Tuesday, February 17, 2026

When daily-wage workers are similarly situated to others whose services have been regularized pursuant to judicial orders, denial of identical relief amounts to impermissible discrimination. The decision in Umadevi (3) cannot be mechanically invoked to defeat claims of long-serving employees engaged in posts of perennial nature, especially where their appointments are irregular but not illegal. Parity and equality require extension of the same benefit to all identically placed employees.

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Service Law — Casual Workers in Income Tax Department — Regularization — Parity with Similarly Situated Employees — Discrimination Impermissible

(Paras 6 to 8, 10, 11)

Where daily-wage workers of the Income Tax Department, whose names figured in the same seniority list as other similarly situated employees, were denied regularization despite this Court having earlier directed regularization of co-workers from the very same list, such denial amounts to hostile discrimination. Once the benefit of regularization has been granted to identically placed employees pursuant to judicial orders, the employer cannot selectively refuse similar treatment to others similarly situated. The principle of parity and non-discrimination mandates extension of identical relief.


Regularization — Applicability of Umadevi (3) — Distinction Between “Illegal” and “Irregular” Appointments

(Paras 2, 4, 9, 10)

The Constitution Bench decision in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) does not bar regularization in every case of non-permanent engagement. The judgment distinguishes between illegal appointments and irregular appointments. Where employees were engaged through employment exchange sponsorship, interviewed, and have rendered long years of service in posts of perennial nature, their engagement cannot be treated as illegal. Mechanical reliance on the ten-year cut-off in Umadevi (3), without examining factual parity and the nature of work performed, amounts to misapplication of the law.


Service Jurisprudence — Perennial Nature of Work — Outsourcing — Indicator of Continuing Need

(Para 9)

Where duties performed by casual workers are subsequently outsourced, such outsourcing demonstrates that the work is perennial and essential to the functioning of the department. Replacement of one set of workers by contractual labour does not negate the existence of regular, continuing functions. Courts must examine the substance of employment rather than the nomenclature.


Precedent — Binding Effect of Earlier Directions for Regularization — Ravi Verma and Raman Kumar

(Paras 6 to 8, 11)

In Ravi Verma v. Union of India, this Court directed regularization of daily-wage workers in the Income Tax Department whose names appeared in the same departmental list. Subsequently, in Raman Kumar v. Union of India, identical relief was granted on the ground of parity. Employees forming part of the same list and similarly situated cannot be denied relief once such judicial directions attain finality.


Interpretation of Umadevi (3) — Clarification in Jaggo — Human and Equitable Approach

(Para 9)

The subsequent decision in Jaggo v. Union of India clarifies that Umadevi (3) cannot be weaponized to defeat legitimate claims of long-serving employees performing indispensable duties. Courts must adopt a humane and equitable approach where appointments are not illegal and the service rendered is continuous and unblemished.


ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

The appellants were casual workers engaged in the Office of the Commissioner of Income Tax, Gwalior, from the early 1990s and late 1990s. Their names were sponsored through the Employment Exchange, and they were engaged after interview as daily-wage workers on posts such as Sweeper and Cook. They continued in service for considerable periods.

Their request for regularization was rejected by the Central Administrative Tribunal on the ground that they did not fulfil the requirement of ten years’ continuous service as on 10.04.2006, as contemplated in Umadevi (3). The High Court affirmed that decision.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellants demonstrated that their names appeared in the same departmental list dated 31.10.2005 (and subsequent lists) alongside other daily-wage workers whose services had already been regularized pursuant to the judgment in Ravi Verma. The Court noted that five workers from that very list had secured regularization from 01.07.2006 by virtue of judicial directions.

The Court further observed that in Raman Kumar, regularization was extended to similarly situated employees, and the principle of parity was applied to prevent discrimination.

In addition, reliance was placed on Jaggo, wherein this Court clarified that Umadevi (3) must not be misapplied to deny regularization where appointments are irregular rather than illegal and where the employees have rendered long years of indispensable service.

The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal had erred in mechanically applying Umadevi (3) without examining parity and the factual matrix. The High Court compounded the error by affirming that approach.

Since the appellants were similarly situated as those in Ravi Verma and Raman Kumar, and since the department could not discriminate between workers drawn from the same list, the denial of regularization was unsustainable.


RATIO DECIDENDI

When daily-wage workers are similarly situated to others whose services have been regularized pursuant to judicial orders, denial of identical relief amounts to impermissible discrimination. The decision in Umadevi (3) cannot be mechanically invoked to defeat claims of long-serving employees engaged in posts of perennial nature, especially where their appointments are irregular but not illegal. Parity and equality require extension of the same benefit to all identically placed employees.


CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and directed regularization of the appellants’ services with effect from 01.07.2006 on the same terms as granted in Ravi Verma and Raman Kumar. Consequential benefits were directed to be released within three months. The appeal was allowed without costs.

Evidence Act, 1872 — Sections 63, 64 and 65 — Secondary Evidence — Foundational Requirements — Photocopy of Power of Attorney — Admissibility (Paras 19 to 23) Primary evidence is the rule and secondary evidence is an exception. Before secondary evidence can be admitted, the party relying upon it must establish the existence and execution of the original document and must satisfactorily account for its non-production within the framework of Section 65 of the Evidence Act. A photocopy, even if notarised, does not become admissible unless foundational facts are proved and the case falls within one of the clauses of Section 65. Mere marking of a document as an exhibit does not dispense with the obligation of proving its admissibility in accordance with law. In the absence of compliance with Sections 63 and 65, the photocopy remains no evidence in the eye of law.

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Second Appeal — Scope of Interference under Section 100 CPC — Findings Based on Inadmissible Evidence — Whether Substantial Question of Law Arises

(Paras 16 to 16.7, 17, 23)

The restriction imposed by Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, confines the jurisdiction of the High Court in second appeal to cases involving substantial questions of law. Ordinarily, findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court are final and binding. However, where such findings are founded upon inadmissible evidence, or are based on no evidence, or suffer from perversity by ignoring settled principles of law, interference becomes permissible. A finding rendered on the basis of an unproved photocopy, without compliance with the mandatory requirements for leading secondary evidence, constitutes a perversity in law. Such perversity itself gives rise to a substantial question of law warranting interference in second appeal.


