Wednesday, February 25, 2026

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 110 — Presumption as to ownership from possession — Scope and limitations. Section 110 embodies the principle that possession furnishes prima facie proof of ownership, but the presumption is rebuttable and applies only when possession is prima facie lawful and the contesting party has no title. It cannot substitute proof of title in a declaratory suit. Reliance was placed on Chief Conservator of Forests v. Collector, State of A.P. v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Co., Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala and Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh. (Paras 38–47) Where revenue records stood in the name of the Endowment/Mutt and plaintiffs failed to prove ancestral title, presumption under Section 110 could not be invoked. (D) Pleadings — Alleged admission — Plea of ignorance not admission of title. Pleadings must be read as a whole. A statement by the defendant that he was “not aware” regarding issuance of pattadar passbooks did not amount to admission of ownership. There was clear and categorical denial of plaintiffs’ title. (Paras 34–36) Held, burden of proof was not discharged by relying on alleged admissions.



(A) Suit for Declaration of Title — Burden of Proof — Plaintiff must succeed on strength of own title — Weakness of defence immaterial.

In a suit for declaration of title, the burden always lies on the plaintiff to establish a clear and cogent title. The plaintiff cannot succeed merely because the defendant’s case is weak or defective. The plaintiff must prove his own title independently by legally admissible evidence. Reliance was placed on Union of India v. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. and Jagdish Prasad Patel v. Shivnath. (Paras 21–25, 54)

Held, the plaintiffs failed to prove title of their ancestors and therefore the suit was rightly dismissed.


(B) Revenue Records — Mutation Entries — Pattadar Passbooks — Cist Receipts — Not proof of title.

Revenue entries, pattadar passbooks, adangals and mutation records are maintained for fiscal purposes and do not confer ownership. They may at best raise a presumption regarding possession but cannot form the foundation for declaration of title. Reliance was placed on Nagar Palika v. Jagat Singh, Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner and Union of India v. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Ltd.. (Paras 48–53)

Held, Exs.A1 to A32 were insufficient to establish ownership.


(C) Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 110 — Presumption as to ownership from possession — Scope and limitations.

Section 110 embodies the principle that possession furnishes prima facie proof of ownership, but the presumption is rebuttable and applies only when possession is prima facie lawful and the contesting party has no title. It cannot substitute proof of title in a declaratory suit. Reliance was placed on Chief Conservator of Forests v. Collector, State of A.P. v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Co., Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala and Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh. (Paras 38–47)

Where revenue records stood in the name of the Endowment/Mutt and plaintiffs failed to prove ancestral title, presumption under Section 110 could not be invoked.


(D) Pleadings — Alleged admission — Plea of ignorance not admission of title.

Pleadings must be read as a whole. A statement by the defendant that he was “not aware” regarding issuance of pattadar passbooks did not amount to admission of ownership. There was clear and categorical denial of plaintiffs’ title. (Paras 34–36)

Held, burden of proof was not discharged by relying on alleged admissions.


(E) Endowment Property — Similarity of surname — No proof of ancestral title.

Mere similarity between the plaintiffs’ surname “Matam” and the property recorded in the name of the Mutt does not establish ancestral ownership. Title must be proved by documentary evidence tracing succession. (Paras 30–33, 54)

Held, plaintiffs failed to establish linkage between alleged ancestor and suit property.


(F) Appellate Jurisdiction — No perversity in trial court findings — Appeal dismissed.

The trial court properly appreciated oral and documentary evidence. No error of fact or law was demonstrated warranting interference. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the suit. (Paras 54–56)


FINAL ORDER

The First Appeal was dismissed. No order as to costs. The judgment and decree dated 28-07-2011 were affirmed.




HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH* * * *
FIRST APPEAL No. 609 of 2011
Between:
Matam Ashok Kumar and another ….APPELLANTSAND
State of A.P. Rep. by its District Collector, Kurnool and another
.....RESPONDENTSDATE OF JUDGMENT RESERVED : 12.08.2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 07.01.2026
DATE OF JUDGMENT UPLOADED : 07.01.2026SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATHTILHARI
&
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAOKUNCHEAM1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments?
Yes/No
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
marked to Law Reporters/Journals
Yes/No
3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the
fair copy of the Judgment?
Yes/No _______________________RAVI NATHTILHARI, J__________________________MAHESWARA RAOKUNCHEAM, J2026:APHC:8340
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AS No.609 of 20112
* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATHTILHARI&
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAOKUNCHEAM+ FIRST APPEAL No. 609 of 2011
% 07.01.2026
Between:
Matam Ashok Kumar and another ….APPELLANTSAND
State of A.P. Rep. by its District Collector, Kurnool and another
.....RESPONDENTS! Counsel for the Appellants : Sri P. Veera Reddy, Senior Counsel
Assisted by Sri Krishnavamsi
Representing Ms. SodumAnveshaCounsel for Respondent No.1 : Sri Kata Sambasiva Rao, AGP
Counsel for Respondent No.2 : No representation
< Gist :
> Head Note:
? Cases Referred:
1. (2003) 3 SCC 472
2. (2014) 2 SCC 269
3. (2019) 6 SCC 82
4. (2020) 19 SCC 57
5. (2013) 9 SCC 319
6. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 630
7. (1995) 3 SCC 426
8. (2007) 6 SCC 186
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AS No.609 of 20113
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATHTILHARI
&
THE HON’BL SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAOKUNCHEAMFIRST APPEAL No. 609 of 2011
JUDGMENT: (per Hon’ble Sri Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari)
Heard Sri P. Veera Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, assisted bySri
Krishnavamsi, learned counsel, representing Ms. SodumAnvesha, learnedcounsel for the appellants and Sri Kata Sambasiva Rao, learned Assistant
Government Pleader appearing for the 1
st respondent. 2. No representation for the 2
nd respondent. 3. This Appeal has been filed by the appellants/plaintiffs in O.S.No.6of
2004 being aggrieved from the judgment and decree dated 28.07.2011 passedby the III Additional District Judge, Kurnool at Nandyal. The suit was filedagainst the defendants/respondents 1 and 2 for declaration of title andfor
permanent injunction in respect of the plaint schedule properties i.e., anextent
of 7.60 cents in Sy.No.248; extent of Ac.0.92 cents; and extent of Ac.5.15centsin Sy.No.691 of Aamuru village, Rudravaram Mandal and an extent of Ac.4.57cents in Sy.No.316 of Narasapuram village, Rudravaram Mandal. I. Facts:
i) Plaintiffs’ case:
4. The plaintiffs/appellants filed the suit with the averments that theyarethe brothers, living jointly and their father became mentally unsound about 12years back and disappeared and his whereabouts were not known. So, hewaspresumed to be dead. The grandfather of the plaintiffs was one Matam2026:APHC:8340
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Seshaiah and his father (the grandfather of the plaintiffs) was one MatamAyyanna. His father was Matam Veera Brahmam Swamy. So, the case set upwas that the family name of the plaintiffs was ‘Matam’ and their ancestor wasMatam Veera Brahmam Swamy. The plaint schedule property was saidtobethe family properties of the plaintiffs being their ancestral property. Theypleaded to be in possession and enjoyment of the same absolutelyandindependently and also paying cists till it was abolished. The plaintiffs after
they grew up and after the death of their father, developed the land andhadbeen cultivating by employing the modern tools, irrigating the land withbore- well water. Item-1 and 2 of the plaint schedule properties constituted onefield,
in which the plaintiffs’ father dug one bore-well during his lifetime. Theplaintiffs also dug two more bore-wells in the said land. In itemNo.3, theplaintiffs dug two more bore-wells and in all the three items, the plaintiffs weredoing intensive cultivation and raising two crops in a year. In itemNo.4therewas no bore-well and only dried crops were raised. The 1
st plaintiff, in addition, was also carrying a Xerox Centre in Cuddapah and the 2
nd plaintiff was thendoing MCA course at Tirupati, and their cousin brother, namely, K. Munnaiahwas said to be helping the plaintiffs and supervising the cultivation. Theyalsoraised crops by pledging the original documents with Syndicate Bank, Alamur. The Mandal Revenue Officer, Rudravaram issued pattadar passbooks. TheRevenue Divisional Officer, Nandyal and Mandal Revenue Officer, Rudravaramissued title deeds for the plaint schedule land in favour of the plaintiffs and2026:APHC:8340
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those title deeds were pledged with the Syndicate Bank, Alamur for raisingcroploan. 5. The plaintiffs further pleaded that the original pattadar passbookswere taken by the Revenue Inspector Mallikarjun at the instance of the Mandal
Revenue Officer, Rudravaram on 30.08.2004 and receipt with the seal of theMandal Revenue Officer for taking possession of two pattadar passbooks for
item Nos.1 to 3 of the plaint schedule property was issued which was filedwiththe plaint. The circumstances under which the Revenue Inspector seizedthosepattadar passbooks were published in Andhra Jyothi, Daily Supplement newspaper dated 04.09.2004. Some of the cist receipts available with the plaintiffsfor payment of cists by their predecessors in title were also filed. It was allegedthat the defendants were trying to interfere with the peaceful possessionandenjoyment of the plaint schedule property, and so, there was necessity tofilethe suit.
ii) Defendants’ case:
6. The 1
st defendant/respondent i.e., State of Andhra Pradesh, represented by the District Collector, Kurnool remained ex parte. No writtenstatement was filed. 7. The 2
nd defendant in the suit/Respondent No.2, namely, VeeraBrahmam Matam, represented by its Manager and Successors-in-Office, Cuddapah District, Brahmamgari Matam, filed written statement. Themainpleadings of the plaint were denied. It was submitted that the predecessorsof
the plaintiffs were being called as ‘Matam’ people since they were associated2026:APHC:8340
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with the service to Sri Pothuluri Veera Brahmendra Swamy Mutt at
Kandimallayapalli, popularly known as Sri Brahmamgari Matam. It was pleadedthat the 2
nd defendant alone got right and title over the plaint scheduleproperties. The plaintiffs or their ancestors had no right and title over theplaint schedule properties. The plaintiffs were not the actual cultivators of theplaint schedule properties and they were engaged in other avocations. Theplaintiffs were not the residents of either Alamur or Narasapuramvillages andthey were living at Kadapa and Tirupathi. The documents filed by the plaintiffswere the created documents and the 2
nd defendant was the absolute owner andpossessor of the plaint schedule property, which was a famous religiousinstitution having lakhs of devotees all over the State of Andhra Pradesh. Thesuit was said to be not maintainable.
iii) Issues:
8. In view of the pleadings, the following issues were framed bythelearned trial Court. 1) “Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for declaration of title in respect of the suit
