Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 376, 376(2)(n), 375 — ‘Rape on false promise of marriage’ — Long-term consensual relationship — Ingredients not made out Parties (major, educated woman who was already married and an advocate) were in a 3-year intimate relationship, meeting voluntarily and engaging in repeated sexual relations between 12-03-2022 and 20-05-2024. FIR filed only on 31-08-2024, after alleged refusal of appellant to pay ₹1,50,000/-. No allegation in FIR that the appellant forced the prosecutrix to accompany him or that sexual acts were against her will; she repeatedly went to the hotel of her own volition. At relevant times, prosecutrix herself opposed marriage, despite appellant’s proposals. Held, on the face of FIR and material, relationship was consensual, not traceable to a fraudulent promise of marriage; offence of rape under Ss. 376, 376(2)(n) IPC not made out.

A. Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 376, 376(2)(n), 375 — ‘Rape on false promise of marriage’ — Long-term consensual relationship — Ingredients not made out

• Parties (major, educated woman who was already married and an advocate) were in a 3-year intimate relationship, meeting voluntarily and engaging in repeated sexual relations between 12-03-2022 and 20-05-2024.

• FIR filed only on 31-08-2024, after alleged refusal of appellant to pay ₹1,50,000/-.

• No allegation in FIR that the appellant forced the prosecutrix to accompany him or that sexual acts were against her will; she repeatedly went to the hotel of her own volition.

• At relevant times, prosecutrix herself opposed marriage, despite appellant’s proposals.

• Held, on the face of FIR and material, relationship was consensual, not traceable to a fraudulent promise of marriage; offence of rape under Ss. 376, 376(2)(n) IPC not made out.

B. S. 376(2)(n) IPC — ‘Repeatedly on the same woman’ — Scope — Genuine repeated rape vs repeated consensual sex

• S. 376(2)(n) targets aggravated cases where there is a pattern of repeated sexual assault (fear, coercion, captivity, continued deceit), not a normal, functioning relationship.

• “Repeatedly” means distinct acts of sexual assault at different points in time, not mere multiple consensual encounters in a relationship.

• Present case is a “classic instance of a consensual relationship having subsequently turned acrimonious”; invocation of S. 376(2)(n) wholly unwarranted.

C. ‘False promise to marry’ — Consent under misconception of fact — Requirement of mens rea at inception

• Reiterated principles from Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 398; Deepak Gulati; and followed Prashant v. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC 764; Rajnish Singh v. State of U.P., (2025) 4 SCC 197:

  • For “misconception of fact” (S. 90 IPC), the promise must be false from the very beginning, made with no intention to marry, solely to procure sex.

  • Physical relationship must be directly and solely referable to such false promise, not to other considerations (liking, affection, ongoing relationship, etc.).

• On facts, prosecutrix continued the relationship even when she herself declined marriage and despite multiple pregnancies/abortions; her own statement “you live your life, I will live mine” negates promise-centric consent.

• Held, no cogent material to show that consent was vitiated by misconception of fact; no rape on false promise of marriage.

D. IPC — Ss. 406/420 analogy and misuse of rape provision — Failed relationships not to be criminalised

• Court reiterates concern over “disquieting tendency” of giving failed or broken relationships the colour of criminality by invoking rape provisions.

• Offence of rape, being of the gravest kind, must be reserved for instances of real sexual violence, coercion, or absence of free consent, not for sour relationships which did not culminate in marriage.

• To convert every failed relationship into rape trivialises the offence and causes grave injustice and stigma to accused; misuse of criminal justice machinery strongly deprecated.

E. CrPC / BNSS — S. 528 BNSS (analogous to S. 482 CrPC) — Quashing FIR and charge-sheet — Bhajan Lal principles applied

• Applying State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335:

  • Even if FIR and material are taken at face value, they do not prima facie constitute any offence under Ss. 376, 376(2)(n), 507 IPC.

  • Allegations point unmistakably to a voluntary, consensual relationship, later turning bitter after financial demand.

• High Court erred in refusing to exercise inherent jurisdiction under S. 528 BNSS on the ground that charge-sheet was filed and matter ready for trial.

• Held, continuation of prosecution would be abuse of process; power under S. 528 BNSS must be exercised to secure ends of justice.

F. APEX COURT HELD 

• Appeal allowed.

• Judgment and order of Bombay High Court (Aurangabad Bench) dated 06-03-2025 in Criminal Application No. 601 of 2025 set aside.

• FIR No. 294 of 2024 (City Chowk PS, Chhatrapati Sambhajinagar City) under Ss. 376, 376(2)(n), 507 IPC and Charge-sheet No. 143 of 2024 quashed.

• Appreciation recorded for Amicus Curiae; honorarium directed.