advocatemmmohan

THE AUTHORSHIP PARADOX

Balancing Machine Execution Against the Mind That Causes It

By M. Murali Mohan

Introduction: The Question Behind the Machine

Generative artificial intelligence has unsettled one of the foundational assumptions of copyright law: that a work of authorship can be attributed to a legally cognisable human creator whose intellectual contribution finds expression in a protected work. A machine can now produce literary passages, images, musical compositions and other expressive material in response to instructions supplied by a human being. The resulting work may reflect an elaborate human conception, yet its immediate verbal or visual form may be determined, in substantial measure, by computational processes.

The resulting controversy is frequently presented as a choice between two propositions: either the artificial intelligence system is the author, or the work is incapable of copyright protection. That formulation is incomplete. It overlooks a third possibility: the system may be an instrument through which a human being causes a work to be created, while the extent of copyright protection depends upon the applicable statute, the nature of the human contribution and the originality of the resulting expression.

The distinction is particularly important under Indian law. Section 2(d)(vi) of the Copyright Act, 1957 expressly provides that, in relation to a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is computer-generated, the author means “the person who causes the work to be created”. The provision supplies a statutory point of departure that cannot properly be disregarded merely because the technology employed is capable of producing expressive material with considerable autonomy.¹

The difficult question is not whether a machine possesses consciousness, personality or moral responsibility. It is whether, and in what circumstances, the human agency that initiates, directs, controls, selects or materially transforms computer-generated expression falls within the statutory conception of authorship.

This article advances the argument that copyright analysis must distinguish the machine's execution of a process from the human agency that may bring the protected work into existence. It examines the statutory framework under Indian law, the originality doctrine, the allocation of first ownership, and the comparative significance of the United States decisions concerning photography, computer-generated works and artificial intelligence.

The argument is not that every prompt necessarily creates a copyright, nor that payment for an AI subscription automatically confers ownership of every output. It is that the use of an artificial intelligence system should not, by itself, extinguish a claim to human authorship where the statutory requirements are otherwise satisfied.

Part I — The Judicial and Administrative Position: The Case for Caution

1. The distinction between conception and expression

Copyright protects expression, not an abstract idea, intention or general instruction. A person may conceive a novel, formulate its central theme, determine its characters and establish its moral architecture without thereby acquiring copyright over every sentence subsequently written by another person. The same distinction becomes more difficult to apply when the person receiving the instructions is not another human being but a generative system.

A prompt may range from a general request—such as asking for a poem about the sea—to an elaborate set of instructions specifying structure, imagery, character relationships, tonal progression, recurring motifs and successive revisions. These situations should not be treated as legally identical.

In the first situation, the user may supply little more than an idea or subject. In the second, the user's contribution may extend to the detailed design of the work, the repeated correction of its direction and the deliberate selection or transformation of particular expressions. Even then, the degree of control over the final expression must be established rather than presumed.

The relevant inquiry is therefore one of attribution and degree. What did the human actually contribute? Which expressive elements were determined by the human, and which were generated independently by the system? Did the human exercise meaningful control over the final form, or merely request a result and accept what the system supplied?

These questions are central to a sound copyright analysis. They prevent two opposite errors: treating every user as the author of everything generated following a prompt, and treating every work produced with AI assistance as incapable of containing protectable human authorship.

2. The United States position after Thaler v. Perlmutter

In Thaler v. Perlmutter, the United States courts considered an application for copyright registration in relation to an image claimed to have been generated autonomously by an artificial intelligence system. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the requirement of human authorship under the United States Copyright Act. The United States Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari on 2 March 2026 in Thaler v. Perlmutter, No. 25-449.²

The procedural consequence must be stated accurately. A denial of certiorari leaves the judgment under review undisturbed; it is not itself a Supreme Court judgment on the merits affirming every proposition advanced by the lower court. Nevertheless, the lower-court decision remains an important comparative authority concerning the requirement of human authorship under United States law.

It is equally important not to transpose that conclusion mechanically into Indian law. The Indian Copyright Act contains an express provision addressing computer-generated works and identifying the author by reference to the person who causes the work to be created. Whether a particular AI-assisted work falls within that provision requires an examination of Indian statutory language, the nature of the contribution and the relevant principles of originality.

The comparative question is consequently not whether India must adopt the American position. It is whether the Indian statutory text permits, or requires, a different analysis in circumstances where a human being can be identified as the person who caused the work to be created.

3. The significance of Zarya of the Dawn

The United States Copyright Office's determination concerning Zarya of the Dawn provides a further illustration of the distinction between human-authored and AI-generated material. The Office recognised copyright in the human-authored text and in the author's selection, coordination and arrangement of written and visual elements, while excluding the Midjourney-generated images from the scope of the registration on the ground that those images were not the product of human authorship.³

The decision is significant for two reasons.

First, the use of generative AI did not render the entire work ineligible for protection. Human-authored components and qualifying creative arrangements remained capable of protection.

Secondly, the protection recognised for selection and arrangement did not establish that the user automatically owned copyright in every AI-generated image incorporated into the work. The Office distinguished the copyrightable human contribution from the material it considered to lack human authorship.

The decision therefore supports a differentiated approach. It does not conclusively determine how Indian law should interpret Section 2(d)(vi), but it demonstrates why the analysis should identify the particular elements claimed to be protected instead of classifying an entire work as either wholly copyrightable or wholly unprotected merely because AI was used.

Part II — The Structural Tensions in the Conventional Analysis

1. The tool–creator tension

Artificial intelligence systems are not ordinarily recognised as legal persons capable of independently holding copyright, entering into contracts or bearing legal obligations in their own capacity. Yet an objection to human authorship may arise from the proposition that the system, rather than the user, determined the precise expression appearing in the output.

This creates a conceptual tension, though not necessarily a formal contradiction. The law may deny legal personality to a machine while concluding that a particular expression was not authored by the human who initiated its production. The absence of a machine author does not logically compel the conclusion that the user authored the entire output.

The question must instead be approached through the applicable statutory definition of authorship. Where the statute identifies the person who causes a computer-generated work to be created, the absence of machine personhood does not answer the question; it makes the statutory identification of the relevant human agency particularly important.

The distinction is between causal responsibility and authorship. A person who presses a button may cause a machine to operate without becoming the author of every result. Conversely, a person who designs the expressive structure, directs the production process, makes consequential choices and materially shapes the final work may have a substantially stronger claim to authorship.

The law should therefore resist both extremes. It should neither attribute all generated expression automatically to the user nor infer from the system's computational role that human authorship is necessarily absent.

2. The statutory significance of the person who causes the work to be created

Section 2(d)(vi) of the Copyright Act, 1957 states:

“in relation to any literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is computer-generated, the person who causes the work to be created.”

This provision is the principal statutory foundation for the argument advanced in this article.⁴

Its language does not expressly require that the person personally type every word, draw every line or manually execute every technical operation involved in producing the work. It directs attention instead to the person who causes the work to be created.

The expression “causes the work to be created” nevertheless requires judicial interpretation when applied to generative AI. Causation in the ordinary sense may be broad: a person may initiate a process, finance it, provide instructions or accept its result. Copyright authorship, however, cannot be determined solely by identifying the earliest or most remote cause of production.

The more persuasive interpretation would examine the nature and effectiveness of the human contribution. Relevant considerations may include:

• the specificity and expressive content of the instructions;

• the extent to which the human establishes the structure, arrangement, characterisation or other expressive features;

• the number and substance of iterative revisions;

• the human's selection, rejection and transformation of generated material;

• the degree to which the final work reflects the human's demonstrable creative choices; and

• the distinction between the material generated by the system and the original expression subsequently contributed by the human.

These considerations are proposed as an analytical framework, not as an established judicial test under Indian law.

A general prompt may establish a causal connection without establishing authorship of the resulting expression. Detailed direction and meaningful editorial intervention may provide stronger evidence, although the legal conclusion must still be reached under the statute and the applicable originality standard.

The critical question is not whether the human contributed something to the process, but whether the evidence establishes the contribution necessary to support the claim made. Section 2(d)(vi) should neither be read out of the statute nor converted into an automatic rule that every person initiating a computer process owns its entire output.

3. The originality requirement: Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak

In Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, the Supreme Court of India examined the originality required for copyright protection in edited and reported judicial decisions. The Court rejected the proposition that labour and expenditure alone were sufficient and required the exercise of skill and judgment accompanied by a sufficient degree of creativity.⁵

The judgment is important to AI-assisted authorship, but its significance must be carefully confined. It does not decide whether a person who prompts an AI model is the author of its output. It establishes principles relevant to the originality of the claimed contribution.

The case supports the proposition that copyright cannot be claimed merely because a person has expended time, money or effort. The contribution must satisfy the applicable standard of originality. At the same time, the requirement of originality directs attention to intellectual choices embodied in the work rather than to the physical mechanism by which the work was produced.

An author may exercise creative judgment through selection, revision, arrangement and refinement. Those activities may be relevant to copyright protection where they result in original expression. But their mere existence is insufficient: the claimed contribution must be identified, and its originality must be demonstrated.

Applied to AI-assisted writing, the distinction is between the effort of operating a system and the intellectual contribution expressed in the resulting work. Repeatedly generating alternatives and choosing one without more may not establish authorship of the selected output. Substantive rewriting, original composition, creative arrangement or other demonstrable human expression may support a claim to protection in the material contributed by the human.

The principle derived from Eastern Book Company is therefore not that extensive prompting automatically creates copyright. It is that human contribution must be assessed for its intellectual substance and originality rather than dismissed merely because technological assistance was employed.