schedule properties?
2) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for consequential relief of perpetual injunction?3) Whether the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit?
4) To what relief the plaintiffs are entitled?”
iv) Evidences:
9. On behalf of the plaintiffs, PWs 1 to 4, viz., PW 1-MatamAshok Kumar, PW 2-B. Ratnamaiah, Asst. Manager, Syndicate Bank, Alamur, PW3-KambamLakshmi Munaiah and PW 4- B. Syed Sharif, were examined and Exs.A1 toA33,
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viz., Exs.A1 to A28 – Cist receipts, Ex.A29-Pattadar Passbook of 1
st plaintiff, Ex.A30-Receipt issued by Mandal Revenue Officer, Ex.A31-Pattadar passbookof
1
st plaintiff, Ex.A32-Pattadar passbook of 2
nd plaintiff, Ex.A33-Newspaper cutting;and Exs.X1 to X9, viz., Ex.X1-Attested copy of crop loan application of first
plaintiff, Ex.X2-Attested copy of crop loan application of 2
nd plaintiff, Ex.X3- Attested copy of simple mortgage loan application of PW 1, Ex.X4-Attestedcopyof Title Deed of 1
st plaintiff, Ex.X5-Attested copy of Title Deed of 1
st plaintiff, Ex.X6-Attested copy of Title Deed of 2
nd plaintiff, Ex.X7-Attested copy of croploan statement of PW 1, Ex.X8-Attested copy of crop loan statement of PW2and Ex.X9-Attested copy of mortgage loan statement of PW1, were marked. 10. On behalf of the defendants, DWs.1 and 2, viz., DW1-P. Penchalaiahand DW 2-D. S. Ramesh Babu, the then Revenue Inspector of Rudravaram, were examined and Exs.B1 to B8, viz., Ex.B1-True copy of R.H, Ex.B2-Letter
addressed for the District Collector, Kurnool, Ex.B3-True copy of R.S.R, Ex.B4- True copy of R.H, Ex.B5-True copy of 10 (1) for Fasli No.1379, Ex.B6-Truecopyof Adangal fasli No.1414, Ex.B7-Title Deed and Ex.B8-Pattadar passbook, andExs.X10 to X15, viz., Ex.X10-Re-settlement register photo copy attestedbytheTahsildar, Rudravaram for Survey Nos.248, 249, 691 of Alamur, Ex.X11-Photocopy of 10 (1) Adangal for land bearing Survey No.248, 249, 691 attestedbyTahsildar, Rudravaram, Ex.X12-Photo copy of No.3 Adangal for Sy.No.248, 249, 691 for Faslis 1415 to 1417, Ex.X13-Photo copy of 10 (1) account for thelandbearing Survey No.316, Ex.X14-Photo copy of R.S.R.Register and Ex.X15-Photocopy of No.3 Adangal (attested) for the Faslies 1415 to 1417, were marked.
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v) Judgment of learned Trial Court:
11. The learned trial Court observed that the plaintiffs’ case was basedmainly on Ex.A29, Ex.A31 and Ex.A32, pattadar passbooks to prove that theplaint schedule properties belonged to them. They had also filed Exs.A1toA28to show that their predecessors paid cists to the revenue authorities till it wasabolished. Those documents are the cist receipts. Their case was that MatamVeerabramha Swamy, the great grandfather of the plaintiffs, was the original
owner of the property and it came down to the plaintiffs by succession. Thelearned trial Court observed that the plaintiffs did not file any documentaryevidence to prove that the plaint schedule properties originally belongedtoMatam Veerabhramha Swamy. No registered document or any revenueadangal was filed to prove the same or that it belonged to any of the ancestorsof the plaintiffs. The 2
nd defendant had also filed Exs.B7 and B8, the titledeedand pattadar passbooks for item No.4 of the plaint schedule property. Thelearned trial Court observed that except filing of Exs.A1 to A28, the cist receiptsand Exs.A29 to A32, the plaintiffs did not file any evidence to prove that theplaint schedule property belonged to their ancestors. So, the plaintiffs failedtodischarge their initial burden. 12. Thus considered, the learned trial Court recorded findings onissueNos.1 and 2 that the plaintiffs had no right and title over the plaint scheduleproperties and the plaint schedule properties belonged to the 2
nd defendant. The plaintiffs were not the owners. These two issues were answered against
the plaintiffs and in favour of the 2
nd defendant. On issue No.3, the learned2026:APHC:8340
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trial Court held that the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to entertain thesuit. The issue was answered in favour of the plaintiffs and against the 2
nd defendant. Consequent upon the answer on issue Nos. 1 and 2, the learned Trial Court
held on issue No.4 that the suit deserved to be dismissed. Finally, the suit wasdismissed by judgment and decree, dated 28.07.2011. II. Submissions of the learned counsels:
i) For the Appellants:
13. Learned senior counsel for the appellants Sri P. Veera Reddysubmitted that the plaintiffs’ surname is ‘Matam’ and he referred tothepedigree. 14. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that in viewof thedocumentary evidence in the form of cist receipts and Exs.A29 to A32, theburden was on the defendants to disprove the title. He submitted that inthewritten statement, the defendant No.2 admitted the cultivation by the plaintiffs, referring to para-4 of the written statement of the 2
nd defendant. 15. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that thoughthedefendants’ case was that the plaint schedule property was the mutt property, but no document was produced to prove that. In paragraph-5 of the writtenstatement, the defendant pleaded ignorance about the plaintiffs’ case of beingin possession and all the original pattadar passbooks having been snatchedaway. So, he submitted that pleading ignorance is no denial and consequently, the plaintiffs pleading that, the plaintiffs were in possession and enjoyment of
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the plaint schedule property shall be taken as proof by admission of the2nd
defendant as the denial was by pleading ignorance. 16. Learned counsel for the appellants also referred to paragraph-6of thewritten statement to contend that the defendants’ case was that the plaintiffsand their men in the Alamur village were encroachers over the endowment
properties, and they were contemplating to initiate proceedings beforetheDeputy Commissioner Endowment, Kurnool under Section 83 of the AndhraPradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987to get them evicted, but in the meantime the plaintiffs filed the suit, so, pleading further that the defendants were at liberty to take steps requiredtotake back possession from the plaintiffs. Referring to the aforesaid pleadingsinthe written statement, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants vehementlysubmitted that the possession of the plaintiffs was thus admitted and anysuit
or proceeding for the eviction of the plaintiffs, though terming themasencroachers, was not filed nor proceeding initiated, under Section 83of theEndowments Act, and the defendants also having failed to prove the title totheplaint schedule properties being the property of the endowment/2
nd defendant, the learned trial Court should have decreed the suit for declaration of title, asthe possession follows title in the absence of proof of a better title. 17. Learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance on the judgment of
the Hon’ble Apex Court in Chief Conservator of Forests v. Collector
1
ii) For the 1
st Respondent:
1
(2003) 3 SCC 472
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18. Learned Asst. Govt. Pleader for the 1
st respondent submittedthat
