Monday, December 1, 2025

Mohammedan law – Partition under, during the lifetime of the owner – If permissible: Held: No – Under Mohammedan Law, partition while a person is alive between him and his heirs is impermissible – Under the Mohammedan Law, the right of an heir-apparent comes into existence for the first time on the death of the ancestor, and he is not entitled until then to any interest in the property to which he would succeed as an heir if he survived the ancestor – Thus, in the present case, ‘SS’ during his lifetime could not have partitioned his property, giving two parts thereof to his sons (appellants). [Paras 20, 21]

Under Mohammedan law, whether an owner of property can, in
his lifetime, transfer said property to his heirs by way of partition;
whether, in the facts of this case, the requisites of a valid gift were
met and also whether nomenclature employed in Mutation Entry
can be said to be indicative of intentions.
Headnotes†
Mohammedan law – Partition under, during the lifetime of the
owner – If permissible:
Held: No – Under Mohammedan Law, partition while a person
is alive between him and his heirs is impermissible – Under the
Mohammedan Law, the right of an heir-apparent comes into
existence for the first time on the death of the ancestor, and he is
not entitled until then to any interest in the property to which he
would succeed as an heir if he survived the ancestor – Thus, in
the present case, ‘SS’ during his lifetime could not have partitioned
his property, giving two parts thereof to his sons (appellants).
[Paras 20, 21]
Mohammedan law – Oral gift made by ‘SS’ in favour of his
sons, if was a valid gift – Plea of the appellants that even
though the Mutation entry used the word ‘partition’, it should
be read as ‘gift’ – Nomenclature employed in Mutation Entry,
if indicative of intentions:
Held: Only the substance, not the form or nomenclature, is
pertinent to determine the nature of the transaction – ‘Partition’
and ‘gift’ are two terms that have different requisites, require
different circumstances, and bear different consequences –
Partition, is the division of property among co-owners, whereas
gift is a voluntary transfer of existing property made voluntarily
*Author
924 [2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
without consideration – The legal necessities of both these modes
of conveyance are quite different and, thus, cannot be liberally
interpreted – What is required to be considered is the intention as
shown by the words written in a document – Further, the words
used in a document have to be understood in their natural meaning
with reference to the language employed – While interpreting any
document, common or usual meaning is ascribed to the words
unless that leads to absurdity – A perusal of the Mutation Entry
No.8258 (Ex.P1) shows that ‘SS’ got the ‘partition’ done in favour
of his sons – The words “partition of the property done by SAKS”
clearly indicate his intention to divide the property into three
parts without any indication of his intent to gift the property to
his sons – Had ‘SS’ intended to gift the property, it ought to have
been recorded as a gift in the Mutation Entry – Even though the
other two requisites, i.e. acceptance and possession, may have
been proved, the essential requirement of the declaration made
with clear and unequivocal intention remains unfulfilled – When
neither the words of the Mutation Entry nor the Entry itself support
the claim of the appellants-original defendants in any manner, for
neither can it be a gift nor does the Mutation Entry mean that any
title rests with them, the oral gift made by ‘SS’ in favour of his sons
cannot be held to be a valid gift – No fault with the reasoning of
the Trial Court and the High Court qua the questions of gift and
partition – Order of the Trial Court concurred by the High Court
is confirmed. [Paras 31-34, 36, 38]
Mohammedan Law – Gift deed – Requisites of a valid gift
deed – Enumerated.
Islamic Personal Law – Sources – Discussed.
Mohammedan Law – Gift – Registration:
Held: Registration of gift is not required under Mohammedan
Law – An unwritten and unregistered gift executed by the donor
in favour of donees is valid. [Para 27]
Words and Phrases – ‘Partition’; Gift (Hiba) – Meaning –
Discussed.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973 – SS. 372 PROVISO, 397, 401 – VICTIM’S RIGHT OF APPEAL – DELAY IN FILING APPEAL AGAINST ACQUITTAL – CONDONATION

A. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973 – SS. 372 PROVISO, 397, 401 – VICTIM’S RIGHT OF APPEAL – DELAY IN FILING APPEAL AGAINST ACQUITTAL – CONDONATION

Criminal Revision under Ss. 397, 401 CrPC challenging order of appellate Court refusing to condone 77 days’ delay in filing appeal by de facto complainant/victim against judgment of acquittal in C.C. No.145 of 2018.

Held:

  • By 2009 amendment, proviso to S.372 CrPC confers a statutory right of appeal upon the “victim” against an order of acquittal, conviction for lesser offence, or inadequate compensation. Such right is substantive in nature and continues through appeal/revision.

  • No corresponding amendment has been made in Art.114 of the Limitation Act to specifically cover victim’s appeal under S.372 proviso. In the absence of an express provision, the substantive statutory right of appeal of the victim cannot be curtailed merely on the ground of delay which is not inordinate and where sufficient cause is shown.

  • On facts, judgment of acquittal was dated 13-07-2022; victim was unaware of the date of pronouncement, applied for copy on 12-09-2022, received on 13-10-2022, and filed appeal on 29-10-2022. Effective delay, after excluding copy-time, was held to be about 17 days only and satisfactorily explained (paras 2, 6, 8).

  • Appellate Court’s refusal to condone such delay, treating it as inordinate and inadequately explained, ignoring the position of the victim and the copy-application timeline, was held to be perverse and unsustainable (paras 2, 6, 8).

Criminal Revision allowed; order refusing condonation of delay set aside; delay treated as sufficiently explained (paras 8–9).

B. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973 – VICTIM’S RIGHTS – SCOPE AND CONTENT – PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS FROM INVESTIGATION TILL APPEAL/REVISION

Relying on Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321, the Court reiterates:

  • Rights of a “victim” under amended CrPC are substantive, enforceable and an aspect of human rights, and are independent of the State’s rights; presence of the State in proceedings is not equivalent to hearing the victim (para 2, quoting paras 22–23 of SC).

  • A victim has a legally vested right to be heard at every stage post-occurrence – from investigation until culmination of proceedings in appeal or revision.

  • “Victim” and “complainant/informant” are distinct concepts; a victim need not be the complainant, and an informant need not be the victim.

In the present case, petitioner is the de facto complainant/victim; his independent participatory and appellate rights must be recognised and cannot be neutralized by procedural hyper-technicality regarding limitation (paras 2, 6, 8).

C. LIMITATION ACT, 1963 – ARTS. 114, 115 – APPEAL BY VICTIM UNDER PROVISO TO S.372 CrPC – PERIOD OF LIMITATION – “REASONABLE PERIOD” – AFFIDAVIT INSTEAD OF FORMAL DELAY PETITION

The Court surveys divergent High Court views:

  1. Kerala High CourtPeethambaran v. State of Kerala, 2023 SCC OnLine Ker 1642; FB in Sobhanakumari K. v. Santhosh (MANU/KE/2167/2017):

    • Victim’s appeal against acquittal: no specific limitation prescribed in Limitation Act; Article 114 does not strictly apply.

    • Appeal by victim to be filed within a “reasonable period” (90 days), and if beyond, an affidavit explaining delay is sufficient; “delay condonation petition” as such is not necessary and no formal condonation order is contemplated (paras 3–4).