Evidence Act, 1872 — Sections 63, 64 and 65 — Secondary Evidence — Foundational Requirements — Photocopy of Power of Attorney — Admissibility

(Paras 19 to 23)

Primary evidence is the rule and secondary evidence is an exception. Before secondary evidence can be admitted, the party relying upon it must establish the existence and execution of the original document and must satisfactorily account for its non-production within the framework of Section 65 of the Evidence Act. A photocopy, even if notarised, does not become admissible unless foundational facts are proved and the case falls within one of the clauses of Section 65. Mere marking of a document as an exhibit does not dispense with the obligation of proving its admissibility in accordance with law. In the absence of compliance with Sections 63 and 65, the photocopy remains no evidence in the eye of law.


Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 85 — Presumption as to Power of Attorney — Applicability

(Para 23)

The statutory presumption under Section 85 of the Evidence Act applies only when a power of attorney is duly produced and proved. The presumption cannot be invoked in respect of a document whose admissibility itself is not established. Where the foundational requirement of admissible evidence is not satisfied, the presumption under Section 85 does not arise.


Registration Act, 1908 — Section 33 — Authentication of Power of Attorney — Relevance

(Para 23)

Questions concerning authentication under Section 33 of the Registration Act become relevant only after the existence and admissibility of the power of attorney are established. When the very document relied upon is not proved in accordance with law, the issue of statutory authentication does not arise for consideration.


Civil Law — Agency — Burden of Proving Authority to Alienate — Consequence of Failure

(Paras 14, 15, 23)

Where an agent claims authority to alienate immovable property on the strength of a power of attorney, the burden lies squarely upon the agent to prove the existence, execution and scope of such authority. Failure to discharge that burden renders any conveyance executed by the agent void and non-binding on the principal.


ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

The controversy arose out of a family dispute concerning alienation of immovable properties by the 1st defendant, who claimed to have acted under a power of attorney allegedly executed by the plaintiff, his sister. The plaintiff admitted execution of a limited power of attorney but denied granting authority to sell the property. The defendants relied upon a document marked as Exh. B-2, which was only a notarised photocopy of the alleged power of attorney.

The Trial Court, upon examination of the document and surrounding circumstances, found that the alleged clauses authorising sale appeared interpolated and that the original power of attorney was not produced. It concluded that the defendants failed to prove valid authority to alienate and decreed the suit.

The First Appellate Court reversed this decree. It treated the photocopy as admissible secondary evidence, invoked the presumption under Section 85 of the Evidence Act, and accepted that the authority to sell stood proved.

In second appeal, the High Court restored the decree of the Trial Court, holding that the foundational requirements for adducing secondary evidence were not satisfied and that reliance on Exh. B-2 was legally untenable.

Before the Supreme Court, the principal question was whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC by interfering with findings of fact.

The Court undertook a detailed exposition of the law governing second appeals. It reiterated that although factual findings are ordinarily immune from interference, such protection does not extend to findings based on inadmissible evidence. A decision founded upon a document that is legally non-existent in evidence amounts to a perverse finding.

Turning to the evidentiary issue, the Court emphasised that secondary evidence is not automatically admissible merely because the original is unavailable. The party must first establish the existence and execution of the original and then account for its absence in terms of Section 65. No such foundation was laid in the present case. There was no order permitting secondary evidence, nor any proof satisfying the statutory requirements. Consequently, Exh. B-2 could not be treated as evidence.

The Court further clarified that statutory presumptions under Section 85 presuppose proper proof of the document. A presumption cannot cure a fundamental defect of inadmissibility. Since the power of attorney itself was not proved, the presumption did not arise.

The First Appellate Court, by relying on Exh. B-2 and comparing signatures without proper evidentiary basis, acted upon inadmissible material. Such reliance vitiated its findings. The High Court, therefore, did not reappreciate evidence but corrected a legal error concerning admissibility. That correction fell squarely within the permissible ambit of Section 100 CPC.


RATIO DECIDENDI

A finding of fact based upon a document that has not been proved in accordance with the mandatory requirements governing secondary evidence is perverse in law. The presumption under Section 85 of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked unless the power of attorney is first proved by admissible primary or secondary evidence. Where the first appellate court relies upon an inadmissible photocopy to uphold authority of an agent to alienate immovable property, the High Court is justified in interfering in second appeal under Section 100 CPC. Failure to prove authority results in the conveyance being void and non-binding upon the principal.


CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court dismissed the civil appeal and affirmed the High Court’s judgment restoring the decree of the Trial Court. The sale deeds executed by the 1st defendant were held invalid for want of proof of authority. The decision reinforces the strict evidentiary discipline governing secondary evidence and clarifies that correction of perversity falls within the legitimate scope of Section 100 CPC.

Bail — Annulment vs Cancellation — Distinction Reaffirmed (Paras 13–19) An appeal against grant of bail is distinct from cancellation of bail based on post-bail conduct. In an appeal against grant, the appellate court examines: Legality Propriety Sustainability of the bail order at inception Where bail is granted ignoring material evidence, criminal antecedents, or based on irrelevant considerations, annulment is justified without requiring supervening circumstances.

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Bail — Annulment vs Cancellation — Distinction Reaffirmed

(Paras 13–19)

An appeal against grant of bail is distinct from cancellation of bail based on post-bail conduct.

In an appeal against grant, the appellate court examines:

  • Legality

  • Propriety

  • Sustainability of the bail order at inception

Where bail is granted ignoring material evidence, criminal antecedents, or based on irrelevant considerations, annulment is justified without requiring supervening circumstances.


Bail — Suppression of Criminal Antecedents — Fraud on Court

(Paras 31, 42–44)

Suppression of criminal history in bail applications vitiates the order.

Deliberate concealment amounts to abuse of process and attracts the doctrine:

Suppressio veri, expressio falsi

Full and candid disclosure is mandatory.