there is no illegality in the judgment of the learned trial Court. He submittedthat the property belonged to the Mutt and not to the plaintiffs. He submittedthat by considering the documentary evidence, as also the oral evidenceonrecord, the finding has been recorded by the learned trial Court dismissingthesuit. He submitted that by taking advantage of the name of their father, theplaintiffs created Exs.A29, A31 and A32 i.e., the pattedar passbooks of the1st
plaintiff and the pattedar passbook of the 2
nd plaintiff. He submitted that theburden of proof was on the plaintiffs to prove their right and title over theplaint
schedule property. The suit for declaration could not be decreed basedontheweakness if any of the case of the defendants. The plaintiffs have to standonthe strength of their own case. III. Points for determination:
19. The following point arises for our consideration and determination: “Whether the learned trial Court committed error of fact and lawin dismissing the suit of the appellant for declaration of right and titleover the plaint schedule property?” IV. Analysis:
20. We have considered the aforesaid submissions and perusedthematerial on record. 21. We are of the considered view that once the suit was filedfor
declaration over the suit schedule property by the plaintiffs, the burdenwas onthe plaintiffs to prove the title to the suit schedule property.
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22. In Union of India v. Vasavi Cooperative HousingSocietyLimited
2
the Hon’ble Apex Court clearly laid down that in a suit for declarationof title, the burden always lies on the plaintiff to make out and establishaclear
case for granting such a declaration and the weakness, if any, of the caseset
up by the defendants would not be a ground to grant relief to the plaintiff. TheHon’ble Apex Court held that the legal position is clear that the plaintiff inasuit
for declaration of title and possession could succeed only on the strengthof itsown title and that could be done only by adducing sufficient evidencetodischarge the onus on it, irrespective of the question whether the defendantshave proved their case or not. The Hon’ble Apex Court further observedthat
even if the title set up by the defendants is found against them, in the absenceof establishment of the plaintiff's own title, the plaintiff must be non-suited. 23. Paragraphs 15 and 19 of Vasavi Cooperative HousingSocietyLimited (supra) read as under: “15. It is trite law that, in a suit for declaration of title, the burden always
lies on the plaintiff to make out and establish a clear case for granting such a
declaration and the weakness, if any, of the case set up by the defendants wouldnot be a ground to grant relief to the plaintiff. 19. The legal position, therefore, is clear that the plaintiff in a suit for
declaration of title and possession could succeed only on the strength of its owntitle and that could be done only by adducing sufficient evidence to discharge
the onus on it, irrespective of the question whether the defendants have provedtheir case or not. We are of the view that even if the title set up by the
defendants is found against (sic them), in the absence of establishment of the
plaintiff's own title, the plaintiff must be non-suited.”
2
(2014) 2 SCC 269
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24. In Jagdish Prasad Patel (dead) through LRs v. Shivnath3
theHon’ble Apex court held that in the suit for declaration of title and possession, the plaintiffs could succeed only on the strength of their own title andnot onthe weakness of the case of the defendants. The burden is on the plaintiffstoestablish their title to the suit properties to show that they are entitledfor adecree for declaration. 25. Paragraphs 44 and 45 of Jagdish Prasad Patel (dead) throughLRs (supra) read as under: “44. In the suit for declaration of title and possession, the respondent- plaintiffs could succeed only on the strength of their own title and not on the
weakness of the case of the appellant-defendants. The burden is on the
respondent-plaintiffs to establish their title to the suit properties to showthat
they are entitled for a decree for declaration. The respondent-plaintiffs have
neither produced the title document i.e. patta-lease which the respondent- plaintiffs are relying upon nor proved their right by adducing any other
evidence. As noted above, the revenue entries relied on by them are also held tobe not genuine. In any event, revenue entries for few khataunis are not proof of
title; but are mere statements for revenue purpose. They cannot confer any right
or title on the party relying on them for proving their title. 45. Observing that in a suit for declaration of title, the respondent-plaintiffs
are to succeed only on the strength of their own title irrespective of whether the
appellant-defendants have proved their case or not, in Union of India v. Vasavi
Coop. Housing Society Ltd. [Union of India v. Vasavi Coop. Housing Society
Ltd., (2014) 2 SCC 269 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 66] , it was held as under: (SCCp. 275, para 15) “15. It is trite law that, in a suit for declaration of title, the burden always
lies on the plaintiff to make out and establish a clear case for granting such a
3
(2019) 6 SCC 82
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declaration and the weakness, if any, of the case set up by the defendants wouldnot be a ground to grant relief to the plaintiff.” 26. The property was entered in the name of the 2
nd defendant –VeeraBrahmam Matam by its Manager and the same was established fromtherevenue record entries. The plaintiffs had to establish their title and alsothetitle of their predecessors. Their claim was based on the pleadings that, theproperty was in the name of Veera Brahmam Matam and they also usedtheMatam in their name as the sons of Matam Veerabrahmendra Swamy. So, theywere co-relating the Matam property to be their ancestral property, and thesuit
for declaration was filed. They also submitted that they were in possession, based on the cist receipts Exs.A1 to A28 and the revenue record entriesinExs.A29 to A32. The plaintiffs were therefore required to prove their pedigreeand connection with the property, it being an ancestral property as per their
case. Merely because of ‘Matam’ being common, the suit for declarationcouldnot be decreed. The cist receipts or the entry in the pattedar passbooks beingthe mutation entries, would not prove title to the suit property. The plaintiffscould succeed only on the strength of their case, by adducing evidence of title, and not otherwise, even if according to them the 2
nd defendant failed toproveits title to the suit property. 27. The learned trial Court in its judgment rightly held that the claimof
the plaintiffs was basing on Exs.A1 to A28 cist receipts, and the pattedar
passbooks of the 1
st and 2
nd plaintiff, but the plaintiffs did not adduceanyevidence about the right and title of their predecessors, with convincing2026:APHC:8340
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evidence, and in the absence of any convincing evidence, the plaintiffs couldnot succeed basing on the entries in the revenue records. 28. It also held, by relying on Exs.X10 to X15, B6 and B7, that the2nd
defendant in the suit Sri Potuluru Veera Brahmendra Swamy Mutt was theowner and pattedar of the plaint schedule property in which the plaintiffs hadno right and title. With respect to the evidence, Exs.X1 to X9, filed bytheplaintiffs to show that they were in possession and enjoyment of the properties, the learned trial Court rightly held that those transactions betweentheplaintiffs and PW 2 were behind the back of the 2
