1. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 227 — Discharge — “Strong Suspicion” Test — Duty of Court

Held, at the stage of S. 227 CrPC, the court is not a mere post office for framing charge. It must sift the material to see whether there is grave or strong suspicion against the accused which can be translated into evidence at trial.
If two views are possible and one leads only to suspicion (not grave suspicion), the Judge is justified in discharging the accused.
The Judge considers broad probabilities, total effect of evidence, basic infirmities, without conducting a roving enquiry or making a mini trial. (Paras 14–18; relying on Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad, P. Vijayan, Prafulla Kumar Samal, M.E. Shivalingamurthy, Ram Prakash Chadha)

2. IPC — S. 354C (Voyeurism) — Ingredients — “Private Act” Requirement — FIR and Chargesheet Not Disclosing Offence

Held, voyeurism under S. 354C IPC requires that the woman be watched or imaged while engaged in a “private act” with a reasonable expectation of privacy, as defined in Explanation 1 (exposure of genitals/posterior/breasts, use of lavatory, or sexual act not ordinarily done in public).
FIR and chargesheet only allege that accused clicked photographs/made videos of complainant entering the premises; there is no allegation that she was engaged in any “private act” as defined.
High Court itself held that S. 354C IPC is not attracted, yet did not discharge the accused. Supreme Court holds that no offence under S. 354C is disclosed; continuation of proceedings for that offence is impermissible. (Paras 19–21)

3. IPC — S. 506 (Criminal Intimidation) — Ingredients — Threat of Injury and Intent to Cause Alarm — Bald Allegations Insufficient

Held, for S. 506 IPC, there must be a threat of injury to person, reputation or property, made with intent to cause alarm.
In the present case, apart from a bald allegation that the accused “intimidated” the complainant by taking photographs, FIR and chargesheet do not specify any threatening words, nature of threat, or injury threatened.
Complainant never gave a judicial statement; her alleged friend/workmen have no 161 CrPC statements. Even accepting the FIR at face value, ingredients of S. 506 are not made out. (Para 22)

4. IPC — Ss. 339, 341 (Wrongful Restraint) — “Right to Proceed” and Lawful Obstruction — Injunction and Co-Ownership — No Offence

Wrongful restraint under S. 341 requires: (i) obstruction, and (ii) such obstruction prevents a person from proceeding in a direction in which that person has a right to proceed.
Exception: no offence if the accused, in good faith, believes he has a lawful right to obstruct.
Here, complainant’s right to enter premises was asserted as tenant of a co-owner, but:
- No document in chargesheet evidences tenancy;
- Co-owner Amalendu’s statement shows she was a prospective tenant who had come to “see” the property;
- A prior injunction in the civil suit directed parties to maintain joint possession and not create third-party interests.
Held, complainant, being only a prospective tenant, had no right to enter; induction itself would violate injunction. Accused, son of co-owner protected by injunction, bona fide enforced what he believed to be a lawful right over property. Exception to S. 339 applies; S. 341 IPC not made out. (Paras 23–26)

5. Civil vs Criminal — Pending Civil Dispute over Property — Role of Police and Courts at Chargesheet/Charge Stage

Held, where serious civil disputes over property (with subsisting injunction orders) exist, police and criminal courts must be especially circumspect in:
- filing chargesheets, and
- framing charges.
Filing chargesheets in cases with no strong suspicion clogs the judicial system, wastes resources, prolongs trials likely to end in acquittal, and compromises fair process.
The State must not prosecute citizens without a reasonable prospect of conviction. (Paras 28–29)

6. Investigation — Chargesheet Without Strong Suspicion — Complainant Refusing Judicial Statement

Investigating Officer’s duty is to assess whether evidence gives a reasonable prospect of conviction before filing chargesheet.
In present case:
- Civil injunction existed;
- Complainant refused judicial statement under S. 164 CrPC;
- No corroborative 161 statements from friend/workmen;
- Material disclosed at best a civil dispute over possession/ingress.
Held, police and trial court failed to act as initial filters; strong suspicion based on legally tenable material was absent. (Paras 4, 11, 17–18, 28–29)

7. Result

Appeal allowed. Impugned judgment of High Court and order refusing discharge set aside. Appellant discharged from G.R. Case No. 223/2020 (FIR No. 50/2020, Bidhannagar North PS) for offences under Ss. 341, 354C, 506 IPC. (Para 30)

ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

I. Factual Setting

Property CF-231, Salt Lake is jointly owned by two brothers, Bimalendu (accused’s father) and Amalendu (complainant’s side).
Civil suit (Title Suit No. 20/2018) was filed by Bimalendu; on 29-11-2018 the Civil Court ordered:
- joint possession to be maintained;
- no disturbance of each other’s possession;
- no alienation or creation of third-party interest till disposal.
FIR dated 19-03-2020 alleges:
- complainant, described as “tenant” of Amalendu, went with friend and workmen to enter property;
- accused restrained them, took photos and videos, outraging her modesty and intimidating her.
Chargesheet filed u/Ss. 341, 354C, 506 IPC even though complainant refused to make judicial statement u/S 164 CrPC.

