Where the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation records a finding of employer–employee relationship and of accident arising out of and in the course of employment on the basis of oral and documentary evidence, including admissions of the employer, such findings—being neither perverse nor legally infirm—cannot be interfered with by the High Court; erroneous reliance on an initial denial while ignoring subsequent admissions constitutes a misreading of the record warranting interference by the Supreme Court.

advocatemmmohan

Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923 — Employer–employee relationship — Finding of fact — Interference by High Court — Scope

A. Employer–employee relationship — Admission by owner — Evidentiary value
Where the owner of the vehicle, in cross-examination and subsequently on affidavit before the Supreme Court, unequivocally admitted that the deceased was employed as a driver under him and that earlier denial was to avoid civil liability, the finding of employer–employee relationship recorded by the Commissioner was based on correct appreciation of evidence.
(Paras 3.4, 6, 7)

B. Accident during and in the course of employment — Fatal motor accident
When the deceased driver met with a fatal accident while driving the employer’s vehicle in the early hours of the morning, the death was held to have occurred during and arising out of the course of employment.
(Paras 3.2, 3.3, 8)

C. High Court — Erroneous reversal of findings — Misreading of record
The High Court erred in reversing the award of compensation by relying on an initial counter-affidavit while ignoring subsequent admissions and by wrongly recording that the FIR was lodged by the wife of the deceased, when it was in fact lodged by the wife of another deceased.
(Paras 5, 6)

D. Commissioner’s award — No perversity or legal infirmity
Findings recorded by the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, being based on oral and documentary evidence and not suffering from perversity or legal infirmity, ought not to have been interfered with by the High Court.
(Paras 6, 8)

E. Restoration of compensation — Joint and several liability — Withdrawal of deposited amount
The award of compensation of Rs. 3,73,747/- with interest at 12% per annum was restored, and the claimant was permitted to withdraw the remaining amount deposited before the High Court along with accrued interest.
(Paras 9, 10)

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ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court examined the limited scope of interference with findings of fact recorded by the Commissioner under the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923. The Commissioner had concluded that the deceased was employed as a driver with respondent No. 5 and that the accident occurred during and in the course of employment (Paras 3.5, 6).

The High Court reversed this finding primarily on the basis of an initial denial in the counter-affidavit, ignoring the owner’s subsequent admissions in cross-examination and other material evidence. The Supreme Court held that such an approach amounted to a misreading of the record (Paras 5, 6).

A significant factor weighed by the Court was the affidavit filed by respondent No. 5 before the Supreme Court, wherein he categorically admitted the employment, wages, and stated that the earlier denial was to avoid civil liability (Para 7). This admission fortified the correctness of the Commissioner’s findings.

The Court reiterated that findings of fact based on proper appreciation of evidence, in the absence of perversity or legal infirmity, ought not to be interfered with in appeal (Paras 6, 8). Consequently, the interference by the High Court was held to be unwarranted.

Relief was moulded by restoring the Commissioner’s award and issuing consequential directions for withdrawal of the deposited compensation amount with interest (Paras 9–10).

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Where the Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation records a finding of employer–employee relationship and of accident arising out of and in the course of employment on the basis of oral and documentary evidence, including admissions of the employer, such findings—being neither perverse nor legally infirm—cannot be interfered with by the High Court; erroneous reliance on an initial denial while ignoring subsequent admissions constitutes a misreading of the record warranting interference by the Supreme Court.