Monday, December 1, 2025

HINDU LAW – HINDU WOMEN’S RIGHT TO PROPERTY ACT, 1937 – AGRICULTURAL LAND – WIDOW’S RIGHT – JOINT FAMILY PROPERTY – EFFECT OF FEDERAL COURT DECISION

(A) HINDU LAW – HINDU WOMEN’S RIGHT TO PROPERTY ACT, 1937 – AGRICULTURAL LAND – WIDOW’S RIGHT – JOINT FAMILY PROPERTY – EFFECT OF FEDERAL COURT DECISION

  1. The Trial Court held, on the basis of the Federal Court decision, that the expression “property” in the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937 did not include agricultural land and therefore Veeramma had no rights over the plaint schedule agricultural land, as her husband had died prior to 1956 (para 28).

  2. The High Court held that “the law is otherwise settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in plethora of pronouncements” (para 37) and, after quoting at length from Vaijanath v. Guramma, (1999) 1 SCC 292 and Babu Ram v. Santokh Singh, (2019) 14 SCC 162, held that:

    “The words ‘property’ as well as ‘interest in joint family property’ are wide enough to cover agricultural lands also … As the Federal Court has noted … the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act is a remedial Act … and it ought to receive a beneficial interpretation. The beneficial interpretation in the present context would clearly cover agricultural lands under the word ‘property’.” (para 37, quoting Vaijanath)

    and that

    “… the decision of the Federal Court no longer holds good in view of the changed position of law … in view of the change of law, the Act will apply to agricultural lands also, and the decision in Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, would no longer hold good.” (para 38, quoting Babu Ram)

  3. On facts, the Court found, on the basis of Exs.A.21 to A.23 and PW-5’s evidence, that the land in S.No.496 (15.50 acres) constituted the joint family property of T. Adisesha Reddy and his uterine brother T. Venkatesam Reddy; that the plaintiffs’ vendors T. Veeramma (wife) and P. Lakshmi Devi (daughter) of Venkatesam Reddy had rights in that joint family property; and that defendant No.3 himself relied upon Ex.B-19 (memorandum of partition) which “indicates that the plaintiffs' vendors had rights in the joint family property as legal heirs of Venkatesam Reddy” (paras 33–35).

  4. Applying the above Supreme Court law, the High Court held:

    “… this Court has no hesitation in concluding that Veeramma, being the wife of Venkatesam Reddy, had rights over the said property, even though it is agricultural land and was entitled to half share in the entire property in Survey No. 496/2.” (para 40)

(B) HINDU SUCCESSION ACT, 1956 – SECTION 14(1) – ENLARGEMENT OF WIDOW’S INTEREST – FULL OWNER

  1. The Court held, referring to Section 14(1) HSA, 1956 and Mangal Singh v. Rattno, AIR 1967 SC 1786, that:

    “any property includes both movable and immovable possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner there for and not as a limited owner. It is also clear that even if a female Hindu be, in fact, out of actual possession, the property must be held to be possessed by her, if her ownership rights in that property still exist.” (para 41)

  2. Relying also on Sukhram v. Gauri Shankar, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 182, the Court reiterated that the interest over joint family property acquired by a widow under the 1937 Act is “indisputably her ‘property’ within the meaning of Section 14” and that on the coming into force of the 1956 Act she became “full owner” with right “uninhibited in point of disposition” (para 39, quoting Sukhram).

  3. Consequently, the Court held that the vendors T. Veeramma and P. Lakshmi Devi had prima facie right or title over the suit schedule property to transfer the same to the plaintiffs by way of sale deeds Exs.A-1, A-3 and A-14 (paras 45–46, 84).

(C) CIVIL PROCEDURE – SUIT FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION – VACANT SITE – WHEN TITLE TO BE EXAMINED – POSSESSION FOLLOWS TITLE

  1. The Court reiterated, relying on Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594, that in a suit for permanent injunction:

    “… the plaintiff will have to establish that as on the date of the suit he was in lawful possession of the suit property and the defendant tried to interfere or disturb such lawful possession.” (para 24, quoting para 15 of Anathula)

    and that where the property is “a vacant site, which is not physically possessed, used or enjoyed … the principle is that possession follows title … it will be necessary to examine and determine the title as a prelude for deciding the de jure possession.” (para 24, quoting para 16 of Anathula).