nd defendant and therefore, based on the evidence of PW 2 and Exs.X1 to X9 the plaintiffs could not beheldto be the owners of the plaint schedule property against the 2
nd defendant. 29. Further, Ex.X3, i.e., copy of the simple mortgage loan applicationof
PW 1, is dated 12.11.2007. By that time the suit was already pending. Consequently, the document appearing during the pendency of the suit wasof
no legal evidentiary value so as to hold title of the plaintiffs over the suit landbased on that document, that the plaintiffs had also taken loanandconsequently, it should be presumed that the plaintiffs were the owners. 30. In the written statement, the 2
nd defendant had specifically takenastand that the plaintiffs had to strictly prove that MatamSeshaiahis thegrandfather of the plaintiffs and that their father was Ayyanna andthat
Ayyanna’s father was one Matam Veera Brahma Swamy. The plaintiffs hadtostrictly prove that their family name was ‘Matam’ and MatamVeera BrahmaSwamy was their ancestor. The defendants specifically pleaded that the2026:APHC:8340
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plaintiffs’ predecessors were being called as ‘Matam People’ and they wereassociated with service to Sri Pothuluri Veera Brahmendra Swamy Mutt at
Kandimallayyapalli, popularly known as ‘Sri Brahmamgari Matam’. Thedefendants’ set up the case that the plaintiffs had to strictly prove that their
house name or surname was ‘Matam’ ever since their ancestors. Thedefendants specifically denied that the family name of the plaintiffs, as ‘Matam’ and their ancestor was Matam Veera Brahma Swamy. 31. The learned trial Court clearly observed and held that the plaintiffsdid not file any documentary evidence that the plaint schedule mentionedproperties originally belonged to Sri Pothuluri Veera Brahmendra Swamy. Anyregistered or any revenue adangal was not filed to prove that the plaint
schedule mentioned properties belonged to Matam Veerabrahma Swamy or theancestors of the plaintiffs. The learned trial Court recorded that the plaintiffsdid not file any registered document or registered sale deed or any other
registered instrument to prove that the plaint schedule mentioned propertybelonged to their ancestors. The plaintiffs on the other hand wantedtoestablish their right and title basing on Exs.A29, A31 and A32 the pattedar
passbooks in their favour. On the other hand, the 2
nd defendant filedExs.B7and B8, the pattedar passbooks for Item No.4 of the plaint schedule propertiesand those pattedar passbooks were issued in favour of the Commissioner, Endowments, Hyderabad. Further, the documents Exs.X11 to X15 were filedbythe defendants which showed that, Sri Potuluru Veera Bramhendra Swamywasthe pattedar and the Matam was in its possession and enjoyment. Torebut
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those Exs.X11 to X15, the plaintiffs did not adduce any evidence to disprovethecontents of those exhibits. 32. The learned trial Court also considering Ex.X12-photo copy of adangal,
in which the name of the plaintiffs were shown as enjoyers of the land bearingSy.Nos.248, 249 and 691 for Faslis 1415 to 1417, held that the plaintiffs didnot
file any R.S.R. Register or any other document to prove that their ancestorswere the owners of the property and so merely basing on entry in Ex.X12, it
was rightly held that, it was difficult to say that the plaintiffs were the ownersof the property. In view of Exs.B7 and B8, and in the absence of any document
of title in plaintiffs’ favour, the learned trial Court rightly recorded that theplaintiffs failed to discharge their burden and they were trying totakeadvantage of the weakness of the defendants’ case. 33. The learned trial Court rightly recorded that the plaintiffs failedtodischarge their initial burden by proving that the plaint schedule mentionedproperties belonged to them. Except filing of Exs.A1 to A28 cist receipts, Exs.A29, A31 and A32 pattedar passbooks, the plaintiffs did not fileanyevidence to prove that the plaint schedule mentioned properties belongedtotheir ancestors. 34. Paragraph-4 of the written statement of the 2
nd defendant, uponwhich learned counsel for the appellants placed much reliance, its relevant part
reads as under: “4…………The plaintiffs alleged intensive cultivation in plaint schedule
properties and raising of crops would not be a criteria that they are the absolute
owners thereof. To the knowledge of this defendant the plaintiffs are not at all
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actual cultivators of plaint schedule properties as admittedly they are engaged inother avocations…….” 35. In our view, the aforesaid averments cannot be said to betheadmission of the defendant No.2 with respect to the cultivation of the plaintiffs, or based thereon any admission by the defendant No.2 of the plaintiffs beingthe owners. Defendant No.2 clearly denied the suit property to be the ancestral
property of the plaintiffs and also pleaded that it was false to allege that theplaintiffs and their predecessors had been in possession and enjoyment of theplaint schedule property absolutely. The plaintiffs’ case of ‘intensive cultivation’ in the plaint was referred by the 2
nd defendant, in para-4 of the writtenstatement as ‘alleged intensive cultivation’. That would not constituteanadmission. Further, with respect to the plaint averments of declarationetc., it
was said in paragraph-2 of the written statement that the plaintiffs had toprovethe same strictly. It was clearly stated that the plaint schedule lands weretheendowment properties belonging to Sri Pothuluri Veera Brahmendra SwamyMutt, Kandimallayapalli and any amount of the alleged spending bytheplaintiffs on cultivation or development of the endowment properties wouldnot
divest title and rights of the defendant Matam in the plaint schedule properties. So, we are of the considered view that based on the pleadings of the defendant
No.2 in para-4 of the written statement, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs’ alleged title to the suit property was admitted and therefore the plaintiffs werenot required to prove their plaint case of title to the suit property. The burden2026:APHC:8340
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of proof was on the plaintiffs and it cannot be said to have been dischargedvide paras-4 or/and 6 of the written statement. 36. With respect to para-5 of the written statement, on whichtheargument has been advanced that, the denial there under is by saying‘is not
aware’ and so there is no denial in the eyes of law. We are of the viewthat, firstly, the averment of the 2
nd defendant in para-5 with respect to ‘is not
aware’, is not for the entire contents of para-5 of the plaint, but onlywithrespect to the plaintiff’s case that if Mandal Revenue Officer, Rudravaramissued Pattadar Pass Books and the Revenue Divisional Officer of Nandyal alongwith M.R.O, Rudravaram issued Title deeds for the plaint schedule landinfavour of the plaintiffs and the title deeds for all the lands were pledgedwithSyndicate Bank, Alamur for raising crop loan and the originals were withtheBank and the loan was subsisting. The said ignorance of the defendant is onlywith respect to the plaintiffs’ case of issuance of pattadar passbooks andthetitle deeds and the loan, which, in our view cannot be said to be the ignorancepleaded with respect to the main case of the plaintiffs for declarationonthebasis of possession or/and the property being the ancestral property. Thedocuments, said to have been issued by the Mandal Revenue Officer etc., werealso said to be collusive documents to prove the plaintiffs’ claim, havingnolegal value being opposed to the various records maintained bytheGovernment/revenue department. The cist receipts were also said to benot