Bail — Reliance on Disputed Documents — Improper Exercise of Discretion

(Paras 23–25)

Grant of bail based on documents whose genuineness is itself under investigation is perverse and legally untenable.


Criminal Antecedents — Relevance at Bail Stage

(Paras 26–30)

Criminal antecedents are a significant factor in bail adjudication, especially where allegations disclose:

  • Organised criminal conduct

  • Repeated similar offences

  • Societal impact

Ignoring antecedents renders the bail order deviant and vulnerable to appellate interference.


Forged Educational Degrees — Impact on Legal Profession

(Paras 22, 26)

Forgery of law degrees and impersonation as advocate undermines:

  • Public faith in the justice system

  • Institutional integrity of courts

  • Regulatory framework of legal profession

Such offences have broader societal ramifications.


Transfer of Investigation — Exceptional Circumstances Required

(Paras 34–41)

After filing of chargesheet and taking cognizance, transfer of investigation to special agency can be ordered only in rare and exceptional circumstances involving:

  • Bias

  • Mala fides

  • Influence of high-ranking officials

  • Credibility concerns

Mere allegations of larger racket insufficient.


Bail Pleadings — Mandatory Disclosure Framework Suggested

(Paras 49–50)

Supreme Court issued recommendatory disclosure framework covering:

  • Case details

  • Custody status

  • Trial stage

  • Criminal antecedents

  • Previous bail applications

  • Coercive processes

Directed circulation to all High Courts for possible rule incorporation.


FACTUAL MATRIX


FIR Details

FIR No. 314 of 2024
Registered at: PS Saray Khwaja, District Jaunpur, U.P.
Sections: 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC

Allegation: Large-scale organised racket involving forged law degrees and academic certificates.


Specific Allegations Against Respondent No. 2

Respondent allegedly:

  • Fabricated LL.B. degree purportedly from Sarvodaya Group of Institutions

  • Institution not affiliated to Veer Bahadur Singh Purvanchal University

  • Circulated visiting cards bearing national emblem “Satyameva Jayate”

  • Projected himself as advocate before courts

  • Facilitated forged degrees for others

  • Secured enrolment with Bar Council and SCBA membership


Criminal Antecedents

Nine FIRs across multiple States including:

  • Karnataka

  • Maharashtra

  • Uttar Pradesh

Allegations include forgery, cheating, impersonation, intimidation, exam malpractice.


HIGH COURT ORDER

High Court granted bail primarily on:

  • Claim that degree was genuine

  • Family property dispute between parties

  • Filing of chargesheet

Criminal antecedents allegedly suppressed.


SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS


I. Doctrinal Clarification — Annulment vs Cancellation

The Court reiterated:

  • Cancellation requires supervening circumstances.

  • Annulment examines whether bail order was perverse at inception.

Here, scrutiny was of the bail order itself.


II. Non-Application of Mind by High Court

High Court failed to consider:

  • University’s categorical denial of affiliation.

  • Communication that institution did not offer LL.B.

  • Disclaimer on downloaded marksheet.

  • Multiple criminal cases pending.

  • Suppression of antecedents.

Thus, bail order legally unsustainable.


III. Gravity of Offence

Court observed:

Forgery of law degree is not a private dispute but strikes at the integrity of justice system.

Societal impact significant.


IV. Suppression as Vitiating Factor

Respondent declared before High Court that he had no criminal history except present FIR.

This was factually incorrect.

Court held such suppression materially influenced grant of bail and vitiated discretion.


V. Transfer of Investigation — Rejected

Though larger racket alleged, Court declined transfer because:

  • Chargesheet already filed.

  • Cognizance taken.

  • No material showing biased investigation.

  • Verification of law degrees already under monitoring by Court in:

    • Ajay Shankar Srivastava v. Bar Council of India

    • M. Varadhan v. Union of India


RATIO DECIDENDI

  1. A bail order granted ignoring material evidence and criminal antecedents is perverse and liable to be annulled in appeal.

  2. Suppression of criminal history by accused vitiates bail discretion.

  3. Courts cannot rely on documents under serious challenge as basis for bail.

  4. Criminal antecedents are relevant and significant in bail adjudication.

  5. Transfer of investigation after chargesheet requires exceptional circumstances.

  6. Full and candid disclosure is a mandatory obligation in bail proceedings.

Reserved Forest — Long-standing Occupation — Identity Documents — No Automatic Legal Right (Paras 3, 4) Issuance of Aadhaar cards, ration cards, or identity documents does not confer legal title over reserved forest land.

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Forest Law — Encroachment on Reserved Forest — Constitutional Obligation of State

(Paras 2, 9, 10)

The State is under a constitutional mandate under Articles 48A and 51A(g) to protect forests and prevent environmental degradation.

Encroachment upon reserved forest land constitutes a serious ecological threat.

However, environmental protection must be pursued through lawful and procedurally fair means.


Environmental Governance — Rule of Law — Due Process in Evictions

(Paras 10, 12, 13)

The constitutional duty to remove encroachments does not authorise arbitrary action.

Eviction from reserved forest must conform to:

  • Notice,

  • Opportunity to produce evidence,

  • Scrutiny by a competent committee,

  • Passing of a speaking order,

  • Reasonable notice period prior to eviction.

Environmental protection and rule of law must co-exist.


Reserved Forest — Long-standing Occupation — Identity Documents — No Automatic Legal Right

(Paras 3, 4)

Issuance of Aadhaar cards, ration cards, or identity documents does not confer legal title over reserved forest land.


Procedural Safeguards Approved by Supreme Court

(Paras 12–13)

The mechanism evolved by the State of Assam for removal of encroachments was approved as containing adequate safeguards, including:

  1. Constitution of committee (forest + revenue officials).

  2. Notice to alleged encroachers.

  3. Opportunity to produce documentary evidence.

  4. Determination whether land lies within reserved forest or revenue land.

  5. Speaking order if encroachment established.

  6. 15 days’ notice before eviction.

  7. Protection for forest villagers under Jamabandi Register and rights under Forest Rights Act, 2006.


Status Quo Protection — Interim Safeguard

(Para 13)

Status quo directed till:

  • Speaking order is passed, and

  • 15-day notice period expires.