Part III — Comparative Precedents and Their Proper Reach

1. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony: technology as an instrument of expression

In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884), the United States Supreme Court considered whether a photograph could qualify for copyright protection. The Court upheld protection for the photograph at issue, in which the photographer had exercised creative judgment in posing the subject, selecting and arranging accessories, managing light and shade, and producing the final composition.⁶

The decision is an important historical example of copyright law responding to a technology that could be characterised as mechanical. It demonstrates that the use of an apparatus does not necessarily displace human authorship where the resulting work embodies the photographer's original intellectual conception.

The analogy to generative AI is persuasive but not complete. In the photograph before the Court, the photographer's creative contribution to the composition was established by evidence. In a generative AI process, the system may determine expressive details that the user neither selected in advance nor controlled during production.

The correct lesson from Burrow-Giles is therefore not that every machine-generated result is copyrightable because a human operated the instrument. It is that the technological character of the process does not, by itself, settle the question of authorship. The actual contribution of the human must be examined.

The decision strengthens the argument for a functional inquiry into creative control. It does not eliminate the requirement that the claimed human authorship be established.

2. The analogy to photography and other creative instruments

The history of copyright includes works produced through cameras, recording equipment, editing systems and computer software. In each instance, the instrument may perform technical operations without necessarily becoming the author of the resulting work.

Generative AI presents a more difficult problem because the system may do more than record or execute a predetermined human composition. It can produce expressive alternatives that are not individually specified by the user. That difference matters.

The legal question should not be resolved merely by describing AI as a tool, because the label does not establish how much of the expression the human determined. Nor should the technology be treated as an independent legal author simply because it generates details beyond the user's precise instructions.

A principled analysis asks whether the human's contribution, considered in relation to the particular work claimed, meets the statutory and originality requirements. The instrument may be technologically sophisticated; the legal inquiry remains one of attribution, expression and proof.

3. Selection and arrangement as independent human contributions

A person may assemble a larger work from material obtained through multiple sources, including material generated by AI. The selection and arrangement of that material may contain original human expression. Under the principles illustrated by Eastern Book Company and the United States Copyright Office's decision in Zarya of the Dawn, such contributions must be examined independently from the underlying material.

This distinction is especially important for authors who use AI during the development of a manuscript. The human may establish the architecture of a book, determine the sequence of chapters, create characters and themes, reject unsuitable passages, rewrite generated text and construct a coherent narrative. The resulting work may contain protectable human expression even if some constituent material was generated by a machine.

The extent of protection will depend on the actual contribution and applicable law. Copyright in an original selection or arrangement does not automatically confer exclusive rights over every constituent element, particularly where those elements are themselves unprotected or independently created by another source.

The argument for human authorship is strongest when the author can identify the original expression contributed, the editorial decisions made and the relationship between those decisions and the final form of the work.

Part IV — Authorship and Ownership Must Not Be Confused

1. Section 17(c): the employment provision

Section 17 of the Copyright Act, 1957 begins with the general rule that, subject to the Act, the author of a work is its first owner. Section 17(c) provides an exception for a work made in the course of the author's employment under a contract of service or apprenticeship, where the specified preceding exceptions do not apply. In such a case, the employer is the first owner in the absence of an agreement to the contrary.⁷

This provision illustrates an important distinction between authorship and first ownership. The person who creates a work and the person who first owns the copyright need not invariably be the same person. The statute expressly allocates ownership in certain relationships and circumstances.

It would, however, be incorrect to equate a paid AI subscription with employment under a contract of service. A subscriber ordinarily does not employ the AI platform as a servant or apprentice, and the platform's provision of computational services does not by itself establish the legal relationship contemplated by Section 17(c).

The economic analogy has limited but legitimate force. A human author who uses an AI platform may supply the intellectual direction, pay for the service, evaluate the outputs and decide what enters the final work. Those circumstances may be relevant to understanding the human's role in production. They do not, without more, establish ownership under the employment provision.

The sounder argument is that ownership must be determined by the applicable statutory rules, the nature of the work, any relevant agreement and the extent of the human contribution. Section 17(c) cannot be used to create an employment relationship where none exists.

2. The subscription payment and the question of ownership

Payment for access to a tool is not equivalent to payment for copyright in every product generated through it. A subscription may confer contractual rights to use a service and may be accompanied by terms governing outputs. Those contractual terms cannot, by themselves, resolve every question of statutory authorship or copyright subsistence.

The subscriber's payment may demonstrate that the service was acquired for the subscriber's use. It does not establish that every generated output is original, that the subscriber authored every expressive element or that copyright necessarily subsists in the output.

Conversely, the fact that the system was developed and operated by a third party does not automatically establish that the third party is the author of every output. The legal position must be determined by examining the relevant statutory provisions, the human contribution, the nature of the output and any applicable contractual arrangements.

The distinction is fundamental: access to a system, authorship of a work, subsistence of copyright and ownership of the resulting rights are separate questions.

3. The author's claim must be supported by evidence

Where the claim to authorship depends on the human's direction and editorial intervention, the author should be able to demonstrate the nature of that contribution. Drafts, successive versions, records of substantive revisions, structural outlines and evidence of original selection or arrangement may assist in establishing the human role.

Such records do not automatically prove copyright, nor does the absence of a particular type of record necessarily defeat a claim. Their significance lies in their capacity to show how the work came into existence and which expressive decisions are attributable to the human.

A claim based only on the assertion that the user supplied prompts or paid for a subscription may be weak. A claim supported by identifiable original expression, meaningful revision and evidence of creative control may present a stronger case.

The law should assess the substance of the contribution rather than the mere presence or absence of AI in the creative process.

Part V — A Proposed Framework for Indian Copyright Analysis

The existing statutory scheme permits a disciplined analysis without either assuming that all AI outputs are protected or declaring all such outputs unprotected.

The following framework is proposed for judicial consideration and further scholarly debate.

First: identify the work claimed. The claimant should specify whether copyright is asserted in the complete work, particular passages, a selection or arrangement, or human modifications of generated material. A claim framed at the appropriate level avoids treating a composite work as indivisible.

Secondly: identify the human contribution. The inquiry should establish the instructions, design choices, original composition, selection, arrangement, revision and other expressive decisions attributable to the claimant. General ideas and instructions should not be confused with the expression claimed to be protected.

Thirdly: consider Section 2(d)(vi). Where the work is computer-generated within the meaning of the provision, the court should examine who caused it to be created. That inquiry should be informed by the actual production process, without assuming that mere causal initiation necessarily establishes authorship of every expressive element.

Fourthly: apply the originality requirement. Under the principles of Eastern Book Company, labour, expense and technical effort alone are insufficient. The identified human contribution must meet the applicable standard of originality.

Fifthly: distinguish subsistence from ownership. Once the existence and scope of copyright are assessed, the court should determine first ownership under Section 17 and any relevant agreement or other statutory provision. Ownership should not be assumed merely from payment for the technology or from the fact that the claimant initiated the process.

Sixthly: define the scope of protection. Where a work combines human-authored material and AI-generated content, the analysis should identify the expression in which copyright is claimed. Protection in original human contributions should not automatically be extended to material for which the statutory requirements have not been established.

This framework does not create a new statutory test. It organises the existing questions of authorship, causation, originality and ownership so that each is addressed on its own terms.

Part VI — The Economic and Jurisprudential Stakes

Copyright law must respond to technological change without abandoning the principles that justify protection. If every output generated with AI assistance were categorically excluded from copyright, original human expression embedded in AI-assisted works could be denied protection merely because the author employed a modern instrument.

At the other extreme, if every person who submits a prompt were automatically treated as the author of the resulting expression, the originality requirement could be diluted and claims to protection could extend far beyond the human contribution actually made.

Neither outcome is satisfactory. The first risks disregarding genuine human creativity; the second risks converting the act of operating a service into a claim of authorship over expression determined by the system.

The appropriate response is not to replace the statutory framework with a presumption in favour of either the machine or the user. It is to apply the law to the particular work, identify the contribution claimed and determine whether the statutory conditions for protection have been met.

The question also has economic consequences. Authors, publishers, artists, researchers and businesses require clarity about the rights they may claim in AI-assisted material. Uncertainty can discourage legitimate creative investment, complicate licensing and produce disputes over the use of composite works. Clearer guidance on the relationship between human contribution and computer-generated expression would assist both creators and users of the technology.

Yet economic investment alone cannot determine authorship. Copyright is a statutory right governed by the conditions prescribed by law. The policy objective must be to recognise genuine human creativity while preserving the distinction between original expression and the mere production of material by an automated process.

Conclusion: The Mind Behind the Instrument

The authorship paradox arises when the law is asked to reconcile two facts: a machine may generate the immediate expression of a work, yet the process may have been initiated and shaped by a human being whose intellectual choices are reflected in the final result.

The answer cannot be supplied merely by describing artificial intelligence as a tool. Nor can it be supplied by attributing independent authorship to a system that the law does not recognise as a legal person. The decisive inquiry must be directed to the applicable statute, the work claimed, the human contribution and the originality of the expression.

Indian law possesses a provision of particular significance in this debate. Section 2(d)(vi) identifies, for a computer-generated work, the author by reference to “the person who causes the work to be created”. That language deserves substantive interpretation in the context of generative AI. It should neither be deprived of practical effect nor read as granting automatic copyright to every person who initiates a computational process.

The jurisprudential task is to distinguish mere prompting from meaningful creative direction; technical execution from original expression; authorship from first ownership; and the existence of a work from the scope of rights that may subsist in it.

The law should not presume that the machine has authored everything simply because it has executed the process. Equally, it should not presume that the human has authored everything merely because the human initiated it.

The central principle is narrower, but more enduring: where a human being can establish an original contribution to a work, the use of artificial intelligence should not, by itself, defeat the claim to protection. Where the claim extends to expression determined by the system, the statutory requirements must still be satisfied.

