Tuesday, May 19, 2026

Constitutional Law – Public Safety – Stray Dog Menace – Scope of Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023 – Institutional Premises – Interpretation of “street dogs”, “same place” and “locality” – Article 21 – Exercise of powers under Article 142 – Harmonious construction of PCA Act and ABC Rules.

advocatemmmohan

apex court held that 

 

Constitutional Law – Public Safety – Stray Dog Menace – Scope of Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023 – Institutional Premises – Interpretation of “street dogs”, “same place” and “locality” – Article 21 – Exercise of powers under Article 142 – Harmonious construction of PCA Act and ABC Rules.

The Supreme Court considered multiple interlocutory applications seeking modification, recall, clarification and stay of earlier directions dated 07.11.2025 issued in suo motu proceedings concerning stray dog menace in institutional areas such as schools, hospitals, sports complexes, bus stands and railway stations. The principal challenge was to directions prohibiting re-release of stray dogs into institutional premises after sterilisation and vaccination. Applicants contended that the directions violated Rule 11(19) of the Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023 mandating release of dogs at same place/locality from where captured. The Court examined the scope of the ABC Rules, 2023, the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960 and powers under Article 142 of the Constitution.

Held:

A. “Street dogs” or “community dogs” under Rule 7(2) do not include stray dogs inhabiting sensitive institutional premises.

Rule 7(2) of the ABC Rules, 2023 is merely classificatory and does not confer any indefeasible right upon stray dogs to continue occupying every space including hospitals, schools, colleges, airports and sports complexes. Paras 41-43.

B. Rule 11(19) requiring release at “same place or locality” must be read harmoniously with Section 2(i) of PCA Act.

The expression “same place or locality” in Rule 11(19) is confined to public streets and analogous open-access spaces contemplated under Section 2(i) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, and cannot extend to restricted-access institutional premises. Paras 44-45.

C. Institutional premises are entitled to be maintained free from stray animals in larger public interest.

Hospitals, educational institutions, transport hubs and sports complexes are sensitive public utility spaces requiring controlled, secure and hygienic environments. Presence of stray dogs therein creates serious risks to safety, health and institutional functioning. Paras 43, 46-47.

D. Directions prohibiting re-release of stray dogs into institutional premises are consistent with statutory framework.

The Court held that exclusion of institutional premises from the re-release mechanism under Rule 11(19) is in consonance with purposive and harmonious interpretation of the ABC Rules, 2023 and PCA Act, 1960. Paras 48-49.

E. Article 142 empowers Supreme Court to issue directions for complete justice.

The Court reiterated that powers under Article 142 are plenary and cannot be curtailed merely by ordinary statutory provisions, though such powers must remain consistent with constitutional principles and public policy. Paras 50-51.

F. Article 21 includes right to safety and secure public spaces.

The Court emphasized that unchecked stray dog presence and dog-bite incidents directly affect right to life, safety, mobility and public health guaranteed under Article 21. Paras 1, 13, 24, 31-32.


ANALYSIS OF LAW

1. Harmonious Interpretation of ABC Rules, 2023 and PCA Act, 1960

The core issue before the Court was whether Rule 11(19) of the ABC Rules mandated compulsory re-release of stray dogs into institutional areas.

The Court rejected a literal and expansive interpretation.

The Court held that:

  • Rule 7(2) is merely classificatory.
  • It does not create vested rights in favour of stray dogs.
  • “Same place or locality” cannot be interpreted independent of parent statute.

The Court harmonised:

  • Rule 7(2),
  • Rule 11(19),
  • Section 2(i) of PCA Act.

The definition of “street” under Section 2(i) became the interpretative anchor.

Thus:

  • “locality” means public-access areas,
  • not restricted institutional premises.

Legal significance:

The Court preferred:

  • purposive interpretation,
  • constitutional compatibility,
  • public safety oriented construction.

Paras 40-45.


2. Institutional Premises and Public Safety Doctrine

The Court recognised:

  • hospitals,
  • schools,
  • colleges,
  • railway stations,
  • bus depots,
  • airports,
  • sports complexes

as “sensitive institutional environments”.

The Court held these spaces must remain:

  • hygienic,
  • obstruction free,
  • secure,
  • risk free.

The Court observed that:

  • children,
  • patients,
  • elderly persons,
  • vulnerable persons

are disproportionately exposed to danger from stray dogs.

