Land Law — West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 — Section 6(1)(j) — Retention by company — “Exclusively engaged in farming” — Onus. For a company to retain land under Section 6(1)(j) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, it must establish (i) exclusive engagement in farming, and (ii) such engagement as on 01.01.1952. Mere reference to agricultural objects in the Memorandum of Association is insufficient to prove exclusive farming. (Paras 64–71, 73).

advocatemmmohan

Land Law — West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 — Section 6(1)(j) — Retention by company — “Exclusively engaged in farming” — Onus.
For a company to retain land under Section 6(1)(j) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, it must establish (i) exclusive engagement in farming, and (ii) such engagement as on 01.01.1952. Mere reference to agricultural objects in the Memorandum of Association is insufficient to prove exclusive farming. (Paras 64–71, 73).

Vesting — Finality of vesting order — Reopening impermissible.
A vesting order passed after due inquiry under the WBEA Act, 1953, which attained finality upon dismissal of judicial challenge, cannot be reopened by executive direction decades later. (Paras 13, 51–52, 83).

Quasi-Judicial Authority — Power of Review — Must be expressly conferred.
Power of review is not inherent. A quasi-judicial authority such as a Revenue Officer can exercise review only if expressly or by necessary implication conferred by statute. Section 57A of the WBEA Act, 1953, investing Civil Court powers, does not include substantive power of review. (Paras 31–35, 49).

Relied on:
Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji
Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania

Section 57B Proviso — Bar against reopening decided matters.
Proviso to Section 57B(3) of the WBEA Act, 1953 expressly bars reopening of matters already determined under the Act. Review of 1971 vesting order in 2008 was in direct contravention of statutory mandate. (Paras 50–51).

Separation of Powers — Executive authorities exercising quasi-judicial powers — Limits.
Executive authorities exercising quasi-judicial functions cannot be equated with courts. Conferment of blanket review powers upon such authorities would blur constitutional separation of powers and undermine judicial independence. (Paras 37–49, 56–57).

Relied on:
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala
L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India

Review Jurisdiction — Scope — Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC — Strictly confined.
Review lies only on discovery of new evidence despite due diligence, error apparent on the face of record, or analogous sufficient reason. Old documents within possession cannot constitute “discovery”. Economic or policy considerations cannot justify review of concluded adjudication. (Paras 62, 75–83).

Relied on:
Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P.
State (NCT of Delhi) v. K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd.

Nullity — Order without jurisdiction — Can be challenged at any stage.
An order passed without jurisdiction is void ab initio and can be challenged even in collateral proceedings. (Paras 88–89).

Relied on:
Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan
Balvant N. Viswamitra v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule

Promissory Estoppel — Cannot override statute or confer jurisdiction.
Doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot validate an order passed without statutory jurisdiction. (Paras 87, 91).

---

RATIO DECIDENDI

The principal ratio is that a Revenue Officer under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 does not possess inherent or implied power of review. Section 57A, which invests authorities with powers of a Civil Court, does not confer substantive review jurisdiction. In absence of express statutory conferment, review of a concluded vesting determination is ultra vires and void.

A vesting order passed in 1971, after due inquiry and affirmed through dismissal of judicial challenges, attained finality. The 2008 review, initiated on executive direction citing economic considerations and proposed industrial development, was not grounded in any legally recognised ground of review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. Executive policy preferences cannot displace statutory finality.

The Court further held that the respondent-company failed to establish the essential statutory condition under Section 6(1)(j) — exclusive engagement in agricultural farming as on 01.01.1952. The Memorandum of Association permitting multiple business objects negated exclusivity. Documents produced decades later could not justify reopening.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court restored the Tribunal’s order quashing the 2008 review and upheld the validity of the 1971 vesting order.