FACTUAL BACKGROUND


Location of Dispute

Villages located in:

  • Doyang Reserved Forest

  • South Nambar Reserved Forest

  • Jamuna Madunga Reserve Forest

  • Barpani Reserved Forest

  • Lutumai Reserved Forest

  • Golaghat Forest (Assam)

Forests notified as Reserved Forests in 1887–1888.


Appellants’ Case

  • Residence claimed for 70+ years.

  • Possession allegedly acknowledged by issuance of identity documents.

  • Eviction notices arbitrary.

  • No prior hearing.

  • Seven-day eviction period unreasonable.


State’s Case

  • Approximately 3,62,082 hectares under encroachment.

  • Nearly 19.92% forest area affected.

  • Large-scale illegal clearing for residential/agricultural purposes.

  • Constitutional duty to remove encroachments.


CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK EMPHASIZED


Article 48A

State shall protect and improve environment and safeguard forests and wildlife.

Article 51A(g)

Fundamental duty of citizens to protect and improve natural environment.

The Court emphasized that Directive Principles guide governance even if not enforceable.


COURT’S CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCING


The Court articulated a critical doctrinal position:

The Constitution does not envisage a choice between environmental protection and the rule of law; both must co-exist and reinforce each other.

Thus:

  • Environmental restoration is mandatory.

  • Eviction must follow fair procedure.


STATE’S ADDITIONAL AFFIDAVIT — KEY FEATURES


The State proposed a structured eviction mechanism:

Step 1: Notice

Alleged unauthorised occupant receives notice.

Step 2: Hearing

Committee (forest + revenue officials) evaluates evidence.

Step 3: Classification

  • If land outside forest → matter referred to Revenue Department.

  • If within reserved forest → further action.

Step 4: Speaking Order

Reasoned order determining unauthorized occupation.

Step 5: 15-Day Eviction Notice

Only after expiry of notice period eviction can proceed.

Protection Recognised:

  • Forest villagers recorded in Jamabandi Register.

  • Title holders under Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006.


COURT’S FINDINGS


1. Safeguards Adequate

The evolved mechanism conforms to:

  • Fairness

  • Reasonableness

  • Due process

2. Status Quo Ordered

Till speaking order + expiry of 15-day period.

3. No Opinion on Merits

Claims to be adjudicated by Committee.

4. Article 32 Petitions

Not examined in detail due to mechanism evolved; petitioners free to pursue remedies.


RATIO DECIDENDI

  1. The State’s constitutional duty to protect forests mandates removal of encroachments.

  2. Such removal must comply with principles of natural justice and procedural fairness.

  3. Identity documentation does not confer proprietary rights over reserved forest land.

  4. Eviction from forest land requires notice, hearing, reasoned order, and reasonable time to vacate.

  5. Environmental protection and rule of law are complementary constitutional imperatives.

Service Law — Disciplinary Proceedings — Judicial Review — Remand by High Court — Impermissibility of Deciding on Single Point (Paras 8–10) Where several substantial issues arise in a writ petition challenging disciplinary action, the High Court must adjudicate all material issues with reasons. Remanding a matter solely on one procedural aspect (authorization to initiate proceedings) without examining: Alleged breach of principles of natural justice, Legality of inquiry proceedings, Correctness of Tribunal’s findings, constitutes a fundamental flaw vitiating the order.

Service Law — Disciplinary Proceedings — Judicial Review — Remand by High Court — Impermissibility of Deciding on Single Point

(Paras 8–10)

Where several substantial issues arise in a writ petition challenging disciplinary action, the High Court must adjudicate all material issues with reasons.

Remanding a matter solely on one procedural aspect (authorization to initiate proceedings) without examining:

  • Alleged breach of principles of natural justice,

  • Legality of inquiry proceedings,

  • Correctness of Tribunal’s findings,

constitutes a fundamental flaw vitiating the order.


Judicial Discipline — Duty to Record Findings on All Issues

(Para 9)

It is settled law that when multiple issues arise, the Court must:

  • Record findings on each issue,

  • Assign reasons,

  • Avoid selective adjudication on a single decisive point.

Such an approach ensures clarity, finality, and assists appellate review.


Disciplinary Proceedings — Natural Justice — Denial of Cross-Examination

(Paras 5, 8)

Where employee alleges:

  • Closure of inquiry mid cross-examination,

  • Denial of opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witnesses,

such allegations go to the root of fairness and must be examined by the writ court before remand.


Superannuation — Relief — Reinstatement Infructuous

(Para 11)

Upon employee reaching age of superannuation:

  • Reinstatement becomes academic,

  • Surviving issues are:

    • Justification of Tribunal’s interference,

    • Entitlement to back wages,

    • Entitlement to retiral benefits.


FACTUAL MATRIX


Tribunal Stage

The School Tribunal, Nagpur (8 August 2019):

  • Set aside dismissal order,

  • Granted reinstatement with consequential benefits.


High Court Stage

Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench)

  • Allowed writ petition filed by management (5 September 2024).

  • Quashed Tribunal’s order.

  • Remanded matter to Tribunal.

  • Considered only one issue:

    • Whether Secretary was authorized via resolution to initiate disciplinary proceedings.

No consideration was given to:

  • Alleged breach of natural justice,

  • Cross-examination issues,

  • Merits of Tribunal’s findings.

Review petition rejected on 25 September 2024.


ISSUES BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT

  1. Whether High Court erred in remanding matter based on a solitary procedural issue?

  2. Whether High Court was required to adjudicate all substantial issues?

  3. What relief survives post-superannuation?


ANALYSIS


I. Selective Adjudication — A Jurisdictional Error

The Supreme Court held that the High Court:

  • Focused exclusively on authorization of Secretary,

  • Ignored substantive grounds challenging disciplinary inquiry,

  • Failed to evaluate whether principles of natural justice were violated.

Such selective adjudication renders the decision legally unsustainable.


II. Denial of Cross-Examination — Root Violation

Appellant contended:

  • Cross-examination of main management witness was ongoing on 31 July 2017.

  • Inquiry officer abruptly closed proceedings on 1 August 2017.

