Monday, December 1, 2025

Mohammedan law – Partition under, during the lifetime of the owner – If permissible: Held: No – Under Mohammedan Law, partition while a person is alive between him and his heirs is impermissible – Under the Mohammedan Law, the right of an heir-apparent comes into existence for the first time on the death of the ancestor, and he is not entitled until then to any interest in the property to which he would succeed as an heir if he survived the ancestor – Thus, in the present case, ‘SS’ during his lifetime could not have partitioned his property, giving two parts thereof to his sons (appellants). [Paras 20, 21]

Under Mohammedan law, whether an owner of property can, in
his lifetime, transfer said property to his heirs by way of partition;
whether, in the facts of this case, the requisites of a valid gift were
met and also whether nomenclature employed in Mutation Entry
can be said to be indicative of intentions.
Headnotes†
Mohammedan law – Partition under, during the lifetime of the
owner – If permissible:
Held: No – Under Mohammedan Law, partition while a person
is alive between him and his heirs is impermissible – Under the
Mohammedan Law, the right of an heir-apparent comes into
existence for the first time on the death of the ancestor, and he is
not entitled until then to any interest in the property to which he
would succeed as an heir if he survived the ancestor – Thus, in
the present case, ‘SS’ during his lifetime could not have partitioned
his property, giving two parts thereof to his sons (appellants).
[Paras 20, 21]
Mohammedan law – Oral gift made by ‘SS’ in favour of his
sons, if was a valid gift – Plea of the appellants that even
though the Mutation entry used the word ‘partition’, it should
be read as ‘gift’ – Nomenclature employed in Mutation Entry,
if indicative of intentions:
Held: Only the substance, not the form or nomenclature, is
pertinent to determine the nature of the transaction – ‘Partition’
and ‘gift’ are two terms that have different requisites, require
different circumstances, and bear different consequences –
Partition, is the division of property among co-owners, whereas
gift is a voluntary transfer of existing property made voluntarily
*Author
924 [2024] 12 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
without consideration – The legal necessities of both these modes
of conveyance are quite different and, thus, cannot be liberally
interpreted – What is required to be considered is the intention as
shown by the words written in a document – Further, the words
used in a document have to be understood in their natural meaning
with reference to the language employed – While interpreting any
document, common or usual meaning is ascribed to the words
unless that leads to absurdity – A perusal of the Mutation Entry
No.8258 (Ex.P1) shows that ‘SS’ got the ‘partition’ done in favour
of his sons – The words “partition of the property done by SAKS”
clearly indicate his intention to divide the property into three
parts without any indication of his intent to gift the property to
his sons – Had ‘SS’ intended to gift the property, it ought to have
been recorded as a gift in the Mutation Entry – Even though the
other two requisites, i.e. acceptance and possession, may have
been proved, the essential requirement of the declaration made
with clear and unequivocal intention remains unfulfilled – When
neither the words of the Mutation Entry nor the Entry itself support
the claim of the appellants-original defendants in any manner, for
neither can it be a gift nor does the Mutation Entry mean that any
title rests with them, the oral gift made by ‘SS’ in favour of his sons
cannot be held to be a valid gift – No fault with the reasoning of
the Trial Court and the High Court qua the questions of gift and
partition – Order of the Trial Court concurred by the High Court
is confirmed. [Paras 31-34, 36, 38]
Mohammedan Law – Gift deed – Requisites of a valid gift
deed – Enumerated.
Islamic Personal Law – Sources – Discussed.
Mohammedan Law – Gift – Registration:
Held: Registration of gift is not required under Mohammedan
Law – An unwritten and unregistered gift executed by the donor
in favour of donees is valid. [Para 27]
Words and Phrases – ‘Partition’; Gift (Hiba) – Meaning –
Discussed.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973 – SS. 372 PROVISO, 397, 401 – VICTIM’S RIGHT OF APPEAL – DELAY IN FILING APPEAL AGAINST ACQUITTAL – CONDONATION

A. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973 – SS. 372 PROVISO, 397, 401 – VICTIM’S RIGHT OF APPEAL – DELAY IN FILING APPEAL AGAINST ACQUITTAL – CONDONATION

Criminal Revision under Ss. 397, 401 CrPC challenging order of appellate Court refusing to condone 77 days’ delay in filing appeal by de facto complainant/victim against judgment of acquittal in C.C. No.145 of 2018.

