Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Section 100
Second Appeal — Scope — Interference with findings of fact.
High Court cannot interfere with concurrent or appellate findings of fact unless such findings are contrary to mandatory provisions of law, settled legal position, based on inadmissible evidence or rendered without evidence.
(Paras 16, 31)
Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Section 16(c)
Specific performance — Requirement of demand and readiness and willingness.
Suit for specific performance must comply with Section 16(c) and Forms 47 and 48 of Appendix‑A CPC. Oral demand may suffice, provided proof is strong and unimpeachable.
(Paras 18, 19, 21)
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Appendix A — Forms 47 & 48
Specific performance — Prior demand — Effect of absence of written notice.
Non‑issuance of written notice before filing suit does not vitiate decree where oral demand is pleaded and proved, and defendants do not dispute demand or execution of agreement.
(Paras 18–21)
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 114 (Illustration g)
Adverse inference — Non‑examination of party.
Where party to suit does not enter witness box or contest pleadings, presumption arises that case set up is not correct.
(Para 20)
Specific Performance — Registered agreement of sale
Certified copy — Loss of original — Admissibility.
Where original registered agreement of sale is lost and certified copy obtained from Sub‑Registrar is produced, execution cannot be disbelieved, particularly when executant and legal heirs do not dispute the transaction.
(Paras 22, 24)
Property Law — Possessory agreement of sale
Delivery of possession — Proof.
Recitals in registered agreement coupled with electricity service connection obtained in purchaser’s name from year of agreement establish delivery of possession.
(Paras 19, 23)
Hindu Law — Joint family property
Alienation by manager — Effect.
Even assuming property to be joint family property, alienation by father‑manager for consideration, followed by delivery of possession, binds legal representatives when transaction is not disputed.
(Para 24)
Tenancy Law — Estoppel
Tenant — Challenge to landlord’s title.
Tenant is estopped from questioning title of landlord and cannot deny title until eviction by due process of law.
(Para 26)
Evidence Act, 1872
Third party — Challenge to consideration.
Passing of consideration under registered possessory agreement of sale cannot be questioned by a third party unconnected with the contract.
(Para 28)
Civil Procedure Code, 1908
Specific performance decree — Non‑appealing parties.
Where decree for specific performance is passed against vendors and they do not challenge the decree, a third party unconnected with agreement cannot impeach such decree.
(Paras 17, 22, 30)
Possession — Permissive possession
Licensee — Eviction.
Where occupation is permissive and permission is withdrawn, occupant is liable to be evicted upon enforcement of lawful title of decree‑holder.
(Paras 25, 30)
ANALYSIS OF FACTS
The suit O.S.No.15 of 1992 was instituted seeking:
specific performance of registered agreement of sale dated 09.03.1979; and
possession of schedule property by evicting defendant No.3.
The agreement was executed by late Koppisetty Suryanarayana for Rs.5,000/‑ with delivery of possession on the same day.
Plaintiff pleaded:
full consideration paid before Sub‑Registrar;
possession delivered in 1979;
vendor promised to execute sale deed later;
vendor died subsequently;
defendants 1 and 2 are his legal heirs;
defendant No.3 (plaintiff’s brother) was allowed permissive occupation after loan transaction.
Defendant Nos.1 and 2 remained ex parte throughout.
Defendant No.3 alone contested alleging:
no agreement of sale;
tenancy under Suryanarayana;
denial of plaintiff’s possession;
non‑repayment of loan.
Trial Court dismissed the suit.
First Appellate Court reversed findings and decreed:
specific performance against defendants 1 and 2;
possession by eviction of defendant No.3.
Second Appeal was filed only by defendant No.3.
ANALYSIS OF LAW
(A) Scope under Section 100 CPC
The High Court reiterated settled principles that interference in second appeal is permissible only when findings are perverse, illegal, or based on no evidence. The First Appellate Court being final court of facts, its conclusions cannot be substituted lightly. (Para 16)
(B) Demand prior to suit for specific performance
The appellant contended absence of legal notice.
The Court held:
oral demand is legally permissible;
plaintiff pleaded demand during vendor’s lifetime and after his death;
defendant Nos.1 and 2 never disputed such demand;
hence statutory requirement stood satisfied.
Reliance was placed on Baddam Prathap Reddy v. Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy. (Paras 18–21)
(C) Proof of agreement of sale
Agreement was registered.
Original lost in cyclone.
Certified copy (Ex.A‑1) obtained from Sub‑Registrar.
Execution not disputed by executant during lifetime nor by legal heirs.
Therefore, genuineness stood proved. (Paras 22, 24)
(D) Ownership and joint family plea
Even assuming joint family character:
father executed agreement as manager;
consideration received;
possession delivered;
legal heirs did not dispute alienation.
Hence agreement remained enforceable. (Para 24)
(E) Possession of plaintiff
Possession was established through:
recitals in registered agreement;
electricity service connection obtained in plaintiff’s name in 1979 (Ex.A‑3).
Thus plaintiff’s possession stood proved. (Para 23)
(F) Status of defendant No.3
Defendant No.3:
was not party to agreement;
pleaded tenancy but failed to prove it;
admitted relationship with plaintiff;
gave inconsistent versions regarding ownership.
Court held possession was permissive, not tenancy. (Paras 25, 29, 30)
(G) Third party objections
The Court categorically held:
third party cannot question passing of consideration;
cannot challenge decree for specific performance passed against vendors;
defendant Nos.1 and 2 having accepted decree, appellant had no locus.
(Paras 28, 30)
(H) Result under Section 100 CPC
No substantial question of law survived for consideration. Findings of First Appellate Court were based on evidence and settled law. (Para 31)
RATIO DECIDENDI
A decree for specific performance passed against the executant’s legal representatives cannot be impeached in second appeal by a third party unconnected with the agreement of sale, particularly when execution, consideration and possession under a registered possessory agreement are undisputed by the executant and his heirs, oral demand is pleaded and proved, and the alleged possession of such third party is only permissive and not supported by proof of tenancy.
FINAL HOLDING
Second Appeal dismissed.
Judgment and decree of First Appellate Court confirmed.
No substantial question of law arose.
Each party to bear own costs.
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