sufficient to prove the plaintiffs’ title for the plaint schedule properties. Therevenue record maintained by the revenue department was also saidtobe2026:APHC:8340
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clearly showing that all the plaint schedule properties were belonging to the2nd
defendant, who had got right and title over the same and not the plaintiffs andtheir ancestors. It is well settled in law that the pleadings are to be readasawhole. When read as a whole, the entire written statement, includingtheremaining contents of para-5, it does not follow that the ignorance was pleadedwith respect to the main case of the plaintiffs for declaration. There are specificdenials and clear case has been set up that the plaintiffs are not the ownersand they are taking the advantage of only their surname ‘Matam’ and tryingtoco-relate the property of the 2
nd defendant with their ancestors. Sothesubmissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants that thedefendant pleading in para-5 ‘is not aware’ and therefore, there was admissionin the absence of clear denial, is wholly unsustainable and is unacceptable. 37. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that based onthepossession of the plaintiffs, the suit should have been allowed as the possessionwas admitted and the possession follows title. 38. Section 110 of the Evidence Act reads as under: “110. Burden of proof as to ownership.––When the question is
whether any person is owner of anything of which he is shown to be inpossession, the burden of proving that he is not the owner is on the person whoaffirms that he is not the owner.” 39. In Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala
4
it was held that the maxim“possession follows title” is limited in its application to property, whichhavingregard to its nature, does not admit to actual and exclusive occupation, asin4
(2020) 19 SCC 57
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the case of open spaces accessible to all. The presumption that possessionmust be deemed to follow title, arises only where there is no definite proof of
possession by anyone else. 40. Paragraphs 47 and 48 of Nazir Mohamed (supra) read as under: “47. A person claiming a decree of possession has to establish his
entitlement to get such possession and also establish that his claimis not barredby the laws of limitation. He must show that he had possession before the
alleged trespasser got possession. 48. The maxim “possession follows title” is limited in its application toproperty, which having regard to its nature, does not admit to actual andexclusive occupation, as in the case of open spaces accessible to all. The
presumption that possession must be deemed to follow title, arises only where
there is no definite proof of possession by anyone else. In this case, it is
admitted that the appellant-defendant is in possession and not the respondent- plaintiff.” 41. In Chief Conservator of Forests (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court
held that Section 110 of the Evidence Act embodies the principlethat
possession of a property furnishes prima facie proof of ownership of thepossessor and casts burden of proof on the party who denies his ownership. The presumption is rebuttable and is attracted when the possession is primafacie lawful and when the contesting party has no title. 42. Paragraphs 19, 20 and 21 of Chief Conservator of Forests (supra)are as under: “19. Section 110 of the Evidence Act reads thus: “110. Burden of proof as to ownership.—When the question is whether anyperson is owner of anything of which he is shown to be in possession, the
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burden of proving that he is not the owner is on the person who affirms that he
is not the owner.” 20. It embodies the principle that possession of a property furnishes prima
facie proof of ownership of the possessor and casts burden of proof on the partywho denies his ownership. The presumption, which is rebuttable, is attractedwhen the possession is prima facie lawful and when the contesting party has notitle.21. This Court in Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander [AIR1968 SC1165 : 1968 Ker LT 182] observed: (AIR p. 1173, para 15) “That possession may prima facie raise a presumption of title no one candeny but this presumption can hardly arise when the facts are known. When the
facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides.” 43. In State of A.P. v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Co.5
the Hon’bleApex Court held that the principle enshrined in Section 110 of the EvidenceAct
is based on public policy with the object of preventing persons fromcommittingbreach of peace by taking law into their own hands, however good their titleover the land in question may be. The said presumption is read under Section114 of the Evidence Act, and applies only in a case where there is either noproof, or very little proof of ownership on either side. The maxim“possessionfollows title” is applicable in cases where proof of actual possessioncannot
reasonably be expected, for instance, in the case of wastelands, or wherenothing is known about possession one way or another. Presumption of titleasa result of possession, can arise only where facts disclose that no title vestsinany party. Possession of the plaintiff is not prima facie wrongful, and titleof theplaintiff is not proved. It certainly does not mean that because a man has title5
(2013) 9 SCC 319
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over some land, he is necessarily in possession of it. It in fact means, that if at
any time a man with title was in possession of the said property, the lawallowsthe presumption that such possession was in continuation of the title vestedinhim. A person must establish that he has continued possession of thesuit
property, while the other side claiming title, must make out a caseof
trespass/encroachment, etc. Where the apparent title was with the plaintiffs, it
is incumbent upon the defendant, that in order to displace this claimof
apparent title and to establish beneficial title in himself, he must establishbyway of satisfactory evidence, circumstances that favour his version. Even, arevenue record is not a document of title. It merely raises a presumptioninregard to possession. Presumption of possession and/or continuity thereof, bothforward and backward, can also be raised under Section 110 of the EvidenceAct. 44. Paragraphs 18 to 21 of Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Co. (supra) arereproduced as under: “18. In Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar v. Nagesh SiddappaNavalgund [(2007) 13 SCC 565 : AIR 2008 SC 901] this Court held as under :
(SCC p. 568, para 12) “12. A revenue record is not a document of title. It merely raises a
presumption in regard to possession. Presumption of possession and/or
continuity thereof both forward and backward can also be raised under Section110 of the Evidence Act.” 19. In Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K.C. Alexander [AIR 1968 SC1165] , dealing with the provisions of Section 110 of the Evidence Act, this Court heldas under : (AIR p. 1173, para 15)
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“15. … possession may prima facie raise a presumption of title no one candeny but this presumption can hardly arise when the facts are known. When the