The future of copyright in the age of artificial intelligence will depend not upon choosing between human intelligence and machine execution, but upon identifying, with legal precision, the contribution for which protection is claimed and the person to whom the law attributes it.

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Authorities and statutory references

1. Copyright Act, 1957, § 2(d)(vi). See the statutory text published by India Code and the Government of India's Copyright Office.

2. Thaler v. Perlmutter, No. 25-449, petition for a writ of certiorari denied 2 March 2026, Supreme Court of the United States; see also the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Thaler v. Perlmutter, No. 23-5233 (18 March 2025).

3. United States Copyright Office, Zarya of the Dawn, Registration No. VAu001480196, letter dated 21 February 2023.

4. Copyright Act, 1957, § 2(d)(vi).

5. Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak, (2008) 1 SCC 1; AIR 2008 SC 809. The Supreme Court's judgment was delivered on 12 December 2007.

6. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).

7. Copyright Act, 1957, §§ 17 and 17(c).

Under the United States Copyright Act of 1976, a work claimed to have been generated autonomously by an artificial intelligence system, with the system expressly identified as its sole author and without human creative contribution, is not eligible for copyright registration because the statutory scheme requires authorship by a human being. The work-made-for-hire doctrine cannot confer copyright where the threshold requirement for copyright protection has not been satisfied.

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THALER v. PERLMUTTER

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit — Decided on 18 March 2025

COPYRIGHT ACT — Artificial intelligence — Computer-generated artistic work — Human authorship — Whether an artificial intelligence system can be recognised as author — Whether owner and operator of AI system entitled to copyright in autonomously generated work — Held, under the United States Copyright Act of 1976, copyrightable work must be authored in the first instance by a human being; an artificial intelligence system cannot be recognised as the sole author of a work — Copyright registration rightly refused where the applicant expressly identified the AI system as the sole author and represented that the work had been generated autonomously without human creative contribution — Applicant’s alternative claim that he was himself the author by reason of creating and using the system not considered on merits, having been waived before the administrative agency and not properly preserved on appeal — Appeal dismissed. (Paras. 1–8, 15–23)

COPYRIGHT — Original works of authorship — Human contribution — AI-assisted creation distinguished from autonomous machine generation — Held, requirement of human authorship does not prohibit copyright protection for every work produced with artificial intelligence; protection may be available where a human being is the author and the circumstances establish sufficient human creative contribution — Whether an AI-assisted work qualifies for protection depends upon the manner in which the tool operates and is used — Disputes concerning the extent of AI contribution to a particular work were not decided, the work in question having been expressly claimed as autonomously generated by the machine. (Paras. 9–14, 24–27)

COPYRIGHT — Authorship and ownership — Work made for hire — Artificial intelligence system claimed to be employee of applicant — Held, work-made-for-hire doctrine does not dispense with the threshold requirement that a copyrightable work must originate in human authorship; the doctrine cannot confer copyright in material that was never eligible for copyright protection — Claim rejected. (Paras. 28–31)

COPYRIGHT — Statutory interpretation — Meaning of “author” — Scheme and structure of Copyright Act of 1976 — Provisions concerning initial ownership, duration of copyright, inheritance, transfer and legal attributes of authorship — Held, read as a whole, the statutory scheme supports the conclusion that an author must be a human being; machines are treated as instruments used in the creative process and not as independent authors — Longstanding Copyright Office practice and the historical treatment of computer technology reinforced that construction. (Paras. 9–14)

COPYRIGHT — Judicial interpretation — Technological change — Scope of judicial power — Held, adaptation of copyright law to new technological developments must remain within the statutory framework; policy arguments for extending copyright to works generated autonomously by artificial intelligence are matters for legislative consideration and cannot, by themselves, justify a departure from the statute as interpreted by the Court. (Paras. 24–27)

Disposition: Appeal dismissed; denial of copyright registration affirmed.

I. Analysis of facts

1. Material facts

Dr. Stephen Thaler, a computer scientist, developed an artificial intelligence system called the “Creativity Machine”. The system autonomously generated an artistic image entitled A Recent Entrance to Paradise.

On 19 May 2019, Dr. Thaler applied to the United States Copyright Office for copyright registration. In the application, he identified the Creativity Machine as the sole author of the artwork and himself as its owner. He expressly described the work as having been created autonomously by the machine.

The Copyright Office rejected the application because the work lacked human authorship. The administrative reconsideration process did not alter that decision.

Dr. Thaler then sought judicial review. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia upheld the refusal of registration. He appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

Stanford Copyright and Fair Use Center+1

2. Arguments and procedural complications

Dr. Thaler advanced three principal lines of argument:

1. The statutory requirement of human authorship was unsupported by the Copyright Act and was constitutionally objectionable.

2. He should be treated as the owner under the work-made-for-hire doctrine, contending that the AI system functioned as his employee.

3. He should himself qualify as the author because he had created and used the AI system.

The third argument encountered a decisive procedural obstacle. The appellate court held that the argument had been waived before the administrative agency and had not been adequately preserved on appeal. Consequently, the court did not determine its substantive merits.

The distinction is fundamental: the case concerned a work expressly claimed to have been generated autonomously by a machine, with the machine identified as the sole author. It was not a case in which the applicant had properly preserved and established a claim that the final expression embodied his own creative contribution.

II. Questions of law

The principal questions were:

1. Whether an artificial intelligence system can be recognised as the author of a copyrightable work under the United States Copyright Act of 1976.

2. Whether a person can obtain copyright in an autonomously generated work by claiming ownership of, or an employment relationship with, the AI system.

3. Whether the constitutional question concerning human authorship required determination.

4. Whether the applicant's alternative claim to authorship through his creation and use of the AI system could be considered on appeal.

III. Analysis of the applicable law

1. Copyright Act of 1976 — Sections 102(a) and 201(a)

Section 102(a) provides for copyright protection in original works of authorship, subject to the statute's requirements. Section 201(a) provides that copyright initially vests in the author or authors of the work.

The Court interpreted these provisions in the context of the statutory scheme as a whole. It examined provisions concerning the duration of copyright, inheritance, transfer of copyright, the legal attributes of authorship, and the treatment of machines as instruments used in creative processes.

The Court concluded that the statutory scheme required the author to be a human being. Since the application identified a machine as the sole author, the application failed at the threshold.

2. Work-made-for-hire doctrine — Section 201(b)

Section 201(b) permits an employer or other qualifying person for whom a work is prepared to be considered its author for purposes of the statute in specified circumstances.

The Court rejected Dr. Thaler's reliance on this doctrine. The work-made-for-hire provision does not independently create copyright in material that is not eligible for copyright protection in the first place. The threshold requirement of human authorship continued to apply.

The decision therefore does not establish that payment for an AI subscription, ownership of the system, or the provision of instructions automatically transfers copyright in an otherwise unprotected output.

3. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony (1884)

The Court's discussion of the historical treatment of photography supported its analysis of the relationship between technology and authorship. Photography may employ a mechanical instrument, but copyright protection can attach where the work embodies the photographer's creative contribution.

The analogy does not mean that every result produced by a machine is copyrightable. It supports the distinction between a technological instrument assisting a human creator and a machine claimed to have generated a work autonomously.

4. AI-assisted works distinguished from autonomous generation

The Court expressly recognised that the human-authorship requirement does not prohibit copyright protection for every work made with AI assistance. Whether an AI-assisted work qualifies depends upon the circumstances, including how the system operates and how it was used in producing the final work.

The Court did not resolve the disputed boundary between human creative contribution and AI-generated expression in this appeal, because Dr. Thaler had identified the machine as the sole author and claimed autonomous generation.

5. Constitutional issue

The Court declined to determine whether the United States Constitution independently requires human authorship. It considered the Copyright Act itself sufficient to dispose of the appeal.

Accordingly, the constitutional issue was left open, rather than decided against Dr. Thaler on its merits.

IV. Ratio decidendi

The ratio decidendi may be stated as follows:

Under the United States Copyright Act of 1976, a work claimed to have been generated autonomously by an artificial intelligence system, with the system expressly identified as its sole author and without human creative contribution, is not eligible for copyright registration because the statutory scheme requires authorship by a human being. The work-made-for-hire doctrine cannot confer copyright where the threshold requirement for copyright protection has not been satisfied.

The ratio must be confined to the issues actually decided.

The Court did not hold that all works created with AI assistance are ineligible for copyright. Nor did it determine the merits of the applicant's alternative contention that his own creation and use of the system made him the author, because that argument had been waived and was not properly preserved.

V. Conclusion

The judgment affirms the refusal to register A Recent Entrance to Paradise because the application attributed sole authorship to an AI system said to have generated the image autonomously.

Its significance lies in the distinction between autonomous machine generation and human-authored work produced with technological assistance. The former was rejected on the facts and statutory interpretation before the Court; the latter was not categorically excluded.

For Indian copyright jurisprudence, the judgment is persuasive comparative material, not a binding interpretation of Section 2(d)(vi) of the Copyright Act, 1957. India's express provision identifying the author of a computer-generated work as “the person who causes the work to be created” raises a distinct question of statutory interpretation. Thaler does not answer that question.

The Indian inquiry must therefore independently determine how statutory causation, human creative contribution, originality and first ownership interact in the case of generative AI.

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WHAT IS “VESTED” PROPERTY UNDER SECTION 12(b) OF THE HINDU ADOPTIONS AND MAINTENANCE ACT, 1956?