  2. The Court noted the settled position that “a party seeking a permanent injunction … must establish lawful possession of the property. The plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own case and cannot rely on the weakness of the defendant's case” (para 25).

  3. On facts, after holding that the plaintiffs’ vendors had prima facie title, the Court examined Ex.A-3 (15-11-1990) and found that:

“it is categorically averred that they have entered into an agreement on 09.05.1980 … and handed over the possession of the schedule agricultural land. Thereby, it is evident from the record that by the date of agreement itself the possession was delivered.” (para 50)

  1. Referring to the principle that “the de jure possession has to be established on the basis of title to the property in the case of vacant site” (para 51) and to Thimmaiah v. Shabira, 2008 AIR SCW 1310, the Court held:

“based on the material on record coupled with legal position … the plaintiffs proved their possession over the suit schedule property.” (para 51)

  1. Accordingly, the Trial Court’s dismissal of the suit for injunction was held to be erroneous and the suit was decreed restraining defendants “from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property by the plaintiffs” (paras 84, 86).

(D) SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE – EXECUTION – COURT-EXECUTED SALE DEED – ORDER 21 RULE 34 CPC – DOCTRINE OF MERGER – SALE DEED MUST CONFORM TO APPELLATE DECREE

  1. Defendant No.3 claimed title on the basis of an agreement of sale dated 23-09-1981 and a Court-executed sale deed dated 09-04-1999 in E.P.No.142 of 1998 in O.S.No.201 of 1985 (paras 52–54).

  2. The plaintiffs contended that the decree in O.S.No.201/1985 as modified in A.S.No.149/1985 had not been properly worked out; that under Order XXI Rule 34 CPC the draft sale deed had to conform to the appellate decree; and that Ex.B-14 (sale deed dated 09.04.1999) was not in conformity with the terms of the appellate decree and therefore did not convey valid title (para 56).

  3. The High Court, relying on Chandi Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad, (2004) 8 SCC 724, and Balbir Singh v. Baldev Singh, (2025) 3 SCC 543, reiterated:

“… when an appellate court passes a decree, the decree of the trial court merges with the decree of the appellate court … there cannot be more than one operative decree governing the same subject-matter at a given point of time.” (paras 57–58)

  1. Referring to Rajbir v. Suraj Bhan, (2022) 14 SCC 609, the Court noted that where a court-executed sale deed is “found to not be in conformity with the decree … it will necessarily be set aside, and thereafter, a fresh sale deed must be executed….” (para 62, quoting Rajbir).

  2. On facts, the Court found that in A.S.No.149/1985 the appellate Court had directed payment of balance sale consideration “together with interest at 12% per annum within two months”; but Ex.B-14 was “not executed in accordance with the modification made by the appellate court” (para 61). It held:

“it is evident that the sale deed obtained by Defendant No. 3 through the court is not in accordance with the appellate decree and, therefore, is neither binding nor legally valid. Consequently, it cannot confer any right over the disputed property.” (para 63)

and that “no material has been placed on record to show that Defendant No. 3 paid the consideration directed by the appellate court” (para 63).

  1. The Court further found discrepancies regarding survey numbers: Ex.B-15 related to S.No.496/2 (Ac.4.00 out of 15.50), whereas the plaintiffs’ land lay in S.No.496/5; subsequent re-subdivision and mutation into S.No.496/2-C, etc., occurred only after 2004 without notice to the plaintiffs or their vendors (paras 64–66), and D.W.2’s evidence was inconsistent and unreliable (para 66).

  2. Consequently, the Court held that defendant No.3 failed to put forth any substantial material to prove prima facie right, possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property, and answered Point No.III against him (paras 69, 52, 63).