Held:

  • By 2009 amendment, proviso to S.372 CrPC confers a statutory right of appeal upon the “victim” against an order of acquittal, conviction for lesser offence, or inadequate compensation. Such right is substantive in nature and continues through appeal/revision.

  • No corresponding amendment has been made in Art.114 of the Limitation Act to specifically cover victim’s appeal under S.372 proviso. In the absence of an express provision, the substantive statutory right of appeal of the victim cannot be curtailed merely on the ground of delay which is not inordinate and where sufficient cause is shown.

  • On facts, judgment of acquittal was dated 13-07-2022; victim was unaware of the date of pronouncement, applied for copy on 12-09-2022, received on 13-10-2022, and filed appeal on 29-10-2022. Effective delay, after excluding copy-time, was held to be about 17 days only and satisfactorily explained (paras 2, 6, 8).

  • Appellate Court’s refusal to condone such delay, treating it as inordinate and inadequately explained, ignoring the position of the victim and the copy-application timeline, was held to be perverse and unsustainable (paras 2, 6, 8).

Criminal Revision allowed; order refusing condonation of delay set aside; delay treated as sufficiently explained (paras 8–9).

B. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, 1973 – VICTIM’S RIGHTS – SCOPE AND CONTENT – PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS FROM INVESTIGATION TILL APPEAL/REVISION

Relying on Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321, the Court reiterates:

  • Rights of a “victim” under amended CrPC are substantive, enforceable and an aspect of human rights, and are independent of the State’s rights; presence of the State in proceedings is not equivalent to hearing the victim (para 2, quoting paras 22–23 of SC).

  • A victim has a legally vested right to be heard at every stage post-occurrence – from investigation until culmination of proceedings in appeal or revision.

  • “Victim” and “complainant/informant” are distinct concepts; a victim need not be the complainant, and an informant need not be the victim.

In the present case, petitioner is the de facto complainant/victim; his independent participatory and appellate rights must be recognised and cannot be neutralized by procedural hyper-technicality regarding limitation (paras 2, 6, 8).

C. LIMITATION ACT, 1963 – ARTS. 114, 115 – APPEAL BY VICTIM UNDER PROVISO TO S.372 CrPC – PERIOD OF LIMITATION – “REASONABLE PERIOD” – AFFIDAVIT INSTEAD OF FORMAL DELAY PETITION

The Court surveys divergent High Court views:

  1. Kerala High CourtPeethambaran v. State of Kerala, 2023 SCC OnLine Ker 1642; FB in Sobhanakumari K. v. Santhosh (MANU/KE/2167/2017):

    • Victim’s appeal against acquittal: no specific limitation prescribed in Limitation Act; Article 114 does not strictly apply.

    • Appeal by victim to be filed within a “reasonable period” (90 days), and if beyond, an affidavit explaining delay is sufficient; “delay condonation petition” as such is not necessary and no formal condonation order is contemplated (paras 3–4).

  2. HP & Bombay High CourtsKeshavu Devi v. Puran Chand (MANU/HP/0111/2025) and Amit v. State of Maharashtra, MANU/MH/0993/2015:

    • Where no express limitation is provided for victim’s appeal, the settled principle is that such appeals must be filed within a reasonable time, guided by legislative policy behind Arts.114 & 115 and, if necessary, delay to be considered with reference to date of knowledge (para 4).

  3. Punjab & Haryana High Court (FB)Tata Steel Ltd. v. Atma Tube Products Ltd., MANU/PH/0175/2013:

    • Reasonable limitation for victim’s appeals, by analogy with Arts.114 & 115, indicated as:
      • Against acquittal: 90 days (if to High Court), 60 days (if to other Court);
      • Other orders: 60 days (to High Court), 30 days (to other Court) (para 5).

Present Court:

  • Notes that proviso to S.372 creates a right of appeal for the victim without a corresponding explicit limitation article.

  • Holds that this substantive right cannot be defeated on a narrow view of limitation when delay is marginal and properly explained by affidavit, especially given want of notice of judgment and the victim’s status (paras 6, 8).

D. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – NOTICE TO VICTIM / DE FACTO COMPLAINANT – PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT – EFFECT ON LIMITATION

  • CrPC contains no provision requiring:
    (i) notice to the victim/de facto complainant at the stage of final arguments, or
    (ii) notice at the time of pronouncement of judgment of acquittal (para 2).

  • Where the victim is not on notice of the date of judgment, it is unreasonable to expect him to file an appeal within the prescribed or “reasonable” period without reference to when he acquired knowledge and obtained a copy (paras 2, 8).

  • In this case, immediately upon coming to know of the judgment, petitioner applied for certified copy and filed appeal promptly after its supply. This conduct constitutes “sufficient cause” for delay; appellate Court was bound to consider this contextually instead of mechanically branding delay as “inordinate” (paras 2, 6, 8).

E. REVISIONAL JURISDICTION – Ss. 397, 401 CrPC – INTERFERENCE WITH ORDER REFUSING CONDONATION OF DELAY – PERVERSITY

  • Revisional Court may interfere where the subordinate Court’s refusal to condone delay:
    • ignores relevant legal standards concerning victims’ rights and limitation,
    • fails to appreciate material facts regarding knowledge of judgment and copy-application, and
    • results in denial of a substantive statutory right of appeal.

  • On facts, the Principal Sessions Judge failed to appreciate that the petitioner was a victim/de facto complainant, had no notice of the judgment date, acted promptly after knowledge, and that effective delay was marginal and properly explained. Such refusal to condone was held to be perverse (para 8).

Criminal Revision accordingly allowed; impugned order in Crl.M.P. No.707 of 2022 set aside; connected interlocutory applications closed; no order as to costs (para 9).

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT / PROMISSORY NOTE – EXECUTION – PROOF – EXAMINATION OF ATTESTOR – NON-REFERENCE TO HANDWRITING EXPERT – ADVERSE INFERENCE Suit for recovery based on promissory note dated 29-08-2013 (Ex.A-1); plaintiff examined himself as PW1 and sole attestor as PW2; both deposed that defendant himself scribed Ex.A-1 and later scribed part-payment endorsement Ex.A-2. Defendant denied execution and alleged fabrication, but led only his own evidence as DW1 and did not seek handwriting expert’s opinion. Held: Plaintiff discharged initial burden by producing original promissory note and examining the sole attestor (PW2), whose testimony corroborated PW1. Once execution is proved through credible evidence, bare denial by defendant without any supporting material is insufficient. Defendant, having specifically alleged forgery/fabrication, ought to have taken steps to send the document to handwriting expert; failure to do so weakened his defence (paras 16–18, 20, 23, 26). Both courts below were justified in accepting plaintiff’s evidence and holding Ex.A-1 and Ex.A-2 genuine.

A. CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908 – S. 100 – SECOND APPEAL – CONCURRENT FINDINGS OF FACT – SCOPE OF INTERFERENCE – “SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW” – REITERATION OF LIMITS

Second appeal filed against concurrent decree of trial Court and first appellate Court in suit for recovery on promissory note.

Held:

  • Right of appeal is neither natural nor inherent; it is statutory and regulated by S.100 CPC.

  • Second appeal lies only when a substantial question of law arises.

  • A substantial question of law must directly and substantially affect rights of parties, and must be an open, difficult, or debatable question not finally settled by superior courts.

  • High Court cannot re-appreciate evidence or interfere with findings of fact of first appellate court merely because another view is possible.

  • Pure appreciation of facts, appreciation of oral / documentary evidence, or drawing of inferences of fact do not give rise to a substantial question of law.

Applied ratio of Boodireddy Chandraiah v. Arigela Laxmi, (2007) 8 SCC 155; Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki, AIR 2006 SC 1975.

On facts, findings regarding execution of promissory note, part-payment endorsement, and limitation were all factual, based on proper appreciation of evidence. No substantial question of law arose. Second appeal dismissed at admission stage (paras 13–15, 27–28).


B. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT / PROMISSORY NOTE – EXECUTION – PROOF – EXAMINATION OF ATTESTOR – NON-REFERENCE TO HANDWRITING EXPERT – ADVERSE INFERENCE

Suit for recovery based on promissory note dated 29-08-2013 (Ex.A-1); plaintiff examined himself as PW1 and sole attestor as PW2; both deposed that defendant himself scribed Ex.A-1 and later scribed part-payment endorsement Ex.A-2. Defendant denied execution and alleged fabrication, but led only his own evidence as DW1 and did not seek handwriting expert’s opinion.

Held:

  • Plaintiff discharged initial burden by producing original promissory note and examining the sole attestor (PW2), whose testimony corroborated PW1.

  • Once execution is proved through credible evidence, bare denial by defendant without any supporting material is insufficient.

  • Defendant, having specifically alleged forgery/fabrication, ought to have taken steps to send the document to handwriting expert; failure to do so weakened his defence (paras 16–18, 20, 23, 26).

Both courts below were justified in accepting plaintiff’s evidence and holding Ex.A-1 and Ex.A-2 genuine.

C. LIMITATION ACT, 1963 – SS. 3, 18 – SUIT ON PROMISSORY NOTE – PART PAYMENT ENDORSEMENT – FRESH PERIOD OF LIMITATION – PLEA OF LIMITATION

Promissory note dated 29-08-2013; endorsement of part-payment of Rs.5,000/- dated 26-08-2016 (Ex.A-2) written and signed by defendant on reverse of Ex.A-1; suit filed on 24-08-2019.

Held:

  • Even though no specific plea of limitation was raised in written statement, court is bound under S.3 to examine limitation.

  • As per S.18, where before expiry of the prescribed period there is a written and signed acknowledgment/part-payment, a fresh period of limitation is computed from date of such acknowledgment.

  • Endorsement Ex.A-2, scribed and signed by defendant, constituted acknowledgment/part-payment within limitation; hence a fresh three-year period ran from 26-08-2016.

  • Suit filed on 24-08-2019 was within time (paras 17, 20, 22).

Contention that suit was time-barred rejected.

D. EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 – S. 73 – COURT’S POWER TO COMPARE SIGNATURES – NO EXPERT OPINION – CONCURRENT FINDING UPHELD

Neither party moved for handwriting expert. Trial Court compared defendant’s signatures on Ex.A-1 and Ex.A-2 with admitted signatures on record under S.73 Evidence Act and found them genuine; first appellate Court concurred.

Held:

  • Court is expressly empowered under S.73 to compare disputed and admitted writings/signatures.

  • Though expert opinion is a matter of prudence, its absence does not bar the Court from itself comparing signatures.

  • Apex Court in Murari Lal v. State of M.P., AIR 1980 SC 531 held that the Court cannot shirk this duty merely saying it is not an expert.

  • On facts, careful comparison by trial Court, coupled with oral evidence of PW1 and PW2, constituted adequate basis for concurrent factual finding that Ex.A-1 and Ex.A-2 were genuine (paras 23–25).

No perversity shown; findings not open to interference in second appeal.

E. APPRECIATION OF ORAL EVIDENCE – CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS – ROLE OF APPELLATE COURT

Referring to Pottem Subbarayudu v. Kothapalli Gangulu Naidu, 2000 (5) ALT 759, Court reiterated:

  • Credibility of witness must be tested on probabilities and surrounding circumstances;

  • Trial Judge, having seen demeanour, is best placed to assess credibility;

  • Appellate Court should be slow to disturb such findings.

Here, trial Court accepted PW1 and PW2 as credible; first appellate Court re-appreciated and concurred. High Court found no perversity or misreading justifying interference (paras 21, 26–27).

F. MATERIAL ALTERATION – NOT PLEADED – INAPPLICABILITY OF PRINCIPLE

Reliance placed on Kammali Venkata Subbayya v. Velamuri Viswanatham, 1970 SCC OnLine AP 121 regarding material alteration.

Held:

  • No plea of material alteration was raised; neither side contended that the promissory note was altered.

  • Case-law on material alteration inapplicable to facts (para 19).

RESULT

  • Second Appeal dismissed at admission stage.

  • Judgments and decrees of II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Kadapa (O.S. No. 858/2019, dated 28-09-2022) and Principal District Judge, Kadapa (A.S. No. 75/2022, dated 30-07-2024) confirmed.

  • No order as to costs; pending applications closed (para 29).