Friday, August 28, 2026

Proved impotence of the husband, resulting in his inability to discharge marital obligations, constitutes legal and mental cruelty and is a “just ground” within the meaning of the second proviso to Section 125(3) CrPC for the wife to refuse to live with him. Such refusal does not disentitle her from claiming maintenance according to the husband's means. The concept of “just ground” is illustrative and includes circumstances of physical, mental or legal cruelty; Section 125 is a secular statutory remedy applicable irrespective of the parties' personal law.

advocatemmmohan

1981 AIR 1972 : 1981 SCC (4) 250 : 1982 SCR (1) 695
Criminal Appeal No. 602 of 1981
Supreme Court of India
Judgment dated: 14 September 1981
Bench: Syed Murtaza Fazal Ali and A.P. Sen, JJ.

HEADNOTES WITH PARAGRAPH NUMBERS

1. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 125(3), second proviso — Maintenance — Wife refusing to live with husband — “Just ground” — Scope.

[Paras 5–6, 11–12] — Where the husband offers to maintain his wife on condition that she lives with him, the Magistrate is required to consider the grounds of her refusal and may grant maintenance notwithstanding such offer if satisfied that she has a just ground for refusing to live with him. The expression “just ground” is not exhaustive and includes circumstances of a similar nature to those specifically contemplated by the statutory provision.

2. Husband's impotence — Inability to discharge marital obligations — Just ground for wife to live separately and claim maintenance.

[Para 15] — Where it is proved that the husband is impotent and unable to discharge his marital obligations, such impotence constitutes both legal and mental cruelty and is undoubtedly a just ground for the wife to refuse to live with him. She is consequently entitled to maintenance according to the husband's means.

3. Impotence — Conjugal relationship — Relevance under Section 125 CrPC — Maintenance provision not confined merely to food, clothing and shelter.

[Paras 7–10, 12] — The statutory remedy of maintenance cannot be divorced from the existence and nature of the marital relationship. The earlier view that Section 488 of the old Code, corresponding to Section 125 of the 1973 Code, was concerned only with food, clothing and lodging and had nothing to do with ordinary conjugal rights was held to be legally unsound and outdated.

4. Impotence — Sexual relationship — Marriage — Mental and physical well-being of wife.

[Para 14] — Sexual relationship is an important component of marriage. Persistent inability or refusal resulting in deprivation of marital intercourse may cause mental, psychological and physical harm and may amount to cruelty. The Court accepted that the concept of cruelty does not materially differ merely because the proceeding is one under criminal law rather than matrimonial/civil law.

5. Cruelty — Meaning — Same principles applicable in civil and criminal proceedings.

[Paras 12, 14] — The concept of legal or mental cruelty remains substantially the same whether considered in civil matrimonial proceedings or proceedings under Section 125 CrPC. General principles governing conduct amounting to cruelty cannot vary merely because the forum or statutory proceeding is different.

6. Section 125 CrPC — “Just ground” — Provision beneficial to neglected wife — Progressive interpretation.

[Paras 8–11] — The second proviso to Section 125(3), read with its Explanation, was intended to widen the circumstances in which a wife may justifiably refuse to live with her husband while still claiming maintenance. The provision is beneficial and should not be interpreted in an archaic manner which reduces the wife's entitlement merely to food, clothing and shelter.

7. Second marriage or mistress — Statutory illustration of “just ground” — Provision illustrative, not exhaustive.

[Paras 11–12] — The statutory provision treating the husband's contracting another marriage or keeping a mistress as a just ground for the wife's refusal to live with him is illustrative and not exhaustive. Other circumstances involving physical, mental or legal cruelty may also constitute just grounds, including proved impotence.

8. Dowry-related apprehension — Reasonable apprehension of physical harm — Just ground for separate residence.

[Para 12] — A wife's reasonable apprehension, arising from the husband's conduct, that she may suffer physical harm because of persistent dowry demands by the husband's parents or relatives may itself constitute a reasonable justification for refusing to live with the husband.

9. Muslim marriage — Section 125 CrPC — Personal law — Summary maintenance remedy applicable irrespective of religion.

[Para 5] — The remedy under Section 125 CrPC is a statutory summary remedy applicable to persons belonging to all religions and is not controlled by the personal law of the parties. The fact that the parties were married according to Sunni Muslim rites did not exclude the wife's claim under Section 125.