A Statutory Interpretation in the Light of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the General Clauses Act, 1897, and the Law of Mitakshara Coparcenary

By M. Murali Mohan

I. The Principal Question: What Must Have Vested Before Adoption?

The proviso to Section 12 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (“the HAMA”) preserves certain legal consequences notwithstanding the severance of the adopted child’s ties with the family of birth. Proviso (b) declares that any property which vested in the adopted child before adoption shall continue to vest in that person, subject to the obligations attaching to its ownership, including the obligation to maintain relatives in the family of birth.

The expression “property which vested” is therefore central to the operation of the proviso. Yet the Act does not separately define “vested property”, nor does proviso (b) expressly prescribe that an interest must have been reduced to a definite share by partition before it can qualify for protection.

The principal question is this:

Does property vest only when a person obtains an ascertained share or an individually identifiable asset, or can a presently existing proprietary interest be vested even though its precise extent, possession or enjoyment remains undetermined?

The question assumes particular importance when a child, before adoption, has an interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property by birth. Such an interest is undivided and its quantum may fluctuate with changes in the coparcenary. The Telangana High Court Full Bench in Anumolu Nageswara Rao v. A.V.R.L. Narasimha Rao, LPA No. 204 of 2001, decided on 27 June 2023, considered this very issue and held that an unspecified, fluctuating coparcenary interest does not constitute property vested in the child for the purposes of proviso (b).

The present inquiry does not proceed on the assumption that the Full Bench decision can be displaced by invoking general principles of property law. Its object is more specific: to examine whether the statutory expression “vested” admits a distinction between the existence of a proprietary interest and the subsequent ascertainment of its quantum; to identify the circumstances in which a right is merely an expectancy; and to consider whether the principles developed under other enactments assist in understanding the expression employed in Section 12(b).

The analysis must begin with a fundamental distinction. A child may have a present proprietary interest in existing property, a right to obtain a definite share upon partition, or merely an expectation of inheriting property from a living relative. These are not interchangeable legal positions. The statutory question is whether the right asserted had already acquired the character of property vested in the child before adoption.

II. Section 12 of the HAMA: The Statutory Foundation

Section 12 provides, in substance, that an adopted child becomes the child of the adoptive parent for all purposes from the date of adoption and that the ties with the family of birth are deemed severed and replaced by those created in the adoptive family. The material provisos read:

(b) any property which vested in the adopted child before the adoption shall continue to vest in such person subject to the obligations, if any, attaching to the ownership of such property, including the obligation to maintain relatives in the family of his or her birth;

(c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the adoption.

Provisos (b) and (c) protect different interests. Proviso (b) preserves property already vested in the adopted child before adoption. Proviso (c) prevents adoption from divesting an estate which had vested in another person before the adoption. The distinction must be maintained when relying on decisions involving succession that opened before adoption.

Three propositions emerge from the language of proviso (b).

First, the relevant point of time is immediately before adoption. The inquiry is not whether the adopted child might acquire property in the future, but whether a proprietary interest had already vested.

Secondly, the expression “any property” is not expressly confined to property obtained through partition, inheritance, gift or bequest. Whether a particular interest falls within the provision depends on its legal character and on the meaning of “vested” in the context of the Act.

Thirdly, the provision preserves property subject to obligations attaching to ownership. Its operation is not necessarily confined to property which the child can immediately possess or enjoy without restriction.

The third proposition, however, does not answer the entire controversy. An obligation affecting ownership is different from a contingency upon which the right itself depends. The former may qualify an existing proprietary interest; the latter may prevent an interest from becoming vested until the contingency is satisfied.

The expression must therefore be construed by identifying the legal source of the right, the point at which it arose, and the nature of any condition affecting its existence.

III. Section 19 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882: Vesting and Enjoyment

Section 19 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“the TPA”), deals with vested interests created by transfers. It provides that where, on a transfer of property, an interest is created in favour of a person without specifying the time when it is to take effect, or where it is to take effect forthwith or on the happening of an event which must happen, the interest is vested unless a contrary intention appears from the terms of the transfer.

The section further provides that a vested interest is not defeated by the death of the transferee before possession is obtained. Its Explanation makes clear that an intention to postpone vesting is not to be inferred merely because enjoyment is postponed.

Section 19 does not directly govern every proprietary interest arising under Mitakshara law. Its immediate field is the creation of interests by transfer. Nevertheless, it supplies an important statutory illustration of a distinction relevant to the present inquiry: vesting and enjoyment are separate juridical questions.

An interest may be presently created although the beneficiary cannot obtain possession or full enjoyment until a later event. The event may postpone enjoyment without postponing the creation of the interest itself.

That distinction is important because the argument that an undivided coparcenary interest is not vested merely because its quantum has not been fixed by partition risks treating ascertainment as though it were necessarily the event that creates the right. Whether that equation is justified must be determined from the law governing the particular interest, not assumed at the outset.

Section 19 cannot, by itself, establish that a fluctuating coparcenary interest is vested within Section 12(b). The provisions operate in different legal settings. Its proper use is narrower: it demonstrates that the absence of immediate possession or enjoyment is not, as a universal principle, inconsistent with the existence of a vested proprietary interest.

IV. Gift Deeds and Settlement Deeds: Supreme Court Authorities on Present Interests and Postponed Enjoyment

The Supreme Court’s decisions concerning gift deeds and settlement deeds provide concrete illustrations of the distinction between the creation of a proprietary interest and the postponement of its enjoyment. These authorities deserve express consideration because they examine the legal effect of an instrument which may reserve possession, income or enjoyment to the transferor while creating rights in favour of another person.

They are interpretive authorities for the concept of vesting. They are not direct decisions on the effect of adoption under Section 12(b), and their holdings must not be extended beyond their proper reach.

1. Namburi Basava Subrahmanyam v. Alapati Hymavathi

In Namburi Basava Subrahmanyam v. Alapati Hymavathi, (1996) 9 SCC 388, the Supreme Court considered whether a document styled as a settlement deed created an interest in praesenti or was intended to operate only upon the death of the executant.

The Court emphasised that the nomenclature of the instrument is not conclusive. The recitals must be read as a whole to determine whether the executant intended to create an irrevocable present interest or to postpone the transfer itself until death.

On the facts, the settlement deed created a present interest in the beneficiary while reserving a life interest in favour of the settlor. The beneficiary’s absolute enjoyment was postponed until the settlor’s death. The Court treated the instrument as a settlement creating rights in praesenti, rather than as a will taking effect only upon death.

The importance of the decision lies in its method of analysis. A court must identify when the interest was created, rather than infer the time of vesting solely from the date on which full enjoyment became possible.

2. K. Balakrishnan v. K. Kamalam

In K. Balakrishnan v. K. Kamalam, (2004) 1 SCC 581, the Supreme Court considered the validity and effect of a gift under which the donor had reserved enjoyment during her lifetime. The decision formed part of the line of authority examining the relationship between Sections 122 and 123 of the TPA and the legal requirements for a completed gift.

The relevant inquiry was not exhausted by asking whether the donee had obtained immediate physical possession. The Court had to consider the legal effect of the gift, including acceptance and the rights retained by the donor.

The decision must be read alongside the subsequent larger-Bench consideration in Renikuntla Rajamma v. K. Sarwanamma. It should not be cited as laying down that every instrument which postpones enjoyment necessarily creates a vested interest. The effect depends on whether the requirements of a valid gift are satisfied and what interest the instrument actually creates.

3. P.K. Mohan Ram v. B.N. Ananthachary

In P.K. Mohan Ram v. B.N. Ananthachary, (2010) 4 SCC 161, the Supreme Court examined a settlement deed under which the settlor reserved rights concerning the income and use of the property during his lifetime, while making provision for the beneficiaries’ rights thereafter.

The Court considered the deed as a whole to ascertain whether it created present rights or postponed the operation of the transfer itself. The fact that the settlor retained substantial rights of enjoyment was relevant, but it was not by itself conclusive that no present interest had been created in the beneficiaries.

The case reinforces the need to distinguish between a transfer that creates an interest immediately but postpones its enjoyment, and an instrument under which the interest itself is intended to arise only in the future.

4. Renikuntla Rajamma (Dead) by LRs v. K. Sarwanamma

In Renikuntla Rajamma (Dead) by LRs v. K. Sarwanamma, (2014) 9 SCC 445, a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court considered the legal requirements governing a gift of immovable property under Sections 122 and 123 of the TPA. The case addressed the effect of a donor reserving possession and enjoyment during the donor’s lifetime.

The Court held that delivery of possession is not an indispensable requirement for the validity of a gift of immovable property where the statutory requirements are otherwise satisfied. A reservation of lifetime enjoyment by the donor does not, by itself, invalidate a completed gift.

The decision is significant because it rejects the assumption that physical possession must invariably accompany the creation of ownership. The legal effect of the instrument must be determined from the requirements of the governing statute and the rights it creates.

5. The proper significance of the gift-deed authorities

Read together, these decisions establish a limited but important proposition: a present proprietary interest may be created even though possession or full enjoyment is postponed. The court must identify the legal act or rule by which the interest arose and determine whether the postponement affects the existence of the right or only the time of its enjoyment.

That proposition supports a careful examination of Section 12(b). It cautions against treating the absence of possession, enjoyment or an immediately quantified share as conclusive proof that no proprietary interest exists.

It does not, however, establish that every fluctuating interest is vested. In the gift and settlement cases, the terms of the instrument supplied the basis for identifying the interest created. A Mitakshara coparcenary interest arises under a different body of law and is subject to the distinctive incidents of coparcenary ownership. The question whether such an interest qualifies under Section 12(b) must therefore be answered by construing that proviso in its own context.

V. The Contextual Meaning of “Vested”: Usha Subbarao, Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat and MGB Grameena Bank

The word “vested” does not invariably carry one inflexible meaning in every enactment. Its content depends on the statutory setting, the nature of the right in question and the legal consequences attached to the expression.