  • Opportunity to cross-examine remaining witnesses denied.

These allegations:

  • Strike at the core of fair hearing,

  • Engage audi alteram partem,

  • Required judicial examination.

High Court omitted consideration of these material aspects.


III. Doctrine of Comprehensive Issue Determination

Para 9 articulates an important judicial principle:

Courts must answer each issue arising in the case with reasons rather than focusing on a single decisive point.

Rationale:

  • Protects litigant’s right to reasoned justice,

  • Prevents piecemeal adjudication,

  • Assists appellate scrutiny,

  • Promotes judicial discipline.


IV. Superannuation — Shift in Relief

Since appellant attained superannuation:

Reinstatement no longer survives.

High Court must now determine:

  1. Was Tribunal justified in interfering with disciplinary action?

  2. Is appellant entitled to back wages and retiral benefits?


RATIO DECIDENDI

  1. A High Court commits a fundamental adjudicatory error when it decides a writ petition on a single procedural issue while ignoring other substantial issues.

  2. Allegations of breach of natural justice in disciplinary proceedings must be examined before remanding.

  3. Reasoned findings on all material issues are mandatory for judicial legitimacy and appellate efficacy.

  4. Upon superannuation, reinstatement becomes infructuous; entitlement shifts to monetary and retiral consequences.


Writ Jurisdiction – Remand – Duty to Decide All Material Issues (Paras 8–10) Where multiple substantial issues arise in a writ petition, the High Court must: Consider and record findings on all material issues, Provide reasons for each determination, Avoid deciding the matter on a solitary technical point while ignoring other substantial grounds. Failure to do so constitutes a fundamental flaw vitiating the order.

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A. Writ Jurisdiction – Remand – Duty to Decide All Material Issues

(Paras 8–10)

Where multiple substantial issues arise in a writ petition, the High Court must:

  • Consider and record findings on all material issues,

  • Provide reasons for each determination,

  • Avoid deciding the matter on a solitary technical point while ignoring other substantial grounds.

Failure to do so constitutes a fundamental flaw vitiating the order.


B. Judicial Discipline – Reasoned Adjudication

(Para 9)

Law is settled that:

Courts must answer each issue arising in the case with reasons rather than deciding on a single decisive point.

This ensures:

  • Clarity,

  • Finality,

  • Fairness to litigants,

  • Assistance to appellate courts.


C. Disciplinary Proceedings – Natural Justice – Duty of High Court

(Paras 5, 8)

When challenge to disciplinary action includes:

  • Allegation of breach of principles of natural justice,

  • Denial of opportunity to cross-examine witnesses,

  • Tribunal findings on merits,

High Court must examine such claims before remanding solely on a procedural authorization issue.


D. Remand by Supreme Court – Scope

(Paras 10–13)

Supreme Court set aside High Court’s remand order and:

  • Remanded writ petition to High Court for fresh adjudication,

  • Kept all questions of fact and law open,

  • Identified core issues for determination.


E. Superannuation – Relief Modified

(Para 11)

Where employee has attained superannuation:

  • Reinstatement no longer survives,

  • Issues shift to:

    • Validity of Tribunal’s interference,

    • Entitlement to back wages,

    • Entitlement to retiral benefits.


FACTUAL BACKGROUND


I. Parties

  • Appellant: Hemlata Eknath Pise (employee dismissed from service).

  • Respondent No. 1: Shubham Bahu-uddeshiya Sanstha Waddhamna (management).

  • Tribunal: School Tribunal, Nagpur.

  • High Court: Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench).


II. Tribunal Proceedings

The School Tribunal:

  • Set aside dismissal order (8 August 2019),

  • Directed reinstatement with consequential benefits.


III. High Court Proceedings

Management filed Writ Petition No. 5899/2019.

High Court allowed writ petition (5 September 2024) and:

  • Quashed Tribunal’s order,

  • Remanded matter to Tribunal,

  • Based solely on one ground:

    • Tribunal failed to examine resolution authorizing Secretary to initiate proceedings.

High Court did not examine:

  • Alleged breach of natural justice,

  • Whether cross-examination was denied,

  • Whether charges were proved,

  • Whether Tribunal’s findings were justified.


IV. Review Petition

Appellant filed review (MRA No. 838/2024):

Raised:

  • Inquiry officer abruptly closed cross-examination,

  • Main management witness not fully cross-examined,

  • Breach of natural justice,

  • Tribunal had found charges not proved.

Review rejected (25 September 2024).


ISSUES BEFORE SUPREME COURT

  1. Whether High Court erred in remanding matter on a single procedural ground?

  2. Whether High Court was required to consider all material issues?

  3. Whether remand was legally sustainable?


ANALYSIS


I. Error in High Court’s Approach

The Supreme Court held:

High Court considered only:

  • Whether Secretary was authorized to issue charge-sheet.

But failed to consider:

  • Whether inquiry was vitiated by denial of cross-examination,

  • Whether natural justice was breached,

  • Whether Tribunal’s findings were justified.

This was a serious adjudicatory defect.


II. Principle: Comprehensive Issue Determination

Para 9 lays down a significant procedural doctrine:

When several issues arise, Court must:

  • Answer each issue,

  • Provide reasons,

  • Avoid selective adjudication.

This principle serves:

  • Litigant’s right to reasoned decision,

  • Appellate efficiency,

  • Judicial accountability.


III. Breach of Natural Justice – Serious Allegation

The appellant alleged:

  • Cross-examination of main witness was ongoing on 31 July 2017,

  • Inquiry officer abruptly closed proceedings on 1 August 2017,

  • No opportunity to cross-examine remaining witnesses.

Such allegations go to the root of:

  • Fair hearing,

  • Audi alteram partem,

  • Validity of disciplinary proceedings.

High Court ignored these.


IV. Improper Remand

The High Court:

  • Remanded matter without deciding substantive grounds,

  • Focused narrowly on authorization resolution.

Supreme Court held:

This selective adjudication vitiates the order.


V. Superannuation – Modified Relief Landscape

Appellant has reached superannuation.

Therefore:

  • Reinstatement no longer survives.