Important principle:

Animal welfare cannot override institutional safety obligations under Article 21.

Paras 43, 46-47.


3. Scope of Article 21

The judgment significantly expands public safety jurisprudence under Article 21.

The Court treated:

  • dog-bite incidents,
  • stray dog intrusions,
  • unsafe institutional premises

as constitutional violations affecting:

  • life,
  • safety,
  • dignity,
  • mobility,
  • access to public spaces.

The Court recognised positive obligations of State authorities to:

  • secure institutional areas,
  • prevent preventable injury,
  • ensure safe civic infrastructure.

Constitutional principle evolved:

Public safety from preventable animal hazards forms part of Article 21.

Paras 1-4, 23-26, 31-32.


4. Article 142 and Complete Justice

The applicants argued:

  • Article 142 cannot override statutory provisions.

The Court discussed:

  • Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India,
  • Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner.

The Court reiterated:

  • Article 142 is a constitutional power,
  • distinct from ordinary statutory powers,
  • aimed at doing complete justice.

However, the Court avoided direct statutory conflict by holding:

  • its directions were actually consistent with the statutory scheme when properly interpreted.

Thus:

  • the Court harmonised Article 142 with the ABC Rules rather than overriding them.

Paras 50-51.


5. Administrative Accountability

The Court imposed:

  • mandatory obligations upon municipal bodies,
  • district authorities,
  • institutional heads,
  • transport authorities.

The judgment emphasizes:

  • continuous inspection,
  • fencing,
  • nodal officers,
  • removal and relocation,
  • anti-rabies preparedness,
  • SOP formulation,
  • inter-departmental coordination.

Jurisprudential significance:

The judgment converts stray animal management from:

  • discretionary governance
    to
  • enforceable constitutional obligation.

Paras 24-30.


ANALYSIS OF FACTS

1. Background of Suo Motu Proceedings

The proceedings originated from:

  • escalating dog-bite incidents,
  • media reports,
  • stray dog intrusions in public institutions.

The Court took judicial notice of:

  • repeated attacks on school children,
  • patients in hospitals,
  • passengers at transport hubs,
  • athletes in sports complexes.

Paras 1-2, 12-13.


2. Earlier Directions Dated 07.11.2025

The earlier order mandated:

  • removal of stray dogs from institutional premises,
  • sterilisation and vaccination,
  • relocation to shelters,
  • prohibition on re-release to same premises.

Para 25(E).


3. Challenge by Animal Welfare Organisations

Applicants argued:

  • directions violated ABC Rules,
  • re-release was statutorily mandatory,
  • relocation would create “vacuum effect”,
  • infrastructure for shelters was insufficient,
  • large-scale relocation was economically unviable.

Paras 10-28.


4. Counter-position Supporting Directions

Supporting applicants argued:

  • ABC framework failed to control stray population,
  • India witnessed exponential growth of stray dogs,
  • dog-bite incidents and rabies deaths were alarming,
  • unrestricted stray presence violated Article 21 rights of citizens.

Paras 29-37.


RATIO DECIDENDI

The expression “same place or locality” under Rule 11(19) of the Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023 does not include sensitive institutional or restricted-access premises such as hospitals, schools, colleges, sports complexes, bus depots and railway stations, and therefore stray dogs captured from such premises need not be re-released into those areas.

Rule 7(2) of the ABC Rules, 2023 is merely a classificatory provision and does not confer an indefeasible or perpetual right upon stray dogs to inhabit every location where they are found.

The State and its instrumentalities bear a constitutional obligation under Article 21 to secure public and institutional spaces from preventable hazards arising from stray animal menace.

The Supreme Court, in exercise of powers under Article 142, may issue comprehensive directions to balance public safety and animal welfare, provided such directions remain consistent with constitutional principles and purposive interpretation of statutory framework.


Final Conclusion

The Court upheld and reaffirmed the earlier directions dated 07.11.2025 requiring:

  • removal of stray dogs from institutional premises,
  • non-release into same institutional locations,
  • relocation in accordance with humane statutory procedures.

The Court held that the directions are:

  • constitutionally valid,
  • statutorily harmonious,
  • necessary for protection of public safety under Article 21.