  2. HP & Bombay High CourtsKeshavu Devi v. Puran Chand (MANU/HP/0111/2025) and Amit v. State of Maharashtra, MANU/MH/0993/2015:

    • Where no express limitation is provided for victim’s appeal, the settled principle is that such appeals must be filed within a reasonable time, guided by legislative policy behind Arts.114 & 115 and, if necessary, delay to be considered with reference to date of knowledge (para 4).

  3. Punjab & Haryana High Court (FB)Tata Steel Ltd. v. Atma Tube Products Ltd., MANU/PH/0175/2013:

    • Reasonable limitation for victim’s appeals, by analogy with Arts.114 & 115, indicated as:
      • Against acquittal: 90 days (if to High Court), 60 days (if to other Court);
      • Other orders: 60 days (to High Court), 30 days (to other Court) (para 5).

Present Court:

  • Notes that proviso to S.372 creates a right of appeal for the victim without a corresponding explicit limitation article.

  • Holds that this substantive right cannot be defeated on a narrow view of limitation when delay is marginal and properly explained by affidavit, especially given want of notice of judgment and the victim’s status (paras 6, 8).

D. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – NOTICE TO VICTIM / DE FACTO COMPLAINANT – PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT – EFFECT ON LIMITATION

  • CrPC contains no provision requiring:
    (i) notice to the victim/de facto complainant at the stage of final arguments, or
    (ii) notice at the time of pronouncement of judgment of acquittal (para 2).

  • Where the victim is not on notice of the date of judgment, it is unreasonable to expect him to file an appeal within the prescribed or “reasonable” period without reference to when he acquired knowledge and obtained a copy (paras 2, 8).

  • In this case, immediately upon coming to know of the judgment, petitioner applied for certified copy and filed appeal promptly after its supply. This conduct constitutes “sufficient cause” for delay; appellate Court was bound to consider this contextually instead of mechanically branding delay as “inordinate” (paras 2, 6, 8).

E. REVISIONAL JURISDICTION – Ss. 397, 401 CrPC – INTERFERENCE WITH ORDER REFUSING CONDONATION OF DELAY – PERVERSITY

  • Revisional Court may interfere where the subordinate Court’s refusal to condone delay:
    • ignores relevant legal standards concerning victims’ rights and limitation,
    • fails to appreciate material facts regarding knowledge of judgment and copy-application, and
    • results in denial of a substantive statutory right of appeal.

  • On facts, the Principal Sessions Judge failed to appreciate that the petitioner was a victim/de facto complainant, had no notice of the judgment date, acted promptly after knowledge, and that effective delay was marginal and properly explained. Such refusal to condone was held to be perverse (para 8).

Criminal Revision accordingly allowed; impugned order in Crl.M.P. No.707 of 2022 set aside; connected interlocutory applications closed; no order as to costs (para 9).

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT / PROMISSORY NOTE – EXECUTION – PROOF – EXAMINATION OF ATTESTOR – NON-REFERENCE TO HANDWRITING EXPERT – ADVERSE INFERENCE Suit for recovery based on promissory note dated 29-08-2013 (Ex.A-1); plaintiff examined himself as PW1 and sole attestor as PW2; both deposed that defendant himself scribed Ex.A-1 and later scribed part-payment endorsement Ex.A-2. Defendant denied execution and alleged fabrication, but led only his own evidence as DW1 and did not seek handwriting expert’s opinion. Held: Plaintiff discharged initial burden by producing original promissory note and examining the sole attestor (PW2), whose testimony corroborated PW1. Once execution is proved through credible evidence, bare denial by defendant without any supporting material is insufficient. Defendant, having specifically alleged forgery/fabrication, ought to have taken steps to send the document to handwriting expert; failure to do so weakened his defence (paras 16–18, 20, 23, 26). Both courts below were justified in accepting plaintiff’s evidence and holding Ex.A-1 and Ex.A-2 genuine.

A. CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908 – S. 100 – SECOND APPEAL – CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF FACT – SCOPE OF INTERFERENCE – “SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW” – REITERATION OF LIMITS

Second appeal filed against concurrent decree of trial Court and first appellate Court in suit for recovery on promissory note.

Held:

  • Right of appeal is neither natural nor inherent; it is statutory and regulated by S.100 CPC.

  • Second appeal lies only when a substantial question of law arises.

  • A substantial question of law must directly and substantially affect rights of parties, and must be an open, difficult, or debatable question not finally settled by superior courts.

  • High Court cannot re-appreciate evidence or interfere with findings of fact of first appellate court merely because another view is possible.

  • Pure appreciation of facts, appreciation of oral / documentary evidence, or drawing of inferences of fact do not give rise to a substantial question of law.

Applied ratio of Boodireddy Chandraiah v. Arigela Laxmi, (2007) 8 SCC 155; Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki, AIR 2006 SC 1975.

On facts, findings regarding execution of promissory note, part-payment endorsement, and limitation were all factual, based on proper appreciation of evidence. No substantial question of law arose. Second appeal dismissed at admission stage (paras 13–15, 27–28).


B. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT / PROMISSORY NOTE – EXECUTION – PROOF – EXAMINATION OF ATTESTOR – NON-REFERENCE TO HANDWRITING EXPERT – ADVERSE INFERENCE

Suit for recovery based on promissory note dated 29-08-2013 (Ex.A-1); plaintiff examined himself as PW1 and sole attestor as PW2; both deposed that defendant himself scribed Ex.A-1 and later scribed part-payment endorsement Ex.A-2. Defendant denied execution and alleged fabrication, but led only his own evidence as DW1 and did not seek handwriting expert’s opinion.

Held:

  • Plaintiff discharged initial burden by producing original promissory note and examining the sole attestor (PW2), whose testimony corroborated PW1.

  • Once execution is proved through credible evidence, bare denial by defendant without any supporting material is insufficient.

  • Defendant, having specifically alleged forgery/fabrication, ought to have taken steps to send the document to handwriting expert; failure to do so weakened his defence (paras 16–18, 20, 23, 26).

Both courts below were justified in accepting plaintiff’s evidence and holding Ex.A-1 and Ex.A-2 genuine.

C. LIMITATION ACT, 1963 – SS. 3, 18 – SUIT ON PROMISSORY NOTE – PART PAYMENT ENDORSEMENT – FRESH PERIOD OF LIMITATION – PLEA OF LIMITATION

Promissory note dated 29-08-2013; endorsement of part-payment of Rs.5,000/- dated 26-08-2016 (Ex.A-2) written and signed by defendant on reverse of Ex.A-1; suit filed on 24-08-2019.

Held:

  • Even though no specific plea of limitation was raised in written statement, court is bound under S.3 to examine limitation.

  • As per S.18, where before expiry of the prescribed period there is a written and signed acknowledgment/part-payment, a fresh period of limitation is computed from date of such acknowledgment.

  • Endorsement Ex.A-2, scribed and signed by defendant, constituted acknowledgment/part-payment within limitation; hence a fresh three-year period ran from 26-08-2016.

  • Suit filed on 24-08-2019 was within time (paras 17, 20, 22).

Contention that suit was time-barred rejected.

D. EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 – S. 73 – COURT’S POWER TO COMPARE SIGNATURES – NO EXPERT OPINION – CONCURRENT FINDING UPHELD

Neither party moved for handwriting expert. Trial Court compared defendant’s signatures on Ex.A-1 and Ex.A-2 with admitted signatures on record under S.73 Evidence Act and found them genuine; first appellate Court concurred.

Held:

  • Court is expressly empowered under S.73 to compare disputed and admitted writings/signatures.