  • High Court must determine:

    (i) Was Tribunal justified in interfering with disciplinary action?
    (ii) Is appellant entitled to back wages and retiral benefits?


RATIO DECIDENDI

  1. When multiple substantial issues arise, High Court must adjudicate each issue with reasons.

  2. Remanding a matter on a solitary technical ground while ignoring allegations of breach of natural justice and merits is legally unsustainable.

  3. Failure to provide reasoned findings on all material issues constitutes a fundamental flaw.

  4. In cases where reinstatement becomes infructuous due to superannuation, court must determine entitlement to back wages and retiral benefits.

Sports Governance – Cricket – Applicability of Reform Directions Issued in Athletics Case (S. Nithya) (Paras 10–15) Directions issued by the Madras High Court in S. Nithya v. Union of India mandating: 75% membership of sports bodies to comprise eminent sportspersons, Office-bearers to be sports persons, Mandatory eligibility standards for sports persons, are not applicable to cricket associations, particularly where the governance framework of cricket is already regulated by the decision of this Court in BCCI v. Cricket Association of Bihar.

advocatemmmohan


A. Sports Governance – Cricket – Applicability of Reform Directions Issued in Athletics Case (S. Nithya)

(Paras 10–15)

Directions issued by the Madras High Court in S. Nithya v. Union of India mandating:

  • 75% membership of sports bodies to comprise eminent sportspersons,

  • Office-bearers to be sports persons,

  • Mandatory eligibility standards for sports persons,

are not applicable to cricket associations, particularly where the governance framework of cricket is already regulated by the decision of this Court in BCCI v. Cricket Association of Bihar.


B. Cricket Governance – Special Regulatory Regime – BCCI Judgment

(Paras 13–15, 18–20)

The regulatory framework for cricket in India is governed by the BCCI judgment.

The BCCI decision:

  • Approved the BCCI Constitution,

  • Directed State Associations to align with BCCI Constitution,

  • Did not mandate District Associations to restructure their composition or adopt identical constitutional models.

Thus, High Court erred in extending S. Nithya directions to district cricket associations.


C. Autonomy of District Associations – Limits of Judicial Mandate

(Paras 18–20)

District Cricket Associations are not judicially obligated to:

  • Mandate 75% eminent sportsperson membership,

  • Restrict office-bearers exclusively to sportspersons,

  • Model their constitutions exactly on BCCI Constitution.

Absent specific statutory mandate or judicial direction, restructuring cannot be imposed via writ jurisdiction.


D. Judicial Review in Sports Governance – Reform vs. Imposition

(Paras 21–23)

While courts cannot judicially impose structural reform absent legal mandate, they may:

  • Encourage transparency,

  • Promote professionalism,

  • Emphasize accountability and good governance,

  • Highlight constitutional values such as fraternity and accessibility in sports.


E. Pending Statutory Proceedings – Judicial Restraint

(Paras 25–26)

Where membership and composition issues are pending before:

  • Authorities under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975, and

  • High Court in related writ proceedings,

Supreme Court will refrain from adjudicating overlapping issues and instead direct expeditious disposal.


FACTUAL MATRIX


I. Parties

  • Appellant: Tiruchirappalli District Cricket Association (registered society under Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975; affiliated to Tamil Nadu Cricket Association).

  • Respondent No. 1: Anna Nagar Cricket Club.

  • Respondent No. 2: Former office-bearer of appellant association.


II. Writ Appeal (MD) No. 896/2024 – Membership & Voting Rights

Respondent No. 1 sought:

  • Membership,

  • Voting rights,

  • Participation in knockout tournament.

Single Judge disposed petition noting participation allowed.

Division Bench affirmed voting and membership rights.

Before Supreme Court:

Appellant conceded:

  • No objection to respondent no. 1 voting.

Issue became academic.


III. Writ Appeal (MD) No. 915/2024 – Election & Structural Reforms

Respondent No. 2 sought:

  • Direction for free and fair election,

  • Fresh voters list,

  • Compliance with reforms in S. Nithya,

  • Constitutional amendment in line with other sports federations.

High Court allowed petition relying on S. Nithya.

This was challenged.


CORE LEGAL ISSUES

  1. Whether directions in S. Nithya apply to cricket associations?

  2. Whether District Cricket Association must model constitution on BCCI Constitution?

  3. Scope of judicial intervention in internal governance of sports associations?


ANALYSIS


I. Inapplicability of S. Nithya to Cricket

The Court held:

  • S. Nithya arose in context of athletics governance.

  • It mandated 75% eminent sportsperson composition.

  • Cricket is governed by BCCI framework.

Since BCCI judgment did not prescribe 75% eminent sportsperson requirement, S. Nithya cannot be extended to cricket associations.

Key observation (Para 15):

Directions in S. Nithya do not apply to the sport of cricket.


II. BCCI Judgment – Limited Scope

The Court carefully examined BCCI v. Cricket Association of Bihar.

Extracted principles:

  • Right under Article 19(1)(c) protects formation and continued existence of associations.

  • Regulatory reform permissible.

  • BCCI reforms applied to BCCI and State Associations.

  • No mandate for District Associations to identically restructure.

Thus:

District associations cannot be compelled judicially to mirror BCCI Constitution.


III. Distinction from AIFF Case

Court referred to All India Football Federation v. Rahul Mehra.

In AIFF case:

  • Football’s international regulatory pyramid required compliance.

  • Different sport, different regulatory structure.

Cricket regime stands on distinct footing.


IV. Judicial Philosophy on Sports Governance

The Court made significant constitutional observations:

Sports:

  • Promote fraternity (Article 38),

  • Are material resources of community (Article 39(b)),

  • Must remain accessible (Article 15(2)).

Important normative statements (Paras 22–23):

  • Sports operationalize constitutional fraternity.

  • Facilities must not be concentrated in urban elite.

  • Revenue must subserve public sporting access.

This is jurisprudentially significant — linking sports governance to constitutional morality.


V. Voluntary Reform Encouraged

Though judicial imposition rejected, Court emphasized:

District associations must voluntarily:

  • Ensure transparency,

  • Prevent conflict of interest,

  • Maintain professional governance,

  • Encourage inclusive participation.