facts disclose no title in either party, possession alone decides.” 20. In Chief Conservator of Forests v. Collector [(2003) 3 SCC 472 : AIR2003 SC 1805] , this Court held that : (SCC p. 484, para 20) “20. … presumption, which is rebuttable, is attracted when the possession is
prima facie lawful and when the contesting party has no title.” 21. The principle enshrined in Section 110 of the Evidence Act is basedon public policy with the object of preventing persons from committing breachof peace by taking law into their own hands, however good their title over the
land in question may be. It is for this purpose, that the provisions of Section 6of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and Sections 154 and 158 of the Penal Code, 1860, were enacted. All the
aforesaid provisions have the same object. The said presumption is read under
Section 114 of the Evidence Act, and applies only in a case where there is either
no proof, or very little proof of ownership on either side. The maxim“possession follows title” is applicable in cases where proof of actual
possession cannot reasonably be expected, for instance, in the case of
wastelands, or where nothing is known about possession one way or another. Presumption of title as a result of possession, can arise only where facts
disclose that no title vests in any party. Possession of the plaintiff is not prima
facie wrongful, and title of the plaintiff is not proved. It certainly does not meanthat because a man has title over some land, he is necessarily in possession of it. It in fact means, that if at any time a man with title was in possession of the saidproperty, the law allows the presumption that such possession was incontinuation of the title vested in him. A person must establish that he has
continued possession of the suit property, while the other side claiming title, must make out a case of trespass/encroachment, etc. Where the apparent title is
with the plaintiffs, it is incumbent upon the defendant, that in order to displace
this claim of apparent title and to establish beneficial title in himself, he must
establish by way of satisfactory evidence, circumstances that favour his version. Even, a revenue record is not a document of title. It merely raises a presumption2026:APHC:8340
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in regard to possession. Presumption of possession and/or continuity thereof, both forward and backward, can also be raised under Section 110 of the
Evidence Act.” 45. Recently, in Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh6the Hon’ble Apex Court, on the principle enshrined in Section 110 of theEvidence Act (now Section 113 of the BSA), held that presumption of titleasaresult of possession can arise only where facts disclose that no title vests inanyparty and the possession of the plaintiff is not prima facie wrongful. It does not
mean that because a man has title over some land, he is necessarilyinpossession of it. It, in fact, means, that if at any time a man with title wasinpossession of the said property, the law allows the presumption that suchpossession was in continuation of the title vested in him. A personmust
establish that he has continued possession of the suit property, while theother
side claiming title, must make out a case of trespass/encroachment, etc. Wherethe apparent title is with the plaintiffs, it is incumbent upon the defendant, that
in order to displace this claim of apparent title and to establish beneficial titleinhimself, he must establish by way of satisfactory evidence, the circumstancesthat favour his version. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that Section 113of theBharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), 2023, embodies the principlethat
possession of a property furnishes prima facie principle of ownershipof thepossessor and casts burden of proof on the party who denies his ownership. The presumption, which is rebuttable, is attracted when the possession is primafacie lawful and when the contesting party has no title.
6 2025 SCC OnLine SC 630
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46. Paragraphs 83 and 84 of Yerikala Sunkalamma (supra) readasunder: “83. The principle enshrined in Section 110 of the Evidence Act (nowSection 113 of the BSA) is based on public policy with the object of preventingpersons from committing breach of peace by taking law into their own hands, however good their title over the land in question may be. It is for this purpose
that the provisions of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, Section 145 of
the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, and Sections 154 and 158 of the India
Penal Code, 1860, were enacted. All the aforesaid provisions have the same
objective. The said presumption is read under Section 114 of the Evidence
Act and applies only in a case where there is either no proof, or very little
proof of ownership on either side. The maxim “possession follows title” is
applicable in cases where proof of actual possession cannot reasonably be
expected, for instance, in the case of wastelands, or where nothing is knownabout possession one way or another. Presumption of title as a result of
possession can arise only where facts disclose that no title vests in anyparty and the possession of the plaintiff is not prima facie wrongful. It
certainly does not mean that because a man has title over some land, he is
necessarily in possession of it. It, in fact, means, that if at any time a manwith title was in possession of the said property, the law allows the
presumption that such possession was in continuation of the title vestedinhim. A person must establish that he has continued possession of the suit
property, while the other side claiming title, must make out a case of
trespass/encroachment, etc. Where the apparent title is with the plaintiffs, it
is incumbent upon the defendant, that in order to displace this claimof apparent
title and to establish beneficial title in himself, he must establish by way of
satisfactory evidence, circumstances that favour his version. Even a revenue
record is not a document of title. It merely raises a presumption in regardto possession. Presumption of possession and/or continuity thereof, bothforward and backward, can also be raised under Section 110 of the
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Evidence Act. [See : State of Andhra Pradesh v. Star Bone Mill and Fertiliser
Company, (2013) 9 SCC 319]
84. Section 113 of the BSA as discussed aforesaid, embodies the principle
that possession of a property furnishes prima facie principle of ownership of the
possessor and casts burden of proof on the party who denies his ownership. The
presumption, which is rebuttable, is attracted when the possession is primafacie lawful and when the contesting party has no title.” 47. From the aforesaid judgment, it is evident that the presumptionof
ownership is rebuttable and that the presumption can be raised only whenthepossession is valid or lawful. In the present case, even if the submissionof theappellants’ counsel be accepted for the time being that the appellants hadbeenin possession, even then, the appellants had to establish that their possessionat any time was with title and he continued in possession which prima faciewasnot unlawful. In the absence of there being any document showing thetitleand the possession not to be unlawful, the presumption under Section110of