  • Though expert opinion is a matter of prudence, its absence does not bar the Court from itself comparing signatures.

  • Apex Court in Murari Lal v. State of M.P., AIR 1980 SC 531 held that the Court cannot shirk this duty merely saying it is not an expert.

  • On facts, careful comparison by trial Court, coupled with oral evidence of PW1 and PW2, constituted adequate basis for concurrent factual finding that Ex.A-1 and Ex.A-2 were genuine (paras 23–25).

No perversity shown; findings not open to interference in second appeal.

E. APPRECIATION OF ORAL EVIDENCE – CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS – ROLE OF APPELLATE COURT

Referring to Pottem Subbarayudu v. Kothapalli Gangulu Naidu, 2000 (5) ALT 759, Court reiterated:

  • Credibility of witness must be tested on probabilities and surrounding circumstances;

  • Trial Judge, having seen demeanour, is best placed to assess credibility;

  • Appellate Court should be slow to disturb such findings.

Here, trial Court accepted PW1 and PW2 as credible; first appellate Court re-appreciated and concurred. High Court found no perversity or misreading justifying interference (paras 21, 26–27).

F. MATERIAL ALTERATION – NOT PLEADED – INAPPLICABILITY OF PRINCIPLE

Reliance placed on Kammali Venkata Subbayya v. Velamuri Viswanatham, 1970 SCC OnLine AP 121 regarding material alteration.

Held:

  • No plea of material alteration was raised; neither side contended that the promissory note was altered.

  • Case-law on material alteration inapplicable to facts (para 19).

RESULT

  • Second Appeal dismissed at admission stage.

  • Judgments and decrees of II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kadapa (O.S. No. 858/2019, dated 28-09-2022) and Principal District Judge, Kadapa (A.S. No. 75/2022, dated 30-07-2024) confirmed.

  • No order as to costs; pending applications closed (para 29).

MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW – DISSOLUTION OF MUSLIM MARRIAGES ACT, 1939 – S. 2(iv), 2(viii)(a) – CRUELTY – FAILURE OF MARITAL OBLIGATIONS – MENTAL CRUELTY – WIFE ENTITLED TO DECREE OF DISSOLUTION

A. MUSLIM PERSONAL LAW – DISSOLUTION OF MUSLIM MARRIAGES ACT, 1939 – S. 2(iv), 2(viii)(a) – CRUELTY – FAILURE OF MARITAL OBLIGATIONS – MENTAL CRUELTY – WIFE ENTITLED TO DECREE OF DISSOLUTION

Held: Under S. 2(iv) and S. 2(viii)(a), cruelty includes mental or emotional cruelty, need not be physical.
Court held that:

• Continuous discord, strained relationship for several years,
• Allegations of demands relating to wife’s property,
• Absence or disputed conjugal relationship,
• Husband’s own admissions, including medical tests undertaken on allegations concerning fitness for cohabitation,
• Execution of Memorandum of Understanding (Ex.P10 / Ex.R18),
• Return of all gifts/articles exchanged at marriage,
• Long separation, independent living, and breakdown of marital society,

constitute sufficient mental cruelty and “sufferance” to the wife justifying dissolution (paras 17–28).

Family Court’s approach that cruelty was not proved was held unsustainable (paras 24–28).

B. MUSLIM LAW – WOMAN SEEKING DIVORCE – BURDEN OF PROOF – CIVIL STANDARD – PREPONDERANCE OF PROBABILITIES

Held: In civil matrimonial matters, preponderance of probabilities is sufficient (para 27).
Wife’s consistent stand that she is unable to continue marital life, her complaints, the existence of MOU, return of belongings, and undisputed long separation satisfy the required standard.

C. MOU (MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING) – EX.P10/R18 – EFFECT – INDICATES BREAKDOWN OF MARRIAGE – PARTIES AGREED TO SEEK DIVORCE THROUGH KHULA

Ex.P10 / Ex.R18 signed by both parties and their relatives provided:

• Mutual agreement not to execute the RCR decree,
• Withdrawal of maintenance case,
• Withdrawal of criminal case under S. 498-A IPC,
• Withdrawal of application to set aside ex parte RCR decree,
• Return of articles,
• Agreement to seek divorce through Khula before Kazi.

Held:

• Wife substantially complied with her obligations, including abandoning maintenance and criminal proceedings.
• Respondent’s contention that divorce cannot be granted as it would validate allegations is untenable.
• MOU strongly indicates irretrievable breakdown and parties’ intention not to resume marital life (paras 15–23, 26–27).

D. CRUELTY – CONJUGAL RELATIONS – ABSENCE OR NEGATIVE SEXUAL MARITAL LIFE – RELEVANCE

Wife alleged absence of conjugal relations for years; Family Court treated this as an “introduced theory.”
High Court noted:

• Cross-examination of both sides showed disputes touching carnal relations, procreation, fitness for cohabitation, etc.
• Respondent himself admitted medical testing undertaken to refute claims.
• These circumstances “testify the irreparable gap” and contribute to mental cruelty (paras 18–23, 27).

E. RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS – EX PARTE DECREE – UNDERLYING BREAKDOWN – NOT A BAR TO DIVORCE

Respondent obtained RCR decree ex parte (FCOP 1176/2019).
Held:

• Wife filed a petition to set it aside; withdrew application pursuant to MOU.
• RCR decree does not negate evidence of deep marital discord; husband never executed the decree (para 22).
• Ex parte RCR decree cannot defeat wife’s right to dissolve marriage under the 1939 Act.

F. FAMILY COURT – ERRORS – IMPUGNED ORDER SET ASIDE

Family Court erred in:

• Ignoring Ex.P10 / Ex.R18,
• Relying on assumptions that wife deserted husband without cause,
• Treating cruelty allegations as unproved despite clear material.

Held: Findings of Family Court on burden of proof, cruelty, and analysis of evidence unsustainable; decree is liable to be set aside (paras 27–29).

G. RESULT

  1. Appeal allowed.

  2. Impugned judgment dated 09-11-2023 in FCOP No.745/2020 set aside.

  3. Marriage dated 12-02-2012 dissolved by decree of divorce.

  4. Parties left to live separately; no order as to costs.

  5. Pending miscellaneous petitions closed (para 30).

ANDHRA PRADESH RIGHTS IN LAND AND PATTADAR PASSBOOKS ACT, 1971 – Ss. 3(3), 4, 5(1), 5(2), 5(2-A), 5(3), 5(4), 8(2), 9 – MUTATION – JURISDICTION OF REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER – APPEAL UNDER S. 5(4) – MAINTAINABILITY – APPEAL LIES ONLY AGAINST AN ORDER OF THE TAHSILDAR UNDER S. 5(1) OR AMENDMENT UNDER S. 5(3) – NO APPEAL IF TAHSILDAR HAS PASSED NO ORDER

A. ANDHRA PRADESH RIGHTS IN LAND AND PATTADAR PASSBOOKS ACT, 1971 – Ss. 3(3), 4, 5(1), 5(2), 5(2-A), 5(3), 5(4), 8(2), 9 – MUTATION – JURISDICTION OF REVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER – APPEAL UNDER S. 5(4) – MAINTAINABILITY – APPEAL LIES ONLY AGAINST AN ORDER OF THE TAHSILDAR UNDER S. 5(1) OR AMENDMENT UNDER S. 5(3) – NO APPEAL IF TAHSILDAR HAS PASSED NO ORDER

Held:
Section 5(4) provides an appellate remedy only against:

  1. An order of the Tahsildar under S. 5(1) (allowing or refusing mutation), or

  2. An amendment of the Record of Rights under S. 5(3) (registered-document based automatic mutation).

Where no order is passed by the Tahsildar under S. 5(1), no appeal lies to the Revenue Divisional Officer (paras 18–20).

