Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 — Section 3 — Jurisdiction — Whether Family Court can entertain application of divorced Muslim woman for maintenance — Held (per Banumathi, J.) that jurisdiction is exclusively with Magistrate of First Class — Family Court cannot convert petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. into one under Section 3 of the Act — Appeal dismissed.
(Paras 20, 23, 25)
Family Courts Act, 1984 — Section 7 — Conferment of jurisdiction — Additional jurisdiction must be specifically conferred by statute — In absence of express provision in the 1986 Act, Family Court cannot assume jurisdiction.
(Paras 19–20)
Statutory Interpretation — Non-obstante clause — Cannot be presumed to supersede existing law unless legislative intention is clear and manifest.
(Para 15)
Maintenance — Divorced Muslim woman — Remedy under Section 3 of the 1986 Act lies before Magistrate — Family Court lacks competence even if established in the area.
(Paras 12, 25)
Precedent — Iqbal Bano distinguished — Conversion of petition permissible only when application is before a Magistrate having jurisdiction under both provisions.
(Para 24)
Dissent (Indira Banerjee, J.) — Family Courts Act is a secular and beneficial statute — Proceedings for maintenance are essentially civil — On purposive interpretation, Family Court should be deemed competent to entertain application under Sections 3 and 4 of the 1986 Act — Appeal ought to be allowed.
(Paras 64, 70, 79–80)
Reference to Larger Bench — Difference of opinion between the two Judges — Matter directed to be placed before the Chief Justice of India for constitution of a Larger Bench.
(Order)
SUMMARY OF THE CASE
The case concerned whether a Family Court has jurisdiction to convert and decide a maintenance petition filed by a divorced Muslim woman under Section 125 Cr.P.C. as one under Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The majority opinion (R. Banumathi, J.) held that the Act expressly confers jurisdiction on the Magistrate of the First Class, and since no provision extends such power to Family Courts, they cannot entertain or convert such applications; accordingly, the appeal was dismissed with liberty to approach the competent Magistrate. However, Indira Banerjee, J. dissented, holding that maintenance proceedings are civil in nature and, on a purposive interpretation of the Family Courts Act, the Family Court should be treated as competent to decide such claims. Owing to this split verdict, the matter was directed to be placed before the Chief Justice of India for reference to a Larger Bench.
18. Section 7(1)(a) of the Family Courts Act confers the entire jurisdiction hitherto exercised by any district court or any subordinate civil court in suits or proceedings relating to matters mentioned in clauses (a) to (g) of the Explanation. Sub-clause (b) creates a legal fiction endowing upon the Family Courts the status of the District Court or subordinate Civil Court. Section 7(1) can apply only when:- (i) the suit or proceeding is of the nature envisaged by clauses (a) to (g) of the Explanation; and (ii) concerning the matter where the jurisdictions are exercisable by any District Court or Subordinate Court. On these counts, the application under Section 3 of Muslim Women’s Protection Act cannot be said to be covered by Section 7(1) of the Act. As provided in Section 3(2) of Muslim Women’s Protection Act, application can be moved only before the First Class Magistrate having jurisdiction in the area under Criminal Procedure Code. Thus, an application under Section 3 of the Act cannot be maintained before the Family Court under Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act.
19. Section 7(2)(a) confers jurisdiction upon the Family Court hitherto exercisable by a First Class Magistrate under Chapter IX (relating to order for maintenance of wife, children and parents) of the Criminal Procedure Code. Sub-section (2)(a) of Section 7 of the Family Courts Act confers limited jurisdiction upon the Family Court relating to those matters only as are covered under Chapter IX of Criminal Procedure Code. Section 7(2)(b) however relates to conferment of any additional jurisdiction on the Family Courts by other enactments.
The decision primarily concerns the question of jurisdiction rather than the substantive entitlement of a divorced Muslim woman to maintenance. The controversy arose when the wife initially filed a petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C. before the Family Court. During the pendency of the proceedings, divorce took place, and the Family Court converted the petition into one under Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 and granted lump-sum maintenance. The High Court interfered on the ground that the Family Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain such a claim, which led to the appeal before the Supreme Court.
The central legal issue before the Court was whether a Family Court possesses the authority to entertain or convert a maintenance petition into an application under Section 3 of the 1986 Act when that provision specifies the Magistrate as the forum. Thus, the case required reconciliation between the Family Courts Act, 1984 and the Muslim Women Act, 1986, both of which are welfare legislations but operate through different procedural structures.