VI. Pending Membership Disputes

Proceedings pending:

  • Under Section 36, Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act.

  • Before High Court Division Bench.

  • Registrar’s suo motu inquiry.

Court declined to adjudicate membership composition and directed expeditious disposal.


RATIO DECIDENDI

  1. Directions issued in S. Nithya (athletics governance case) are not automatically applicable to cricket associations.

  2. BCCI judgment does not mandate district cricket associations to model their constitutions identically on BCCI Constitution.

  3. Judicial review cannot impose structural reforms on sports bodies in absence of statutory or binding judicial mandate.

  4. Internal composition of district cricket associations remains autonomous subject to applicable statutory framework.

  5. Courts may encourage but cannot compel governance reform absent legal basis.

Limitation – Section 5, Limitation Act, 1963 – “Sufficient Cause” – Government Litigant (Paras 13–17, 20–22) The expression “sufficient cause” under Limitation Act, 1963 is elastic but not unlimited. While some latitude is permissible to a “State” owing to bureaucratic procedures, such latitude cannot extend to condoning gross lethargy, indifference, and prolonged inaction.

advocatemmmohan

A. Limitation – Section 5, Limitation Act, 1963 – “Sufficient Cause” – Government Litigant

(Paras 13–17, 20–22)

The expression “sufficient cause” under Limitation Act, 1963 is elastic but not unlimited.

While some latitude is permissible to a “State” owing to bureaucratic procedures, such latitude cannot extend to condoning gross lethargy, indifference, and prolonged inaction.


B. Delay by Government – Liberal Approach – Limits of Judicial Patience

(Paras 14–19)

Earlier decisions such as:

  • Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji

  • G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer

advocated a justice-oriented and liberal approach in condoning delay for government litigants.

However, later decisions including:

  • Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd.

  • University of Delhi v. Union of India

  • Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector (LA)

reflect a stricter approach, emphasizing that limitation law is founded on public policy and cannot be diluted endlessly.


C. “Explanation” vs. “Excuse” – Distinction

(Para 17, 21)

Courts must distinguish between:

  • A genuine “explanation”, and

  • A stereotyped bureaucratic “excuse”.

Routine pleas of administrative delay and procedural approval do not constitute sufficient cause.


D. Inherent Defect in Appeal – Failure to File Certified Copy

(Paras 3–5)

An appeal not accompanied by a certified copy of the impugned order and not cured for eight years remains inherently defective.

Delay exceeding eleven years cannot be condoned on vague grounds.


E. Judicial Discretion – Not a Matter of Right

(Para 21)

Condonation of delay is discretionary, not a vested right—even for the State.

Where conduct shows gross indifference, discretion must be refused.


FACTUAL MATRIX


1. Original Proceedings

Respondent school approached the State Education Tribunal under Section 24B of the Odisha Education Act, 1969 seeking grant-in-aid.

Tribunal Order (30.12.2013):

  • Directed State of Odisha to release grant-in-aid.


2. Appeal Before High Court

State filed FAO No. 582 of 2015 (16.10.2015).

Defects:

  • Appeal time-barred.

  • No certified copy annexed.

  • Certified copy not filed for 8 years.

High Court (26.04.2023):

  • Dismissed appeal for failure to file certified copy.


3. Subsequent Conduct

State obtained certified copy only on 13.02.2024.

Filed:

  • Recall application (I.A. 165/2024)

  • Delay condonation application (291 days)

High Court (21.02.2025):

  • Observed delay exceeds 11 years.

  • Rejected condonation.

  • Dismissed recall as time-barred.


4. Before Supreme Court

Further delay:

  • 123 days in filing SLP.

  • 96 days in re-filing after curing defects.

Explanation offered:

  • Procedural delay.

  • Approval from higher authority.

  • No deliberate intention.


LEGAL ANALYSIS


I. Evolution of Law on Government Delay

Phase 1 – Liberal Approach

Katiji (1987)
Justice-oriented approach; substantial justice preferred over technicalities.

Ramegowda (1988)
Recognized bureaucratic red-tape; allowed “play at the joints.”


Phase 2 – Judicial Frustration

Commissioner of Wealth Tax v. Amateur Riders Club (1994)
Court expressed exasperation at stereotyped affidavits.


Phase 3 – Strict Scrutiny Era

Living Media (2012)
427-day delay not condoned.

University of Delhi (2020)
916-day delay not condoned.

Pathapati Subba Reddy (2024)
Merits irrelevant at condonation stage; limitation founded on public policy.


II. Core Reasoning of the Court

1. No Sufficient Cause

The Court held:

The explanation given was:

  • Mechanical,

  • Routine,

  • Bureaucratic,

  • Stereotyped.

It was an excuse—not an explanation.


2. Chronic Lethargy

State was:

  • Indolent before High Court.

  • Indolent before Supreme Court.

  • Inactive for 8 years.

  • Approached SC after further 4 months’ delay.

Judicial patience exhausted.


3. Public Policy of Limitation

Limitation:

  • Ensures finality.

  • Prevents indefinite litigation.

  • Applies equally to State and private litigant.

Government cannot take advantage of its own inefficiency.


4. Discretionary Nature of Condonation

Condonation:

  • Not automatic.

  • Not sympathetic.

  • Not routine.

  • Must be justified.

The State failed to establish a case warranting exercise of discretion.


RATIO DECIDENDI

  1. The liberal approach towards delay by Government under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has limits and cannot excuse gross indifference.

  2. Bureaucratic delay and procedural approvals do not automatically constitute “sufficient cause.”

  3. Courts must distinguish between a genuine explanation and a mechanical excuse.

  4. Judicial discretion in condonation is not to be exercised where the State exhibits prolonged lethargy.

  5. There exists a threshold beyond which even courts cannot rescue a Government litigant from the consequences of its indifference.