Service Law – Appointment of Principal in Non-Government Aided Colleges – Wait-listed Candidate – Change of Place of Posting – Repeal and Savings – Scope of Section 13(4) of the Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980 – Interpretation of “otherwise” – Validity of acts after repeal of Old Act.

advocatemmmohan

apex court held that 

Service Law – Appointment of Principal in Non-Government Aided Colleges – Wait-listed Candidate – Change of Place of Posting – Repeal and Savings – Scope of Section 13(4) of the Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980 – Interpretation of “otherwise” – Validity of acts after repeal of Old Act.

The appellant, a wait-listed candidate for the post of Principal under Advertisement No.49 of 2019, was initially recommended on 03.08.2022 for appointment as Principal in Shri Bajrang P.G. College, Ballia. He did not join the post due to personal/family circumstances and later sought change of posting to Meerut College after vacancy arose there. The Director initially clarified on 17.08.2023 that there existed no provision under the Old Act for change of place of posting after recommendation. Subsequently, after the Uttar Pradesh Education Service Selection Commission Act, 2023 came into force repealing the Old Act, the authorities issued fresh recommendation/orders dated 13.12.2023, 12.01.2024 and 15.01.2024 posting the appellant at Meerut College. The Officiating Principal challenged the same. High Court quashed the orders. Supreme Court affirmed.

Held:

A. Interpretation of Section 13(4) of Old Act – “Otherwise” cannot be interpreted broadly.

The expression “otherwise” occurring in Section 13(4) must be read ejusdem generis with “death” and “resignation” and applies only to unforeseen vacancies occurring during validity of select list. It cannot be used to permit a wait-listed candidate, already recommended elsewhere, to seek fresh posting at another institution merely because he chose not to join earlier posting. Paras 20-21.

B. Once recommendation issued under Section 13(3), candidate cannot seek substitution of institution.

After recommendation dated 03.08.2022, appellant neither joined the post nor pursued issuance of appointment order from Ballia College. Instead, he waited for preferred vacancies and sought transfer/change of placement. Such conduct frustrates statutory scheme under Sections 13(3) and 14 of the Old Act. Paras 18-20.

C. Repeal of Old Act by New Act extinguished further exercise of powers under repealed statute.

After commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Education Service Selection Commission Act, 2023 on 21.08.2023, the authorities could not revive or operate old select list for fresh recommendation/change of posting. Any further appointment process had to conform to Sections 10 and 11 of the New Act. Paras 23-24.

D. Saving clause preserves only acts already done, not fresh actions under repealed law.

Section 31(2) of the New Act read with Section 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act protects only acts already validly done prior to repeal. The only protected act was recommendation dated 03.08.2022. Fresh recommendation/orders issued after repeal were unsustainable. Paras 22-24.

E. Illegal administrative action can be challenged even by Officiating Principal.

Where action of authorities is ex facie illegal and contrary to statutory provisions, objection regarding locus standi loses significance. Paras 27-28.

F. State authorities expected to assist Court fairly.

State officials are duty bound to place correct legal and factual position before Court and cannot support unlawful administrative action contrary to statute. Para 26.

Ratio Decidendi

A wait-listed candidate who has already been recommended for appointment under Section 13(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980 cannot invoke Section 13(4) to seek fresh recommendation/change of posting merely because he voluntarily failed to join the originally allotted institution. Further, after repeal of the Old Act by the Uttar Pradesh Education Service Selection Commission Act, 2023, authorities cannot exercise powers traceable to the repealed statute except to the limited extent protected by the saving clause in respect of acts already completed before repeal.


ANALYSIS OF LAW

1. Scheme of Sections 12, 13 and 14 of the Old Act

The Supreme Court undertook a structural interpretation of the statutory framework governing appointments in aided colleges. The Court noted:

  • Vacancies are identified and notified under Section 12.
  • Commission prepares select/wait list under Section 13(1).
  • Director intimates names for appointment under Section 13(3).
  • Management issues appointment order under Section 14.
  • Fresh recommendation can arise only in contingencies contemplated under Section 13(4).

The Court emphasized that the legislative scheme does not permit open-ended mobility or institutional choice by wait-listed candidates after recommendation.

Key Legal Principle:

Recommendation under Section 13(3) culminates the selection process for that candidate vis-à-vis that institution.

Paras 13-15.


2. Interpretation of the word “otherwise”

The central legal issue concerned the meaning of “otherwise” in Section 13(4).

The appellant attempted to argue that since vacancy arose in Meerut College during validity of select list, he could be adjusted there.