In Usha Subbarao v. B.E. Vishveswariah, (1996) 5 SCC 201, the Supreme Court considered testamentary dispositions and the distinction between vested and contingent interests. The decision illustrates the need to determine whether the beneficiary’s right has already arisen or whether its creation depends upon an uncertain future event. It supports the distinction between a present right to future enjoyment and a mere expectancy of acquiring a right.

In Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatarama Deekshithulu, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 228, the Supreme Court recognised that the word “vest” is capable of different meanings according to the context in which it is employed. The expression must be construed in relation to the statutory purpose and the nature of the interest under consideration.

This contextual approach is important, but it does not permit a court to disregard the legal incidents of the particular property right. The meaning of “vested” cannot be determined solely by selecting a broad dictionary definition.

The Telangana Full Bench also considered MGB Grameena Bank v. Chakrawarti Singh, (2014) 13 SCC 583, in examining the meaning of vested rights. That decision describes vesting in terms of a right which has accrued or become settled in a person, distinguishing it from a mere expectancy or contingent interest.

The interpretive question arising from these authorities is whether an interest can be presently attributable to a particular coparcener even though its ultimate quantum remains capable of variation. One view treats the absence of a fixed share as indicating that the interest has not attained the requisite certainty. The alternative inquiry is whether the law recognises a present proprietary interest by birth, notwithstanding that its extent is not yet fixed.

The distinction is not merely verbal. It requires the court to identify precisely what is said to have vested: a definite share in a particular asset, an undivided proprietary interest in the coparcenary estate, or only an expectation of receiving property in the future.

VI. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956: Sections 6 and 8 and the Source of the Right

Sections 6 and 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (“the HSA”), are relevant to the present inquiry because they help distinguish an interest arising under Mitakshara coparcenary law from property devolving by statutory intestate succession.

They do not independently define “vested” for Section 12(b) of the HAMA. Their relevance is to the identification of the source and timing of a proprietary right.

A. Section 6: Interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property

Section 6, as amended in 2005, governs devolution of interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property and recognises daughters as coparceners by birth, with rights and liabilities corresponding to those of sons, subject to the statutory provisions.

Section 6(3) provides a mechanism for determining the interest of a deceased coparcener where the statutory conditions for its operation are satisfied. The deceased coparcener’s interest is ascertained by reference to a notional partition immediately before death and devolves by testamentary or intestate succession, as applicable, rather than by survivorship.

The significance of Section 6 for the present article is twofold. First, the statute recognises the continuing legal category of Mitakshara coparcenary property. Secondly, it distinguishes the coparcenary interest existing before death from the share ascertained for purposes of devolution upon death.

That distinction requires care. Section 6 does not establish that every undivided coparcenary interest is vested within the meaning of Section 12(b) of the HAMA. Nor does the notional-partition mechanism under Section 6(3) mean that an actual partition must occur before any coparcenary interest can exist. It is a statutory mechanism for determining the deceased coparcener’s interest for succession purposes.

The relevance to adoption is therefore analytical. Where a child asserts a right arising by birth in coparcenary property, the court must identify the legal incidents of that right before deciding whether it satisfies the language of Section 12(b).

B. Section 8: Intestate succession to the property of a male Hindu

Section 8 prescribes the general rules of intestate succession to the property of a male Hindu dying after the commencement of the HSA. It operates with the statutory scheme governing the order of succession and the distribution of the estate among the heirs.

The Supreme Court’s decisions in Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Chander Sen, (1986) 3 SCC 567, and Yudhishter v. Ashok Kumar, (1987) 1 SCC 204, establish that property inherited by a son from his father under Section 8 does not, merely by reason of that inheritance, necessarily become coparcenary property in the hands of the son vis-à-vis his own descendants. The legal character of the property depends upon the statutory mode of devolution and the circumstances in which it is held.

The distinction between Sections 6 and 8 is consequently material. Section 6 deals with devolution of an interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property; Section 8 governs intestate succession to the property of a male Hindu within its statutory field. Property inherited under Section 8 must not automatically be treated as though it carries every incident of ancestral coparcenary property under classical Mitakshara law.

For Section 12(b) of the HAMA, the point of time at which succession opens is particularly important. The mere possibility that a child may inherit from a living parent or relative ordinarily constitutes an expectancy, not a presently vested inheritance. A person does not acquire a present right to a living person’s estate merely because that person would be a potential heir if succession were to open.

Where the owner dies before the adoption and succession opens in accordance with the applicable law, the legal position may be different. The heirs’ rights must then be identified under the governing succession provisions. If a proprietary interest has devolved upon the child before adoption, it is necessary to examine the protection afforded by proviso (b), or, where the issue concerns the estate of another person, proviso (c), as appropriate.

The provisions of the HSA therefore assist in identifying when a right arises and by what legal route it devolves. They do not justify treating a mere future expectation as vested property, nor do they independently settle the controversy concerning an undivided coparcenary interest under Section 12(b).

C. The consequence where no ancestral coparcenary property exists

A further distinction is essential. If the natural family holds no Mitakshara coparcenary property in which the child has acquired an interest by birth, the child cannot claim a coparcenary interest in a nonexistent estate. Nor does the fact of birth in a family, by itself, confer a vested proprietary interest in every item of property which a living parent or relative may own.

If the natural parent or relative holds separate property and remains alive at the time of adoption, the child’s expectation of succeeding to that property in the future is ordinarily no more than an expectancy of inheritance. It is not property which has already devolved upon the child. The result may differ where, before adoption, the child has acquired property through an actual transfer, a completed gift, a valid bequest that has taken effect, an earlier succession, or another legally effective source of proprietary rights.

The controlling inquiry is not whether the child might eventually inherit, but whether a present proprietary right had arisen before adoption. The source, timing and legal incidents of the right must be established.

VII. The General Clauses Act, 1897: A Limited Interpretive Role

The General Clauses Act, 1897, supplies general rules of statutory interpretation and definitions for the purposes specified in that enactment. It does not, however, furnish a universal definition of “vested property” that automatically determines the meaning of proviso (b) to Section 12 of the HAMA.

Section 6 of the General Clauses Act concerns the effect of repeal, unless a different intention appears. It preserves specified consequences of the repealed enactment, including rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities acquired, accrued or incurred under it. Its immediate operation is directed to the consequences of repeal; it is not a provision governing the effects of adoption under the HAMA.

The language of Section 6 may be relevant by analogy to the broader statutory principle that accrued rights are not ordinarily treated as though they had never existed merely because the legal framework changes. But that analogy must not be converted into a direct rule of construction controlling Section 12(b).

The proper approach is therefore restrained. The General Clauses Act may provide contextual assistance in understanding the legal significance of accrued rights where the analogy is justified. It cannot supply a conclusive answer to whether an undivided Mitakshara coparcenary interest is “property which vested” under the HAMA.

The meaning must ultimately be derived from the language, scheme and purpose of Section 12, considered in the light of the legal character of the interest asserted.

VIII. The Mitakshara Coparcenary Interest: Existence, Fluctuation and Ascertainment

Under Mitakshara law, a coparcener acquires an interest in coparcenary property by birth. The coparcenary is characterised by community of interest and unity of ownership. Before partition, a coparcener ordinarily cannot claim exclusive ownership of a specific item of coparcenary property or insist that a particular fractional share has already been demarcated.

The Supreme Court explained the incidents of coparcenary ownership in State Bank of India v. Ghamandi Ram, (1969) 3 SCC 681. The interest of a coparcener is not equivalent to an independently demarcated share in every item of the joint estate. The quantum may change with the birth or death of coparceners and other legally relevant events. In Rohit Chauhan v. Surinder Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 419, the Court likewise addressed the nature of an undivided coparcenary interest and the circumstances in which a share becomes ascertainable.

These principles are central to the controversy, but they must be stated with precision. The following propositions are distinct:

1. A person may acquire a coparcenary interest by birth.

2. The interest may remain undivided while the coparcenary continues.

3. Its quantum may fluctuate in accordance with the legal incidents of coparcenary ownership.

4. Partition may ascertain the share and, where partition by metes and bounds occurs, allot specific property.

5. Whether that undivided interest qualifies as “property which vested” under Section 12(b) is a separate question of statutory construction.

The distinction between existence and ascertainment is the central issue proposed for examination. Partition undoubtedly performs an important function in defining and separating interests. The further question is whether, for the purposes of Section 12(b), partition must be regarded as the event that first creates the proprietary interest, or whether it merely defines an interest already recognised by law.

The answer cannot be supplied by Section 19 of the TPA alone. It requires an examination of the incidents of Mitakshara ownership and the specific statutory consequence which Section 12 attaches to adoption.

The Full Bench considered that an undivided, fluctuating coparcenary interest did not meet the statutory requirement of vested property. The alternative interpretive argument explored here is that the absence of a fixed quantum should not, without further analysis, be treated as conclusive proof that no proprietary interest existed. That argument must be evaluated against the Full Bench’s reasoning and the governing authorities.

IX. The Telangana Full Bench: Anumolu Nageswara Rao v. A.V.R.L. Narasimha Rao

In Anumolu Nageswara Rao v. A.V.R.L. Narasimha Rao, LPA No. 204 of 2001, decided on 27 June 2023, a Full Bench of the Telangana High Court considered whether an undivided interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property continues to vest in a child after adoption by virtue of proviso (b) to Section 12 of the HAMA.

The Full Bench examined the statutory scheme, the legal incidents of coparcenary ownership and the conflicting judicial approaches, including Yarlagadda Nayudamma v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1981 AP 19, and the contrary reasoning reflected in decisions such as Santosh Kumar Jalan alias Kanhaya Lal Jalan v. Chandra Kishore Jalan, 2000 SCC OnLine Pat 721; AIR 2001 Pat 125.