Custody of Minor Children – Paramount Consideration – Welfare Principle (Paras 20–22) In matters of child custody, welfare of the child is the paramount consideration. However, welfare is not to be construed in isolation; it must be evaluated in light of surrounding factors including conduct of parents, financial stability, education, comfort, and overall development. The High Court erred in holding that conduct and other surrounding factors are irrelevant.

advocatemmmohan

A. Custody of Minor Children – Paramount Consideration – Welfare Principle

(Paras 20–22)

In matters of child custody, welfare of the child is the paramount consideration. However, welfare is not to be construed in isolation; it must be evaluated in light of surrounding factors including conduct of parents, financial stability, education, comfort, and overall development.

The High Court erred in holding that conduct and other surrounding factors are irrelevant.


B. Guardianship and Wards Act, 1890 – Section 25 – Relevant Factors in Custody Determination

(Paras 11, 22–24)

While deciding custody under Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, courts must consider:

  • Conduct of the parties,

  • Compliance with court undertakings,

  • Existing foreign custody orders,

  • Stability of education,

  • Emotional comfort and inclination of minors.

Ignoring these material factors vitiates the custody determination.


C. Removal of Children from Foreign Jurisdiction – Impact on Custody

(Paras 23–25)

Unilateral removal of minor children:

  • From foreign jurisdiction,

  • Without consent of guardian,

  • Without court permission,

  • By procuring duplicate/fresh passports,

is a material factor adversely affecting custody determination.

The High Court failed to evaluate the legal impact of such conduct.


D. Effect of Foreign Custody Order – Revocation of Custody

(Paras 9, 25)

Where a foreign court revokes custody granted earlier and grants custody to the other parent, such order is a relevant and crucial circumstance in domestic custody proceedings and cannot be ignored.


E. Contempt for Breach of Undertaking – Relevance in Custody

(Paras 10, 26–27)

A parent found guilty of contempt for breaching an undertaking to court in relation to children’s return commits a material act impacting custodial suitability.

The High Court failed to account for the final contempt finding.


F. Preference of Children – Evidentiary Value

(Paras 21, 29–31)

While child preference is not decisive, it is a relevant factor.

Where:

  • Children consistently express desire to accompany one parent,

  • Mediation report corroborates such preference,

  • Emotional comfort with that parent is observed,

such material must be considered cumulatively.


G. Remand – Failure to Consider Material Evidence

(Paras 31–33)

Where High Court fails to consider:

  • Foreign court orders,

  • Contempt findings,

  • Mediation report,

  • Conduct of parties,

the custody order is unsustainable and requires remand.


ANALYSIS OF FACTS


1. Matrimonial Background

  • Marriage: 28.07.2015 (Srinagar).

  • Residence: Qatar.

  • Two minor sons born in Qatar (2017 & 2019).

Divorce granted by Qatar Court (29.03.2022):

  • Custody → Mother.

  • Guardianship → Father.

  • Passports → Father.

  • Personal documents → Mother.


2. Removal of Children

Mother:

  • Left Qatar with children (Aug 2022).

  • Without consent of guardian (father).

  • Without original passports.

  • Without Qatar court permission.

  • During academic session.

This removal triggered:

  • Habeas Corpus in J&K High Court.

  • Undertaking before Division Bench to return by 02.01.2023.

  • Violation of undertaking.


3. Subsequent Developments

(a) Qatar Court Order (31.10.2023)

  • Custody revoked from mother.

  • Granted to father.

(b) Contempt Proceedings (06.08.2024)

  • Mother held guilty.

  • Fine imposed.

  • LPA restored.

(c) Family Court (02.01.2025)

  • Custody granted to father.

(d) High Court (08.09.2025)

  • Reversed Family Court.

  • Restored custody to mother.

  • Held welfare alone decisive.


ANALYSIS OF LAW


I. Welfare Principle – Scope and Limits

The Supreme Court clarified:

Welfare is paramount — but welfare is not abstract.

Welfare includes:

  • Stability,

  • Legal compliance,

  • Moral conduct of parents,

  • Educational continuity,

  • Respect for court orders,

  • Emotional environment.

The High Court erred in treating:

  • Conduct,

  • Financial stability,

  • Foreign custody order,

  • Contempt finding,

as irrelevant.


II. Impact of Unilateral Removal

The Court implicitly applied principles from international child custody jurisprudence:

A parent cannot:

  • Violate jurisdictional custody framework,

  • Remove child mid-session,

  • Breach undertaking,

  • Benefit from wrongdoing.

The High Court failed to assess whether such conduct reflects adversely on custodial suitability.


III. Foreign Custody Order – Relevance

Though not treated as automatically binding, the Qatar order:

  • Revoked mother's custody.

  • Granted custody to father.

  • Recorded misconduct.

This was a crucial fact ignored by the High Court.

The Supreme Court emphasized that foreign judicial findings affecting custody cannot be brushed aside.


IV. Contempt Finding – Legal Effect

The mother:

  • Gave undertaking to return.

  • Violated undertaking.

  • Was convicted for contempt.

  • Showed no remorse.

The Court held:

Such conduct is a material factor in assessing parental responsibility and trustworthiness.

The High Court ignored its evidentiary weight.


V. Children’s Preference

Evidence included:

  • Family Court findings.

  • Mediation report.

  • Children expressing desire to go with father.

  • Comfort in English-speaking environment.

  • Difficulty adapting locally.

The Supreme Court held:

While not decisive, child preference is relevant and cannot be disregarded entirely.


VI. Error of the High Court

The High Court:

  • Narrowed welfare principle improperly.

  • Ignored foreign order.

  • Ignored contempt conviction.

  • Ignored mediation findings.

  • Overlooked removal misconduct.

Thus, the judgment suffered from non-consideration of material evidence.


RATIO DECIDENDI

  1. In custody matters, welfare is paramount, but welfare must be assessed holistically, including conduct of parties, educational continuity, legal compliance, and emotional comfort.

  2. Unilateral removal of children from foreign jurisdiction without guardian consent or court permission is a material factor in custody determination.

  3. A foreign custody revocation order and a domestic contempt finding are relevant and must be considered in custody adjudication.

  4. Failure to consider material circumstances renders a custody determination legally unsustainable.

  5. Preference of minors, though not conclusive, is a relevant factor requiring due weight.