The Court rejected this construction by applying:

  • Doctrine of ejusdem generis
  • Legislative intent analysis
  • Earlier precedent in Kamlesh Kumar Sharma v. Yogesh Kumar Gupta.

The Court held that:

“otherwise” refers only to unforeseen vacancies akin to death, resignation, invalidation, long leave, or non-joining.

It does not include:

  • voluntary refusal to join,
  • preference-based relocation,
  • change of posting on compassionate or personal grounds.

Importance of the ruling:

The Court preserved integrity of:

  • advertised vacancies,
  • merit-based institutional allocation,
  • equality in public employment under Articles 14 and 16.

Paras 20-21.


3. Effect of Repeal and Savings Clause

The Court gave detailed interpretation to:

  • Section 31 of the New Act,
  • Section 6 of the U.P. General Clauses Act.

Court’s reasoning:

The repeal clause did not revive or continue the old panel indefinitely.

Only completed acts survive repeal.

The only surviving act was:

  • recommendation dated 03.08.2022.

What was not protected:

  • fresh posting orders,
  • altered recommendations,
  • revival of old list after repeal.

Thus:

  • recommendation after 21.08.2023 lacked statutory authority.

Important principle:

A saving clause preserves completed legal acts, not future exercises of repealed power.

Paras 22-24.


4. Administrative Law Dimension

The Court strongly criticized the conduct of State authorities.

The authorities:

  • initially stated no legal provision existed for change of posting,
  • later reversed position,
  • attempted to support appellant contrary to statute.

The Court observed that State litigation conduct must:

  • assist Court fairly,
  • reflect statutory fidelity,
  • avoid partisan illegality.

This part of judgment reinforces:

  • doctrine of public trust,
  • fairness in State litigation,
  • constitutional obligation of State officers.

Para 26.


ANALYSIS OF FACTS

Chronological factual findings relied upon by Supreme Court

(i) Selection and wait list

The appellant was merely a wait-listed candidate at Sl.No.59.

Para 4.

(ii) First recommendation

Director validly recommended appellant to Ballia College on 03.08.2022.

Para 5.

(iii) Appellant voluntarily did not join

The Court treated this fact as decisive.

The appellant himself admitted:

“Due to family circumstances, I have not taken charge…”

The Court repeatedly stressed:

  • there was no denial of appointment by management,
  • appellant himself remained inactive.

Paras 18-19.

(iv) Representation seeking preferred vacancy

After noticing vacancies elsewhere, appellant sought posting in alternative colleges including Meerut College.

The Court treated this as an attempt to bypass statutory allocation process.

Para 19-20.

(v) New Act came into force

Before fresh recommendation was issued, Old Act already stood repealed.

Hence all later orders lacked jurisdiction.

Paras 22-24.

RATIO DECIDENDI

Primary Ratio

A candidate already recommended for appointment under Section 13(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980 cannot subsequently seek fresh recommendation or change of institution under Section 13(4) merely because he voluntarily failed to join the originally allotted post.

After repeal of the Uttar Pradesh Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980 by the Uttar Pradesh Education Service Selection Commission Act, 2023, no fresh exercise of powers under the repealed Act can be undertaken except to the extent expressly saved by Section 31 of the New Act.

The expression “otherwise” in Section 13(4) must receive restricted ejusdem generis interpretation and applies only to unforeseen vacancies analogous to death, resignation, invalidation, or non-joining, and not to administrative rearrangement or preference-based reposting.

Final Outcome

Appeal dismissed. Orders of learned Single Judge and Division Bench upheld. Parties directed to bear own costs. Paras 25 & 28

PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT, 2002 – RETURN OF COMPLAINT BEFORE COGNIZANCE – JOINT TRIAL – SEPARATE COMPLAINTS – SECTION 223 Cr.P.C. – COGNIZANCE – NATIONAL HIGHWAYS LAND ACQUISITION SCAM – QUASHING OF PMLA COMPLAINTS

advocatemmmohan

Uttarakhand High Court held that 

PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT, 2002 – RETURN OF COMPLAINT BEFORE COGNIZANCE – JOINT TRIAL – SEPARATE COMPLAINTS – SECTION 223 Cr.P.C. – COGNIZANCE – NATIONAL HIGHWAYS LAND ACQUISITION SCAM – QUASHING OF PMLA COMPLAINTS


A. Criminal Procedure – Complaint case – Return of complaint before cognizance – Whether permissible – Scope of Sections 200 to 204 Cr.P.C.

