BHARATIYA NAGARIK SURAKSHA SANHITA, 2023 – Ss. 473 & 477 – Remission/Premature release – Life convict – CBI investigated case – Requirement of concurrence of Central Government – Non-speaking order rejecting remission – Validity – Reformative theory of punishment – Heinousness of offence – Scope of judicial review.

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APEX COURT HELD THAT 

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA – Arts. 72 & 161 – BHARATIYA NAGARIK SURAKSHA SANHITA, 2023 – Ss. 473 & 477 – Remission/Premature release – Life convict – CBI investigated case – Requirement of concurrence of Central Government – Non-speaking order rejecting remission – Validity – Reformative theory of punishment – Heinousness of offence – Scope of judicial review.

Petitioner convicted for offences under Ss.120-B/302 IPC in murder case investigated by CBI and sentenced to life imprisonment – Petitioner underwent more than twenty-two years of incarceration – State of Uttarakhand recommended premature release/remission – Ministry of Home Affairs rejected proposal by cryptic communication merely stating non-concurrence without assigning reasons – Co-accused in same case already granted premature release by State of Uttar Pradesh – Validity of rejection order.

Held : Any order affecting personal liberty, particularly rejection of remission or premature release, must be supported by cogent reasons and must disclose due application of mind. Recording of reasons is safeguard against arbitrariness and integral facet of fairness, transparency and accountability in administrative decision-making. Mere statement that competent authority “does not concur” with proposal for remission, without disclosure of reasons, renders order ex facie non-speaking and unsustainable in law. Such cryptic rejection violates principles of natural justice and frustrates effective judicial review.

Executive discretion in matters of remission, though broad, is not uncanalised and must be exercised on relevant, rational and non-discriminatory considerations. Heinousness or gravity of offence cannot, by itself, constitute sole ground for denial of remission, since such factors stand exhausted at stage of sentencing itself. Remission is distinct executive function concerned with prisoner’s conduct, reformation and prospects of reintegration into society. Criminal justice system founded on reformative theory cannot permanently incarcerate individual solely in shadow of past crime.

Where prisoner had undergone more than twenty-two years of incarceration, exhibited good conduct in prison, received favourable recommendation from State Government and co-accused in same case had already been prematurely released, denial of similar benefit without cogent distinguishing reasons was arbitrary and violative of constitutional fairness.

Court further observed that conflicting judicial opinions within same High Court create uncertainty and emphasized corresponding duties of Bar and Bench to maintain consistency in precedent and avoid per incuriam decisions.

Laxman Naskar v. State of W.B., (2000) 7 SCC 626; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Prem Raj, (2003) 7 SCC 121; Satish v. State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 580; Mohd. Giasuddin v. State of A.P., (1977) 3 SCC 287, relied on.
Radheshyam Bhagwandas Shah v. State of Gujarat, (2022) 8 SCC 552, held per incuriam in view of Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, (2024) 5 SCC 481.

(Paras 5 to 10)

HELD

Order rejecting remission or premature release must contain reasons and reflect application of mind; absence of reasons renders order arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice. (Paras 5 to 5.4)

Power of remission is executive in character and distinct from judicial sentencing. Remission reduces period of incarceration without altering conviction or sentence imposed by Court. (Paras 6 to 6.4)

Gravity or heinousness of offence cannot be sole ground to deny remission, as reformative theory underlying modern penology requires assessment of prisoner’s conduct, rehabilitation and prospects of reintegration into society. (Paras 7 to 7.3)

Where State Government recommended premature release, prisoner had undergone more than twenty-two years of incarceration with good conduct and co-accused had already obtained remission, denial of parity without rational distinguishing basis was arbitrary. (Paras 8 to 8.4)

RESULT

Impugned letter dated 09.07.2025 issued by Ministry of Home Affairs rejecting premature release/remission quashed. Petitioner held entitled to benefit of premature release/remission. Since petitioner already on interim bail, surrender dispensed with and respondents directed to treat petitioner as prematurely released/remitted. Writ Petition allowed