In the present case, the 5th respondent’s claim was based on inheritance, thus governed by S. 5(1).
The Tahsildar did not pass any order under S. 5(1), except issuance of an endorsement dated 25-03-2025 advising parties to approach a civil court (para 15).
Such endorsement was not challenged and does not constitute an order under S. 5(1).

Held: The RDO’s order dated 18-10-2025 is without jurisdiction, and therefore liable to be set aside (paras 20–21).

B. SCOPE OF MUTATION PROCEEDINGS – TITLE QUESTIONS – SECTION 8(2) – CIVIL COURT HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION

Held:
Mutation authorities cannot adjudicate questions of title or conduct a detailed factual enquiry relating to ownership; such matters fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the civil court under S. 8(2) of the Act (para 7).
The Court expressly refrained from examining rights or title of either party (para 21).

C. RECORD OF RIGHTS – RECTIFICATION AFTER ONE YEAR – SECTION 3(3)

Appellants argued that entries in favour of their predecessors existed since 1980 and that applications after 44 years are barred by S. 3(3) (para 7).
The Court left this issue open (para 21).

D. PROCEDURAL SCHEME UNDER Ss. 4 & 5 – REQUIREMENT OF TAHASILDAR’S ORDER BEFORE APPEAL

• Under S. 4, any person acquiring rights (succession, survivorship, inheritance, patta, decree, etc.) must intimate the Tahsildar.
• Under S. 5(1), the Tahsildar must conduct enquiry and either carry out mutation or, if he concludes mutation is impermissible, he cannot reject; he must refer the matter under S. 5(2) with recommendations to the RDO (para 11).
• Only thereafter does RDO exercise power under S. 5(2-A).

In the present case, none of these mandatory steps occurred; the RDO acted in the absence of a referral and in absence of any S.5(1) order (paras 11, 19).

E. APPLICABILITY OF RATNAMMA v. RDO, DHARMAVARAM (2015 (6) ALD 609)

Division Bench judgment in Ratnamma holds:
An appeal under S. 5(4) lies only against an order of the Tahsildar; no appeal is maintainable in the absence of such an order (para 17).

Held: Ratnamma applies.
Since no order under S.5(1) was passed by the Tahsildar, the RDO had no jurisdiction (paras 18–20).

F. REPRESENTATIONS FILED AFTER DECADES – MAINTAINABILITY UNDER THE ACT

Appellants’ argument: Entries existed since 1980; representations in 2025 are not maintainable (para 7).
Court: Issue not decided; all questions of delay are kept open (para 21).

G. RESULT – WRIT PETITION & WRIT APPEAL – COMMON DISPOSAL

  1. Order of RDO dated 18-10-2025 in D.Dis.No.D2(B)/989/2025 set aside as without jurisdiction (para 21).

  2. W.P. No. 30624/2025 allowed.

  3. W.A. No. 1164/2025 allowed.

  4. Parties left to pursue their rights before appropriate forum (civil court) (para 22).

  5. No order as to costs.

  6. Pending miscellaneous petitions closed.


ANDHRA PRADESH RIGHTS IN LAND & PATTADAR PASSBOOKS ACT, 1971 – Ss. 4, 5(1), 5(2), 5(2-A), 5(3), 5(4), 8(2), 9 – MUTATION ENTRIES – APPEAL UNDER S.5(4) – APPEAL LIES ONLY AGAINST (i) ORDER OF TAHSILDAR UNDER S.5(1) OR (ii) AMENDMENT UNDER S.5(3) – NO APPEAL LIES IF TAHSILDAR HAS PASSED NO ORDER

A. ANDHRA PRADESH RIGHTS IN LAND & PATTADAR PASSBOOKS ACT, 1971 – Ss. 4, 5(1), 5(2), 5(2-A), 5(3), 5(4), 8(2), 9 – MUTATION ENTRIES – APPEAL UNDER S.5(4) – APPEAL LIES ONLY AGAINST (i) ORDER OF TAHSILDAR UNDER S.5(1) OR (ii) AMENDMENT UNDER S.5(3) – NO APPEAL LIES IF TAHSILDAR HAS PASSED NO ORDER

Held: For an appeal under Section 5(4) to lie, there must exist:

  1. An order of the Tahsildar under S. 5(1) determining mutation (either allowing or refusing), or

  2. An amendment of ROR under S. 5(3) (automatic change based on a registered document).

Absent either, no appeal lies to the Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO) (paras 18–20).

In the present case:

• 5th respondent claimed mutation based on inheritance, falling under S.5(1).
Tahsildar passed no order under S.5(1), except issuing an endorsement dated 25-03-2025 advising parties to approach the civil court.
• Endorsement not challenged; no mutation order existed.

Held: RDO lacked jurisdiction to entertain or decide an appeal under S. 5(4). Impugned RDO order (18-10-2025) set aside as without jurisdiction (paras 19–21).

B. REVENUE AUTHORITIES – MUTATION BASED ON INHERITANCE – TAHASILDAR’S ROLE – PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS UNDER Ss. 4 & 5

Held:

• Mutation on basis of succession/inheritance must be processed only under S.4 → S.5(1).
• If Tahsildar refuses mutation, he cannot reject; must send file with recommendations to RDO under S.5(2) (para 11).
• RDO then acts only on “recommendations” under S.5(2-A).
• In the absence of such referral and order, RDO cannot assume jurisdiction.

C. JURISDICTION OF REVENUE AUTHORITIES – TITLE DISPUTES – LIMITATION OF POWERS – Ss. 8(2), 9

Held: Determination of title or competing ownership claims lies exclusively within the jurisdiction of the civil court under S.8(2) of the Act. Mutation authorities cannot conduct detailed title adjudication (para 7).
The present order does not determine title; all rights are left open (para 21).

D. RECORD OF RIGHTS – ORIGINAL ENTRIES – APPLICATION FOR CHANGE AFTER DECADES – S.3(3)

Held (observation): S.3(3) provides only a one-year window to seek rectification of initial ROR entries. Appellants argued that entries existed since 1980 and challenge after 44 years was not maintainable (para 7).
Court leaves this question open (para 21).

E. WRIT PETITION & WRIT APPEAL – COMMON ORDER – SCOPE – DISPOSAL

Since the RDO’s order suffered from jurisdictional error, both the Writ Petition (30624/2025) and the Writ Appeal (1164/2025) were allowed (para 22). All issues on title, delay, and merits remain open.

F. PRECEDENT – RATNAMMA v. RDO, DHARMAVARAM (2015(6) ALD 609) – APPLICATION

Division Bench precedent applied: appeal under S.5(4) is maintainable only against mutation orders or amendments specifically traceable to S.5(1) or S.5(3). As no such order existed here, RDO had no jurisdiction (paras 17–18).