(E) PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – APPEAL BY DEFENDANTS 5–7 – AGREEMENT HOLDER – DECREE VS FINDING – PERSON AGGRIEVED – NO RELIEF POSSIBLE

  1. Defendants 5 to 7, who were impleaded on their own application in the Trial Court, claimed to be agreement-holders under an agreement dated 29-01-1993 in respect of item No.3 of ‘A’ schedule and relied only on a draft sale deed (Ex.B-33) arising out of O.S.No.64/1997 and E.P.No.171/2000 (paras 70–71).

  2. The Court recorded that D.W.3 (defendant No.6) admitted that the original of Ex.B-33 “is not yet registered and it is pending for registration … he has not taken any steps to get it registered … as his father was asked to pay Rs.16 lakhs towards registration charges and as his father failed to pay those charges, the E.P. was closed. There are no other documents with them except sale agreement to prove possession.” (para 71).

  3. On maintainability of A.S.No.372/2009, the Court referred to Banarsi v. Ram Phal, (2003) 9 SCC 606 and Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar, AIR 1974 SC 1126, noting the principle that “No appeal lies against a mere finding … an appeal lies only as against a decree” (paras 73–74), but also that on grounds of justice an appeal may lie against a finding which would operate as res judicata (para 75).

  4. The Court examined the grounds of appeal and found that, except grounds 3 & 4 (relating only to O.S.No.64/1997), defendants 5 to 7 merely supported the plaintiffs’ case; and that even ground 10 was “contra to their entire case”, asserting a registered sale deed which in fact did not exist (paras 79–80).

  5. The Court held that an agreement-holder cannot claim title until a registered sale deed is executed; that Ex.B-33, being only a draft sale deed, has “no sanctity in the eye of law to create any charge over the property”; and that, apart from admitted facts, there was no adverse decree against defendants 5 to 7, nor any substantial material on record to grant them relief in this appeal (paras 80, 82–83).

  6. Applications in I.A.Nos.1–3 of 2023 and 1 of 2024 (for transposition as plaintiffs, reception of additional evidence, framing of additional issues, and remitting the appeal for further evidence) were also held to be without merit, the Court observing that “this Court cannot do any futile exercise by deciding the right of defendant Nos.5 to 7 against the property of plaintiff No.3 in the present proceedings without any substantial material on record” (para 82).

  7. Accordingly, A.S.No.372 of 2009 was dismissed with no order as to costs (paras 83, 87).

(F) RESULT – DECREE OF TRIAL COURT SET ASIDE – SUIT FOR INJUNCTION DECREED – APPEAL BY DEFENDANTS 5–7 DISMISSED

  1. On a cumulative consideration of (i) plaintiffs’ prima facie title via vendors Veeramma and P. Lakshmi Devi; (ii) legal position under the 1937 Act read with Section 14 HSA; (iii) de jure possession following title in the case of a vacant site; and (iv) invalidity of Ex.B-14 sale deed and insufficiency of defendant No.3’s evidence, the Court held:

“… the vendors of the plaintiffs has primafacie right or title over the suit schedule property to pass legal right to them under Exs.A.1, A.3 and A.14 and that the plaintiffs are able to prove their possession and enjoyment over the plaint schedule property. On the other hand … the defendant No.3 failed to put forth any substantial material … thereby, the Trial Court went wrong in dismissing the suit … as such, the decree and judgment passed by the Trial Court is liable to be set aside and consequently, the suit filed by the plaintiffs is decreed for granting relief as prayed.” (para 84)

  1. A.S.No.156 of 2009 was allowed with costs, the decree and judgment dated 26-02-2009 in O.S.No.38 of 2002 were set aside and:

“… the suit [is] decreed, restraining the defendants, their men, agents and anybody interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property by the plaintiffs.” (para 86)

  1. A.S.No.372 of 2009 was dismissed; no order as to costs (para 87). Interim orders, if any, stood vacated; all miscellaneous petitions, if any, stood closed (para 87).

By advocatemmmohan -

No comments:

Post a Comment

Subscribe to: Post Comments (Atom)