10. Contrary High Court decisions — Impotence not a just ground — Overruled.

[Paras 6–11, 15] — The earlier decisions of various High Courts which had taken the view that the husband's impotence was not a just ground enabling the wife to live separately and claim maintenance were held to be no longer good law and were overruled.


CASE FACTS

The respondent-wife was married to the appellant-husband on 27 May 1978 according to Sunni Muslim rites. She lived with the husband until July 1978.

During that period, the wife alleged that she discovered that her husband was physically incapable of having sexual relations with her and that he had himself admitted that he was impotent. She further alleged that she was maltreated and ultimately driven out of the matrimonial home on 11 July 1978.

The husband subsequently sent a registered notice dated 17 November 1978, asserting that he had no physical disability and expressing his willingness to keep the wife with him and discharge his marital obligations.

The wife had already instituted proceedings on 28 October 1978 seeking maintenance under Section 125 CrPC.

Both the Metropolitan Magistrate and the High Court found as a matter of fact that the husband was physically incapable of having sexual relations with the wife, i.e. that he was impotent and unable to discharge his marital obligations.

However, the Magistrate held that impotence was not a “just cause” for the wife to refuse to live with the husband and dismissed her maintenance application.

The Gujarat High Court, in revision, took the contrary view. It held that the husband's proved impotence constituted a just ground for the wife to refuse to live with him and consequently awarded her ₹150 per month maintenance, having regard to the husband's means.

The husband appealed to the Supreme Court.


QUESTIONS OF LAW

The principal question before the Supreme Court was:

Whether a husband's proved impotence and consequent inability to discharge his marital obligations constitute a “just ground” under the second proviso to Section 125(3) CrPC enabling the wife to refuse to live with him and claim maintenance?

A connected question was whether the earlier decisions holding that impotence was not a sufficient ground for separate residence and maintenance represented the correct law.


LAW CONSIDERED

1. Section 125(3) CrPC

The second proviso permits the Magistrate to consider the wife's grounds for refusing to live with her husband and grant maintenance notwithstanding the husband's offer to maintain her, if the Court is satisfied that there is a just ground for such refusal. [Para 5]

2. Scope of “just ground”

The Court held that the provision is not exhaustive. The statutory illustration relating to a second marriage or mistress was intended to widen the scope of “just ground”; it did not limit the expression to those two circumstances. Physical, mental and legal cruelty of a similar nature could also constitute just grounds. [Paras 11–12]

3. Impotence as cruelty

The Court reasoned that where the husband is impotent and unable to discharge the fundamental marital obligation of sexual relations, compelling the wife to continue living with him may subject her to a life of mental and psychological suffering. The Court therefore treated proved impotence as legal as well as mental cruelty. [Para 14]

4. Conjugal relationship and maintenance

The Court rejected the narrow proposition that Section 125 is concerned merely with providing food, clothing and shelter. The statutory remedy is founded upon the marital relationship, and the Court can consider the husband's conduct and the nature of the conjugal relationship when determining whether the wife's refusal to live with him is justified. [Paras 7–10]

5. Personal law

The parties' marriage was according to Sunni Muslim rites, but Section 125 is a secular statutory remedy applicable to persons of all religions. Personal law does not exclude the wife from invoking the statutory remedy. [Para 5]


APPLICATION OF LAW

The Supreme Court noted that the finding of impotence was concurrent: both the Magistrate and High Court had found the husband physically incapable of sexual relations and unable to discharge his marital obligations. Therefore, the principal issue was purely one of law—whether that proved condition constituted a “just ground” under Section 125(3).

The Court held that it would be unjust to compel a wife to live with a husband who is incapable of marital intercourse and thereby subject her to continuing mental and psychological suffering.

The Court also rejected the older judicial approach which treated maintenance as merely a provision for food, clothing and lodging, holding such an approach to be outdated and inconsistent with the legislative purpose of the provision.


CONCLUSION / FINAL DECISION

The Supreme Court dismissed the husband's appeal and upheld the Gujarat High Court's order granting maintenance to the wife.