RESULT

  1. RDO Order dated 18-10-2025 in D.Dis.No.D2(B)/989/2025 set aside as being without jurisdiction.

  2. W.P. No. 30624/2025 – Allowed.

  3. W.A. No. 1164/2025 – Allowed.

  4. All rights of parties left open to be adjudicated before appropriate forum (civil court).

  5. No order as to costs.

  6. Pending miscellaneous petitions closed.


HINDU LAW – SUCCESSION – SELF-ACQUIRED PROPERTY OF DECEASED FATHER – DEATH INTESTATE – DEVOLUTION UNDER SECTION 8, HINDU SUCCESSION ACT, 1956 – CLASS I HEIRS ENTITLED EQUALLY

A. HINDU LAW – SUCCESSION – SELF-ACQUIRED PROPERTY OF DECEASED FATHER – DEATH INTESTATE – DEVOLUTION UNDER SECTION 8, HINDU SUCCESSION ACT, 1956 – CLASS I HEIRS ENTITLED EQUALLY

It was admitted that items 1 to 5 of plaint ‘A’ schedule lands and the ‘B’ schedule house were the self-acquisitions of late Vathada Sriranganatha Lakshmanaswamy, who died intestate on 04-03-1979 (paras 21, 23).
Held: On intestacy, the property devolves equally upon his Class-I heirs, namely the widow (D-1) and children (plaintiff, D-2, D-5, D-6, D-7) (paras 21, 23, 49).
Trial Court's contrary allotment based on a disputed Will was erroneous and liable to be set aside (paras 32–33).

B. WILLS – PROOF – SECTIONS 63, INDIAN SUCCESSION ACT & 68, EVIDENCE ACT – PROPOUNDER MUST PROVE – MERE EXHIBITING NOT ENOUGH – WILL NOT PROVED – NO TESTAMENTARY DEVISE OF SHARE

Ex.B-45 (alleged Will of D-1/mother) was relied on to claim exclusive bequest of her share. Held:

  1. Will was not proved according to Sections 63 and 68;

  2. Propounder not examined;

  3. No attesting witness examined except D.W.5 (interested witness, husband of beneficiary) (paras 26–31);

  4. No pleadings asserting existence of Will;

  5. D.W.1 (testatrix) testified in 1993 but made no reference to executing a Will (para 30).

Held: Will surrounded by suspicious circumstances; not proved; no devolution in favour of either plaintiff or D-7; intestate succession applies (paras 28–32; Rani Purnima Debi applied).

C. JOINT FAMILY PROPERTY – SELF-ACQUISITIONS – SALE BY ONE COPARCENER – AGREEMENTS OF SALE – BINDING ONLY ON EXECUTANT – NO CONSENT OF OTHER CO-SHARERS – NO LEGAL NECESSITY PROVED

Defendant No.2, claiming to act as managing member, executed Exs.B-20 & B-35 (1980 agreements of sale) in favour of D-8 and D-11 for item No.1 of plaint A schedule.
Held:

  1. Suit property was self-acquired property of deceased father, not joint family property (paras 21, 42);

  2. Defendant No.2 failed to prove legal necessity, family debts, or sale proceeds used for marriage expenses (paras 37–41);

  3. No proof that other sharers received consideration (para 43);

  4. Purchasers knew plaintiff had a share but did not secure his signature (paras 43–44);

  5. Ryot passbooks (Ex.B-44) and land tax receipts do not create title without a registered sale deed (para 45).

Held: Agreements valid only inter se executant (D-2) and purchasers; not binding on other co-sharers (paras 46–47).

D. JOINT FAMILY – MANAGER – POWER TO ALIENATE – LEGAL NECESSITY – BURDEN ON ALIENEE – NOT DISCHARGED

For an alienation by manager of Hindu family to bind non-consenting members, alienees must prove (i) manager's status, (ii) existence of legal necessity, and (iii) inquiry made in good faith.
Held: Defendant No.2 not proved to be manager; existence of debts not proved; no evidence of necessity or bona-fide enquiry by purchasers (paras 38–45).
Therefore, alienation does not bind shares of other heirs.

E. PARTITION – PRELIMINARY DECREE – CORRECTION BY APPELLATE COURT – EQUAL DIVISION INTO FIVE SHARES

Trial Court wrongly allotted double share to D-7 on basis of unproved Will (Ex.B-45).
Held: Partition must be made into five equal shares among plaintiff and D-2, D-5, D-6, D-7 (paras 49, 51).
Decree modified accordingly.

F. MESNE PROFITS – ORDER 20 RULE 12 CPC – CONSEQUENCE OF MODIFIED PRELIMINARY DECREE – APPEAL BECOMES INFRACTUOUS

In view of setting aside the Trial Court’s preliminary decree on share allocation, the consequential order in I.A.No.136/2000 (mesne profits) requires fresh determination.
Held: A.S.No.769/2009 (mesne profits appeal) is infructuous (para 48, 52).

G. ALIENATION BY MANAGING MEMBER – PASSBOOKS, TAX RECEIPTS – NO PRESUMPTION OF TITLE – ONLY REGISTERED SALE DEED CONVEYS TITLE

Held: Ryot passbooks (Ex.B-44) and land tax receipts (Exs.B-42, B-43) do not confer title; alienee acquires no rights absent registered conveyance (para 45).

H. RESULT – APPEALS DISPOSED

  1. A.S.No.1412 of 1998 (purchasers’ appeal)Dismissed (para 50).

  2. A.S.No.1479 of 1999 (plaintiff’s appeal)Partly allowed; partition modified into five equal shares; other findings of Trial Court upheld (para 51).

  3. A.S.No.769 of 2009 (mesne profits)Dismissed as infructuous (para 52).

  4. Interim orders vacated; pending I.As closed.

LIMITATION – SUIT FOR DECLARATION AND POSSESSION – ARTICLE 65, LIMITATION ACT – WHEN SUIT BARRED

A. CIVIL PROCEDURE – SECOND APPEAL – SECTION 100 CPC – SCOPE – INTERFERENCE WITH FIRST APPELLATE COURT – WHEN PERMISSIBLE

The High Court reaffirmed that in second appeal it cannot re-appreciate evidence unless the findings of the First Appellate Court are:
(i) contrary to mandatory provisions of law;
(ii) contrary to Supreme Court precedent; or
(iii) based on inadmissible or no evidence (paras 16–17).

Held, the First Appellate Court committed perversity by applying a repealed statute (Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937) despite the overriding effect of Section 4, Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and by reversing the well-considered judgment of the Trial Court (para 14).

B. LIMITATION – SUIT FOR DECLARATION AND POSSESSION – ARTICLE 65, LIMITATION ACT – WHEN SUIT BARRED

Plaintiffs in O.S.No.27/2008 claimed succession on death of Hanumayamma. Evidence of plaintiffs (P.W.1 & P.W.2) established:
– Hanumayamma died in 1988, not in 1993;
– Defendants were in possession from 1983 onwards;
– Plaintiffs had complete knowledge of mutation, passbooks, revenue payments, mortgages, enjoyment by defendants (paras 20–23).

Suit filed in 2001, i.e., more than 12 years after the death of Hanumayamma and after execution of gift deeds in 1983.
Held: Suit hopelessly barred by limitation (paras 20–24).

C. DECLARATION OF TITLE – BURDEN OF PROOF – PLAINTIFF MUST SUCCEED ON OWN TITLE – WEAKNESS OF DEFENDANT’S CASE IRRELEVANT

High Court reiterated principles from Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society (2014) 2 SCC 269, Moran Mar Basselios (1958), and several binding precedents:
Plaintiff in a suit for declaration and possession must establish title independently.
Held, plaintiffs adduced no documentary evidence to establish title; their own admissions disproved possession and title; burden not discharged (paras 21–23, 26–33).