The Full Bench rejected the broader approach adopted in Yarlagadda Nayudamma. It reasoned that a coparcener’s interest, though acquired by birth, remains unspecified and fluctuates with changes in the coparcenary. In its view, the interest becomes crystallised into a definite share upon partition; an unspecified coparcenary interest does not constitute “property which vested” within the meaning of proviso (b).

The Full Bench thus drew a distinction between property already vested in the child in an individually identifiable sense—such as property acquired through inheritance, bequest, transfer or partition—and an undivided coparcenary interest whose quantum remains subject to fluctuation.

The judgment also considered authorities addressing the contextual meaning of “vested”, including Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatarama Deekshithulu and MGB Grameena Bank v. Chakrawarti Singh. It is therefore not accurate to suggest that the Full Bench approached the word without reference to the wider jurisprudence of vesting.

The Full Bench’s conclusion is the governing position in Telangana on the question it decided, unless and until it is displaced or distinguished by a competent superior court or otherwise modified by a binding subsequent authority. Any article advancing a different interpretation must state that legal position candidly.

The purpose of the present analysis is not to disregard the Full Bench’s reasoning. It is to examine whether the distinction between an existing but unascertained interest and an interest that has not vested at all is sufficiently resolved by treating partition as the point at which the share becomes definite.

X. What the Authorities Establish—and What They Do Not

The authorities considered above perform different functions and must not be treated as though they decide one identical question.

First, Section 19 of the TPA and the gift-deed and settlement-deed decisions—including Namburi Basava Subrahmanyam, K. Balakrishnan, P.K. Mohan Ram and Renikuntla Rajamma—illustrate that vesting may be distinct from possession and enjoyment. They establish no automatic rule that a Mitakshara coparcenary interest is protected by Section 12(b).

Secondly, Usha Subbarao, Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat and MGB Grameena Bank demonstrate the importance of identifying the legal character of the right and interpreting “vested” in its statutory context. The word cannot be construed in isolation from the interest to which it is applied.

Thirdly, Sections 6 and 8 of the HSA help identify the source and timing of proprietary rights. Section 6 addresses interests in Mitakshara coparcenary property, while Section 8 governs intestate succession within its statutory field. Neither provision supplies an independent definition of “vested” for Section 12(b).

Fourthly, the General Clauses Act does not provide a universal definition of vested property or directly govern the consequences of adoption. Section 6, dealing with the effect of repeal, may offer a limited analogy concerning accrued rights but cannot control the present question.

Finally, the Telangana Full Bench directly decided the issue of the undivided coparcenary interest under Section 12(b) and rejected the broader approach in Yarlagadda Nayudamma. That direct holding must be distinguished from the supportive principles derived from other statutory and doctrinal contexts.

The distinction is essential to a sound legal argument. An authority may supply a principle relevant to interpretation without having decided the precise statutory issue before the court. The force of the proposed argument lies in the disciplined application of those principles, not in attributing to them a ratio they do not contain.

XI. A Proposed Interpretive Framework for “Property Which Vested”

For the purposes of analysing proviso (b) to Section 12, the expression “property which vested in the adopted child before the adoption” may be examined through the following questions.

1. What is the source of the alleged right?

The claimant must identify whether the right arose by birth in coparcenary property, inheritance, gift, settlement, bequest, transfer, partition or another legally recognised source. A mere expectation of receiving property in the future must be distinguished from a right already created or accrued.

2. Had the relevant event occurred before adoption?

Where the claim is based on inheritance, it is necessary to determine whether succession had opened before adoption and whether the applicable law had vested a proprietary interest in the child. The possibility of inheriting from a living owner is ordinarily an expectancy and does not, without more, constitute vested property.

3. Did the law recognise a present proprietary interest?

The inquiry must identify the right that existed immediately before adoption. It should not assume that the absence of physical possession, exclusive enjoyment or a quantified share necessarily means that no proprietary interest existed.

4. Is the uncertainty about the extent of the right, or about its very existence?

This is the central distinction. A presently existing interest may have an extent that remains to be ascertained. Conversely, a person may have no present proprietary interest at all because the right depends upon a future event that has not occurred. The two situations must not be conflated.

5. What legal effect does Section 12 attach to that interest?

Even where a present interest is established, the court must determine whether it falls within the statutory expression in proviso (b), having regard to the main provision, the purpose of the proviso, the legal incidents of the relevant property and binding judicial authority.

This framework does not predetermine the answer in favour of either position. It identifies the questions that must be answered before the conclusion can properly be reached.

For an undivided Mitakshara coparcenary interest, the fifth question remains subject to the Full Bench’s decision in Telangana. The proposed framework is intended to make the underlying statutory issue clearer, not to represent that the contrary view is already the governing law in that jurisdiction.

XII. Conclusion: The Meaning of Vesting Must Follow the Nature of the Right

Section 12(b) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, protects property which vested in the adopted child before adoption. The provision does not expressly define “vested”, and its application requires the court to identify the nature, source and timing of the proprietary interest asserted.

Section 19 of the Transfer of Property Act and the Supreme Court’s decisions concerning gift deeds and settlement deeds demonstrate that vesting is not invariably synonymous with immediate possession or enjoyment. Namburi Basava Subrahmanyam, K. Balakrishnan, P.K. Mohan Ram and Renikuntla Rajamma illustrate why the creation of a present interest must be distinguished from the postponement of its enjoyment. Usha Subbarao, Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat and MGB Grameena Bank reinforce the need to interpret the expression “vested” in its proper legal and statutory setting.

Sections 6 and 8 of the Hindu Succession Act assist in distinguishing coparcenary interests from property devolving by intestate succession. They also underscore the importance of identifying when succession opens and when a proprietary right arises. The General Clauses Act provides no universal definition that resolves the issue; its provisions must be used only within their proper statutory scope.

The decisive distinction is between a present proprietary interest whose extent remains unascertained and a mere expectancy of acquiring property in the future. A child who has no proprietary interest in ancestral coparcenary property cannot claim one merely because of birth in the family. Nor does a potential right to inherit the separate property of a living relative ordinarily constitute vested property. Where, however, an interest is asserted to have arisen by birth or through another legally effective source, its nature must be examined before the conclusion is reached that it never vested.

The Telangana High Court Full Bench in Anumolu Nageswara Rao v. A.V.R.L. Narasimha Rao has held that an undivided, fluctuating Mitakshara coparcenary interest does not qualify as vested property under proviso (b). That holding must be acknowledged and applied as the governing position in Telangana. The interpretive question examined in this article is whether the distinction between ascertainment of a share and the existence of a proprietary interest warrants further consideration in the appropriate appellate forum.

The argument advanced is therefore a limited one. Vesting should be determined by the legal nature and source of the right, rather than by treating possession, enjoyment or ascertainment as interchangeable concepts. Whether an undivided coparcenary interest satisfies Section 12(b) remains a distinct question that must be resolved within the statutory framework of adoption law and the binding authorities governing that issue.

advocatemmmohan

ADOPTION AND THE UNDIVIDED MITAKSHARA COPARCENARY INTEREST: DOES SECTION 12, PROVISO (b), OF THE HINDU ADOPTIONS AND MAINTENANCE ACT, 1956, PRESERVE A RIGHT ACQUIRED BY BIRTH?

By M. Murali Mohan

Abstract

The legal consequences of adoption under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, raise a substantial question of property law: where a person acquires an undivided interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property by birth and is subsequently given in adoption to another family, does that interest survive by virtue of Section 12, proviso (b), of the Act? Or does the principal provision of Section 12, which severs the adoptee’s ties with the family of birth, extinguish the interest because no specific share has been allotted by partition?

The Andhra Pradesh High Court answered the question in favour of preservation in Yarlagadda Nayudamma v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1981 AP 19. The contrary view was adopted by the Patna High Court in Santosh Kumar Jalan alias Kanhaya Lal Jalan v. Chandra Kishore Jalan, AIR 2001 Pat 125, and subsequently by the Full Bench of the Telangana High Court in Anumolu Nageswara Rao v. A.V.R.L. Narasimha Rao, LPA No. 204 of 2001, decided on 27 June 2023.

The controversy turns on the meaning of the word “vested”, the distinction between an existing proprietary interest and a quantified share, and the proper relationship between the principal provision of Section 12 and its proviso (b). This article examines the competing constructions, identifies the interpretative difficulty in the restrictive approach, and argues that the statutory protection deserves to be understood in a manner that distinguishes the extinction of family status from the preservation of an independently vested proprietary interest.

Keywords: Hindu adoption; Section 12(b); Mitakshara coparcenary; vested interest; adoption and property rights; Yarlagadda Nayudamma; Anumolu Nageswara Rao.

I. The question that refuses to disappear

Adoption under Hindu law is not merely a change in the social identity of a child. It carries legal consequences concerning status, family relationships, inheritance and property. Parliament, while enacting the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, recognised the transfer of the adoptee from the family of birth to the adoptive family. Yet Parliament also introduced express qualifications to the consequences of that transfer.

The controversy arises when a child who is already a coparcener in a Mitakshara joint Hindu family is adopted into another family before a partition of the coparcenary property. The adoptee’s interest is not ordinarily represented by a specific parcel of land or a permanently fixed fraction. It is an undivided interest in property held jointly by the coparcenary, capable of variation according to the applicable law.

The restrictive view proceeds on the footing that, because the adoptee’s share has not crystallised into a specific allotment, no property has vested in the adoptee within the meaning of proviso (b). The consequence is that adoption extinguishes the adoptee’s coparcenary interest in the natural family, although the adoptee acquires corresponding rights in the adoptive family.