the Evidence Act cannot be invoked. Here in Exs.X7, X8, the property (itemNo.4) is recorded in the name of the Endowment Commissioner. The plaintiffs’ case is of title in plaintiffs’ ancestors, so their title had to be proved andmerelybecause of possession, if so, by raising presumption of title, suit for declarationcould not be decreed. 48. The contention based on mutation entry so as to declare title carrynoforce. The law is well settled that mutation entries do not confer title nor areevidence of title.
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49. In Nagar Palika v. Jagat Singh
7
the Hon’ble Apex Court heldinparagraph 7 with respect to the revenue entries, that those do not confer anytitle, as under: “7. The claim of the respondent was that he had purchased the suit landthrough a sale deed in the year 1970. Thereafter he filed a suit on 17-4-1971 for
permanent injunction against the appellant. That suit was ultimately withdrawnon 7-11-1977 with permission to file a fresh suit. Ultimately, the suit withwhich we are concerned was filed on 23-8-1979. In this background anyreliance on entries in the revenue records after 1971 was of not muchconsequence and value, because the respondent had already instituted the earlier
suit which was then pending. In any case, an order of mutation in the name
of the respondent in the revenue records cannot be a source of title. In the
case of Nirman Singh v. Lal Rudra Partab Narain Singh [AIR 1926 PC100:
53 IA 220] , in respect of mutation of names in revenue records, it was said: “They are nothing of the kind as has been pointed out times innumerable bythe Judicial Committee. They are much more in the nature of fiscal inquiries
instituted in the interest of the State for the purpose of ascertaining whichof the several claimants for the occupation of certain denominations of
immovable property may be put into occupation of it with greater
confidence that the revenue for it will be paid. It is little less than a travesty of judicial proceeding to regard the twoorders of the Extra Commissioner of Bahraich and Mr M.L. Ferrar, DeputyCommissioner, as judicial determinations expelling proprio vigore anyindividual from any proprietary right or interest he claims in immovable
property.”
7
(1995) 3 SCC 426
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50. In Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner
8 with respect totheentries in the revenue records, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that those donot
confer any ownership. Paragraph 9 of the said judgment reads as under: “9. There is an additional reason as to why we need not interfere with that
order under Article 136 of the Constitution. It is well settled that an entry inrevenue records does not confer title on a person whose name appears inrecord-of-rights. It is settled law that entries in the revenue records
or jamabandi have only “fiscal purpose” i.e. payment of land revenue, andno ownership is conferred on the basis of such entries. So far as title to the
property is concerned, it can only be decided by a competent civil court
(vide Jattu Ram v. Hakam Singh [(1993) 4 SCC 403 : AIR 1994 SC 1653] ). As
already noted earlier, civil proceedings in regard to genuineness of will are
pending with the High Court of Delhi. In the circumstances, we see no reason tointerfere with the order passed by the High Court in the writ petition.” 51. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Jagdish Prasad Patel (dead) throughLRs. (supra) held that the revenue entries for few khataunis were not proof of
title, but were mere statements for revenue purpose. They could not confer
any right or title on the party relying on them for proving their title. 52. In Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Limited (supra), withrespect to the revenue record entries, the Hon’ble Apex Court reiteratedthat
revenue records are not documents of title and the question of interpretationof
a document not being a document of title is not a question of law. The entriesin the record of rights itself would not confer any title on the plaintiff to thesuit
land. An entry in the revenue papers by no stretch of imagination can formthebasis for declaration of title in favour of the plaintiffs.
8
(2007) 6 SCC 186
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53. Para-21 of Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Limited(supra)reads as undr: “21. This Court in several judgments has held that the revenue records donot confer title. In Corpn. of the City of Bangalore v. M. Papaiah [(1989) 3SCC 612] this Court held that: (SCC p. 615, para 5) “5. … It is firmly established that the revenue records are not documents of
title, and the question of interpretation of a document not being a document of
title is not a question of law.”
In Guru Amarjit Singh v. Rattan Chand [(1993) 4 SCC 349] this Court has heldthat: (SCC p. 352, para 2) “2. … that entries in the Jamabandi are not proof of title.”
In State of H.P. v. Keshav Ram [(1996) 11 SCC 257] this Court held that: (SCCp. 259, para 5) “5. … an entry in the revenue papers by no stretch of imagination canform the basis for declaration of title in favour of the plaintiffs.” V. Conclusion:
54. In conclusion, we hold that:
i) In a suit for declaration of title, the burden of proof is always on plaintiffsto prove the title by adducing cogent evidence to the satisfactionof theCourt.
ii) When the suit for declaration was filed based on title to the suit propertyin favour of the plaintiffs’ ancestors and so after them, in the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs had to prove the title of their ancestors to suit propertybyadducing cogent evidence of title.
iii) Mere mutation in revenue records does not confer any title nor is aproof
of title.
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iv) Possession follows title, is the presumption that may be raisedunder
Section 110 of the Evidence Act (Section 113 of the Bharatiya SakshyaAdiniyam (BSA), 2023. To raise such presumption, the possessionmust
at any time be with title and the person must have continuedwithpossession which was prima facie not unlawful and the contestingpartyhad no title. This maxim is applicable in cases where proof of actual
possession cannot reasonably be expected, for instance, in the caseof
wastelands, or where nothing is known about possession one wayor
another. The presumption is rebuttable. v) The property being recorded in the name of the 2
nd defendant
(Endowment Commissioner) Exs.X7 & X8, the presumptionthat
possession follows title, cannot be attracted nor invoked togrant
declaration of title, in the absence of any document of title in favour of
the plaintiffs’ ancestors, since the claim itself was based on title. vi) Mere resemblance of the surname ‘Matam’ would not make the propertyrecorded in the name of ‘Mutt’ the ancestral property of the plaintiffs. vii)The plaintiffs having failed to establish title by adducing document of titlethe suit for declaration could not succeed. viii) The judgment of the learned trial Court does not suffer fromanyerror of fact or law. It does not call for any interference in the exerciseof our appellate jurisdiction.
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VI. Result:
55. In the result, the appeal lacks merit and is dismissed. 56. No order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closedinconsequence. _______________________RAVI NATHTILHARI, J______________________________MAHESWARA RAOKUNCHEAM, JDate: 07.01.2026
Dsr
Note:
LR copy to be marked
B/o
Dsr
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