D. HINDU SUCCESSION – SECTION 14(1) – ABSOLUTE OWNERSHIP OF WIDOW – EFFECT OF REPEAL OF HINDU WOMEN’S RIGHTS TO PROPERTY ACT, 1937

Plaintiffs pleaded that Hanumayamma possessed the entire ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’ schedule properties continuously from 1941 until her death (paras 27–29, 38, 45–46).
Held:

  1. By virtue of Section 14(1), Hindu Succession Act, 1956, any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the Act, becomes her full and absolute estate (paras 44, 49).

  2. The Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937, stood repealed; by Section 4 of the 1956 Act, any inconsistent law ceases to apply (paras 42–43).

  3. Hanumayamma, having possessed the property for more than 40 years, became the full owner upon commencement of the 1956 Act (paras 49, 55, 59).

  4. As full owner, she was competent to execute registered gift deeds (Ex.B-9, Ex.B-16 to B-19) in 1983 without consent of alleged reversioners (paras 24, 49–55).

E. GIFT DEEDS – VALIDITY – ACCEPTANCE – DELIVERY OF POSSESSION – MUTATION – LONG POSSESSION

Defendants proved execution of registered gift deeds (1983), acceptance by donees, delivery of possession, mutation entries, issuance of pattadar and title deed passbooks, revenue payments, bank loans based on property, long possession (paras 21–23, 33–35).
Held:
Gift deeds valid; Trial Court rightly upheld defendants’ title; First Appellate Court erred in disregarding unchallenged registered deeds (paras 39–40).

F. JOINT FAMILY PROPERTY – NO PLEADING – NO PROOF – PLAINT REVEALS EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION OF WIDOW

Plaintiffs never pleaded that the properties were coparcenary or joint family properties (para 37).
Their own plaint states widow possessed the property exclusively from 1941 until death (para 38).
Held: Question of reversion does not arise; plaintiffs’ theory of coparcenary was contrary to their own pleadings and prior litigation (paras 37–40).

G. FIRST APPELLATE COURT – ERROR OF LAW – APPLICATION OF REPEALED ACT – NON-CONSIDERATION OF EVIDENCE

Held:
The First Appellate Court committed serious legal error by applying the Hindu Women’s Rights to Property Act, 1937, repealed by Section 31 of the 1956 Act and overridden by Section 4 (paras 39–43, 60).
Its judgment suffered from perversity, incorrect legal tests, and non-appreciation of binding evidence (paras 39–40, 60).

H. CONTEMPT – ORDER 39 RULE 2-A CPC – NO UNDERTAKING – NO INJUNCTION – NO CASE OF WILLFUL DISOBEDIENCE

Petition alleged violation of interim order dated 28.01.2020.
Held:
– No injunction order was ever passed restraining construction or alteration of property (paras 65–67).
– Undertaking not to take coercive steps in E.P. was given by counsel for plaintiffs in I.A., not by alleged contemnors (paras 65–67).
– No undertaking by respondents/contemnors; no order restraining construction; no enforceable direction.

Contempt petition closed (paras 61–68).

I. RESULT – SECOND APPEALS ALLOWED – TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT RESTORED – FIRST APPELLATE COURT SET ASIDE

Held (para 69):
S.A. Nos. 651 and 652 of 2019 allowed.
– Judgment and decree dated 06.09.2019 in A.S. Nos. 30 & 32 of 2013 set aside.
– Judgment and decree dated 21.02.2012 in O.S. Nos. 21 & 27 of 2008 restored and confirmed.
Contempt case closed.
– Parties to bear their own costs.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – DEFAULT BAIL – SECTION 167 CrPC – INVESTIGATION COMPLETION – WHETHER CHARGE SHEET WITHOUT FSL, CFSL, WATER ANALYSIS AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC REPORTS CONSTITUTES “INCOMPLETE CHARGE SHEET”

(A) CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – DEFAULT BAIL – SECTION 167 CrPC – INVESTIGATION COMPLETION – WHETHER CHARGE SHEET WITHOUT FSL, CFSL, WATER ANALYSIS AND OTHER SCIENTIFIC REPORTS CONSTITUTES “INCOMPLETE CHARGE SHEET”

Petitioners contend that non-filing of FSL, CFSL, water analysis reports, video forensics, call data records, super imposition report, fingerprint analysis etc., renders the charge sheet “incomplete”, and therefore the filing under Section 167 CrPC is not valid.
Held, in the part of the judgment provided, the core issue framed is:

“Whether the filing of charge sheet under Section 167 CrPC without FSL, CFSL and other scientific reports is to be considered as incomplete and whether the petitioners are entitled to the benefit of default bail?” (Issue A, para 6)

The Court took note of petitioner’s reliance on Memo dated 06.01.2023 of the Director General of Prosecution asserting that charge sheets without forensic reports are incomplete (para 5).
(Full determination appears beyond para 70; not included in supplied text.)

(B) CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – INVESTIGATION – WHETHER CHARGE SHEET CAN BE FILED WITHOUT EXPERT OPINION – DOCTRINAL POSITION

Petitioners argued that investigation is “incomplete” until all expert opinions are obtained and that filing of charge sheet without such reports is contrary to Sections 173(2), 173(8), 174 CrPC (paras 4–5).

Respondents relied on precedent that investigation is “proceeding to collect evidence” and that final report need not contain every report; additional reports may be filed under Section 173(8) CrPC without reopening investigation (paras 7–9).
Issues framed:

“Whether the charge sheet submitted by the prosecution without scientific/medical experts reports can be considered as incomplete?” (Issue C, para 6)

(Determination appears in later paras not provided.)

(C) BNSS, 2023 – SECTION 193 – RULE OF CONSTRUCTION – APPLICATION TO SECTION 173(8) CrPC – RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CRPC AND BNSS

Court extracted the object and reasons of BNSS (paras 20–26).
Held, while interpreting statutes consolidating procedural law, legislative purpose and social context must be considered (paras 23–26).
Particularly, reference made to statutory continuity and to repeal-and-savings context under BNSS (paras 23–26).
(Conclusion regarding applicability to the present petitions falls in paras beyond 70.)

(D) AMENDING ACTS – RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT – APPLICATION OF NEW PROCEDURAL STATUTES TO PENDING PROCEEDINGS

Court referred to Constitution Bench principles:
An amending Act is prospective unless expressly or impliedly retrospective; where procedural, it may apply to pending cases (paras 27–29).

Cited Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra (para 29) and extracted five tests determining retrospectivity.
Court recorded that these principles would guide consideration of BNSS and any procedural change affecting filing of charge sheets and default bail.

(E) CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – MEANING OF INVESTIGATION – COLLECTION OF EVIDENCE – WHETHER INCOMPLETE FORENSIC REPORTS INVALIDATE A CHARGE SHEET

Court extracted Section 2(h) CrPC and Supreme Court definition: investigation includes proceeding to collect evidence (para 7).
Held reliance on State of Kerala v. Babu & Ors. (2023 SCC OnLine SC 1557) clarifying that police may file supplementary reports under Section 173(8) and that filing such reports does not vitiate the trial nor amount to “reopening” investigation (para 8).
Applied principle: further reports do not necessarily render the initial report “incomplete” for the purpose of Section 167 CrPC (paras 8–9).
(Full application to facts appears in later paras.)