A complaint may be returned before taking cognizance where Court finds complaint not maintainable in present form – Return of complaint before proceeding under Section 200 Cr.P.C. is not illegal – Cognizance is taken only when Court applies judicial mind for proceeding under Chapter XV Cr.P.C.
(Paras 21 to 33)

Facts Analysis:

ED filed a composite PMLA complaint alleging generation of proceeds of crime in NH-74 compensation scam involving several land owners, revenue officials and public servants. Special Court observed that different proceeds of crime arose from different conspiracies and returned complaint for filing separate complaints under Section 223 Cr.P.C. Thereafter seven separate complaints were filed. Petitioners challenged power of Court to return complaint before cognizance.
(Paras 2, 9, 21 to 33)

Law Analysis:

Court examined:

  • Sections 200 to 204 Cr.P.C.;
  • distinction between presentation of complaint and taking cognizance;
  • decisions in:
    • CREF Finance Ltd. v. Shree Shanthi Homes (P) Ltd.
    • Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy
    • S.K. Sinha v. Videocon International Ltd.
    • Narsingh Das Tapadia v. Goverdhan Das Partani

Court held that cognizance had not been taken because Special Court had not proceeded under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and had merely heard arguments on cognizance before returning complaint.
(Paras 25 to 33)

Ratio:

Prior to taking cognizance, criminal court may return complaint if complaint is not maintainable in its existing form, and such return does not amount to illegal exercise of jurisdiction. Cognizance arises only when Court applies mind for proceeding under Chapter XV Cr.P.C.
(Paras 25 to 33)


B. Sections 218 and 223 Cr.P.C. – Separate trial is rule – Joint trial exception – PMLA prosecutions involving different proceeds of crime

Where different proceeds of crime arise from distinct transactions, involving different accused and separate conspiracies, Special Court may direct filing of separate complaints – Joint trial is exception and separate trial is normal rule.
(Paras 37 to 45)

Facts Analysis:

Special Court found:

  • different farmers obtained enhanced compensation independently;
  • different forged and backdated orders were allegedly used;
  • proceeds of crime generated from separate transactions;
  • all accused were not involved in laundering every proceeds of crime.

Accordingly, Court directed filing of seven separate complaints.
(Paras 37 to 39)

Law Analysis:

Court relied upon:

  • Sections 218, 219 and 223 Cr.P.C.;
  • principles governing joint trial from:
    • Nasib Singh v. State of Punjab
    • State of Jharkhand v. Lalu Prasad Yadav
    • State of A.P. v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao

Court reiterated:

  • separate trial is general rule;
  • joint trial permissible only where offences form same transaction;
  • separate conspiracies may require separate complaints/trials.

(Paras 39 to 44)

Ratio:

Under Sections 218 and 223 Cr.P.C., separate trial is the normal rule and joint trial is only an exception. In PMLA matters involving distinct proceeds of crime generated through separate conspiracies and transactions, filing of separate complaints is legally permissible.
(Paras 39 to 45)


C. PMLA – “Proceeds of Crime” – Distinct proceeds arising from separate conspiracies – Separate offences of money laundering

Where different transactions generate different proceeds of crime through separate acts of conspiracy and forgery, laundering of each proceeds of crime constitutes separate offence under Section 3 PMLA.
(Paras 37 to 43)

Facts Analysis:

According to ED:

  • agricultural lands acquired for NH-74 were falsely shown as non-agricultural;
  • backdated orders under Section 143 ZA Act were allegedly created;
  • compensation was illegally enhanced 8 to 10 times;
  • different land owners acted through different conspiracies with revenue officials.

