.A1: registered sale deed dated 04-04-2008 (Doc.No.1172/2008), and claims delivery of possession.

• On 10-12-2008, defendants allegedly dispossessed the plaintiff and grabbed the property claiming ownership.

• On enquiry, plaintiff discovered a forged/impersonated sale route:

  • One Bikki Venkateswarlu (D.W.5), in collusion with D2, allegedly impersonated Alla Venkateswara Rao and executed a registered sale deed in favour of D2 on 21-10-2002 (Doc.No.7528/2002) by affixing his own photograph as if he were the vendor.

  • D2 then sold property to D1 under sale deed dated 11-05-2006 (Doc.No.6328/2006).

• P.W.2 categorically deposed he never sold the property to anyone other than plaintiff; he also lodged a criminal case (C.C.No.85/2009) against Bikki and D1 for impersonation.

3. Defences of the Defendants

Defendant No.1

• Claims no title or possession in plaintiff; asserts she is bonafide purchaser from D2 (sale deed 11-05-2006).

• Took housing loan from LIC Housing Finance; mortgaged the property; had municipal mutation and has been paying taxes.

• Alleges plaintiff’s document is fabricated and collusive with D2.

• Relies on long possession (more than 30 years through predecessors) and sets up adverse possession.

Defendant No.2

• Pleads non-joinder of necessary parties: P.W.2 (Alla Venkateswara Rao) and Bikki Venkateswarlu.

• Asserts suit is not maintainable without seeking cancellation of the two registered sale deeds (2002 and 2006).

• Claims to be a bona fide purchaser.

4. Issues Before the Trial Court

The trial Court framed seven issues including:

1. Plaintiff’s entitlement to declaration of title.

2. Entitlement to recovery of possession.

3. Truth, validity and binding nature of sale deeds of 2002 and 2006.

4. Bona fide purchaser plea.

5. Maintainability of suit without cancellation.

6. Past and future profits.

7. Relief.

Evidence:

• Plaintiff side: P.Ws.1–2; Exs.A1–A5.

• Defendants: D.Ws.1–9; Exs.B1–B20.

Trial Court decreed the suit in plaintiff’s favour.

5. Points Before the First Appellate Court

The first appellate Court framed nine detailed points, covering:

• Limitation (including Article 59 argument);

• Necessity of cancellation of sale deeds;

• Impersonation by Bikki;

• Plaintiff’s title and possession;

• Adverse possession;

• Validity and binding nature of 2002 and 2006 sale deeds;

• Sustainability of trial Court judgment under law and facts.

All points were answered against D1.

6. Substantial Questions of Law in Second Appeal

Six substantial questions were framed, centrally revolving around:

• Whether possession under an invalid document could ripen into adverse possession and bar suit under Article 59;

• Whether suit for recovery of possession is maintainable when appellant’s long possession is admitted;

• Whether prior sale deed with delivery of possession bars execution of subsequent sale deed without cancellation;

• Whether a sale deed can be executed without cancellation of an earlier sale;

• Whether the first appellate Court judgment complied with Order XLI Rule 31 CPC.

7. High Court’s Legal Analysis

(a) Scope of Section 100 CPC

The Court reiterated the well-settled limitations under Section 100 CPC:

• Second appeal lies only on substantial question of law.

• Concurrent findings of fact cannot be interfered with unless:

  • Contrary to mandatory provisions of law or settled law by the Supreme Court, or

  • Based on inadmissible evidence, or

  • Arrived at without evidence.

Relied on:

• Bhagwan Sharma v. Bani Ghosh, AIR 1993 SC 398.

• Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar, AIR 1999 SC 471.

On facts, the Court found no such infirmity in concurrent findings.

(b) Title — Validity of Transactions

Key factual/legal findings:

• It is undisputed that P.W.2 / Alla Venkateswara Rao is original owner (110 sq. yds with RCC house, Ex.A2 — 30-06-1979).

• P.W.2’s testimony is consistent with Ex.A1 and Ex.A2: he purchased from Tarumani Subba Rao and later sold to plaintiff in 2008, delivering possession.

• As regards D2’s title:

  • Bikki (D.W.5) admitted in evidence that:

    • The photograph in Ex.B5 (sale deed to D2) is his,

    • He signed the document as if he were Alla Venkateswara Rao.

  • D.W.4 (defence witness) also confirmed that the photograph in the sale deed to D2 is that of Bikki.

  • D.W.5’s claim of having purchased from one Mallela Krishna Murthy is unsupported by any documentary proof.

  • D.W.5 admits knowledge of criminal prosecution for impersonation.

• During pendency of appeal, D.W.5 was convicted on 15-09-2013 by the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Guntur, under Sections 419, 420, 468, 471 IPC for the impersonation transaction.

From this, the High Court held:

• Sale deed of 21-10-2002 in favour of D2 was executed by an impersonator, not the real owner.

• Such transaction is void ab initio; it conveys no title to D2.

• As a corollary, no valid title could pass from D2 to D1 under sale deed dated 11-05-2006.

(c) Limitation — Articles 59 vs 65

• Plaintiff’s suit is essentially for:

  • Declaration of title based on his own purchase (Ex.A1, 04-04-2008), and

  • Recovery of possession, alleging dispossession on 10-12-2008.

• Suit was filed immediately in January 2009.

• The Court held:

  • This is a suit for possession based on title involving declaration; therefore Article 65 governs — 12 years from dispossession.

  • The earlier impersonated sale deed being void ab initio does not require cancellation; hence Article 59 does not control the relief.

Thus, the plea that suit is barred by limitation under Article 59 was rejected.

(d) Need for Cancellation of Void Sale Deed

• Appellant argued that:

  • Existing sale deeds in favour of D2 and D1 (2002 and 2006) must be cancelled first;

  • A subsequent sale in favour of plaintiff is not maintainable without cancelling earlier sale.

• The Court held:

  • The 2002 sale deed, being obtained by impersonation, is void from inception.

  • Delivery of possession under a void document is legally meaningless.

  • Therefore, there is no necessity to seek cancellation of such a void document; it can be simply ignored.

  • Consequently, Ex.A1, executed by the real owner, is valid and effective.

(e) Adverse Possession

• D1 claimed she and her predecessors had been in possession for more than 30 years, thereby perfecting title by adverse possession.

• The Court held:

  • D1’s claim rests on a registered sale deed of 2006.

  • A party asserting lawful derivative title under a sale deed cannot simultaneously claim adverse possession, which requires hostile, open, continuous, exclusive possession denying title of the true owner.

  • The very assertion of lawful title negatives the animus possidendi required for adverse possession.

Adverse possession plea was rejected.

(f) Order XLI Rule 31 CPC — First Appellate Judgment

• The High Court noted:

  • The first appellate Court framed relevant points for determination.

  • It discussed the evidence of each witness and the documents.

  • It recorded findings on all points.

Hence, it was held that the first appellate judgment satisfies O.41 R.31, and the contention to the contrary has no substance.

(g) Substantial Questions of Law

Given the above, the High Court held that:

• On proper appreciation and re-appreciation of evidence, both Courts below rightly decreed the plaintiff’s suit.

• The substantial questions of law framed at admission did not truly survive or warrant different conclusions.

• No substantial question of law arises for consideration under Section 100 CPC.

III. CONCLUSION

• The High Court dismissed the second appeal, confirming the decree and judgment dated 10-07-2025 in A.S.No.240/2012.

• It directed the appellant/defendant No.1 to:

  Deliver vacant possession of the plaint schedule property to respondent No.1/plaintiff within two months from the date of the judgment.

• Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, were dismissed as a consequence.

• Parties were directed to bear their own costs.