The defence case: complainant is not tenant but a prospective tenant; entry was an attempt to dispossess accused’s side in breach of injunction; accused merely protested and protected possession.

The State accepts she is only a prospective tenant and relies on Amalendu’s statement that she “came to see” the premises.

II. Legal Framework on Discharge (S. 227 CrPC)

The Court reiterates and applies the settled tests:

Judge has power to sift and weigh material for limited purpose of seeing whether there is a prima facie case/grave suspicion.
If material, even taken at its best, cannot show commission of offence, discharge is warranted.
Two views test: if one view leads only to suspicion (not grave suspicion), the accused should be discharged.
Defence documents are generally not looked at, but the court must examine prosecution material critically, not mechanically.

This becomes the lens through which S. 341, 354C and 506 are examined.

III. Why S. 354C IPC (Voyeurism) Fails on the Face of FIR/Chargesheet

Statutory requirement: the woman must be watched/filmed during a “private act” with reasonable expectation of privacy.
“Private act” is tightly defined (exposure of genitals/breasts, use of lavatory, sexual acts not done in public).
In this case, allegations are limited to the complainant entering the property and accused taking photos/videos.
There is no suggestion of any private act, exposure, or intimate circumstance.
Even the High Court accepted that 354C ingredients are not disclosed but failed to give consequential relief.

The Supreme Court corrects that inconsistency and holds that continuing prosecution under S. 354C is unsustainable.

IV. Why S. 506 IPC (Criminal Intimidation) Is Not Made Out

Essential ingredients:

Threat of injury (to body, reputation or property),
With intent to cause alarm or compel action/inaction.

The Court notes:

FIR contains only a generic statement that accused “intimidated” complainant by taking photographs.
No specific words, nature of threat, or stated injury is pleaded.
No supporting statements from friend or workmen; complainant herself avoids judicial statement.

Even if FIR is taken as true, there is no material satisfying the legal ingredients of criminal intimidation.

V. Why S. 341 IPC (Wrongful Restraint) Is Not Attracted

Key elements (S. 339 + S. 341):

Voluntary obstruction,
Preventing a person from proceeding in a direction where that person has a right to proceed.
Exception: no offence where obstructing person, in good faith, believes he has a lawful right to obstruct.

Analysis:

Complainant’s claimed right of entry rests on alleged tenancy under Amalendu.
Chargesheet carries no tenancy documents.
Amalendu’s own statement describes her only as someone who “came to see” the property — a prospective tenant.
Inducting her as tenant would itself violate the existing injunction (no creation of third-party interest).

Thus:

On date of alleged offence, complainant had no legal right to enter the premises.
Accused, as son of joint owner protected by injunction, acted in bona fide belief that he had legal right to resist such entry.

The Court holds the statutory exception applies; there is no wrongful restraint.

VI. Civil–Criminal Overlap and Systemic Concerns

The Court uses this case to send a broader message:

When a property is sub judice with clear civil injunctions, police and trial courts must carefully evaluate whether criminal process is being used as a weapon in a civil dispute.
Filing chargesheets without strong suspicion misuses criminal law, burdens system, and subjects citizens to trial without a realistic prospect of conviction.
At both stages — filing chargesheet and framing charge — authorities must act as filters, not conduits, ensuring only cases with legally tenable strong suspicion move to trial.

In the present case:

The existence of a civil injunction and the absence of core ingredients under Ss. 354C, 506, 341 made it a typical civil conflict over possession and ingress.
It should have been handled by civil remedies (injunction/enforcement/modification), not criminal prosecution.

VII. Final Outcome

Applying the “strong suspicion” standard:

No strong suspicion arises on any of the three IPC sections alleged.
FIR and chargesheet, even at their face value, do not disclose the essential legal ingredients.

Therefore, the Supreme Court:

Allows the appeal,
Sets aside the High Court’s order and the trial court’s refusal to discharge,
Discharges the appellant from the criminal proceedings (G.R. 223/2020 / FIR No. 50/2020).

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN

Monday, December 8, 2025