The contrary view begins with a different premise: the absence of a quantified share does not necessarily mean the absence of a vested proprietary interest. If the interest arises by birth, and the statute protects property vested before adoption, the central question is whether the legislature intended to preserve only property held separately or also an undivided proprietary interest recognised by Mitakshara law.

The issue is therefore not whether adoption changes the adoptee’s family status. The issue is whether that change, by itself, extinguishes an existing proprietary interest which the statute may have intended to preserve.

II. The statutory text must remain the starting point

Section 12 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, provides:

“An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family.”

The provision is followed by three provisos. Proviso (b), which is central to this controversy, states:

“any property which vested in the adopted child before the adoption shall continue to vest in such person subject to the obligations, if any, attaching to the ownership of such property, including the obligation to maintain relatives in the family of his or her birth”.

The language contains two distinct legislative commands. The principal provision prescribes the legal consequences of adoption for family status and relationships. Proviso (b) expressly protects property which vested in the adoptee before adoption, while preserving obligations attached to its ownership.

The word “any” is broad. The expression “property which vested” must, however, be interpreted in its statutory and legal context. The real dispute is whether a Mitakshara coparcener’s undivided interest falls within that expression even though the precise share remains liable to fluctuation.

A construction which treats the principal provision as conclusive without giving independent effect to proviso (b) risks reducing the statutory exception to a narrow category of separately held property. Conversely, a construction which treats every incident of birth in the natural family as permanently preserved would risk undermining the statutory transfer of family status.

The proper interpretation must give effect to both parts of the provision without allowing either to defeat the other.

III. The legal nature of an undivided coparcenary interest

The difficulty cannot be resolved merely by stating that a coparcener has no definite share before partition. That proposition describes an important feature of Mitakshara law, but it does not, by itself, answer the separate question whether the coparcener possesses a legally recognised interest in the property.

A coparcenary is characterised by unity of ownership and joint possession. While the family remains undivided, no coparcener can ordinarily identify a particular portion of the property as exclusively belonging to that coparcener. The interest may increase or decrease with changes in the coparcenary. Partition ordinarily defines the share and enables separate enjoyment.

Three concepts must therefore be kept distinct:

1. The existence of an interest: whether the law recognises a proprietary interest in the coparcenary property.

2. The quantification of that interest: whether the precise fraction or allotment has been determined.

3. Separate enjoyment: whether the property has been divided and allotted so that the person may enjoy it independently.

These concepts are related, but they are not identical. The fact that an interest is fluctuating does not necessarily mean that no interest exists. Equally, the existence of an interest does not mean that a coparcener owns a specified parcel of property to the exclusion of the other coparceners.

The decisive interpretative question is whether Parliament used “vested” to require exclusive ownership of identified property, or whether the expression can encompass an existing undivided proprietary interest whose extent remains subject to the incidents of coparcenary law.

That is the precise point at which the two judicial approaches diverge.

IV. The affirmative approach: Yarlagadda Nayudamma

In Yarlagadda Nayudamma v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1981 AP 19, the Andhra Pradesh High Court considered whether a Mitakshara coparcener’s undivided interest in the property of the natural family continued after adoption under proviso (b) to Section 12.

The Court accepted that a coparcener acquires an interest in coparcenary property by birth. The absence of a defined share before partition did not, in its view, justify treating that interest as legally nonexistent. The interest could be recognised as vested even though its precise extent would be determined only when partition took place.

The reasoning gives substantive effect to the statutory expression “any property which vested”. It does not confine the protection to property acquired by inheritance, partition, gift or self-acquisition. Instead, it recognises that the right acquired by birth under Mitakshara law may itself constitute a proprietary interest within the protection of proviso (b).

This approach has an important doctrinal strength. It distinguishes the existence of a right from the later determination of its precise extent. A right may be legally recognised even when its ultimate monetary or physical value has not yet been calculated.

The approach also gives significance to the legislature’s decision to qualify the general severance rule by expressly preserving property vested before adoption. If the relevant interest existed immediately before adoption, the question becomes whether the statutory language is sufficiently broad to preserve it notwithstanding the change in family status.

The Yarlagadda Nayudamma approach answers that question affirmatively. Its reasoning rests on the legal character of the coparcener’s pre-existing interest, rather than on the existence of a completed partition.

The judgment is reported as Yarlagadda Nayudamma v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1981 AP 19; (1980) 2 Andh WR 327. The reasoning is also reproduced and examined in the later Full Bench judgment of the Telangana High Court in Anumolu Nageswara Rao.

V. The restrictive approach: Santosh Kumar Jalan

The Patna High Court adopted the contrary view in Santosh Kumar Jalan alias Kanhaya Lal Jalan v. Chandra Kishore Jalan, AIR 2001 Pat 125.

The central distinction drawn in that decision is between an undivided right of joint possession and enjoyment and property which has already vested in the adoptee to the exclusion of others. While a coparcener has a right to seek partition and participates in the enjoyment of the joint family property, the exact share remains uncertain until the coparcenary status is disrupted and partition takes place.

On that reasoning, proviso (b) protects property which has already become the adoptee’s separate property through a legally recognised event, such as partition, inheritance, bequest or transfer. It does not preserve the undivided coparcenary interest acquired by birth.

The argument has considerable force if “property which vested” is understood to mean an identifiable estate held by the adoptee independently of the other coparceners. It also draws support from the principal provision of Section 12: the adoptee is transferred into the adoptive family, and the statutory severance would be impaired if the adoptee retained all the incidents of coparcenary membership in the natural family.

But the restrictive interpretation raises a further question. Does the fact that the extent of a right fluctuates mean that the right itself is not vested? A fluctuating interest and a non-existent interest are not necessarily the same thing. The conclusion that the interest is not protected therefore depends on a particular understanding of the statutory word “vested”; it does not follow merely from the absence of partition.

The distinction between a vested interest and a crystallised share must be confronted directly rather than assumed away.

VI. Sawan Ram and Vasant: what the Supreme Court decisions do—and do not—decide

The Supreme Court’s decision in Sawan Ram v. Kala Wanti, AIR 1967 SC 1761; (1967) 3 SCR 687, explains the legal effect of adoption, including the transfer of the adoptee into the adoptive family and the severance of ties with the family of birth. The Court also examined the statutory protection of rights which had already vested before adoption.

That decision is important to the general legal framework. It must not, however, be treated as a direct determination of whether an adoptee’s own undivided Mitakshara coparcenary interest survives under proviso (b). Its discussion of severance and vested rights does not eliminate the need to interpret the particular words of proviso (b) in the context of the disputed undivided interest.

Likewise, Vasant v. Dattu, AIR 1987 SC 398, considered proviso (c) to Section 12. That proviso protects another person from being divested of an estate which had vested in that person before adoption. The Supreme Court explained that the introduction of a member into a joint family by birth or adoption may affect the shares of other members without necessarily constituting a divestment of an estate already vested in a particular person.

The Telangana Full Bench relied on the reasoning in Vasant when considering the consequences of adoption for the natural coparcenary. But provisos (b) and (c) protect different interests: proviso (b) concerns property vested in the adoptee; proviso (c) concerns an estate vested in another person.

The distinction matters. A judgment interpreting proviso (c) may illuminate the statutory scheme, but it should not be treated as if it directly resolved the scope of proviso (b). The latter question requires its own analysis of the nature of the adoptee’s interest and the language chosen by Parliament.

VII. The Full Bench decision: Anumolu Nageswara Rao

The controversy received an authoritative pronouncement from a Full Bench of the Telangana High Court in Anumolu Nageswara Rao v. A.V.R.L. Narasimha Rao, LPA No. 204 of 2001, decided on 27 June 2023.

The reference specifically asked whether a coparcener’s undivided interest continued to vest in that person after adoption by virtue of proviso (b). The Full Bench answered the question in the negative.

The Court held that, although a Mitakshara coparcener acquires an interest in the joint family property by birth, the interest remains unspecified and fluctuating. In the Court’s view, the property becomes vested in the sense contemplated by proviso (b) only when the share has crystallised through partition or where property is otherwise held by the adoptee in a legally distinct form.

The Full Bench concluded that, on adoption, the child ceases to be a coparcener of the family of birth and relinquishes the undivided interest in its ancestral property. It held that the adoptee carries property into the adoptive family where, before adoption, a share had been allotted on partition or property had been acquired through self-acquisition, will, inheritance or another recognised source. The Court expressly disagreed with the contrary opinions, including Yarlagadda Nayudamma, and agreed with the reasoning in Santosh Kumar Jalan.

The judgment is available at Anumolu Nageswara Rao v. A.V.R.L. Narasimha Rao, Telangana High Court, 27 June 2023.

The ruling is therefore not a minor disagreement over terminology. It adopts a restrictive construction of proviso (b) and rejects the proposition that the undivided coparcenary interest is preserved merely because it arose by birth before adoption.

Its precedential position must be stated accurately. The Full Bench decision is authoritative for courts bound by the Telangana High Court. Its existence does not, by itself, establish that the same ruling binds every court in India, or that the competing interpretation in Yarlagadda Nayudamma has been erased from the legal history of the issue. The applicable precedent in a particular proceeding must be determined with reference to territorial jurisdiction, binding Supreme Court authority and the relevant hierarchy of courts.

VIII. Why the restrictive construction deserves reconsideration

With respect, the restrictive construction raises a legitimate question of statutory interpretation: whether the absence of a quantified share is a sufficient reason to exclude an otherwise recognised proprietary interest from the protection of proviso (b).

1. A fluctuating interest is not necessarily a non-existent interest

The proposition that a coparcener cannot specify the exact fraction of the joint family property before partition is well established. But the proposition does not, without more, establish that the coparcener has no proprietary interest before partition.