(F) DEFAULT BAIL – JUDICIAL NATURE AND REQUIREMENTS – RIGHT ACCRUES ONLY IF INVESTIGATION NOT COMPLETED WITHIN STATUTORY PERIOD

Court noted petitioners’ reliance on Rakesh Kumar Paul, M. Ravindran, Fakhrey Alam, Parminder Singh, P. Vijayan, etc., for the proposition that:
Default bail is not merely statutory but is a species of personal liberty protected under Article 21 (paras 10–12).

Petitioners argued that any charge sheet filed without mandatory reports is not “police report” under Section 173(2), and therefore cannot defeat right under Section 167(2) (paras 10–12).
(Court’s conclusion not visible in supplied text.)

(G) INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES – RIGHT CONFERRED BY STATUTE IS NOT A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT BUT PART OF PERSONAL LIBERTY

State relied on contrasting precedent emphasising that the accused must satisfy statutory conditions, and default bail is not unconditional (para 15).
The Court noted the principle:

“No person has a fundamental right to be released on bail in all situations. Right to bail arises only when conditions prescribed by statute are met.” (para 15)

(H) ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM – WHETHER BINDING ON COURT – DG PROSECUTION MEMO DT. 06.01.2023

Petitioners relied on DG Prosecution Memo directing that charge sheets without forensic reports be treated as “incomplete” (para 5).
Court framed:

“Whether Memo dated 06.01.2023 is binding upon the prosecution and is required to be strictly followed by the investigating agencies?” (Issue D, para 6)

(Conclusion appears in paras beyond 70.)

(I) SUBMISSIONS OF STATE AUTHORITIES – ROLE OF EXPERT REPORTS – INVESTIGATION PROPERLY COMPLETED EVEN IF REPORTS PENDING

Respondents argued (paras 7–9, 14–17):

  • Investigation is considered complete once evidence sufficient for prosecution is collected.

  • Expert reports can be filed subsequently.

  • Delay in forensic laboratories cannot defeat statutory timelines.

  • Charge sheet is valid so long as core investigation is completed.

Court recorded these arguments but has not yet ruled within the provided excerpt.

(J) SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN DEFAULT BAIL APPLICATION – COURT CANNOT TEST SUFFICIENCY OF MATERIAL IN CHARGE SHEET

Respondents submitted (para 17):
The Court cannot inquire whether the investigating agency has collected “sufficient” evidence; that falls within the investigator’s discretion.
Default bail cannot be granted merely because expert reports are awaited.

(K) STATUTORY PROVISIONS EXAMINED

Court extracted and analysed:

  • Section 173(2) & (8) CrPC

  • Section 167 CrPC

  • Section 2(h) CrPC

  • BNSS Statement of Objects & Reasons (paras 20–26)

  • Constitutional Bench tests on retrospectivity (para 29)


HINDU LAW – HINDU WOMEN’S RIGHT TO PROPERTY ACT, 1937 – AGRICULTURAL LAND – WIDOW’S RIGHT – JOINT FAMILY PROPERTY – EFFECT OF FEDERAL COURT DECISION

(A) HINDU LAW – HINDU WOMEN’S RIGHT TO PROPERTY ACT, 1937 – AGRICULTURAL LAND – WIDOW’S RIGHT – JOINT FAMILY PROPERTY – EFFECT OF FEDERAL COURT DECISION

  1. The Trial Court held, on the basis of the Federal Court decision, that the expression “property” in the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937 did not include agricultural land and therefore Veeramma had no rights over the plaint schedule agricultural land, as her husband had died prior to 1956 (para 28).

  2. The High Court held that “the law is otherwise settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in plethora of pronouncements” (para 37) and, after quoting at length from Vaijanath v. Guramma, (1999) 1 SCC 292 and Babu Ram v. Santokh Singh, (2019) 14 SCC 162, held that:

    “The words ‘property’ as well as ‘interest in joint family property’ are wide enough to cover agricultural lands also … As the Federal Court has noted … the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act is a remedial Act … and it ought to receive a beneficial interpretation. The beneficial interpretation in the present context would clearly cover agricultural lands under the word ‘property’.” (para 37, quoting Vaijanath)

    and that

    “… the decision of the Federal Court no longer holds good in view of the changed position of law … in view of the change of law, the Act will apply to agricultural lands also, and the decision in Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, would no longer hold good.” (para 38, quoting Babu Ram)

  3. On facts, the Court found, on the basis of Exs.A.21 to A.23 and PW-5’s evidence, that the land in S.No.496 (15.50 acres) constituted the joint family property of T. Adisesha Reddy and his uterine brother T. Venkatesam Reddy; that the plaintiffs’ vendors T. Veeramma (wife) and P. Lakshmi Devi (daughter) of Venkatesam Reddy had rights in that joint family property; and that defendant No.3 himself relied upon Ex.B-19 (memorandum of partition) which “indicates that the plaintiffs' vendors had rights in the joint family property as legal heirs of Venkatesam Reddy” (paras 33–35).

  4. Applying the above Supreme Court law, the High Court held:

    “… this Court has no hesitation in concluding that Veeramma, being the wife of Venkatesam Reddy, had rights over the said property, even though it is agricultural land and was entitled to half share in the entire property in Survey No. 496/2.” (para 40)


(B) HINDU SUCCESSION ACT, 1956 – SECTION 14(1) – ENLARGEMENT OF WIDOW’S INTEREST – FULL OWNER

  1. The Court held, referring to Section 14(1) HSA, 1956 and Mangal Singh v. Rattno, AIR 1967 SC 1786, that:

    “any property includes both movable and immovable possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner there for and not as a limited owner. It is also clear that even if a female Hindu be, in fact, out of actual possession, the property must be held to be possessed by her, if her ownership rights in that property still exist.” (para 41)

  2. Relying also on Sukhram v. Gauri Shankar, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 182, the Court reiterated that the interest over joint family property acquired by a widow under the 1937 Act is “indisputably her ‘property’ within the meaning of Section 14” and that on the coming into force of the 1956 Act she became “full owner” with right “uninhibited in point of disposition” (para 39, quoting Sukhram).

  3. Consequently, the Court held that the vendors T. Veeramma and P. Lakshmi Devi had prima facie right or title over the suit schedule property to transfer the same to the plaintiffs by way of sale deeds Exs.A-1, A-3 and A-14 (paras 45–46, 84).


(C) CIVIL PROCEDURE – SUIT FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION – VACANT SITE – WHEN TITLE TO BE EXAMINED – POSSESSION FOLLOWS TITLE

  1. The Court reiterated, relying on Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594, that in a suit for permanent injunction:

    “… the plaintiff will have to establish that as on the date of the suit he was in lawful possession of the suit property and the defendant tried to interfere or disturb such lawful possession.” (para 24, quoting para 15 of Anathula)

    and that where the property is “a vacant site, which is not physically possessed, used or enjoyed … the principle is that possession follows title … it will be necessary to examine and determine the title as a prelude for deciding the de jure possession.” (para 24, quoting para 16 of Anathula).

  2. The Court noted the settled position that “a party seeking a permanent injunction … must establish lawful possession of the property. The plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own case and cannot rely on the weakness of the defendant's case” (para 25).