The Court authoritatively held:

Where it is proved that the husband is impotent and unable to discharge his marital obligations, such impotence amounts to both legal and mental cruelty and constitutes a just ground under the second proviso to Section 125(3) CrPC for the wife to refuse to live with her husband. The wife is consequently entitled to maintenance according to the husband's means.

The Court further declared that the contrary decisions of the High Courts, including the authorities relied upon by the husband, were no longer good law and stood overruled.

RATIO DECIDENDI

Proved impotence of the husband, resulting in his inability to discharge marital obligations, constitutes legal and mental cruelty and is a “just ground” within the meaning of the second proviso to Section 125(3) CrPC for the wife to refuse to live with him. Such refusal does not disentitle her from claiming maintenance according to the husband's means. The concept of “just ground” is illustrative and includes circumstances of physical, mental or legal cruelty; Section 125 is a secular statutory remedy applicable irrespective of the parties' personal law.

Where spouses have amicably and comprehensively settled their matrimonial disputes through mediation, have agreed to discontinue their marital relationship, and have been living separately for a substantial period, the Supreme Court may, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, dissolve the marriage by decree of divorce and bring to an end the connected criminal, civil, departmental and writ proceedings so as to give complete and effective quietus to the dispute.

advocatemmmohan

ANJUM ARA BEGUM & ORS. v. THE STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ANR.

Transfer Petition (Criminal) No. 317/2025 (@ Diary No. 16766/2025)
Supreme Court of India
Sanjay Kumar and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ.
Order dated: 29 April 2026

HEADNOTES

1. Matrimonial dispute — Settlement through Supreme Court Mediation Centre — Settlement acted upon — Continuing multiple proceedings would serve no useful purpose — Proceedings quashed/disposed of in terms of settlement.

[Order] — During pendency of the transfer petition, the parties were referred to the Supreme Court Mediation Centre and successfully settled their differences. The terms were reduced into a Settlement Agreement dated 24.02.2026. In view of the settlement, the Court held that no purpose would be served in keeping alive the various proceedings initiated by the parties against each other and accordingly quashed/disposed of the proceedings specified in the settlement.

2. Matrimonial dispute — Settlement — Payment of ₹31 lakhs to wife — Demand draft handed over in Court — Settlement acted upon.

[Order] — In terms of the Settlement Agreement, the husband handed over a demand draft dated 07.02.2026 for ₹31,00,000/- to the respondent-wife, who was personally present before the Court.

3. Criminal proceedings — Matrimonial offences — Settlement between husband and wife — Supreme Court exercising jurisdiction to bring proceedings to an end.

[Order] — In view of the parties having amicably settled their disputes, the Court ordered that FIR No. 622/2020 under Sections 498-A, 406 and 34 IPC and Section 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, together with all consequential proceedings including C.R. Case No. 7306/2024, stand quashed/disposed of in terms of the settlement.

4. Criminal proceedings instituted by husband against wife and her family — Settlement — Proceedings quashed/disposed of.

[Order] — FIR No. 606/2024 dated 06.12.2024, registered at P.S. Arariya, District Arariya, Bihar, under the provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and all consequential proceedings were ordered to stand quashed/disposed of in view of the settlement.

5. Civil proceedings — Matrimonial dispute — Settlement — Pending civil proceedings brought to an end.

[Order] — Civil Suit No. CS/14/2025 and Misc. DJ/54/2025, pending before Family Court No.2, District East, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi, were ordered to stand disposed of in terms of the settlement.

6. Departmental proceedings — Complaint by spouse — Matrimonial settlement — Proceedings discontinued.

[Order] — Departmental proceedings initiated against the husband on the complaint of the wife before North Bihar Power Distribution Company Ltd. were ordered to stand disposed of in view of the settlement between the parties.

7. Writ proceedings — Matrimonial dispute — Settlement — Proceedings rendered unnecessary.

[Order] — Writ Petition No. 1263/2021, Minhaz Ahmad v. Govt. of NCT, pending before the High Court of Delhi, was also ordered to stand disposed of in terms of the settlement.

8. Divorce — Marriage irretrievably broken down — Parties living separately since 2016 — Article 142 Constitution of India — Supreme Court empowered to dissolve marriage by decree of divorce.

[Order] — Since the parties were no longer desirous of continuing their marital relationship and had been living separately since 2016, the Supreme Court considered it appropriate to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution and dissolved the marriage by granting a decree of divorce.