Justice R. Banumathi, writing the majority opinion, adopted a strict statutory interpretation. The judgment proceeds on the settled doctrine that when a statute creates a right and simultaneously prescribes the forum for enforcement of that right, the remedy must be pursued only before that forum. Section 3(2) of the 1986 Act expressly enables a divorced Muslim woman to apply to a Magistrate for reasonable and fair provision and maintenance. The Court treated this language as conferring exclusive jurisdiction. It reasoned that the Family Courts Act transfers only such jurisdiction as is specifically conferred by statute, particularly under Section 7(2)(b), which contemplates additional jurisdiction only when another enactment expressly provides for it. Since the 1986 Act does not refer to Family Courts, the Court inferred that Parliament never intended to vest them with such power.
The majority further emphasized legislative chronology. Although the Muslim Women Act was enacted after the Family Courts Act, Parliament did not amend the latter nor indicate that Family Courts should exercise powers under the new legislation. Such silence was interpreted as deliberate rather than accidental. The Court also distinguished the earlier decision in Iqbal Bano, explaining that conversion of a petition was upheld there because the application had been filed before a Magistrate who already possessed jurisdiction under both statutes. In the present case, however, the Family Court lacked foundational competence; consequently, the act of conversion itself was without authority. The High Court was therefore correct in setting aside the Family Court’s order, and the appeal was dismissed with liberty to the wife to approach the competent Magistrate.
Justice Indira Banerjee dissented and presented a markedly different interpretive approach rooted in purposive construction and constitutional values. According to the dissent, maintenance proceedings are essentially civil in character, intended to prevent destitution rather than punish wrongdoing. Even when a Magistrate adjudicates such matters, the function is quasi-civil. Family Courts, being specialized civil forums created to resolve family disputes expeditiously and with procedural flexibility, should logically exercise jurisdiction over such claims.
The dissent placed considerable reliance on the overriding clause contained in Section 20 of the Family Courts Act, which gives that statute primacy over inconsistent laws. On a harmonious reading of the two enactments, the reference to “Magistrate” in the 1986 Act should not be construed as excluding Family Courts, particularly in areas where Magistrates cease to exercise maintenance jurisdiction once a Family Court is established. Justice Banerjee also invoked constitutional principles of equality, observing that denying divorced Muslim women access to Family Courts—when women of other faiths and even Muslim wives under Section 125 Cr.P.C. can approach those courts—creates an unjustified procedural disparity that may offend Article 14. Beneficial legislation, the dissent argued, must be interpreted liberally so as to expand access to remedies rather than restrict them through technical barriers.
The jurisprudential tension between the two opinions reflects the classic divide between literal and purposive interpretation. The majority prioritizes jurisdictional certainty and adherence to legislative text, cautioning against judicial expansion of statutory forums. The dissent prioritizes substantive justice, equality, and the social objective underlying maintenance laws. Both approaches are doctrinally defensible: the former safeguards separation of powers, while the latter aligns with evolving constitutional sensibilities and gender-justice jurisprudence.
An important procedural consequence of the case is that it resulted in a split verdict. Justice Banumathi dismissed the appeal, whereas Justice Banerjee would have allowed it. Owing to this difference of opinion, the matter was directed to be placed before the Chief Justice of India for reference to a larger bench. Consequently, no binding law under Article 141 emerges from this decision, and the issue of Family Court jurisdiction under the 1986 Act remains authoritatively unsettled.
From a practical standpoint, the case signals caution to litigants and practitioners. Until a larger bench resolves the conflict, the safer procedural course is to institute claims under the 1986 Act before a Magistrate, thereby avoiding challenges to jurisdiction. At the same time, the dissent indicates a possible future trajectory toward a more integrated and access-oriented forum structure for maintenance disputes.
In doctrinal terms, the case reiterates the principle that jurisdiction must ordinarily flow from express statutory conferment. Yet it simultaneously raises a deeper constitutional question: whether procedural interpretation should adapt to ensure equal access to justice for vulnerable groups. The eventual resolution by a larger bench will likely determine whether Indian courts continue to prefer strict textualism in jurisdictional matters or move toward a purposive framework that harmonizes welfare statutes with constitutional guarantees.
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