  3. On facts, after holding that the plaintiffs’ vendors had prima facie title, the Court examined Ex.A-3 (15-11-1990) and found that:

“it is categorically averred that they have entered into an agreement on 09.05.1980 … and handed over the possession of the schedule agricultural land. Thereby, it is evident from the record that by the date of agreement itself the possession was delivered.” (para 50)

  1. Referring to the principle that “the de jure possession has to be established on the basis of title to the property in the case of vacant site” (para 51) and to Thimmaiah v. Shabira, 2008 AIR SCW 1310, the Court held:

“based on the material on record coupled with legal position … the plaintiffs proved their possession over the suit schedule property.” (para 51)

  1. Accordingly, the Trial Court’s dismissal of the suit for injunction was held to be erroneous and the suit was decreed restraining defendants “from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property by the plaintiffs” (paras 84, 86).


(D) SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE – EXECUTION – COURT-EXECUTED SALE DEED – ORDER 21 RULE 34 CPC – DOCTRINE OF MERGER – SALE DEED MUST CONFORM TO APPELLATE DECREE

  1. Defendant No.3 claimed title on the basis of an agreement of sale dated 23-09-1981 and a Court-executed sale deed dated 09-04-1999 in E.P.No.142 of 1998 in O.S.No.201 of 1985 (paras 52–54).

  2. The plaintiffs contended that the decree in O.S.No.201/1985 as modified in A.S.No.149/1985 had not been properly worked out; that under Order XXI Rule 34 CPC the draft sale deed had to conform to the appellate decree; and that Ex.B-14 (sale deed dated 09.04.1999) was not in conformity with the terms of the appellate decree and therefore did not convey valid title (para 56).

  3. The High Court, relying on Chandi Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad, (2004) 8 SCC 724, and Balbir Singh v. Baldev Singh, (2025) 3 SCC 543, reiterated:

“… when an appellate court passes a decree, the decree of the trial court merges with the decree of the appellate court … there cannot be more than one operative decree governing the same subject-matter at a given point of time.” (paras 57–58)

  1. Referring to Rajbir v. Suraj Bhan, (2022) 14 SCC 609, the Court noted that where a court-executed sale deed is “found to not be in conformity with the decree … it will necessarily be set aside, and thereafter, a fresh sale deed must be executed….” (para 62, quoting Rajbir).

  2. On facts, the Court found that in A.S.No.149/1985 the appellate Court had directed payment of balance sale consideration “together with interest at 12% per annum within two months”; but Ex.B-14 was “not executed in accordance with the modification made by the appellate court” (para 61). It held:

“it is evident that the sale deed obtained by Defendant No. 3 through the court is not in accordance with the appellate decree and, therefore, is neither binding nor legally valid. Consequently, it cannot confer any right over the disputed property.” (para 63)

and that “no material has been placed on record to show that Defendant No. 3 paid the consideration directed by the appellate court” (para 63).

  1. The Court further found discrepancies regarding survey numbers: Ex.B-15 related to S.No.496/2 (Ac.4.00 out of 15.50), whereas the plaintiffs’ land lay in S.No.496/5; subsequent re-subdivision and mutation into S.No.496/2-C, etc., occurred only after 2004 without notice to the plaintiffs or their vendors (paras 64–66), and D.W.2’s evidence was inconsistent and unreliable (para 66).

  2. Consequently, the Court held that defendant No.3 failed to put forth any substantial material to prove prima facie right, possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property, and answered Point No.III against him (paras 69, 52, 63).


(E) PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – APPEAL BY DEFENDANTS 5–7 – AGREEMENT HOLDER – DECREE VS FINDING – PERSON AGGRIEVED – NO RELIEF POSSIBLE

  1. Defendants 5 to 7, who were impleaded on their own application in the Trial Court, claimed to be agreement-holders under an agreement dated 29-01-1993 in respect of item No.3 of ‘A’ schedule and relied only on a draft sale deed (Ex.B-33) arising out of O.S.No.64/1997 and E.P.No.171/2000 (paras 70–71).

  2. The Court recorded that D.W.3 (defendant No.6) admitted that the original of Ex.B-33 “is not yet registered and it is pending for registration … he has not taken any steps to get it registered … as his father was asked to pay Rs.16 lakhs towards registration charges and as his father failed to pay those charges, the E.P. was closed. There are no other documents with them except sale agreement to prove possession.” (para 71).

  3. On maintainability of A.S.No.372/2009, the Court referred to Banarsi v. Ram Phal, (2003) 9 SCC 606 and Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar, AIR 1974 SC 1126, noting the principle that “No appeal lies against a mere finding … an appeal lies only as against a decree” (paras 73–74), but also that on grounds of justice an appeal may lie against a finding which would operate as res judicata (para 75).

  4. The Court examined the grounds of appeal and found that, except grounds 3 & 4 (relating only to O.S.No.64/1997), defendants 5 to 7 merely supported the plaintiffs’ case; and that even ground 10 was “contra to their entire case”, asserting a registered sale deed which in fact did not exist (paras 79–80).

  5. The Court held that an agreement-holder cannot claim title until a registered sale deed is executed; that Ex.B-33, being only a draft sale deed, has “no sanctity in the eye of law to create any charge over the property”; and that, apart from admitted facts, there was no adverse decree against defendants 5 to 7, nor any substantial material on record to grant them relief in this appeal (paras 80, 82–83).

  6. Applications in I.A.Nos.1–3 of 2023 and 1 of 2024 (for transposition as plaintiffs, reception of additional evidence, framing of additional issues, and remitting the appeal for further evidence) were also held to be without merit, the Court observing that “this Court cannot do any futile exercise by deciding the right of defendant Nos.5 to 7 against the property of plaintiff No.3 in the present proceedings without any substantial material on record” (para 82).

  7. Accordingly, A.S.No.372 of 2009 was dismissed with no order as to costs (paras 83, 87).


(F) RESULT – DECREE OF TRIAL COURT SET ASIDE – SUIT FOR INJUNCTION DECREED – APPEAL BY DEFENDANTS 5–7 DISMISSED

  1. On a cumulative consideration of (i) plaintiffs’ prima facie title via vendors Veeramma and P. Lakshmi Devi; (ii) legal position under the 1937 Act read with Section 14 HSA; (iii) de jure possession following title in the case of a vacant site; and (iv) invalidity of Ex.B-14 sale deed and insufficiency of defendant No.3’s evidence, the Court held:

“… the vendors of the plaintiffs has primafacie right or title over the suit schedule property to pass legal right to them under Exs.A.1, A.3 and A.14 and that the plaintiffs are able to prove their possession and enjoyment over the plaint schedule property. On the other hand … the defendant No.3 failed to put forth any substantial material … thereby, the Trial Court went wrong in dismissing the suit … as such, the decree and judgment passed by the Trial Court is liable to be set aside and consequently, the suit filed by the plaintiffs is decreed for granting relief as prayed.” (para 84)

  1. A.S.No.156 of 2009 was allowed with costs, the decree and judgment dated 26-02-2009 in O.S.No.38 of 2002 were set aside and:

“… the suit [is] decreed, restraining the defendants, their men, agents and anybody interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property by the plaintiffs.” (para 86)

  1. A.S.No.372 of 2009 was dismissed; no order as to costs (para 87). Interim orders, if any, stood vacated; all miscellaneous petitions, if any, stood closed (para 87).