9. Article 142 — Matrimonial settlement — Complete resolution of disputes — Power to do complete justice.

[Order] — Where matrimonial disputes have been comprehensively settled and the parties have decided not to continue the marital relationship, the Supreme Court may exercise its jurisdiction under Article 142 to give complete effect to the settlement, including dissolution of marriage and termination of connected proceedings.

10. Transfer Petition — Settlement — Disposal in terms of Settlement Agreement.

[Order] — I.A. No.108198/2026 seeking appropriate directions in terms of the settlement was allowed and the Transfer Petition was disposed of in the terms recorded by the Court.


CASE FACTS

The marriage between Minhaz Ahmed (petitioner No.3) and Ruana Rahman (respondent No.2) took place on 24.07.2016. The parties separated shortly thereafter and had been living separately since 2016. Petitioner Nos.1 and 2 were the parents of petitioner No.3.

Various proceedings had been instituted by the parties against each other arising out of their matrimonial dispute.

During the pendency of the Transfer Petition, the Supreme Court referred the parties to the Supreme Court Mediation Centre. The parties successfully settled their differences with the assistance of the learned Mediator.

The settlement was reduced into writing in a Settlement Agreement dated 24.02.2026.

Pursuant to the settlement, the parties filed I.A. No.108198/2026 seeking appropriate directions.

Under the settlement, the husband handed over to the wife, who was present personally in Court, a demand draft for ₹31,00,000/- dated 07.02.2026 drawn on State Bank of India, New Delhi Main Branch.

The parties also agreed that the various criminal, civil, departmental and writ proceedings arising out of their disputes should not be continued.


PROCEEDINGS ORDERED TO BE QUASHED / DISPOSED OF

(a) Wife's criminal case

FIR No. 622/2020, P.S. Laxmi Nagar, Delhi, under:

  • Sections 498-A, 406 and 34 IPC; and
  • Section 4 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019,

together with consequential proceedings including C.R. Case No. 7306/2024, pending before JMFC, Mahila Court, East Karkardooma, Delhi.

(b) Husband's criminal case

FIR No. 606/2024 dated 06.12.2024, P.S. Arariya, District Arariya, Bihar, registered under Sections 126(2), 115(2), 308(3), 74, 303(2), 352, 351(2) and 3(5) BNS, 2023, and consequential proceedings.

(c) Civil proceedings

Civil Suit No. CS/14/2025 and Misc. DJ/54/2025, pending before Family Court No.2, District East, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.

(d) Departmental proceedings

Departmental proceedings against the husband initiated on the complaint of the wife by North Bihar Power Distribution Company Ltd., vide Resolution No.205 dated 08.04.2022.

(e) Writ proceedings

W.P. No.1263/2021, Minhaz Ahmad v. Govt. of NCT, pending before the Delhi High Court.


LAW

1. Settlement of matrimonial disputes

The Supreme Court recognised that the parties had voluntarily and successfully settled their differences through mediation. Once the settlement comprehensively resolved the disputes and the parties themselves requested appropriate orders, continuation of the multiple proceedings would serve no useful purpose.

The Court therefore gave effect to the Settlement Agreement and brought the pending litigation to an end.

2. Exercise of Article 142 jurisdiction

The important legal aspect of the order is the exercise of Article 142 of the Constitution.

The parties were no longer desirous of continuing their marital relationship and had remained separated since 2016. Taking these circumstances into account, the Supreme Court exercised its constitutional power and ordered that:

the marriage between Minhaz Ahmed and Ruana Rahman shall stand dissolved by way of a decree of divorce.

Thus, the Court did not merely dispose of the Transfer Petition; it also granted substantive matrimonial relief by dissolving the marriage.

3. Effect of settlement on connected proceedings

The settlement covered proceedings of different kinds—criminal, civil, departmental and writ proceedings. The Supreme Court gave comprehensive effect to the settlement by directing that all the identified proceedings stand quashed/disposed of in terms of the settlement.

The order therefore demonstrates the Court's approach to achieving a complete and final quietus to a matrimonial dispute where the parties have genuinely resolved their differences.


CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court held that, in view of the successful mediation and comprehensive settlement, there was no purpose in keeping alive the various proceedings between the parties.