A right to joint possession, a right to seek partition, and a right to challenge legally impermissible dealings with coparcenary property are manifestations of a legally recognised interest. The fact that the final extent of the interest may change does not necessarily answer whether the interest itself is protected by the statutory expression “any property which vested”.

The question is not whether the adoptee possessed exclusive ownership of a specified parcel. It is whether the law recognised a proprietary interest in the coparcenary property immediately before adoption.

The distinction deserves independent consideration.

2. The statute protects property, not merely a completed allotment

Proviso (b) does not expressly state that the property must have been partitioned, separately possessed or reduced to a defined fraction. It refers to “any property which vested in the adopted child before the adoption”.

The restrictive construction treats the absence of partition as decisive. The affirmative construction treats the statutory language as capable of including an undivided interest which the applicable personal law recognises as having arisen by birth.

Neither conclusion follows from the word “vested” without interpretation. The issue is whether the context requires “vested” to mean a defined, exclusive estate or whether it can include a presently existing proprietary interest whose extent remains variable.

The affirmative construction has the advantage of confronting the nature of the right directly. It asks whether the adoptee’s interest was legally in existence before adoption, rather than equating the absence of a fixed share with the absence of a vested interest.

3. The principal provision and proviso (b) must be read together

The principal provision of Section 12 establishes the general consequences of adoption. Proviso (b) qualifies those consequences by preserving certain property rights.

A proviso cannot ordinarily be interpreted in isolation from the provision to which it is attached. Equally, the principal provision should not be read so expansively that the express statutory exception loses its intended effect.

The proper inquiry is therefore not whether adoption generally severs the adoptee’s ties with the natural family. It does. The inquiry is whether Parliament intended that general rule to extinguish every undivided proprietary interest, notwithstanding the specific protection for property vested before adoption.

The affirmative construction does not require the adoptee to remain a member of the natural family for every legal purpose. It requires only that family status and the preservation of a pre-existing property interest be treated as distinct legal questions where the statutory language permits that distinction.

4. Preservation of property need not mean continuation of family membership

A central concern underlying the restrictive approach is that the adoptee cannot simultaneously remain a coparcener in the natural family and become a coparcener in the adoptive family.

That concern is understandable, but it should not be allowed to answer the statutory question by itself. Proviso (b) expressly contemplates the continued vesting of property in a person whose family ties have been severed by adoption. The legislature has therefore recognised that adoption and the preservation of certain property rights can coexist.

The real issue is the extent of that preservation. If the statutory protection includes an undivided interest, the preservation of the interest does not necessarily mean that the adoptee retains all personal or status-based rights in the natural family. It means that the property consequence of adoption is limited by the statutory exception.

The scope of that exception must be determined from the language and scheme of the Act, rather than from a general assumption that all consequences of family severance must be absolute.

5. The phrase “subject to the obligations” deserves attention

Proviso (b) states that the property continues to vest subject to obligations attached to its ownership, including the obligation to maintain relatives in the family of birth.

This language demonstrates that the legislature contemplated a continuing legal connection between the adoptee and the natural family in relation to preserved property. It is not conclusive proof that an undivided coparcenary interest is protected. It does, however, support the proposition that the severance contemplated by the main provision is subject to the qualifications expressly enacted by Parliament.

The question should therefore be approached through a complete reading of Section 12, rather than through the principal provision alone.

IX. The counterargument: the statutory transfer must have practical effect

A fair analysis must recognise the strength of the opposing position.

The principal provision of Section 12 is not merely declaratory of a change in nomenclature. It transfers the adoptee into the adoptive family and replaces the legal ties of the family of birth with those of the adoptive family. If the adoptee’s interest in the natural coparcenary continued unchanged in every respect, the statutory consequences of adoption could be substantially diminished.

The restrictive approach also relies on the traditional character of Mitakshara coparcenary property: the property belongs to the body of coparceners, the interest of each member fluctuates, and the precise share becomes defined on partition. From that premise, the Full Bench concluded that the interest does not constitute “property which vested” within the meaning of proviso (b).

This argument cannot be dismissed merely by repeating that a coparcener acquires an interest by birth. The affirmative approach must establish why that interest falls within the statutory protection despite its fluctuating character.

Nevertheless, the restrictive approach also bears a burden of reasoning. It must explain why the absence of a fixed share is decisive under proviso (b), rather than simply relevant to the extent and enjoyment of the interest. It must also demonstrate that the statutory expression “any property” excludes an undivided proprietary interest, although the proviso does not expressly confine itself to separately allotted property.

The controversy is thus one of statutory construction, not a dispute that can be resolved solely by invoking the general doctrine of severance on adoption.

X. The proper place of Yarlagadda Nayudamma in the debate

The decision in Yarlagadda Nayudamma remains important because it squarely addressed the issue that the later Full Bench was asked to reconsider. It recognised the undivided interest as a right acquired by birth and interpreted proviso (b) as preserving that interest after adoption.

The Full Bench in Anumolu Nageswara Rao did not overlook Yarlagadda Nayudamma. It considered the decision, disagreed with its interpretation and adopted the contrary view. The disagreement must therefore be presented honestly: it is not a case in which the earlier judgment was simply missed or left unconsidered.

The significance of Yarlagadda Nayudamma lies in the alternative method of reasoning it offers. It insists that the legal existence of an interest and the later quantification of that interest are separate matters. It also gives substantive weight to the legislature’s use of the broad expression “any property which vested”.

Those propositions deserve careful consideration in any future judicial examination of the issue, subject always to the binding force of the applicable precedents. The decision cannot simply be applied as though the later Full Bench had never ruled; nor should its reasoning be treated as irrelevant merely because it was rejected by that Bench.

XI. A disciplined approach for courts and practitioners

In a case involving adoption and an alleged continuing interest in the natural coparcenary, the analysis should proceed in a structured manner.

First, establish the nature of the property. The court must determine whether the property is Mitakshara coparcenary property, separate property, self-acquired property, property inherited by the adoptee, or property already allotted on partition. These categories should not be conflated.

Secondly, identify the legal interest immediately before adoption. It is necessary to distinguish an undivided coparcenary interest from a specific share already allotted or an independent estate acquired by inheritance, will or another recognised mode.

Thirdly, identify the date and legal validity of adoption. The statutory consequences depend on a valid adoption and the law applicable to the relevant events. The factual and legal position immediately before adoption must be established.

Fourthly, apply Section 12 as a whole. The principal provision and each relevant proviso must be read together. The argument should address both the legal severance of family ties and the express protection of pre-existing property.

Fifthly, distinguish the authorities by the precise statutory question they decided. A decision concerning proviso (c) should not automatically be treated as conclusive on proviso (b). A case involving property already allotted on partition may not answer the question concerning an undivided interest. A decision concerning a sole surviving coparcener may likewise involve a materially different proprietary position.

Sixthly, ascertain the binding precedent applicable to the forum. The Full Bench decision in Anumolu Nageswara Rao must be addressed in proceedings before courts bound by the Telangana High Court. Where a different territorial or precedential setting applies, the court must identify the relevant hierarchy and determine the effect of the competing authorities.

This approach will prevent the issue from being reduced to general statements about adoption, severance or fluctuating shares. It directs attention to the precise legal character of the property and the statutory question that must be decided.

XII. Conclusion: the real controversy is the meaning of “vested”

The dispute under Section 12, proviso (b), is not simply about whether adoption severs the adoptee’s ties with the natural family. The principal provision answers that question. The controversy is whether the statutory protection of property vested before adoption extends to an undivided Mitakshara coparcenary interest acquired by birth.

The affirmative approach in Yarlagadda Nayudamma treats the existence of a proprietary interest as distinct from the later crystallisation of a share. The restrictive approach in Santosh Kumar Jalan, subsequently accepted by the Telangana Full Bench in Anumolu Nageswara Rao, treats the absence of a defined share before partition as a reason to exclude the undivided interest from proviso (b).

The restrictive interpretation has the force of preserving the practical consequences of adoption. But it must be examined against the actual words of the proviso, which protect “any property” vested before adoption and do not expressly require prior partition. The affirmative interpretation, in turn, must account for the statutory severance of family status and demonstrate why the continued protection of the interest is consistent with that severance.

The soundest analysis keeps the legal questions separate: the adoptee’s status after adoption, the existence of the pre-adoption proprietary interest, the extent to which that interest is protected by proviso (b), and the binding force of the relevant precedents.

The issue remains doctrinally significant because it concerns the relationship between a general statutory rule and an express exception. A court addressing the controversy should not assume that a fluctuating interest is necessarily a non-existent or unvested interest; equally, it should not assume that every right arising by birth survives adoption merely because it existed before adoption. The conclusion must follow from a reasoned interpretation of Section 12 and the legal nature of the interest in question.

The enduring question is this: when Parliament expressly preserves property vested before adoption, should the protection depend on whether the interest has already been quantified, or on whether the law recognised the proprietary interest before adoption? That is the question at the heart of this controversy, and it is the question that any definitive reconsideration must answer.

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Authorities referred to

1. Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, Section 12, particularly provisos (b) and (c).

2. Yarlagadda Nayudamma v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1981 AP 19; (1980) 2 Andh WR 327.

3. Sawan Ram v. Kala Wanti, AIR 1967 SC 1761; (1967) 3 SCR 687.

4. Vasant v. Dattu, AIR 1987 SC 398.

5. Santosh Kumar Jalan alias Kanhaya Lal Jalan v. Chandra Kishore Jalan, AIR 2001 Pat 125.

6. Anumolu Nageswara Rao v. A.V.R.L. Narasimha Rao, LPA No. 204 of 2001, Telangana High Court, decided 27 June 2023.