(Paras 4 to 9, 37)

Ratio:

Distinct proceeds of crime generated from different conspiracies and transactions may constitute separate money laundering offences and need not necessarily be prosecuted through one composite complaint.
(Paras 37 to 43)


D. Cognizance – Meaning and stage – Judicial application of mind

Cognizance means judicial notice of offence with a view to initiate proceedings – Mere registration of complaint or hearing on cognizance does not amount to taking cognizance.
(Paras 26 to 32)

Law Analysis:

Court surveyed jurisprudence on cognizance from:

  • Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of West Bengal
  • Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy
  • Narsingh Das Tapadia v. Goverdhan Das Partani
  • S.K. Sinha v. Videocon International Ltd.
  • S.R. Sukumar v. S. Sunaad Raghuram

Court held that cognizance occurs only when Magistrate decides to proceed under Chapter XV Cr.P.C. against accused.
(Paras 26 to 32)

Ratio:

Cognizance is taken only upon judicial application of mind for proceeding against accused under statutory procedure; mere administrative or preliminary judicial scrutiny before such stage does not amount to cognizance.
(Paras 26 to 32)


E. National Highways Act – Sections 3C, 3D and 3G – Compensation determination – Alleged fraudulent conversion of agricultural land

Issue whether competent authority could revisit nature of land at compensation stage under Section 3G NH Act involved disputed factual matters requiring trial and could not be adjudicated in quashing jurisdiction.
(Paras 47 to 62)

Facts Analysis:

Petitioner Dinesh Pratap Singh contended:

  • as competent authority under Section 3G NH Act he was duty-bound to determine market value;
  • he merely sought reports from SDM regarding land nature;
  • alleged backdated entries predated his tenure;
  • no concealment was made from NHAI.

ED alleged:

  • nature of land attained finality at Section 3D stage;
  • petitioner intentionally sought reports to facilitate illegal enhancement;
  • forged backdated orders were used to disburse excessive compensation.

(Paras 47 to 59)

Law Analysis:

Court examined:

  • Sections 3C, 3D and 3G NH Act;
  • decisions in:
    • National Highways Authority of India v. P. Nagaraju @ Cheluvaiah
    • Anurag Srivastava v. NHAI
    • NHAI v. Durgappa Bharamappa Sannagudi

Court held that detailed examination of legality of compensation determination and alleged manipulation required evidentiary trial and could not be conclusively adjudicated in Section 482 proceedings.
(Paras 47 to 62)

Ratio:

Where allegations disclose prima facie manipulation of land classification and compensation determination under NH Act leading to generation of proceeds of crime, disputed factual defences cannot ordinarily be examined in quashing jurisdiction.
(Paras 47 to 62)


F. Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Quashing – Scope of interference in PMLA prosecutions

At stage of cognizance and summoning, High Court does not conduct meticulous appreciation of evidence or adjudicate disputed factual defences – If complaint and accompanying material disclose prima facie offence, proceedings cannot be quashed.
(Paras 60 onwards)

Law Analysis:

Petitioners relied on:

  • State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal

Court reiterated limited scope of interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and held that detailed factual disputes regarding:

  • competence under NH Act,
  • validity of land conversion,
  • compensation assessment,
  • money trail,
  • and conspiracy,
    must be examined during trial.

Ratio:

In quashing jurisdiction, Court only examines existence of prima facie material and not sufficiency or reliability of evidence; disputed questions of fact in PMLA prosecutions are matters for trial.
(Paras 60 onwards)


FACTS AND LAW ANALYSIS

  1. Lands were acquired for widening of NH-74 in Uttarakhand.
  2. Compensation for non-agricultural land was substantially higher than agricultural land.
  3. ED alleged:
    • forged and backdated Section 143 ZA Act orders were created;
    • agricultural lands were falsely shown as non-agricultural;
    • compensation of nearly Rs.500 crores was illegally siphoned;
    • revenue officials, land owners and public servants acted in conspiracy.
  4. Initially one composite PMLA complaint was filed.
  5. Special Court returned complaint holding:
    • different transactions generated distinct proceeds of crime;
    • all accused were not connected with every transaction;
    • separate complaints were necessary.
  6. Seven separate complaints were thereafter instituted.
  7. Petitioners challenged:
    • return order dated 28.04.2022;
    • cognizance/summoning orders;
    • maintainability of separate complaints.
  8. High Court held:
    • return of complaint before cognizance was lawful;
    • separate trial is normal rule;
    • issue of joint trial may still be raised before Special Court;
    • complaints disclosed prima facie material;
    • disputed factual controversies require trial.


FINAL DISPOSITION

  • All petitions dismissed.
  • Order dated 28.04.2022 returning composite complaint upheld.
  • Separate complaints under PMLA sustained.
  • Liberty reserved to accused to seek joinder/joint trial before Special Court.
  • Cognizance and summoning orders not interfered with.

(Paras 44 to 45 and concluding portion)