Accordingly:

  1. I.A. No.108198/2026 was allowed.
  2. The specified criminal proceedings, civil proceedings, departmental proceedings and writ petition were quashed/disposed of in terms of the Settlement Agreement.
  3. The parties having decided not to continue their marital relationship and having lived separately since 2016, the Supreme Court exercised Article 142 jurisdiction.
  4. The marriage between Minhaz Ahmed and Ruana Rahman was dissolved by decree of divorce.
  5. The Registry was directed to prepare the decree of divorce in terms of the order.
  6. The Transfer Petition was accordingly disposed of and pending applications, if any, were also disposed of.

CORE RATIO / PROPOSITION

Where spouses have amicably and comprehensively settled their matrimonial disputes through mediation, have agreed to discontinue their marital relationship, and have been living separately for a substantial period, the Supreme Court may, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, dissolve the marriage by decree of divorce and bring to an end the connected criminal, civil, departmental and writ proceedings so as to give complete and effective quietus to the dispute.

Proof of a specific dowry demand, continued dowry-related harassment and reiteration of that demand immediately before the unnatural death of a married woman within seven years of marriage satisfies the requirement of “soon before her death” under Section 304-B IPC. Once such foundational facts are proved, the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act arises. Minor contradictions in witness testimony, an isolated statement that the deceased was living happily, or the poverty of the accused cannot displace otherwise consistent and credible evidence of dowry harassment. Further, the Dowry Prohibition Act does not distinguish between dowry demands made before and after marriage.

advocatemmmohan



STATE OF U.P. v. AJMAL BEG ETC.

2025 INSC 1435
Criminal Appeal Nos. 132–133 of 2017
Supreme Court of India
Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.


HEADNOTES

1. Dowry death — Section 304-B IPC — Ingredients — “Soon before her death” — Reasonable nexus between dowry harassment and death.

[Para 14.1] — To attract Section 304-B IPC, the prosecution has to establish that (i) the death of the woman was caused by burns or bodily injury or occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances; (ii) such death occurred within seven years of marriage; (iii) soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relative; and (iv) such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with, a demand for dowry. The expression “soon before her death” does not contemplate a fixed or restricted period; the Court has to ascertain whether there was a reasonable nexus between the dowry-related cruelty or harassment and the death. [Para 14.1]

2. Dowry death — Reiteration of dowry demand one day before death — Sufficient to satisfy “soon before” requirement.

[Para 20] — Where the demand for dowry, namely a motorcycle, colour television and ₹15,000/-, was proved beyond reasonable doubt and the demand was reiterated by the husband one day before the deceased's death, coupled with evidence of continuous harassment, the requirement of cruelty or harassment “soon before her death” stood satisfied.

3. Presumption of dowry death — Section 113-B, Evidence Act — Once foundational facts established, presumption arises — Accused required to rebut.

[Paras 14.2 & 20] — Once the prosecution establishes that the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, dowry soon before her death, Section 113-B of the Evidence Act mandates a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. The presumption is rebuttable. In the present case, the presumption arose on proof of the requisite cruelty and remained unrebutted, as the defence led no evidence.

4. Section 498-A IPC — Cruelty — Scope — Not confined to dowry-related harassment.

[Para 14.3] — Section 498-A encompasses both wilful conduct likely to drive a woman to suicide or cause grave injury or danger to her physical or mental health and harassment intended to coerce her or her relatives to meet an unlawful demand for property or valuable security. Cruelty under Section 498-A is therefore wider than cruelty connected exclusively with dowry.

5. Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 — Section 2 — Demand after marriage — Whether dowry.

[Para 23] — The Dowry Prohibition Act does not distinguish between a demand made before marriage and one made after marriage. Property or valuable security given or agreed to be given at, before or at any time after marriage, when connected with the marriage, falls within the statutory definition of dowry. Consequently, a demand made after marriage may constitute dowry.

6. Muslim parties — Mahr/dower distinguished from dowry — Demand for articles and cash constitutes dowry.

[Para 23] — Although Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act excludes dower or mahr applicable to persons governed by Muslim Personal Law, that exclusion does not extend to a demand for articles or money made in connection with the marriage. The demand for a colour TV, motorcycle and ₹15,000/- cash unquestionably constituted dowry.

7. Section 4, Dowry Prohibition Act — Mere demand — Sufficient to constitute offence.

[Para 14.4] — Under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the mere demand for dowry is sufficient to attract the statutory offence. Actual receipt of the demanded property is not necessary.

8. Evidence — Contradictions and discrepancies — Entire prosecution evidence not liable to rejection.

[Para 19.1] — Minor discrepancies, contradictions, omissions, exaggerations or embellishments do not justify rejection of the prosecution evidence in its entirety. The Court must sift the evidence carefully and separate the truthful and material portions from exaggeration or embellishment. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not a sound rule of evidence.

9. Evidence — Witness not eyewitness to actual act of burning — Evidence not thereby rendered unreliable.

[Para 21] — PW2 was rightly relied upon notwithstanding that he did not actually see the accused setting the deceased ablaze. His evidence established that he reached the spot, saw the deceased after she had been set ablaze and saw the accused persons fleeing. The fact that PW1 described PW2 as an eyewitness did not justify discarding PW2's own testimony.

10. Evidence — Statement that deceased was living “happily” — Isolated statement cannot outweigh consistent evidence of dowry harassment.

[Para 22] — The statement of PW6 that the deceased lived happily in her matrimonial home could not be read in isolation or treated as sufficient to discredit the consistent evidence of dowry demands and harassment. An isolated expression such as “happily” cannot override the tenor of the evidence as a whole.

11. Dowry demand — Poverty of accused — No ground to reject prosecution case.

[Para 23] — The High Court erred in treating the alleged poverty of Ajmal and his family as a reason for disbelieving the dowry demand. The financial status of the accused does not make a proved demand for a colour television, motorcycle and cash inherently improbable.

12. Criminal appeal against acquittal — Article 136 — Opposite findings by Trial Court and High Court — Supreme Court entitled to analyse evidence.

[Paras 15, 15.1 & 15.2] — Though the Supreme Court ordinarily exercises restraint in reappreciating evidence where there are concurrent findings, such restraint does not prevent examination of the evidence where the Trial Court and High Court have arrived at opposite conclusions. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court is required to analyse the evidence to determine whether conviction or acquittal is justified.

13. Acquittal — Reversal of Trial Court findings — High Court must assign proper reasons.

[Para 23] — While reversing the findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court, the High Court had not expressly demonstrated that those findings were erroneous, perverse or illegal. Its reasoning for acquitting the accused was therefore unsustainable.

14. Sentencing — Advanced age — Humanitarian considerations — Conviction may be maintained while incarceration avoided.

[Para 24] — In sentencing a convict of advanced age, the Court may take into account humanitarian considerations, including physical frailty, medical dependency, reduced capacity to endure imprisonment and the dignity protected by law. Accordingly, although Jamila's conviction was restored, the Supreme Court, considering that she was 94 years of age, refrained from incarcerating her.

15. Dowry prohibition — Constitutional and social dimension — Need for effective implementation.

[Paras 25–27] — The Court emphasised that dowry remains a deep-rooted social evil notwithstanding statutory prohibition. It directed measures including greater public awareness through educational curricula, effective functioning of Dowry Prohibition Officers, periodic training of police and judicial officers, expeditious disposal of Section 304-B/498-A cases, and grassroots awareness programmes through District Administration and Legal Services Authorities.


CASE FACTS

1. Marriage and death

Nasrin was married to Ajmal Beg and was the daughter-in-law of Jamila Beg. The marriage had lasted only a little over one year when Nasrin died. [Para 10(i)]

2. Dowry demands

Ajmal, Jamila and other family members repeatedly demanded from Nasrin and her father Taslim Beg (PW1):

  • a colour television;
  • a motorcycle; and
  • ₹15,000/- in cash.

Ajmal reiterated the demand before PW1 on 4 June 2001. PW1 expressed his inability to meet the demand. [Para 10(ii)–(iii)]

3. Death by burning

On 5 June 2001, Ajmal, Jamila and other accused allegedly assaulted Nasrin and threatened to kill her if their demands were not fulfilled. When she cried for help, PW2 Khaliq Beg and another person reached the spot. By then Nasrin had been set on fire after kerosene was poured over her, and she could not be saved. [Para 10(iv)–(vi)]

4. Medical evidence

PW4, Dr. V.K. Mishra, conducted the post-mortem. He deposed that death was caused by asphyxia and shock resulting from extensive burns. The entire body surface had been burnt down to the muscles, and the injuries were consistent with pouring of kerosene. [Para 16.3]

5. Trial Court

The Trial Court relied upon the prosecution evidence and found that the dowry demands and harassment had been established. It convicted Ajmal and Jamila under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The Trial Court imposed life imprisonment on Ajmal under Section 304-B IPC and corresponding sentences under the other provisions. [Para 11]

6. High Court

The High Court reversed the conviction and acquitted Ajmal and Jamila. It doubted PW2's credibility, relied upon PW6's statement that the deceased lived happily, and considered the dowry demand improbable because the accused were allegedly poor. [Para 12]

7. Appeal before Supreme Court

The State of Uttar Pradesh challenged the acquittal. Since the Trial Court and High Court had reached opposite conclusions, the Supreme Court re-examined the evidence. [Paras 13 & 15.2]


LAW APPLIED BY THE SUPREME COURT

Section 304-B IPC

The Court applied the five essential requirements of dowry death:

  1. unnatural death/burns or bodily injury;
  2. death within seven years of marriage;
  3. cruelty or harassment by husband or his relative;
  4. cruelty or harassment for or in connection with dowry; and
  5. such cruelty or harassment soon before death.

[Para 14.1]

The Court held that the expression “soon before” means a reasonable proximity or nexus, not necessarily an immediate or fixed period. [Para 14.1]

Section 113-B, Evidence Act

Once dowry-related cruelty soon before death is established, the Court shall presume that the accused caused the dowry death. The accused may rebut the presumption. [Para 14.2]

In the present case, the presumption arose because the dowry harassment and its proximity to death were proved, and it remained unrebutted because the defence led no evidence. [Para 20]

Section 498-A IPC

Cruelty includes both physical/mental wilful conduct and harassment connected with unlawful demands for property or valuable security. The provision is not confined to dowry harassment alone. [Para 14.3]

Sections 2, 3 and 4, Dowry Prohibition Act

The statutory definition of dowry extends to property or valuable security given or agreed to be given before, at or after marriage, when connected with the marriage. The mere demand itself is punishable under Section 4. [Para 14.4; Para 23]


APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

The Supreme Court found that:

  • the demand for the motorcycle, colour TV and ₹15,000/- was proved beyond reasonable doubt;
  • the deceased had been continuously harassed for dowry;
  • Ajmal repeated the demand one day before her death;
  • the death was an unnatural death caused by extensive burns;
  • the defence led no evidence to rebut the statutory presumption.

Therefore, all the ingredients of Section 304-B IPC were satisfied and the presumption under Section 113-B arose. [Para 20]

The Court further held that the High Court's reliance upon the alleged poverty of the accused and the isolated statement that the deceased lived “happily” was legally unsustainable. [Paras 22–23]


CONCLUSION / FINAL DECISION

[Para 24] — The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in setting aside the Trial Court's conviction and acquitting Ajmal and Jamila. The State's appeals were accordingly allowed.

The Trial Court's conviction of Ajmal and Jamila was restored. Ajmal's sentence was also restored, and he was directed to surrender before the concerned Court within four weeks to serve the sentence.

In respect of Jamila, aged 94 years, the Court restored the conviction but, having regard to her advanced age, physical frailty, likely medical dependency and humanitarian considerations, refrained from incarcerating her.

The Court also issued systemic directions for effective implementation of the Dowry Prohibition Act, training of police and judicial officers, appointment and functioning of Dowry Prohibition Officers, awareness programmes and expeditious disposal of pending Section 304-B and 498-A cases. [Paras 25–27]

RATIO DECIDENDI

Proof of a specific dowry demand, continued dowry-related harassment and reiteration of that demand immediately before the unnatural death of a married woman within seven years of marriage satisfies the requirement of “soon before her death” under Section 304-B IPC. Once such foundational facts are proved, the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act arises. Minor contradictions in witness testimony, an isolated statement that the deceased was living happily, or the poverty of the accused cannot displace otherwise consistent and credible evidence of dowry harassment. Further, the Dowry Prohibition Act does not distinguish between dowry demands made before and after marriage.